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INTRODUCTION

This document contains coding rules, codings of cases, justification for those codings and source material used in reaching the coding judgments. The data set consists of all changes in regime to or from democracy for the period 1980–2008 that are included in two data sets:


The definition of democracy in the CGV dataset is a dichotomous one that rests on four coding rules (page references are to Przeworski et al. 1990):

- The chief executive is elected in popular elections (19, 28);
- The lower house of the legislature is popularly elected (19, 28);
- There is more than one party (20, 28);
- Countries are coded as authoritarian, however, if “the incumbents will have or already have held office continuously by virtue of elections for more than two terms or have held office without being elected for any duration of their current tenure in office, and until today or until the time when they were overthrown they had not lost an election.” (23, 28).

This dataset records 79 democratic transitions and 25 reversion during the 1980–2008 period.
The Polity dataset treats regime type as a continuous variable that is composed of a democracy (DEMOC) and an autocracy (AUTOC) component. DEMOC is an additive eleven-point scale (0 to 10) derived from a weighted sum of the following: the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. Similarly, AUTOC is an additive eleven-point scale from (0 to 10) derived from the same variables as the DEMOC indicator with the addition of the regulation of participation.

The standard Polity score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC from the DEMOC score, and ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Following convention, we code transitions to democracy as movements from below 6 to 6 or more on the so-called "dem-auth" scale; reversions are movements from 6 or above to below 6. These coding rules are from the Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual.

In addition to the standard scores, the Polity dataset also codes some country years with two dummy variables:

- -66 country years are defined as cases of “foreign interruption”.
- -77 country years are defined as an “interregnum or anarchy” and converted into a score of 0. Two reversions—Lesotho in 1998 and the Solomon Islands in 2000—are coded as “-77s”. In our judgment, the 0 coding for Lesotho in 1998 is not warranted and appears to be an anomaly of the coding rule; we have provided an analysis of the case but have removed it from the dataset for all summary purposes. The other case, the Solomon Islands, does experience a reversion in 2000. But the basis of the 0 coding also appears to be an anomaly of the coding rule, reflecting the fact that country was experiencing “anarchy” during the year rather than a judgment about the nature of its political institutions. We have thus excluded it from the dataset as well.
- -88 country years are “transitions” and converted into a pro-rated Polity score according to the following rule: “Cases of transition” are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years—so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5. In all of the -88 or transition cases, the -88 years are coded as less than 6 and thus authoritarian. The one exception is South Africa in which the transition year itself—1992—is coded a 6 as a result of the Polity coding rule. All countries with a -88 coding are entered into the data set using their pro-rated scores.

Table 1 summarizes the transition and reversion cases that had -77 or -88 codings that were subsequently converted (in parentheses). It identifies the
country-year of the coding; the years leading up to or surrounding it; and the concordance with the CGV dataset.

Table 1: Polity Cases and Concordance with CGV Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>Transition Path</th>
<th>Concordance with CGV Dataset Transitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin 1991</td>
<td>-7 in 1989, -88 (0) in 1990, 6 in 1991</td>
<td>Coincides with CGV transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 1990</td>
<td>-88(4) in 1989, 10 in 1990</td>
<td>Coincides with CGV transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines 1987</td>
<td>-6 in 1985, -88(1) in 1986, 8 in 1987</td>
<td>CGV transition in 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea 1986</td>
<td>-5 in 1986, -88(1) in 1987, 6 in 1988</td>
<td>Coincides with CGV transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan 1986</td>
<td>-7 in 1984, -88(0) in 1985, 7 in 1986</td>
<td>Coincides with CGV transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reversions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti 1999</td>
<td>7 in 1998, -88(2) in 1999, -2 in 2000</td>
<td>Not a CGV reversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho 1998</td>
<td>8 in 1997, -77(0) in 1998, -88(2) in 1999, -88(4) in 2000</td>
<td>Not a CGV reversion; omitted from Haggard, Kaufman and Teo dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>8 in 1999, -77(0) in 2000</td>
<td>Not a CGV reversion; omitted from Haggard, Kaufman and Teo dataset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the composite nature of the Polity score, there are multiple actions that might account for shifts in scores. In order to assure alignment of our coding with the Polity dataset, we have drawn on the descriptions provided in Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. *Polity IV Country Reports 2010.* 4

This Polity dataset records 73 democratic transitions and 27 reversions during this period. The CGV dataset records 79 transitions and 25 reversions. 36 of the Polity transitions and 9 of the reversions are either exactly the same as the CGV dataset or fall within a two year window on either side of the CGV dating of the transition. Nine of the transitions and none of the reversions code the same country but place the transition at a date outside the two year window.

There is therefore partial overlap between the two datasets. What follows are the cases that one dataset includes and the other omits.

- The CGV dataset includes 29 cases that Polity omits: Albania 1991, Bangladesh

\[http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm\]


Similarly, there are a number of reversions that appear only in one dataset:


For each case in the dataset we indicate whether it is coded as a transition by the CGV dataset, the Polity dataset or both. Cases coded as transitions by only one of the two datasets might reflect differences in underlying coding rules. In particular, the CGV dataset takes a more minimalist electoral conception of democracy than the Polity dataset. However, a number of differences arise only as a result of the exact timing of the transition. In cases where the difference in coding is one or two years, we consolidate the qualitative analysis into a single case description but note the possible reasons for the differences and whether it affects the coding of the case. If the transition falls outside of the two-year window, we treat it as a separate case.

We inadvertently omitted two cases from the dataset: Malawi 2001 (Polity reversion) and Slovenia 1991 (Polity transition).

**Democratic Transitions**

*Table 2* lists all of the transitions in the two datasets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CGV Year</th>
<th>Polity Year</th>
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<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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</table>
Distributive Conflict and Elite-Led Transitions

We use a dichotomous coding rule to divide the democratic transitions into “distributive conflict” transitions and “elite-led” transitions. In each case, we identify the specific decision or action on the part of incumbent elites that constitutes the transition point. We then consider the role of mass mobilization in that transition, provide a brief justification for the coding and references consulted in reaching the judgment. We also identify ambiguous cases in a way described below.

We code “distributive conflict” transitions as ones in which both of the following occurred:

- The mobilization of redistributive grievances on the part of economically disadvantaged groups or representatives of such groups (parties, unions, NGOs) posed a threat to the incumbency of ruling elites;

- And mass mobilization directly ousts incumbents, or the rising costs of repressing these demands force elites to make political compromises in favor of democratic challengers, typically indicated by a clear temporal sequence (mass mobilization followed by authoritarian withdrawal).
Comments and clarifications on the coding rule

- “Mass mobilization” can include both organized collective action (protests, rallies, demonstrations, insurgencies) and spontaneous forms of collective action (riots, destruction of property, land seizures).

- Distributive conflicts need not follow any particular cleavage, and can include urban class conflicts (for example, strikes) rural mobilization (for example, land seizures), and the mobilization of ethnic, sectarian or regional conflicts, including secessionist movements, where those can be interpreted as reflecting distributive grievances.

- The economically disadvantaged or the organizations representing them need not be the only ones mobilized in opposition to the incumbent regime; oppositions can be cross-class in nature.

- Although grievances must partly reflect demands for redistribution—whether of assets, income or through increased government transfers or services—they can be motivated by other grievances as well.

- Mass mobilization need not be the only factor in the calculation of incumbent elites, but it must be a significant factor.

Elite-led transitions are cases in which:

- Mass mobilization did not occur at all;

- Mass mobilization was present but was not aimed at distributive grievances and/or did not appear to be a significant factor in the decision of authoritarian elites to withdraw.

Comments and clarifications on the coding rule

Although we do not attempt to provide an alternative theory of the transition, we code cases as elite-led when the following factors appear significant in the transition, typically indicated by a clear temporal sequence (antecedent condition followed by incumbent withdrawal or concessions):

- Military intervention or political pressures from outside actors;

- Demands from aid donors;

- Elite defections from within the ruling coalition, for example, by politicians or the military, or challenges from elites or elite parties outside of the government;

- Decisions on the part of the incumbent elite to democratize that reflect a presumed ability to limit subsequent redistributive challenges. This might occur through transitions that include institutional features granting authoritarian incumbents veto powers or transitions designed to pass power to parties controlled by incumbents and their elite allies.
Table 3 provides a summary of our codings of the cases.

Table 3: Distributive and Elite-Led Transitions

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Share of all</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Share of all</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Burundi 1993</td>
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<td>Pakistan 2008</td>
<td>Sudan 2008</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania 1990</td>
<td>Uruguay 1990</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Percent/Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Typology of Elite-Led Transitions

In addition to the basic distinction between distributive conflict and elite-led transitions, we also distinguish between three different elite-led paths and note them as follows in the dataset: elite displacement transitions, preemptive transitions and institutional transitions:

- In elite-displacement transitions, authoritarian incumbents were ousted by rival domestic elites, who in turn initiated liberalization and democratization processes.

- In preemptive transitions, incumbents themselves initiated transition processes.

- In contrast, institutional transitions involve more incremental changes—ones that are captured only by the continuous Polity measure. In these cases, incumbent elites decided to abide by constitutional constraints or allow elections that they themselves put into place.

Table 4 contains the incidence of these transition paths.

Table 4: A Typology of Elite-Led Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Displacement</th>
<th>Preemptive Democratization</th>
<th>Institutional Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic 1993 (CGV), Military</td>
<td>Bangladesh 1986 (CGV), Military</td>
<td>Albania 2002 (P), Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros 1990 (CGV), One-party</td>
<td>Belarus 1991 (CGV/P), One-party</td>
<td>Croatia 2000 (P), Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros 2004 (CGV/P), Military</td>
<td>Bhutan 2007 (CGV), Monarchy</td>
<td>Fiji 1999 (P), Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia 1989–90 (CGV/P), One-party</td>
<td>Cape Verde 1990–91 (CGV)/P One-party</td>
<td>Honduras 1989 (P), Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>System 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2000 (CGV)</td>
<td>Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2006 (CGV/P)</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2007 (CGV)</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1998 (CGV/P)</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1989 (CGV)</td>
<td>Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007 (CGV)</td>
<td>Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1980 (CGV)</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1992 (P)</td>
<td>Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2008 (CGV)</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1983 (CGV/P)</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 CGV only = 9
18 Polity only = 1
20 CGV/Polity = 5
### Military = 6
One-party = 2
Multiparty = 5
Civil War = 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memo Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CGV/Polity cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity-only cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGV cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGV-only cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources of Ambiguity**

Any given transition is driven by a variety of factors. The foregoing coding attempts to identify cases in which distributive conflict is an important cause and those in which it did not appear to play an important causal role or was absent altogether. We generally sought to give the theories in question the benefit of the doubt, and a number of cases did fall easily into these two categories. However, a number of cases were ambiguous, in the sense of being subject to alternative interpretations in which the significance of distributive conflict could be challenged.

We identify three non-mutually exclusive sources of ambiguity: doubts about the class composition of mass mobilization; doubts about the significance of economic grievances; and doubts about the weight of economic factors. We mark these cases in the dataset with an asterisk (*) and note the particular source or sources of ambiguity in each case.

**Doubts about the class composition of mass mobilization.**

We code cases as distributive conflict transitions even when the protest appears to be driven primarily by middle-class or even upper middle-class groups without significant involvement of the poor. These distributive conflict cases do reflect protest on the part of sectors that are disadvantaged relative to economic elites favored by the regime. But the role of the lower classes—even as coalition partners—may not be decisive or even relevant at all. As a result, such cases could be reinterpreted as more conventional narratives about the rise of a middle-class (for example Ansell and Samuels 2010) rather than in terms of...
two- or even three-class models in which coalitions between the middle class and the poor are deemed decisive.

Doubts about the objectives of protest groups.

The distributive conflict model assumes that actors are protesting against socio-economic inequalities sustained by the regime. A number of cases fit this model of overt economic protest, including those in which mass mobilization highlighted the corruption of incumbents. However, resentment against inequality is often implicit rather than explicit in the protests leading to democratic transitions. Although we coded most cases of mass protest as distributive conflict cases, there are cases in which socio-economic grievances did not appear to play a dominant role or in which they did not appear to conform with the class conflict model. Of particular interest in this regard are the protests that led to the overthrow of several Communist regimes. In some of these transitions, socio-economic grievances on the part of lower class groups were indeed significant. However in other instances, such grievances did not appear to play a central role. Moreover, inequality was comparatively low. To the extent that protests called for market-oriented economic reforms they arguably favored more not less inequality and greater mobility for relatively favored groups—such as the well-educated—in particular.

Doubts about the importance of international pressures.

In many transitions, mass mobilization against authoritarian regimes occurred in conjunction with strong economic and political pressure from economic donors and/or powerful states. As long as the former appeared to be one of the factors driving elite concessions, the case was coded as distributive conflict. However, alternative interpretations could plausibly place greater—even decisive—weight on these external pressures, i.e., could argue that in the absence of international pressures, domestic mobilization would not have been of adequate scale or scope to force authoritarian withdrawal. Where such arguments could be made, we have coded the case as ambiguous.

Table 5 identifies the ambiguous cases by the source of ambiguity (class composition of protest; nature of grievances; significance of international pressures).
Table 5: Ambiguous Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Source of Ambiguity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Source of Ambiguity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Grievance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Grievance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>International</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Class/International</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Class/International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Suriname</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Class/Grievance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

*Albania 1991 (CGV Only) - Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. The Communist leadership legalized opposition parties in late 1990 and held competitive elections for a Constitutional Assembly in 1991. This set the stage for a new constitution and parliamentary elections in 1992 that resulted in the victory of an opposition coalition.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Reform communists under the leadership of Ramiz Alia pursued controlled liberalization after the death of Hoxha in 1985, including some measures of political liberalization in 1989. But economic collapse generated significant protest that was followed by further political concessions. In 1990, thousands of Albanians stormed embassies in an effort to leave the country. In the wake of this incident the first opposition party (Democratic Party) was formed and legalized. Protests, led initially by students, continued in late 1990 and early 1991 and pressed the government to hold the first multi-party elections in 1991. The victory of a coalition of Communist and socialist parties was greeted by further social upheaval that made it impossible to govern. A general strike in May 1991 by independent trade unions mobilized over 350,000 workers, demanding a 50 percent wage increase. In the countryside, peasants seized land and livestock. Although the demands of opposition political leaders centered on access to Europe, they capitalized on economic collapse and demands for relief as well. Communist rulers agreed to stage new elections in the wake of these protests in March 1992 which were won by the opposition Democratic Party.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Early phases of the transition were initiated from above, but subsequent protests over economic grievances on the part of low-income groups, including with respect to wages and access to land, appeared central to political concessions in 1990 and 1991.

**Albania 2002 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)**

The transition. Multi-party elections were held in 1991 (see CGV coding above) but according to Polity both the Democratic Party (PDS) and the Socialist Party (PSS) were really remnants of the old Communist regime. Intra-elite conflicts between the opposition and ruling party and within the ruling party are resolved in 2001, resulting in a new consensus government under Fatsos Nano and elections for a new president in 2002, won by Alfred Moisiu.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial in the past, but not during the settlements reached in 2001-2. After the PDS lost parliamentary elections in the midst of the financial crisis and mass protest of 1997, the PSS came back into power and repressed the PDS. The PDS boycotted parliament for nearly a year from mid-1998 to mid-1999 and the Albanian government was headed unofficially by an executive triumvirate of the president, prime minister, and PSS party secretary.

The PSS and PDS reached an agreement in 2001 on the conduct of legislative elections, which proved the most peaceful of the post-communist era although marred by fraud despite the presence of OSCE observers. The PDS-led coalition Union for Victory (BF) made substantial gains but the PSS won an outright majority and formed a government with three small parties under Prime Minister Ilir Meta. A power struggle quickly broke out within the PSS between party leader Fatsos Nano and Ilir Meta. The EU (through the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee) pressured the parties to reach a settlement. Following Ilir Meta’s resignation in January 2002 the BF ended its boycott of the Assembly and former Prime Minister Majko was reappointed to the position of Prime Minister. In April 2002, an agreement was reached within the PSS to end intra-party feuding and Fatos Nano was appointed and approved as Prime Minister in July 2002 following Majko’s resignation. A reconciliation government was formed by Nano that included both Majko (Defense Minister) and Meta (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs). In June 2002, Gen. (ret.) Alfred Moisiu was elected president as the consensus candidate of both the PDS and PSS, again a result of European pressure.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, institutional. The conflicts during this period were intra-elite in nature, both between and within parties. Outside pressure, including withholding of disbursements by the IMF and World Bank and direct involvement of the European Union appear responsible for the settlement of 2002.

Argentina 1983 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. In 1983, the heads of the Navy and Air Force withdrew from the ruling military junta. The Army command appointed a caretaker government that organized general elections in negotiation with an opposition coalition of Peronists, Radicals, and Peronist labor unions.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The union movement was initially divided over whether to negotiate or oppose the military government, but it converged on a strategy of massive opposition during the severe economic crisis of 1981. In 1982, a wave of mass mobilizations and general strikes forced the resignation of General Viola, who was replaced by General Galtieri, a hardliner. The military seized the disputed Falkland Islands in April 1982 to divert popular pressure and reduce growing tensions between military hard and soft liners. But protest resumed after a humiliating defeat by Great Britain in June. These mass protests led to the withdrawal of the Navy and Air Force from the junta and the decision on the part of the Army command to establish a caretaker military government that would negotiate the terms of elections with the opposition. The ban on political parties was lifted in August 1982, setting the stage for general elections in October 1983 that brought Raul Alfonsin to office.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Argentina’s powerful labor movement was pivotal in exacerbating divisions between hard and soft-line military rulers and eventually forcing the collapse of the government.

Armenia 1991 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. The Armenian National Movement (ANM), headed by Levon Ter-Petrossian, defeated the Communist party in multiparty legislative elections held in the Soviet Republics in August 1990. The Armenian Soviet proceeded to select Ter-Petrossian as head of government. Following an overwhelming referendum in favor of full independence, the Armenian Soviet—now led by the ANM and Ter-Petrossian—voted to withdraw from the Soviet Union in September 1991. It held presidential elections on October 16, which Ter-Petrossian won with 83 percent of the vote.

The role of distributive conflict. Extensive, although directed only secondarily at the ruling Soviet elite and their local communist allies. Perestroika provided an opening for a nationalist Armenian movement, and public demonstrations became more common. However, the focus of conflict was not Russian domination, but on the struggle for Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K), an Armenian ethnic enclave of Azerbaijan. In 1988, the parliament of

N-K voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join with Armenia, and this triggered intense and increasingly violent ethnic conflict.

The Armenian nationalist movement, the ANM, was formed in 1989 in support of the annexation of N-K, and grew stronger as Soviet authorities vacillated about how to handle the conflict. In the unrest that followed a devastating earthquake in December 1988, the Soviets first tried to quell opposition by arresting the leaders of the Karabakh Committee, which championed the ethnic cause. The arrests, however, unleashed large nationalist protests. Gorbachev proposed enhanced autonomy for N-K within Azerbaijan in 1989, but local communist governments in both Armenia and Azerbaijan opposed this initiative. In September of that year, Azerbaijan began to block the flow of vital oil supplies to Armenia, dealing a devastating economic blow to Armenia. In January 1990, Gorbachev sent troops to stop pogroms against Armenians in N-K, but his unwillingness to transfer jurisdiction of N-K to Armenia and his failure to end the Azerbaijani blockade discredited the local communist elite and alienated much of the population. The Armenian Communist party backed the demands of the N-K Armenians, but even so, they were overwhelmingly defeated by the ANM in the elections to the Armenian Supreme Soviet in August 1990. Now dominated by the ANM, the Armenian Soviet quickly declared sovereignty and the incorporation of N-K. The failed putsch against Gorbachev in August 1991 was the final step in the independence process, convincing the Armenian government that it was essential to break with the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. A referendum in September voted overwhelmingly for secession, and this was followed by the Armenian Soviet’s declaration of full independence.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Violent ethnic conflict and an intense nationalist movement drove this transition, but Azerbaijan was the principal adversary. At the same time, however, the Soviet elite, which resisted the secession of N-K from Azerbaijan, was a secondary target and thus the conflict did contribute to regime change. Redistributive grievances did not appear to play any significant role in the broad ethno-nationalist movement, but in keeping with the expansive approach to the application of our coding rule, we classify this as a distributive transition.

**Bangladesh 1986 (CGV only) · Elite–led transition (preemptive)**

The transition. In 1986 the government of Hussain Muhammed Ershad, which had come to power in a military coup in 1982, removed the ban on political parties and held a general election. The CGV coding appears to arise from the fact that there was ultimately turnover in the 1991 elections. The categorization of the 1986 decision as a democratic transition is nonetheless

* Sources of ambiguity. Nature of grievances and class composition of protest. The mobilization of an ethno-nationalist majority against a Soviet elite is roughly consistent with the theory, but the primary target was ethnic rivals in neighboring Azerbaijan, and economic grievances did not appear to play a significant role.

problematic. The Polity score for 1986 was -6, and this score did not rise above six until Ershad was pushed out of power in 1990 and defeated in the 1991 elections.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Elections were stage-managed by the regime in order to “civilianize” Ershad’s rule. After seizing power in 1982, Ershad had suspended the constitution, barred political activity, and assumed the presidency. Ershad nonetheless sought to return the country to parliamentary rule by undertaking elections, albeit on the military’s terms. From the onset of military rule, the main opposition parties (the 15-Party Alliance headed by the Awami League [AL] and the 7-Party Alliance led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party [BNP]) repeatedly refused to participate in any elections until martial law was lifted. Reversing an offer of parliamentary elections in 1985, Ershad staged a national referendum on his leadership that he won overwhelmingly. Pro-Ershad politicians also overwhelmingly won in local elections later in the year as a result of an opposition boycott.

In the wake of these victories, Ershad removed some restrictions on political party activities, including their right to hold large public rallies. With the lifting of the ban on political activities the opposition staged processions and mass rallies and threatened a general strike. In response, Ershad made some limited concessions and scheduled parliamentary elections. The opposition ultimately divided on the question of whether to participate in the elections, with the AL participating and the BNP continuing the boycott. Ershad’s Jatiya Party, a personal political vehicle, won a majority of the parliamentary seats. Citing fraud in the 1986 election, both the BNP and the Awami League decided to boycott the next general election in 1988.

Coding. Elite-led transition, pre-emptive. Despite some mass mobilization by the political parties in early 1986, the decision to return the country to some form of controlled parliamentary rule had been taken before that time. Moreover, the elections of 1986 were clearly a stage-managed effort to perpetuate Ershad’s rule. In 1991, Ershad was pushed from power by major demonstrations by opposition parties and civil society groups (see the discussion of this case below). However, Ershad clearly controlled the limited transition in 1986.

Bangladesh 1991 (Polity only) · Distributive conflict transition


The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Students initially led protests against the government, but following violence against them the major opposition parties (the BNP, a center-right party, and the center-left Awami League) issued statements calling for Ershad to resign. In addition to workers, NGOs, and students, professional groups, civil servants and businessmen also mobilized demonstrations. In the face of widespread mass protests in Dhaka, senior army officers withdrew support from Ershad in December 1990. Although political themes dominated the protests and subsequent campaigns, the major center-right and center-left parties faced pressure from other left parties and social movements to keep the democratic reform on track. The electoral campaigns of the competing parties emphasized a variety of economic grievances, including union disaffection with the Ershad government and rural indebtedness.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Although protests were initially led by students, urban and was cross-class in nature and emphasizing political issues, center-left political leaders also played a role in the protests and democracy movement.

Belarus 1991 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. In August 1991 the Belarussian parliament, still dominated by the Communist party, declared independence from the Soviet Union, and the incumbent Prime Minister, Vyacheslav Kebich, suspended the activities of the Communist party. In December, Belarus joined with Russia and Ukraine in the Alma Ata Declaration which dissolved the Soviet Union entirely. A prolonged struggle ensued over a new constitution, which was only adopted in 1994 (with multiparty elections in 1995). Nevertheless, the events of 1991 appear to be the basis for the transition coding in both data sets.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. In 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear accident in neighboring Ukraine stirred some protest, as did the discovery of a mass grave of Stalin’s victims in 1988. But the nationalist protest movement was very weak in comparison with those in the Baltic countries, Armenia, and Ukraine. The Belarussian People’s Front, organized from exile, led the initial opposition to Soviet rule but it was unable to gain widespread support in the electorate or the streets.

Unlike these other countries, Belarus had become highly Russified during the Soviet era. The Belarussian communist party remained dominant in the legislature after multiparty elections were held within the Soviet Republics in 1990. In July 1990, following Yeltsin’s lead in Russia, the parliament declared Belarus sovereign, but without breaking with the Soviet Union. In an all-Union


referendum held in March 1991, 83 percent of Belarussian voters supported preserving the USSR. Full independence was driven by events in Moscow. In the anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991, top Belarus officials appeared to side with the putsch, and were ousted by the communists in the legislature. The full declaration of independence several weeks later again followed the lead of Yeltsin in Russia.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition. The “transition” in this case was very superficial; it was led primarily by the Communist party itself, which remained in control of most of the levers of power. The opposition, did attempt to mobilize both nationalist and democratic protest, had very little leverage.

**Benin 1991 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*\(^*\)**

The transition. In 1990, incumbent General Kerekou convened a National Conference, which declared sovereignty and appointed a transitional government. The transitional government organized a referendum on a new constitution (1990) and parliamentary and presidential elections (1991) that resulted in the defeat of Kerekou and the victory of opposition politician Nicéphore Soglo, who had headed the transitional government.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Benin had been a Soviet client state under President Kerekou. Economic crisis—including a severe banking crisis in 1988—left the country in a state of fiscal collapse, unable to pay public sector salaries, dispense patronage or maintain support of the military. The crisis led to protests by students, civil servants, and teachers as well as more spontaneous urban riots. The incumbent government legalized opposition parties and called the National Conference for February 1990 in response to deepening social mobilization and the refusal of the armed forces to support further repression. The conference asserted sovereignty over the country, drafted a new constitution and held competitive multiparty elections in March 1991.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Popular protest was decisive in the decision to call the National Conference, which set the transition process in motion.

**Bhutan 2007 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)**

The transition. Following the release of a draft constitution in 2005, the monarchy staged mock legislative elections in 2007. These were followed by


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* Source of ambiguity: Class composition of protest, which came primarily from civil servants, students and teachers.
national elections for a 25-member non-partisan National Council in December 2007. Three months later elections were held for the 47-member National Assembly.

The role of distributive conflict. Minimal. For over a decade, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck had pursued a path established by his predecessor of gradual political liberalization and democratization. In landmark National Assembly proceedings in 1998, the king relinquished his role as head of government to the chairman of the cabinet, which was reconstituted with the retirement of formerly appointed cabinet ministers and the election of a new set of ministers by the National Assembly. The Assembly was also empowered with the authority to pass a no-confidence vote on the monarch. In 2001, the king issued a Royal Decree establishing a constitution drafting committee to transform the country into a constitutional monarchy. The constitution-drafting process lasted four years, with a draft document released for consultation in 2005. In December 2005, the king announced both that the country would make a full transition to a constitutional monarchy and that he would abdicate in favor of his son, which he did in 2006. The electoral process leading to the establishment of full parliamentary government was set in motion in 2007 and the new constitutions adopted in 2008.

Coding. Elite-led transition, pre-emptive. The 1990s saw an increase in intra-ethnic tensions between the government and the Lhotshampas, an ethnic group of Nepali origin living in the southern part of the country. However, there is no evidence that the process of democratization was influenced by the desire to accommodate these political forces. To the contrary, the government enacted highly discriminatory citizenship laws against the Lhotshampas, stripping about one-fifth of the population of its citizenship. A harassment campaign from the early 1990s culminated in the expulsion of large numbers of refugees who ended up in camps in Nepal. From the beginning, the monarchy led the process of democratization even over objections from politicians and civil society.

Bolivia 1982 (CGV and Polity) - Distributive conflict transition

The transition. In 1982, incumbent General Garcia Meza was ousted in a military coup. The coup leaders reinstated the legislature that had been deposed by Garcia Meza in 1980, and the legislature in turn named Hernan Siles Suazo to the presidency. The choice was ratified in a competitive presidential election held several months later.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The mineworkers union was one of the most militant in the region and frequently allied with peasant
organizations. Between 1978 and 1982, they led the opposition to a series of military efforts to take control of the government. The first of these came in 1978, when General Hugo Banzer, who had seized power in a coup in 1971, attempted to use rigged elections to extend his time in power. A mass movement, triggered by a hunger strike by four miners’ wives, derailed the plan. In 1979, the military allowed presidential elections to proceed, but when this ended in a stalemate, it again seized control of the government. Again, however, blockades and strikes led by the miner’s union forced the military to accede to new elections in 1980. This time, although no candidate received the necessary plurality, the newly elected congress named Hernan Siles Suazo to the presidency, only to have its decision overturned by a still another coup led by General Garcia Meza. In 1982, mine workers were once more at the forefront of a broad opposition coalition which led to the downfall of the Garcia Meza dictatorship and the decision of the military to allow competitive elections to go forward.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. By 1982, Garcia Meza met strong opposition from business groups and the United States as well as unions. There is little doubt, however, that large, militant, well-organized unions, together with peasant movements, were decisive in the defeat of repeated military attempts to reassert control between 1978 and 1982.

Brazil 1985 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition.

The transition. Following a scheduled vote of the electoral college for the presidency, a soft-line military government reluctantly accepted the transfer of the presidency to a moderate civilian, Tancredo Neves, supported by the opposition party. Neves fell ill and subsequently died; the position went to his vice-president, José Sarney. The presidential succession was followed by a competitive congressional election in 1986, swept by the political opposition.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. A soft-line military president initiated a process of gradual political liberalization in 1974, which opened the way to additional pressure by moderate leaders of the political opposition. However, massive popular protest substantially added to the pressure for full democracy. A wildcat strike movement, originating in the metallurgical industry, spread to millions of workers between 1978 and 1980, then resumed again in 1983 after a period of repression. The unions provided the core of a social movement involving a broader range of civil society groups in poor neighborhoods. In 1984-85, massive rallies in favor of direct elections prompted leading pro-government politicians to defect in the electoral college and to support the choice of a civilian successor from the opposition. In the face of protest and ruling party defections, the military allowed the electoral college vote to stand.


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Distributive conflict and regime change

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The labor movement was a core component of a broader opposition coalition that deprived the regime of control of the liberalization process.

Bulgaria 1990 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. Long-time dictator, Zhikov, was deposed in a coup d’état by reform communists in November 1989. National Roundtable Talks held from January through March 1990 initiated a number of political reforms, including agreements on a new constitution and electoral rules. The incumbent reformed communist party—the Bulgarian Socialist Party—won competitive parliamentary elections in June 1990.

The role of distributive conflict. Although there was some increase in civil society activity over the course of 1989, the decision to depose Zhivkov in November 1989 appears largely the result of calculations by the communists who also proposed Roundtable Talks. However, the departure of Zhivkov was followed by mass demonstrations, in which organized labor played an important role, and the formation of a broad anti-communist coalition. These demonstrations provided the context for the roundtable talks and the environment in which the communists ultimately made the decision to relinquish the communist party’s monopoly of power and to hold elections. Although the reform communists won the transitional elections in June, evidence of ongoing mass mobilization can be found in the fact that the reform communist government itself ultimately fell in November 1990 as a result of demonstrations and a general strike.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Although the deposing of Zhikov was the pivotal event in the transition, subsequent political decisions took place in the shadow of the mass anti-communist protests of late 1989 and early 1990. Although political issues dominated these protests, demonstrations included a highly mobilized union movement.

Burundi 1993 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. In 1988, authoritarian incumbent President Buyoya set up a national commission to study “national unity” made up of equal Hutu and Tutsi representation. The commission produced a report, which was followed by the drafting of a “Charter on National Unity” that was approved by referendum in 1991. A Constitutional Commission then drafted a new constitution that

* Source of ambiguity. Class composition of popular protest and nature of grievances. Although labor did play a role, the demonstrations were very much broader and focused largely on political issues.

was approved in 1992 by referendum setting the stage for national elections in 1993.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The 1987 coup maintained Tutsi hegemony of the political system despite their minority status vis-à-vis the majority Hutu (approximately 85-15). The remnants of an extremist Hutu organization (Umugambwe w’Abakozi b’Uburundi or Burundi Workers’ Party (UBU)) appear to have been responsible for the deaths of a number of Tutsi peasants in the northern communes of Ntega and Marangara in August 1988. In response, the Tutsi-dominated army unleashed a wave of violence against Hutus in the North in which as many as 20,000 were killed and 60,000 displaced. In the wake of this violence, the government came under strong external as well as internal pressure to reach some intra-ethnic accommodation and responded with the “National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity” and the inclusion of increasing numbers of Hutu into the government. These processes explicitly addressed a number of distributional issues, including Hutu access to education and the civil service. The negotiation of the constitution took place under the shadow of ongoing Tutsi control of the state and military (with coup attempts in February 1989 and March 1992) and contained strong power-sharing elements. The 1993 elections resulted in a lopsided victory for Hutu parties. Following two unsuccessful coup attempts, the president, his family and leaders of the (Hutu) FRODEBU were assassinated in a successful coup. Although the coup leaders did not seize power and were even allowed to escape, a “creeping coup” effectively restored Tutsi control over the state.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The incumbent’s decision to gradually cede power was triggered by ethnic violence. Even though the perpetrators of this violence were not pushing for democratization, concerns about the difficulty of continuing to repress Hutu demands appeared to motivate the transition process. Given the history of exclusion, these demands implicitly had a strong distributive component. However, incumbent state and military elites were willing to brutally suppress ethnic challenges, effectively controlled the constitution-writing process and wielded a veto over the new government. The country is coded as reverting to authoritarian rule in CGV dataset in 1996.


Burundi 2005 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. A new constitution, drafted by a power-sharing transitional government, was passed overwhelmingly by referendum in February 2005, setting the stage for communal, National Assembly, Senate and indirect presidential elections over the course of June–August 2005.

* Sources of ambiguity. External actors, including particularly South Africa, played a crucial role in brokering and encouraging the power-sharing agreement.
The role of distributive conflict. After seizing power in 1996 in the aftermath of the civil war (see discussion of the 1993 transitions and 1996 reversions), President Buyoya promulgated a transitional constitution in June 1998 that sought to share power between his Tutsi-led government and Hutu-led National Assembly. The government continued to restrict party activity, freedom of assembly and speech and engaged in systematic harassment of the opposition. Nonetheless, Buyoya continued to pursue an agreement, which was signed in August 2000 by 19 Hutu and Tutsi-dominated political groups, including Buyoya’s government and the FRODEBU-dominated National Assembly (the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement). African Union peacekeepers were deployed to support the agreement, which did not initially secure support of the major rebel groups. Although fighting continued until 2008, several of the major rebel groups—including most importantly the Conseil national pour la démocratie/Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD)—agreed to implement the agreement, paving the way to their integration into the political process.

One of the key provisions in the agreement was the creation of a three-year interim grand coalition government, which would adopt a new constitution and organize democratic elections at the end of its term. The first 18-month transitional government was headed by Buyoya, a Tutsi, with a Hutu vice-president; this government was followed by one led by a Hutu (Domitien Ndayizeye) with a Tutsi vice-president. After two extensions of its mandate, the interim government finalized the work on a new post-transitional Constitution, which was adopted by 2/3 of the Parliament in October 2004 and approved by 91.2% of the vote in a referendum in February 2005. National Assembly and Senate elections were held in July 2005 and indirect presidential elections in August. The new constitution stipulated that the President was to be elected by popular vote to serve a five-year term, but under the terms of the transitional agreement the first president was elected by two-thirds majority in parliament. Pierre Nkurunziza (CNDD-FDD) won 93% of the vote within the legislature in the August 19 election.

Coding. Distributive conflict. The transition is not driven by overt distributive conflict or the residual violence, but the civil war constitutes an important backdrop to the transitional government and new Constitution and we thus code it as a distributive conflict transition (see coding of the 1993 transition as well).

Cape Verde 1990–91 (CGV 1990; Polity 1991) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. In February 1990, the National Council of the ruling Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) officially supported a transition
to multiparty rule and lifted the ban on opposition parties. In September, the government adopted a constitutional revision that officially ended one-party rule and established a multi-party semi-presidential system. Competitive legislative elections were held in January 1991 and presidential elections in February.

The role of distributive conflict. None. The Catholic Church had criticized the ruling party in the past, and some overseas migrants had formed an opposition party. However, there was no organized opposition within the country and what did emerge followed rather than led the transition. When the ruling party introduced subnational elections in 1989, opposition groups started to form in response. These groups shifted their focus to the national level after, rather than before, the political shift on the part of the PAICV. Following the announcement of the intention to change the constitution, the PAICV engaged in a dialogue with the emergent opposition forces in parliament about the new framework, leading to the developments outlined above.

Coding. Elite-led transition, pre-emptive. The transition has been called a “pacted” one (Meyns 2002, 150). However, the ruling party undertook the changes in response to international changes and the desire to appeal to donors and in the belief that they would win the founding elections. This expectation proved wrong; the Movement for Democracy won both the presidency and a majority in the parliamentary elections.

Central African Republic 1993 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)

The transition. General Kolingba agreed to hold elections in October 1992 but nullified the election results. Elections were held again in August 1993. Again, Kolingba sought to make changes in the electoral code and the makeup of the Supreme Court to avoid a runoff election but reluctantly allowed the elections to stand leading to a runoff and transition of power.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. After 1990, a small pro-democracy movement called for the convocation of a National Conference but Kolingba refused and detained several opponents. Pressure from the United States, France, and from a group of locally represented countries and agencies called GIBAFOR (France, USA, Germany, Japan, EU, World Bank and UN) finally led Kolingba to agree, in principle, to hold free elections in October 1992. After using the excuse of alleged irregularities to suspend the results of the elections, Kolingba again came under intense pressure from GIBAFOR to make political concessions. He established a Provisional National Political

6. Private communication, Professor Bruce Baker, Professor of African Security and Director of African Studies Centre, Coventry University.
Council (Conseil National Politique Provisoire de la Republique or CNPPR) and a Mixed Electoral Commission, which included representatives from all political parties. The new bodies drafted the new electoral code. Following a riot and two coup attempts, Kolingba finally agreed to the August 1993 elections. However, given his willingness to repress opponents in the past, pressure from France appears to have been decisive in assuring the final acquiescence to the election results.

Coding. Elite-led transition, elite-displacement. There was some limited mobilization following Kolingba’s attempts to steal elections, but he had successfully repressed it. External actors played a crucial role in forcing elite negotiations and holding Kolingba to the election schedule and results.

Chile 1989–90 (Polity 1989; CGV 1990) · Elite-led transition (hybrid)

The transition. Augusto Pinochet ceded the presidency after a center-left coalition (the Concertacion) won a competitive election over a right wing candidate in 1989 and took office in 1990.

The role of distributive conflict. Not significant at the time of the transition. During the economic crisis of 1982-1983, massive demonstrations led by labor unions and opposition parties opened space for the reconstitution of center-left opposition parties after a decade underground or in exile. Moreover, although open protests subsided after 1984, radical segments of the opposition continued to advocate armed confrontation. Discovery of an assassination plot against Pinochet, however, led to a massive crackdown in 1986. At that point, the opposition leadership turned to a strategy of opposing the regime within the limits set out in its own constitution, registering voters for a constitutionally mandated referendum on Pinochet’s rule in 1988 and, in the event of a rejection of Pinochet, for competitive elections to be held a year later. The opposition triumphed in the 1988 referendum on Pinochet’s continuation in power, and its leaders entered into negotiations with the government over constitutional reforms. Intensive negotiations between the old regime and opposition party leaders led to an agreement in 1989 on a new constitution, which preserved a wide variety of prerogatives for the military and right-wing parties. Agreements on the constitution opened the way to the 1989 presidential elections and the transfer of government to the center-left coalition in 1990.

Coding. Elite-led transition, hybrid. Massive protest in 1983 helped open space for the reemergence of opposition parties onto the political scene. But
these protests met severe repression and ended in 1986, and had no direct impact on the elite negotiations that established the constitutional terms for the transfer of power. The case is a hybrid; it resembles an institutional transition because it occurred as a result of a political opposition organized around constitutional provisions for a plebiscite. Negotiations secured extensive influence for sectors of the old regime, conditions that allowed Pinochet’s displacement.


seize power before the plan could be carried out. However, the South African government withdrew funding from the mercenaries and the French began a military build-up on the dissident island of Mahore. Denard surrendered to French forces and was returned to France.

The deposition of Denard opened the way for the organization of an interim government, headed by the head of the Supreme Court, Said Mohammed Djohar, who was the constitutionally-proscribed successor to Abdallah. The Djohar government held elections in 1990, which Djohar won with about 55 percent of the vote. As before, however, the system continued to be plagued by repeated coup attempts and chronic cabinet instability; see the discussion of the 1995 reversion below.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, elite-displacement. Despite inter-island conflicts, regime changes were driven primarily by military conspiracies, including the activities of French citizen Colonel Bob Denard and a group of French mercenaries. French and South African influence was significant throughout. In the turmoil following the direct elections of 1990, French troops played a direct role in supporting Djohar and establishing a government of national reconciliation.

**Comoros 2004 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)**

**The transition.** The Comoros sees a marginal improvement in its Polity scores as the result of the successful staging of national and island assembly elections in 2004.

**The role of distributive conflict.** The Comoros has a long history of both inter- and intra-island conflict. In 1997, the islands of Nzwani (Anjouan) and Mwali (Moheli) declared independence. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and later the African Union brokered a constitutional settlement among the islands based on a decentralization of power. Each island would have its own president and parliament, and each island would have the right to nominate candidates for a rotating Union presidency. Union presidents would serve terms of four years: Ngazidja (Grande Comore) would provide the first Union president, followed by Nzwani and then Mwali. The agreement was accepted by Ngazidja and Mwali but was resisted by Nzwani. When separatists on Nzwani won elections for the island assembly, the OAU threatened military intervention. In the shadow of intervention, negotiations produced the Fomboni accord in 2000, which ruled out independence while confirming the previous federal structure.

The crisis over Nzwani and the failure of President Abbas Djoussouf to hold elections had generated rioting in the Union capital of Moroni in 1999 (see reversion below). After three days of fighting the president was ousted by army commander Colonel Azali Assoumane, who declared himself president. Assoumane stepped down in favor of a transitional government, which held elections on 14 April 2002. Despite violence and controversy, the elections confirmed Assoumane’s victory. The election, however, was followed by gridlock between the central government and the presidents of the islands in arguments over revenue. In December 2003, the African Union brokered a second agreement, the Beit-Salam Agreement, which allowed for assembly elections on the three islands in March and April 2004 and Union assembly elections the following month. These elections were conducted on time and considered by outside observers to be free and fair.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, elite-displacement. The holding of the elections took place against a backdrop of inter-island conflict that might be considered distributive, but among elites rather than along class or ethnic lines postulated by distributive conflict models. There is no evidence that the holding of the elections was the result of overt distributive pressures on Assoumane to proceed. Rather, the elections were the result of an earlier agreement, enforced from the outside in a second inter-island pact, which had produced a more decentralized constitution.

*Republic of the Congo 1992 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. President Sassou and the ruling PCT concede to the convening of a national conference, which declares itself sovereign and appoints an interim government. The interim government schedules presidential and legislative elections.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. In the wake of substantial economic shocks, the PCT announced that it was abandoning Marxism-Leninism and its monopoly on power in mid-1990. The PCT also announced that it would be open to those of different ideological persuasions and that it would make constitutional changes at an extraordinary PCT congress scheduled for 1991. These concessions were met by a convergence of church and union pressures on the government and demands for a constitutional convention not controlled by the PCT. The crucial event in the transition appears to be a general strike by the dominant trade union in September 1990, which called for autonomy from the government and an independent constitutional convention as well as material demands for higher wages. The government ceded to the demands of the CTU and allowed the formation of opposition parties with

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* Source of ambiguity. Class composition of protest. As in other low-income African countries, distributive demands emanated primarily from urban labor unions.
immediate effect. In early December a number of prominent PCT politicians defected from the party. Substantial conflict ensued concerning the structure and process of the national conference that convened in February and then again in March. Once convened, however, it was broadly representative and took the decision early to declare itself “sovereign”. Sassou accepted this decision, and the conference proceeded to elect a slate of leaders that completely excluded the PCT. At the end of the conference, it chose an interim government for one year, appointed a technocratic leader, and the interim government schedule presidential and legislative elections for March and June 1992. The interim government had to contend with several crises involving the military and charges of election fraud, but weathered these challenges to hold the elections.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The precipitating events leading to the authoritarian withdrawal involved urban protest spearheaded by labor unions, the Church and opposition politicians critical of the corruption of the government.

_Croatia 1991 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding for 2000 below) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)_

The transition. The regional governments of the federal Yugoslav republic held multiparty elections in 1990. Franco Tudjman, founder of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), was elected as head of the Croatia region of Yugoslavia in 1990, which declared independence in 1991.

The role of distributive conflict. After Tito’s death in 1980 the Yugoslav communist party adopted a collective leadership model, with the occupant of the top position rotating annually; and it strengthened the federal structure that gave more authority to Yugoslavia’s constituent republics. During the 1980s, however, attempts to implement IMF-sponsored adjustments to economic decline exacerbated tensions between liberal elites within the federal government and the regional elites, and among the regional elites themselves. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Slovenian government began to withhold tax contributions to the federal government and to resist federal efforts to increase its control over the monetary system. These tensions opened the way for similar responses in Croatia.

Tensions within the federal system escalated further because of ethnic conflicts within Serbia between Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Communist League of Serbia, exploited the intra-Serbia conflicts with Serbian nationalist appeals that further alarmed elites in the other regions. The growing rift among the regional branches of the Communist Party led to the effective dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th
The dissolution of the federal party opened the way for reform communists within the regions to hold multiparty elections in 1990. In Croatia, Tudjman, a dissident nationalist, had begun to build support among diaspora Croatians, founding the HDZ in 1989 in the runup to the 1990 regional elections. His party won only 42 percent of the vote; but as a result of the winner-take-all electoral rules established earlier by the reform communists, he captured 58 percent of the parliamentary seats and declared independence in 1991. His campaign of ethnic cleansing, intended to quell the protest of Serbian minorities, set off the civil war with Serbia.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, preemptive. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the decision to hold regional elections was largely the product of an inter-elite game aimed at expanding the autonomy of the regions within the federal system. Although Croatia and Slovenia objected to Milosevic’s nationalism, the violent ethnic hostilities that fueled the civil war of the 1990s was a consequence, rather than an underlying cause, of these efforts. Regional divisions among Communist party elites made multiparty elections possible, opening the way to the election of Tudman and the declaration of independence.

**Croatia 2000 (Polity only) • Elite-led transition (institutional)**

The Transition. When Tudjman became ill in November 1999, the Supreme Court appointed an interim president to preside over the government until multiparty elections could be held in February 2000; Tudjman died in December. Parliamentary elections led to the defeat of Tudman’s HDZ and the formation of a government under the leader of the Social Democratic Party (former League of Communist of Croatia), Ivica Racan. Presidential elections completed in February also resulted in the victory of opposition leader, Stjepan Mesic.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Some protest in 1998, but with limited impact in the 2000 transition. After the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in 1995, there was some expectation that Croatia might have an opportunity to move toward more democratic rule. This did not prove to be the case, as demonstrated by the ongoing “Zagreb crisis” of the second half of the 1990s in which Tudjman repeatedly refused to recognize the victory of opposition parties in the city, including the success of the Social Democratic Party in blue-collar neighborhoods. Protest against the government included a mass rally in 1998 called by the unions, which combined opposition to Tudjman’s authoritarian tendencies with bread-and-butter issues. Yet despite a sharp shift to the right within the HDZ in 1998 and the resignation of moderates from the gov-
ernment, the 2000 transition itself does not appear to be substantially affected by these events but rather occurred as a result of constitutional processes (the Supreme Court’s appointment of an interim government and the holding of elections).

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, institutional.

*Cyprus 1983 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (direct foreign intervention)*

The transition. On November 15, 1983, Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot National Unity Party (UPB), declared statehood for the Turkish region of Cyprus. Formal independence paved the way for the promulgation of a new democratic constitution in 1985.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Decision to declare statehood or subsequent promulgation of constitution was driven by elite strategies and external patrons. From its independence in 1960, Cyprus has been riven by communal conflict. The independence constitution included complex power-sharing arrangements between the dominant Greek and minority Turkish communities, guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. These arrangements proved incapable of stopping overt conflict, most notably in the outbreak of violence in 1963. In 1974, the Greek military dictatorship invaded Cyprus in response to Archbishop Makarios’ declaration of independence from Greece. Turkey responded with an armed intervention of its own, which led to effective partition and the declaration of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) followed by an exchange of populations under UN oversight. Negotiations between the two sides ensued but continually deadlocked over competing visions of federalism, with the Greek Cypriots seeking a more centralized system than their Turkish counterparts.

On 15 November 1983, the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish area passed a resolution proclaiming the formation and independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Legislative Assembly created a Constituent Assembly which in turn delegated the responsibility of drafting a fundamental law to a constitutional commission. The Constituent Assembly approved the constitution in March 1985 and it was ratified in a referendum in May by a 70-30 margin.

**Coding.** Elite-led, direct foreign intervention. Cyprus has been characterized by ongoing distributive conflicts between the Greek majority and Turkish minority, including periodic mass mobilization and violence. However the dec-

laration of independence was the result of effective partition of the country as a result of actions taken by Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the case is anomalous in many respects. The Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized; its approach to the European Union in 1981 was one precipitating cause of the declaration of independence by Northern Cyprus. Protected by 35,000 Turkish troops, however, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognized by any country except Turkey; the international community considers Northern Cyprus occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

_Czechoslovakia 1989–90 (CGV 1989, Polity 1990) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)_

_The transition._ After mass demonstrations in late 1989, the conservative leadership of the Czech Communist Party abdicated, leaving a rump group to negotiate the transfer of power. The first “government of national understanding” of December 1989 was dominated by leaders of the two main opposition movements: the Civic Forum that had emerged in the Czech lands and its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence; this appears to be the basis of the CGV coding. This government laid the groundwork for the general elections of June 1990. Leaders of the Civic Forum held most of the top positions in the national government, while in the Slovak regions, Public Against Violence predominated. These divisions ultimately led to Czechoslovakia’s separation into two countries.

_The role of distributive conflict._ There was significant mobilization in the final days of the old regime, but it did not appear to reflect economic grievances nor involve groups reflecting the interests of lower-class constituencies. The leadership of the opposition was Charter 77, which was formed in 1977 by several hundred intellectuals and human rights activists. Its objectives focused exclusively on human rights, and particularly on the obligations of the Czech regime to implement the provisions of international human rights charters that it had signed. In November 1989, after over a decade of repression, mass protests provided the opportunity for the leaders of Charter 77 to emerge as the main challengers to the communist regime. These protests were triggered on November 17 by a police crackdown on student demonstrators who were demanding a pullout of Soviet forces and an end to Communist rule. The manifest opposition to the regime led directly to the resignation of the Communist leadership a few weeks later. By the end of December, Vaclav Havel, the leader of Charter 77, had taken over as president.

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Coding. Elite-led transition, elite displacement. Large-scale mass protest was the immediate catalyst that prompted the sudden resignation of the communist leadership, but in contrast to other transitions from Communist rule—including Albania and Romania—the representation of lower-class groups was not decisive or significant and socio-economic grievances were not salient.

**Dominican Republic 1996 (Polity only) · Distributive conflict transition**

**The Transition.** Aging caudillo Joaquin Balaguer fulfilled a commitment to allow an election in 1996 in which he would not be a candidate. The election contest pitted Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, a populist opposition leader, against more moderate leftist Leonel Fernandez. Support from Balaguer’s party played a role in Fernandez’s victory, but the election was widely viewed as free and fair.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Important, although with considerable international backing from the United States. The target of both domestic protest and international opposition was Joaquin Balaguer, who had dominated political life in the Dominican Republic since 1966, and extensively resorted to fraud and intimidation to win elections, and co-opt or intimidate opponents. Nevertheless, under strong pressure from the U.S. Carter administration, he agreed to relatively free elections in 1978 and to the victory of opposition candidates. Politics became much more competitive from this point onward, and the Dominican Republic crossed the 6 point Polity threshold. In the 1986 elections, Balaguer regained the presidency in the midst of a severe economic crisis, capitalizing on wide-spread opposition to a government IMF program and on anti-Haitian nationalist appeals. Continuing to resist IMF adjustments, he won again in relatively free elections in 1990.

In 1994, however, with support slipping, Balaguer again resorted to extensive fraud in an attempt to continue in office. The fraud was widely condemned by international observers and lead to extensive opposition protests. Facing strong backlash from civil society groups and supporters within the U.S. Congress, Balaguer negotiated a pact with the opposition in August 1994 in which he agreed to cut his term to only two years and to hold elections in 1996 in which he would not run. The ensuing two years were characterized by official corruption and police violence, but also by continuing popular protest over both civil liberties and economic conditions thus sustaining pressure to fulfill the terms of the 1994 agreement. The elections went forward as scheduled in 1996, with the moderate leftist Leonel Fernandez emerging as the victor.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The agreement with the opposition to hold new elections took place in the context of civil society protest as well as international scrutiny. Opposition politicians were able to capitalize on militant civil society groups, strike activity and popular protest which made it increasingly costly for Balaguer to renege on the 1994 agreement and continue in office. Dominican politics had long been characterized by a mixture of political pluralism, corruption, and intermittent repression, and this shift in Polity ranking is a marginal one (from 5 to 6). Nonetheless, the withdrawal of Balaguer from office was an important step in the direction of democracy.

Ecuador 2002 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. Noboa Bejarano assumed the presidency in 2000 after short-lived massive street protests and a radical military coup drove the incumbent from office. Noboa sought to calm the turbulent political scene by holding new elections quickly and declining to stand for election. The presidential election was held in October-November 2002. The winner of the election was Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, who had led the prior coup. He ran as the joint candidate of the leftist Popular Socialist Party and the New Country-Pachakutik Movement.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Gustavo Noboa’s caretaker government had taken power in January 2000, after massive street protests by Ecuador’s large indigenous movement (CONAIE). A brief military coup, led by Colonel Gutierrez, forced the incumbent president, Jamil Mahaud to flee the country, and the junior military officers sought to form a junta of “national salvation” together with the leaders of CONAIE. Under pressure from the United States, they relinquished power after only 24 hours, but they turned control over to Mahaud’s vice president, Noboa, rather than restoring Mahaud to the presidency. Street protests quieted at that point, and the 2002 elections proceeded peacefully, but severe social tensions remained just beneath the surface of political life. Although Gutierrez was elected as a left-wing populist, he was forced to undertake unpopular austerity measures as economic and social conditions continued to deteriorate. In April 2005, Gutierrez himself was ousted in a new round of street protests and fled into exile.

El Salvador 1984 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. Incumbent military and economic elites acceded to the election of a constituent assembly in 1982, which was dominated by a newly formed right wing party, ARENA. However, negotiations among the major parties resulted in an agreement (Pact of Apaneca) that created a Political Commission, which subsequently drafted a new constitution in 1983. The new constitution provided for general and presidential elections in 1984. These were relatively free Jose Napolean Duarte, a moderate Christian Democrat, won the presidency.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial. The transition occurred in the context of bloody civil war between oligarchs and right-wing military factions on one side and a coalition of leftist groups, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), on the other. Reformist military officers and civilians attempted to respond to social grievances in a coup launched in October 1979, but their efforts were undermined by death squads and conservative military officers who pushed the reformers out of the ruling junta. In January 1981, the FMLN launched its own military operations, posing a severe threat to ruling economic and political elites. Demands for redistribution of land and income had been at the heart of both peaceful protests in the late 1970s and the revolutionary uprising of the early 1980s. During those years, moreover, the uprising might well have succeeded in ousting the old regime, had it not been for US economic and military counter-insurgency efforts. The convening of the Constituent Assembly, the negotiations among the major parties and the constitutional agreements leading to the 1984 elections were pressed strongly by the United States as part of a classic counter-insurgency program to politically isolate revolutionary forces by bringing moderates and even center-left leaders back into the system.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Political reforms were aimed at responding directly to the grievances that spurred the revolution. The transition coded in 1984 was at best a limited electoral one, and peace initiatives undertaken by the Duarte government subsequently failed and war continued. Nonetheless, the political changes opened new space for unions and civil society groups and there was turnover of government in the elections of 1989.

* Source of ambiguity. Weight of international factors. Pressure from the United States to adopt a “hearts and minds” strategy was a key factor in the military’s and oligarchy’s decision to accept constitutional reform.

The transition. During the Soviet era, the first freely-elected parliament passed the Estonian Sovereignty Declaration in November 1988, independence resolutions in May 1990 and held a referendum on independence in March 1991. In August 1991, a compromise agreement between radical and moderate factions of the independence movement provided for full independence for Estonia from the Soviet Union and the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Protests began in 1987 over ecological issues, and steadily gathered steam around the independence movement in 1988. That same year, the Estonian Communist party responded by replacing pro-Soviet Communist chief, Karl Vaino, with the more reform-minded Vaino Valjas. The Supreme Soviet of Estonia adopted a declaration of sovereignty that gave Estonian laws precedence over all-union ones. However, mass demonstrations grew in size and militancy in the following years. In 1989, these culminated in the formation of a 600-kilometer human chain of over a million people demanding independence for the Baltic republics.

In 1990, radical factions of the movement (the Estonian National Independence Party, ENIP), organized an election for a new Congress of Estonia, which convened in March. In the meantime, the Communist party disintegrated, and a moderate independence faction, which advocated a gradual transition to independence (the Popular Front) gained control of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. Relations between these two wings of the independence movement were extremely stained throughout the transition, but the August coup that temporarily ousted Gorbachev spurred them to form a united front in defense of independence. The Chairmen of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Estonia issued a joint appeal to the Estonian people, and leaders of the two assemblies reached a compromise agreement calling for the formation of a Constituent Assembly. In September 1991, with Gorbachev temporarily restored to power, the Soviet Union recognized Estonian independence.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The massive Estonian independence movement, like those of the other Baltic countries, was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization at the hands of the Soviets. Mass mobilization was aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power away from the Russian minority and toward the Estonian majority.
**Fiji 1992 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition***

The transition. After the first 1987 coup, the issue of constitutional revision became paramount and was the precipitating event driving the second coup in the same year that established Fiji as a republic (see discussion of Fiji 1987 reversion below). Following the coup, however, pressures on the government to transition toward democratic rule and revise the constitution continued. A new constitution was drafted in 1990 and elections were held under it in 1992.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The 1987 general elections resulted in a Labour Party–National Federation Party Coalition victory, ending the post-independence monopoly of the Alliance party. A coup in the same year severed the relationship to the Crown by declaring Fiji a republic and installing a Military Administration; we code this reversion as an elite reversion involving distributive conflict (see below). The coup also had wide-ranging significance for Fiji’s international relations. Protests by the Government of India led to Fiji’s expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations and official non-recognition of the Rabuka regime from foreign governments, including Australia and New Zealand.

The coup was followed by violence against the Indian community. However, the authoritarian tendencies of the government upset labor, which threatened strike actions in the early 1990s, as well as a newly-formed rural union movement that reflected intra-Fijian rivalries and distributive conflicts as well. Western Fijians objected to the corruption and favoritism of the government and had formed their own tribal confederacy and political parties as a result; it was an alliance between the Labor Party and the Indian-based Federation Party that led to the opposition victory in 1987 and sparked the coup.

Partly in response to these pressures, the Rabuka government orchestrated a new constitution in 1990 that served as the basis for the 1992 elections, in which the opposition reluctantly decided to participate. The source of that reluctance was ongoing bias in the nature of the new constitution, which called its democratic nature into question. The Constitution mandated affirmative action in favor of Fijians, elevated the status of Fijian customary law, barred access to the ordinary courts in cases involving Fijian customary land law, and provided for human rights provisions to be superseded by a two-thirds majority of both houses in a wide range of circumstances. Moreover, the electoral rules were clearly biased against the Indian community. National constituencies elected by universal suffrage and comprising approximately half of the House of Representatives under the 1970 constitution were abolished and all members of the House of Representatives were elected from communal constituencies on closed electoral rolls for registered members of a particular ethnic group. 37 seats were allocated to ethnic Fijians and only 27 to Indo-Fijians, despite the near-equality of their numbers in the population. These electoral rules permit-

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* Source of ambiguity. Weight of international factors. The Rabuka government was widely condemned abroad for the 1987 coup, with parallels drawn to apartheid. This had wide-ranging economic effects, as tourism receipts in particular plummeted. The constitution was in part a response to these pressures, and in any case appeared to enshrine continuing political dominance of the incumbent; Polity codes a shift only to a 5 in 1990, thus not crossing the standard democratic threshold. The constitution also continued to be a source of contention (see discussion of Fiji transition 1999).

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ted Rabuka to retain office.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Both Indian and intra-Fijian pressures played at least some role in the transition to a new constitution.

**Fiji 1999 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)**

The transition. In 1997, a new constitution increased Indian representation in the legislature and permitted a non-Melanesian Fijian to become Prime Minister. The legislative elections of May 1999 were the first to be held under the new constitution. Rabuka’s Fijian Political Party (SVT) lost power to a coalition of parties led by the ethnic Indian-dominated Fiji Labour Party (FLP), whose Mahendra Chaudhry became Fiji’s first ethnic-Indian Prime Minister. This government was overthrown in a coup only one year later, however.

The role of distributive conflict. Ethnic conflicts between indigenous Fijians and the Indian community—the two dominant ethnic groups—have roots in tenancy disputes that date to the colonial period, a power-sharing independence constitution that encouraged ethnic political identifications, and affirmative action policies in education and civil service appointments. The dominance of the Fijian Alliance Party—nominally multiracial but with declining Indo-Fijian support over time—ended with the creation of an Indian-dominated but more populist government in 1987. This government was overthrown in a coup in 1987 led by Sitiveni Rabuka who sought to ensure the country was ruled by indigenous leaders; the coup was followed by violence against the Indian community. Fijian dominance was enshrined in new constitution introduced in 1990.

The authoritarian tendencies of the government upset labor, which threatened strike actions in the early 1990s, as did a newly-formed rural union movement. From the outset, the Indian community, including parties and NGOs, also objected to the constitution and sought to overhaul the political structures that favored indigenous Fijians; the issue of constitutional revision was key to the elections of both 1992 and 1994. However, the indigenous Fijian parties needed coalition partners to govern and reached an agreement with Labour that included a variety of concessions on issues of interest to the Indian community. The Indian community also split over tactics for opposing the constitution, with more moderate leaders favoring a dialogue and negotiated constitutional review. Moreover, the Constitution itself included a review process; Article 161 required that the Constitution be reviewed by 1997. Rabuka’s appointment of an electoral reform commission did not appear to result from manifest social mobilization but rather from promises made to Labor in order to form a government and from a willingness to negotiate on the part of more moderate Indian

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leaders led by Jai Jam Reddy.

The review commission produced a draft constitution that reserved the presidency for a Fijian but lowered the proportion of seats reserved by ethnic groups and opened the position of prime minister to all races. Rabuka supported the proposal although nationalist indigenous Fijian parties opposed it; this split allowed the new constitution to be approved setting the stage for the elections of 1999 and victory for a coalition of opposition parties led by Labour.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. Despite the obvious distributional implications of the 1990 constitution and the opposition to it within the Indian community and among labor, the initiation of the review committee does not appear to stem from mass mobilization but rather from the politics of coalition formation and negotiations with the opposition.

Fiji 2004 (Polity only) · Omitted from the dataset

The transition. The transition is a result of a slight—and passing—change in the Polity scoring from a “5” to a “6”. The country immediately reverts to a coding of “5” in the next year, followed by a coup in 2006 that is coded as a “-88”; the coup is not coded as a reversion in the Polity dataset because it took place from a baseline that was below the democracy threshold.

Usually, such cases would be counted as transitions, but it is unclear why Polity codes this case as a transition. Elections held in 2001 marked a return to democracy following the coup of 2000 (see discussion of 2000 reversion below). The elections resulted in a victory for the United Fiji Party (SDL) and the formation of a government with the Conservative Alliance Party (CAP). Under power-sharing arrangements in the constitution, the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) was supposed to be granted seats in the cabinet proportional to its vote share. The victors subsequently balked at the FLP’s demand for cabinet seats, which the FLP challenged. In July 2003, the High Court finally ruled that the exclusion of the FLP from the cabinet was in fact constitutional. However, the stalemate continued as the two sides failed to reach agreement on the precise allocation of seats and the court failed to resolve the issue definitively. In November 2004, the FLP finally announced that it was withdrawing from negotiations over the cabinet and accepted the role of opposition leader, but this does not seem to warrant a regime change coding.

Coding. Omitted from the dataset. If coded, the case would be coded as a non-distributive conflict transition. Despite the backdrop of ethnic conflict, there is no evidence that the particular events Polity appears to associate with the transition in 2004 were driven by the distributive conflict logic, including court

rulings on the power-sharing constitution and the de facto if not de jure resolution of the constitutional standoff over the cabinet. If anything, the final settlement of 2004 appears to be the result of the unwillingness of the incumbent government to implement the power-sharing agreement and the opposition’s ultimate acquiescence to that fact.

Georgia 2004 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. Protest over a flawed 2003 parliamentary election forced the resignation of incumbent Eduard Shevardnadze. As Chairperson of the Parliament, Nino Burjandaze, assumed the role of Acting President and organized new presidential and parliamentary elections, which were held in January and March 2004. The victor in the elections was pro-Western opposition leader, Mikheil Saakashvili and his National Movement-Democrats party.

The role of distributive conflict. Extensive protests emerged against fraudulent parliamentary elections and a constitutional referendum in November 2003. This so-called “Rose Revolution” drove the incumbent from office and paved the way for the supreme court’s annulment of the 2003 elections and new elections in 2004.

The old regime originated during a period of chaotic conflict in 1992, when rival warlords invited Eduard Shevardnadze to assume the presidency and restore political order. During the 1990s Shevardnadze was able to weaken the militias responsible for much of the political violence and to restore a semblance of political control through a ruling party, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG). By the early 2000s, however, the coalition of nomenklatura patronage networks, intellectuals, and lower-level communist officials that formed the CUG began to disintegrate. In late 2000, the New Rights party was formed by a group of businessmen who had defected from the CUG. In 2001, parliamentary leaders also broke with the government, leaving the party with only 41 of the CUG’s 109 deputies. The main opposition came from former regime insiders, including Saakashvili’s National Movement (Levitsky and Way 2012: 224-225). However, discontent over the flawed 2003 elections escalated into large-scale popular protests. Between November 4 and November 13, the opposition organized a peaceful vigil in front of the parliament, with numbers initially ranging between 500 and 5000. As the stalemate over the election continued, however, the ranks of protesters grew substantially. The standoff was broken when the opposition blocked government attempts to seat the new, fraudulently elected parliament and Shevardnadze was “hustled out the door by his security guards” (Mitchell 2004: 344).
Coding. Distributive conflict. The transition was driven in part by intra–elite conflict; both Burjandaze and Saakashvili—the leaders of the opposition—were formerly regime insiders. Nevertheless, mass protest played a critical role in driving Shevarnadze from office, and this warrants a coding of distributive conflict.

Ghana 1993 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. The authoritarian PNDC government under Jerry Rawlings appointed a Constitutional Advisory Committee in 1991 to draft proposals for a new constitution. Following further amendment in a Consultative Assembly, the Constitution was approved by popular referendum in April 1992 followed by presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December 1992. The elections were won by Rawlings and his National Democratic Congress (NDC), which took office in January 1993.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited impact on the reforms of the Rawlings government. The democratic opposition in Ghana consisted of a variety of political forces that would appear to signal a distributive conflict transition, including: the unions, which adopted a pro-democracy stance in 1988; and left and progressive movements which had initially allied with the PNDC but became disillusioned with its economic policies. Human rights protests, including from the Bar Association, and student organizations also played a role. In August 1990, the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) was created as a forum for these organizations to co-ordinate. However, mass protests played little role in the transition, which appeared motivated by concerns about donor disaffection with authoritarian rule and Rawlings’ belief that he could control the transition process. The PNDC pre-empted the democratic opposition and controlled the appointments to the Consultative Assembly, which provided very little basis for consultation with or concessions to the opposition. Although decreed “free and fair” by Commonwealth monitors, the elections of 1992 were in fact widely viewed as fraudulent.

Coding. Elite-led transition, preemptive. Although the Rawlings government was subsequently constrained by new democratic institutions, including rulings by the Supreme Court, mass mobilization did not appear to challenge the regime and Rawlings himself guided the transition.

Grenada 1984 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (direct foreign intervention)

The Transition. On October 25, 1983, United States forces invaded Grenada, deposed the heads of the ruling party and established an interim government under Nicholas Brathwaite. The interim government reinstituted the constitution that had been in effect prior to the 1979 revolution, and on December 1984, Grenada held democratic elections, the first since 1976.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. In March 1979, Grenada’s New Jewel Movement (NJM) party overthrew the corrupt and repressive government of Sir Eric Gairy, a move widely popular amongst Grenadians, and established the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) led by Maurice Bishop. Though Bishop embraced a Marxist ideology and maintained close relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, he maintained an officially neutral foreign policy stance; US policy was initially cautious. Severe economic difficulties generated conflicts within the ruling party over the course of 1983. In October, a competing hardline faction within the party, led by Bernard Coard, ousted Bishop in an internal power struggle. Bishop was first arrested, then freed, but subsequently captured and executed when he attempted to retake power.

The Reagan administration’s decision to invade was a reaction to the coup. Of particular concern to Reagan was the presence of Cuban workers and military personnel building a large airstrip that could potentially be used for military purposes. The construction had begun under the deposed Bishop regime, but with the hardliners in charge, Reagan feared that it would be used to transport weapons to Central American insurgents. The US also had concerns about a small group of stranded US students. The invasion was officially undertaken at the request of the Governor-General, Barbados, and other Eastern Caribbean states.

Coding. Elite-led transition, direct foreign intervention. Although there were some street demonstrations when the relatively moderate Bishop was overthrown, the United States invasion was decisive in deposing the Marxist regime that succeeded him.

Guatemala 1986 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition

The Transition. In 1984, the military government announced elections for an 88-member Constituent Assembly, charged with drafting a new constitution and electoral law. The constitution was formally introduced in June 1985, and
presidential and legislative elections were held in November; the government of Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo took office in January 1986.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial. The reforms were undertaken in an effort to quell an insurgency rooted in Guatemala's large indigenous majority. In 1982, key-armed groups united to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The uprising, in turn, was met with violent repression under General Efrain Rios Montt, who had seized power in a coup in March 1982. Rios Montt combined a merciless anti-insurgency campaign bordering on genocide, with some populist redistributive measures (frijoles y fusiles) and a promise to reform the political system. The reforms were briefly interrupted when General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores replaced Rios Montt in a violent palace coup in 1983, but nonetheless were continued. Both the U.S. government and moderate factions of the ruling military viewed elections as a way to combat the insurgency. In fact, human rights abuses continued well after the transition, and the insurgency did not end until the internationally brokered peace agreements of 1996. Nevertheless, the transition did open the way to successive elections and a turnover among elite parties.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Conservative politicians continued to dominate the electoral process after 1985, but the threat posed by the mass-based insurgency contributed significantly to the military’s decision to accept an electoral process and allow civilians to become heads of government.

Guatemala 1996 (Polity only) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. In 1993, the National Assembly appointed a unity government to rule until elections could be held in 1996. These were won by Alvar Arzu, who defeated the candidate of the hard-right Guatemalan Republican Front. Arzu signed a peace treaty in December with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG). This granted the URNG status as a legal political party and brought an end to the 36-year old civil war.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The peace agreements marked the end of a 36 year civil war. The agreements followed a ten-year process of political liberalization that opened the way to a revival of civil society. In 1993, a “self-coup” initiated by the incumbent president Jorge Serrano triggered widespread popular protests from unions, civic groups, and some military factions and opened the way to a series of constitutional reforms and partial accords over the next several years. From 1993 to 1995, a caretaker president elected by Congress (Ramiro de Leon Carpio) successfully initiated a package of constitutional reforms and accelerated peace negotiations with the URNG. Separate agreements, brokered by the United Nations, were signed in

1994 (human rights), resettlement of displaced persons (1994), and indigenous rights (1995). In elections in 1996, a centrist candidate, Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen, won a narrow victory over a hard-right candidate, setting the stage for the conclusion of the peace agreements and the integration of the URNG into the party system.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Civil society protests played an important role in keeping political liberalization on track from 1993 to 1996. The conclusion of the peace agreements with the URNG marked the end of a violent, redistributive insurgency rooted in Guatemala’s large indigenous majority.

**Guinea-Bissau 2000 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)**

The transition. A military uprising in June 1998 against the incumbent government of long-time ruler João Bernardo Vieira was followed by substantial violence in the capital city, sometimes referred to as a civil war. A peace agreement was signed in November 1998 but the unity government did not hold and in May 1999, the insurgent military forces under the command of Brigadier Asumane Mane succeeded in ousting Vieira. Mane then transferred authority to an interim government headed by the Speaker of the Parliament, which held free elections in November 1999.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The civil war left hundreds dead, but it was primarily a struggle within the military rather than between representatives of political-economic elites and groups representing disadvantaged social or ethnic groups. The incumbent ruler, Vieira, had originally seized power in 1980; the regime itself faced coup attempts in 1983, 1985, and 1993. Vieira governed through a single party system but began to liberalize politics in 1991 and won office in relatively open multi-party elections in 1994. Nonetheless, the system remained only semi-competitive at best with power concentrated in the hands of the president.

The civil war erupted in June 1998, when Vieira dismissed Brigadier Asumane Mane and placed him under house arrest on charges that he had been involved in smuggling weapons to insurgents in the neighboring Senegalese province of Casamance. The Vieira government had sought closer relations with Senegal and Francophone Africa more generally and arms trafficking became a major diplomatic issue. Military rebels loyal Mane launched a coup, which became the precipitating event in nearly a year of intense violence in the capital between military factions loyal to Vieira and Mane.

International actors subsequently played a significant but ultimately ineffective role in seeking to settle the conflict. Senegal and Guinea, encouraged by


France, dispatched troops to defend the Vieira regime. In November 1998, peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) provided the framework of an accord, which included the gradual withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean forces and the establishment of a West African peacekeeping force. Hostilities flared again in January 1999 followed in February by a new accord between Mane and Vieira, which centered around a government of national unity, the disarmament of the rival forces, and the immediate withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops. The unity government did not resolve core issues of military prerogatives, however, and in early May 1999 fighting erupted again. Vieira announced that he would hold legislative and presidential elections later in the year, but Mane’s forces stormed the presidential palace and forced Vieira’s surrender. A transitional government held presidential and parliamentary elections in November 1999 that were won by the opposition Social Renewal Party of Kumba Ialá.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, elite displacement. The violence in the country was largely the result of inter-elite conflicts over military prerogatives rather than distributive mass-elite dynamics. The military was riven with factionalism, and the country had a long history of coups and coup attempts. Ethnic separatists in the Casamance province of Senegal did have sympathizers among co-ethnics in the north of Guinea-Bissau, and accusations of weapons smuggling triggered the internal military conflicts and the Senegalese intervention. Both sides in the civil war, however, were eventually implicated in gun-running, and most of the top military brass were members of the dominant Balante tribe, which comprised only about 30 percent of the population. Moreover, the eventual winner of the 2000 elections was Kumba Ialá, who was himself accused of favoritism toward the Balante, calling into question that the conflicts reflected broader cleavages.

**Guinea-Bissau 2004-5 (CGV 2004; Polity 2005) • Elite-led transition (elite displacement)**

The transition. Following a coup in 2003, the army quickly signed an agreement with the country’s main political and civil society groups to set up a National Transitional Council. This served as an interim legislative body, and handed over executive power to a caretaker administration. Legislative elections were held in March 2004 and the transition was completed in in July 2005 with the holding of presidential elections, won by João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. In September 2003, the military launched a coup against the nominally democratic but highly ineffective and corrupt government of Kumba Yala (elected in 2000; see discussion of this
The 2003 coup came in the wake of increasing evidence of the ineffectiveness and corruption of the Yala government. The National Assembly had been dismissed in November 2002, resulting in a prolonged budget crisis of concern to donors, and parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2003 were repeatedly postponed. When the coup occurred, the EU opened consultations under the Cotonou Agreement, which provided a legal foundation for suspending aid in the face of violation of norms of good governance. Given the military’s willingness to return to democratic rule and hold elections, the consultations over the course of 2004 ended with the decision to normalize relations and continue cooperation but with ongoing monitoring of progress in the return to democratic rule. International monitoring and support continued to play a role in the 2005 elections as well, with involvement of UNDP, the EU and a delegation of African heads of state, including the current head of both the OAU and ECOWAS.

Coding. Elite-led transition, elite displacement. The military appeared to have intervened in order to reverse the political decay under a nominally democratic government. The military appears to have received tacit support from the international community but also pressure to exit to democratic rule.

Guyana 1992 (Polity only) - Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. In October 1992, following several years of political and economic liberalization, the leaders of the ruling party held competitive elections. The elections resulted in the defeat of the People’s National Congress (PNC), which had held power for twenty-eight years, and a victory for the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), which was based in the East Indian (Indo-Guyanese) majority.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited, despite significant inter-racial tensions. Afro-Guyanese constituted about one-third of the population, and provided core support for the ruling party, the PNC. Following independence from Great Britain in the 1960s, Forbes Burnham, the head of the PNC, ruled in increasingly autocratic fashion, providing only limited space for small opposition parties. Indo-Guyanese—largely rural labor and small farmers—constituted about half the population. The PPP, headed by Marxist firebrand Cheddi Jagan, drew primarily on this sector of the population, though the party had been thoroughly marginalized under PNC rule.

More salient to the transition was the fact that Guyana was a small open economy heavily dependent on external economic assistance, remittances from the expatriate population, and trade. Since the 1960s, the United States had been a major donor, preferring the neutral Burnham regime to the more left-oriented...
Jagan and the PPP. The loss of international support and pressure from international donors played a significant role in the eventual withdrawal of the PNC from power.

In 1985, Burnham’s death opened the way to a period of economic and political liberalization. Soft-liners, lead by Hugh Desmond Hoyte gained control of the ruling party. By that point, Guyana faced major international challenges. Economically, it was constrained by crippling external debt and arrears to international creditors. At the same time, as the Cold War wound down, it lost the patronage of the United States government. In this context, the softliners moved—grudgingly at first—toward market adjustments and political reforms that would bring them into line with the demands of the international community. In 1987, the PNC renounced its claim to a political monopoly and opened greater space for opposition parties. In 1989, it initiated an ambitious structural adjustment program financed by the World Bank. From 1990 to the election of 1992, Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center played a major role in pushing the government toward further political opening. Key steps included the establishment of a more independent electoral commission, and the reform of voter lists and ballot-counting procedures. International observers—again lead by the Carter Center—played a crucial role in validating the results of the 1992 elections.

Opposition to the regime was organized by a coalition of parties led by the revived PPP. In the event, the PPP won about 55 percent of the vote to 40 percent for the PNC. Race relations polarized, moreover, after the PPP took office. However, in the years leading up to the election, the opposition demonstrated almost no capacity to mobilize grass-roots opposition to the regime. Repression and cooptation had virtually destroyed the PPP’s organizational infrastructure, and both the PPP and other opposition forces depended heavily on external support. To gain this support, Jagan and his allies lobbied Western governments intensely, renouncing Marxism and embracing democratic capitalism.

Coding. Elite-led transition, preemptive. Deep racial cleavages have been important features of Guyanese society, but they were not mobilized in the run-up to the 1992 election and did not appear to play a major role in the incremental steps toward democratization underway since 1985. These were driven primarily by soft-line elites within the ruling PNC, acting in conditions of economic crisis and under severe pressure from the United States and other international donors.

The transition. In March 1990, military ruler, Prosper Avril, left the country and a provisional civilian government organized elections held in December 1990. In the election, populist leader Jean-Claude Aristide won in the first round with 67 percent of the vote and assumed office in February 1991.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial, but in conjunction with major influence of external actors. From 1957 to 1986, Haiti had been ruled by a brutal personalist dictatorship, first headed by Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier and then after his death in 1971, by his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. The Army and the terrorist militia force, the Tonton Macoute, were the main pillars of control, although for substantial periods, the regime also had support from the Haitian elite and the United States government. In 1986, in the midst of severe economic collapse and wide-spread rioting, military support for the regime collapsed and Duvalier fled the country. Over the next five years, there followed a series of short-lived military and civil-military governments, state terrorism by the Tonton Macoute, and severe political unrest.

In 1988, Colonel Prosper Avril seized power promising to lead a transition to democracy. In early 1990, however, he cancelled scheduled elections and declared a state of siege. The population reacted with wide-spread riots and street demonstrations, and at the urging of the United States Ambassador, Avril fled the country leaving a civilian provisional government to schedule elections. The elections, backed by international monitors and strong diplomatic support, came off as scheduled; as noted, Aristide won an overwhelming popular victory. However, a brief military uprising in January 1991 came close to preventing him from taking office. The uprising failed in the face of popular violence, including the “necklacing” of suspected supporters of the old regime and strong diplomatic pressure. However, as discussed in the “reversions” section below, Aristide continued to face severe opposition from the military and elite and was ousted only seven months later in September 1991.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Divisions within the repressive apparatus and declining external support from the United States contributed to the withdrawal of the Duvalier regime and the political turmoil that followed after 1986. International pressure from the OAS and the United States was also very important in preventing the reconsolidation of authoritarian rule between 1986 and 1991. Nevertheless, popular opposition led by Aristide was clearly instrumental in preventing the reconsolidation of authoritarian rule and forcing the elections that brought Aristide to power.
**Haiti 1994 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (direct foreign intervention)**

The transition. With a United States-led multinational military force of 21,000 troops preparing to enter the country, General Raoul Cedras agreed to be escorted out of Haiti and to transfer power to a transitional civilian authority. In October 1994, Jean-Claude Aristide, who had been elected in December 1990 and then deposed in September 1991, was restored to power along with other elected officials of the governing party.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. As discussed in our coding of the 1990 transition above, popular protest and political violence had been a consistent feature of Haitian politics since the deposition of dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, and played an important role in the reforms that first brought Aristide to the presidency in 1991. However, Raoul Cedras, the military dictator who deposed Aristide in September 1991 appeared to have been consolidating power. Between 1991 and 1994, he appeared to have gained control over the highly fractious military and had launched a systematic campaign of terror directed at pro-Aristide politicians and civil society groups. At the popular level, the most visible response to the dictatorship was a massive wave of emigration, which increasingly worried the Clinton administration in the United States.

Although the potential for popular pressure remained, it was thus international leverage and the threat of a military occupation that brought Cedras’ regime to an end. The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council strongly condemned the Cedras coup and issued a series of resolutions that ultimately authorized the deployment of a multinational military force led by the United States. As noted, the U.S. government of Bill Clinton was motivated primarily by growing concern about the mass exodus of Haitians that followed the 1991 coup. With the military force preparing to enter the country, the Clinton government authorized Jimmy Carter to negotiate Cedras’ exit from Haiti. Once Cedras agreed to withdraw from power in 1994, a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) consisting of about 600 troops and 300 police played a crucial peace-keeping role, particularly in deterring new efforts to depose the Aristide government.

Coding. Elite-led transition, direct foreign intervention. Popular protest, along with intra-elite conflicts, had played a role in forcing previous military rulers from power. Nevertheless, the threat of this protest did not appear to deter the Cedras regime from doubling down with a ruthless campaign against the opposition. Aristide himself remained in exile. It was the prospect of an overwhelming external occupation that eventually drove Cedras from power.

and permitted the return of Aristide.

**Honduras 1982 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)**

The transition. The military regime headed by General Policarpio Paz García permitted the election of a constituent assembly in April 1980 and general elections were held in November 1981. In January 1982, the winner of these elections, Roberto Suazo of the Liberal Party, assumed power.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Unlike in El Salvador, the military regime and Honduran economic elite faced only limited internal threats to their rule. Although some civil society activity was tolerated and the government ignored some land invasions, there were no significant pressures from below. However, the Paz regime, which had seized power in a military coup in 1978, was increasingly plagued by corruption scandals—especially over involvement in the narcotics trade—and deepening economic difficulties. By 1980, the regime faced widespread pressure to liberalize from economic elites, civilian politicians, and the United States government, which also feared the prospect of “contagion” from other countries in Central America. In response, General Paz agreed to the formation of a constituent assembly in April 1980 and to competitive elections in November of the following year. In January 1982—the year marked as the transition in both CGV and Polity—Roberto Suazo, the newly-elected civilian president, took office.

It should be noted, however, that the military, which had previously controlled the government since 1963, remained the dominant political actor. Suazo—himself from an elite political party—remained subordinated to right-wing military leaders who engaged in severe repression of trade unions, student organizations, and peasant groups; the formal transition even brought about a narrowing rather than a broadening of the scope for popular participation.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, preemptive. Although the political reforms responded in part to threats of contagion from conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, the government did not in fact face significant threats from below. The transition was sponsored by the military establishment, the United States, and elite civilian politicians who continued to control the political process.

**Honduras 1989 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)**

The transition. Polity does not explain this coding, but the slight change in Polity score (from 5 to 6) appears to be the result of the victory of National-
ist Rafael Callejas in regularly-scheduled presidential elections in 1989 (taking office in 1990). This was the first transfer of power to a civilian opposition candidate since 1932.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. As in 1982, this transition was an elite affair, with no involvement from civil society. Although the Liberal Party governments of the 1980s faced relatively little challenge from below, they did face controversy over their support for the U.S.-backed Contra war in Nicaragua as well as continued human rights violations by the military (see above). Moreover, with the winding down of the Central American civil wars in 1989 and 1990, the incumbent government of Jose Azcona Hoyos faced cutbacks in U.S. aid, economic recession, and intense debates over neoliberal reform. The regularly-scheduled election of 1989, therefore, took place in a fraught political and economic context, with considerable potential for incumbent manipulation or military involvement. Although the winning opposition candidate, Rafael Callejas, also from an elite party, his majority victory in the election (by 52.3 percent of the vote) and his peaceful accession to office could appropriately be considered an important step toward democracy.

Coding. Elite-led, institutional transition.

Hungary 1990 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. In roundtable negotiations in 1989, the government and moderate opposition leaders agreed to hold elections, which took place in January 1990 and were won by the center-right Hungarian Democratic Form.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Reformist factions in the communist party initiated the political transition as Soviet oversight ebbed and economic difficulties increased. It began with the replacement of Janos Kadar as head of the party in 1988, renunciation of the Party's claim to a monopoly of authority, and the liberalization of controls over the press and assembly. The government followed these steps with the invitation to opposition notables with limited mass support to negotiate over the timing of the elections and the form of the new constitutional regime. The agreement on a parliamentary, rather than presidential, system and on the elections of 1990 marked the culmination of this process. The country did witness subsequent mass mobilization of a more distributive nature in the form of a large taxi strike in the fall of 1990, but this followed the basic political changes rather than leading them.

Coding. Elite-led transition, preemptive. Despite Hungary's reform socialist path, civil society remained very weak. The principal opposition to the regime

was a loose collection of notables with a conservative, nationalist orientation, and the coalition disintegrated rapidly after winning the 1990 parliamentary elections. Initiative for the change came primarily from within the Communist party itself and was negotiated with the opposition in the absence of mass mobilization.

*Indonesia 1999 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*

**The transition.** In May 1998, Soeharto resigned and passed power to his vice-president Habibie. Habibie initiated liberalization, but did not initially signal his intention to step down. A consultative assembly dominated by authoritarian incumbents made further liberalizing moves and electoral laws were finalized in early 1999 leading to free and fair parliamentary elections in June 1999. In October 1999, President Habibie’s “accountability speech” was rejected by the legislature, ending his political career, and Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president by the legislature in November, completing the transition.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. In the second half of 1997, Indonesia became the country hardest hit by the Asian economic crisis. As the financial crisis unfolded, opposition leaders became more vocal in their criticism of Soeharto, but the precipitating event in his resignation was widespread riots following a crackdown on student protests in May 1998. These riots involved a variety of ethnic and economic grievances against ethnic Chinese and between Muslims and Christians. Demonstrations also played a role in the liberalizing concessions made by the constitutional assembly in 1998 and threats of mass mobilization led to the passage of relatively liberal electoral laws in early 1999. The demands of party leaders included religious claims; nearly 40% of the vote in the founding election was for religious parties. However, both religious and secular parties advanced economic claims in the wake of the crisis.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Economic grievances and distributonal conflicts, including those targeted at Chinese, played a significant role in setting the transition in train. Subsequent protest, even though not dominated by distributive demands, also played a role.
**Kenya 1998 (CGV only) - Distributive conflict transition**

The transition. Incumbent President Moi made some concessions to electoral reform in advance of the 1997 general elections, which he won by a plurality. The new government took office in 1998.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with ambiguous results. Kenya’s authoritarian system had electoral elements as a result of constitutional changes undertaken in 1991 prior to the 1992 elections that permitted multipartyism. Demonstrations in 1991 were important in the concessions that led to the opening of a multiparty system, but the electoral system and a divided opposition permitted Moi to retain office and a majority in the legislature with relatively small pluralities of the vote. In mid-1997, a coalition of civic organizations, church groups and reformist opposition politicians formed a National Convention Executive Council to press for political reform, including constitutional changes. Given the unwillingness of the Moi government to enter into negotiation, mass demonstrations were an important tool of the group under the theme of “no reforms, no elections.” Demonstrations in July and August resulted in a large number of deaths (by Kenyan standards; 25–30 and 40 respectively). External donors responded to the violence by withholding aid.

Although continuing to reject direct negotiations with the NCEC or the holding of a national convention, Moi agreed to hold negotiations between the KANU and opposition MPs in parliament, where KANU enjoyed a majority. These negotiations were held through the so-called Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group. In October and November 1997, the IPPG negotiated a variety of changes to the constitution and election-related legislation that represented a compromise between hardliners in KANU, who opposed all concessions, and the opposition in parliament. However, the negotiations served to divide the opposition and the agreements weakened donor resolve with respect to withholding aid. The agreements would not be implemented until following the 1997 elections. In November, Moi suspended parliament and the elections went forward in December, with Moi retaining the presidency and a legislative majority.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Mass mobilization and violence triggered the reforms and they were clearly rooted not only in corruption but wider economic grievances. But despite the reforms, Moi prevailed.

**Kenya 2002 (Polity only) - Elite-led transition (institutional)**

The transition. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated the ruling KANU party in parliamentary and presidential elections in December 2002,
allowing Mwai Kabaki to take office in early 2003.

The role of distributive conflict. Kenya’s transition from one-party rule under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was a prolonged process (see discussion of the CGV transition above). President Daniel Arap Moi liberalized and legalized opposition parties in 1991 and staged multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997. In both elections, Moi won by plurality as the regime mobilized intimidation against opponents and opposition voters split support between various opposition parties. The constitution required that Arap Moi could only rule for two terms. As the 2002 elections approached, Moi sought to control the electoral process in favor of his chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta. The crucial factor in the triumph of the opposition was the formation of new electoral coalitions to avoid the fragmentation of the opposition that had occurred in 1992 and 1997.

The NARC was a coalition of two coalitions. The National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) linked Kibaki’s Democratic Party, which drew largely on Kikuyu support, with a coalition of other ethnic parties. The NAK then joined forces with the Liberal Democratic Party, led by several disaffected members of KANU including Raila Odinga, to form the NARC. In an electoral pact reached in October, the NAK and LDP agreed to a power-sharing agreement under which Odinga would become prime minister and cabinet positions would be divided between the two coalitions. Given the substantial majority of the electorate represented by the NARC, the signing of the electoral agreement assured the transition.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. As noted above, the CGV dataset codes 1998 as a transition, and we code that transition as a distributive conflict one, albeit with some ambiguity based on the strong role of foreign pressures. Moi was also under strong international pressure to allow free and fair elections in 2002, but there is no evidence that his decision to do so resulted from overt distributive conflicts or credible risks of mass mobilization. The transition was primarily the result of coordination among the opposition and elite defections, which secured the NARC a tamper-proof electoral majority in the context of a regularly scheduled election.

Kyrgyzstan 2005 (CGV Only) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. In February and March 2005, massive protests following fraudulent parliamentary elections, dubbed the “Tulip Revolution” caused long-time strongman Askar Akayev to resign and flee the country. The Parliament then appointed opposition leader, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as Interim President. The interim government organized new—and relatively clean—elections, held
in July 2005, in which Bakiyev won a landslide victory.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant, but with ambiguous objectives. The so-called “Tulip Revolution” that drove Akayev from power grew out of a complex mix of village-level patronage politics, elite defections, ethnic tensions, and regional cleavages. It originated in scattered and largely unconnected protests by local politicians and their clienteles who charged that they were fraudulently deprived of victory in the February parliamentary elections. At the elite level, the protests were coordinated through a new opposition party (the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, or NDK), a fragile coalition of business elites and former regime insiders led by Bakiyev.

The country was also divided, however, by deep regional cleavages between the relatively commercialized north and the less prosperous south—a division that largely cut across the Kyrgyz ethnic majority. The deposed Akayev had engaged in a skillful balancing act across both regions and ethnic groups, but he was widely perceived to favor the north in terms of government expenditures and patronage. The protests originated in the south of the country. Demonstrations in Jalalabad escalated into massive crowds and the occupation of the main administrative building of the region. Protests spread to Osh and other parts of the south, and by the time protests broke out in the capital city of Bishkek, the opposition was in control of virtually the entire southern region of the country. A cross-regional agreement within the elite allocated the position of prime minister to a major northern politician, Feliks Kulov, but the more powerful post of the presidency went to Bakiyev, who was a southerner with his political base in Jalalabad. Shortly after the election that propelled Bakiyev to the presidency (by 89 percent of the vote), the coalition began to unravel.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Despite the ambiguity of the objectives of the protest and the importance of local clientelist networks and former regime politicians, the mobilization of the protest operated along regional lines that warrant a distributive coding.

**Latvia 1991 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition**

**The transition.** In March 1990, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic resulted in the victory of a coalition of independence forces, the Popular Front of Latvia. In May 1990, the Latvian Soviet declared independence from the Soviet Union, setting off a prolonged constitutional dispute over whether such actions by Republic soviets were legal. After a tense and violent standoff with pro-Soviet forces and in the wake of the failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev, the Soviet Union recognized Latvia’s independence in September 1991.
The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost initiative opened the way to massive ethno-nationalist demonstrations throughout the Soviet Union. Protests within Latvia as well as in other Baltic states led the way. In 1987, dissidents called for a ceremony to mark Stalin’s mass exile of Latvians in 1941 and attracted a gathering of over 5000 participants. In 1987 and 1988, this experience triggered coordinated mass demonstrations throughout the Baltics, as well as further demonstrations elsewhere in the Soviet Union and growing divisions within the Politburo about how to respond (Beissinger: 63). In 1988, Popular Front organizations were formed throughout the Baltics, and protest escalated even further in 1989. The Latvian independence movement, like most others in the Soviet Union, was motivated by ethno-nationalist—rather than overtly economic—demands (see Beissinger 2002: 75–79). Nevertheless, Latvian nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians.

In 1989 and 1990, Soviet authorities responded to the protest by allowing semi-competitive elections to provincial Soviets, and in Latvia, the way was opened for the victory of the nationalist Popular Front in the multiparty elections to republic’s Supreme Soviet, and to the declaration of succession in May 1990. Tense negotiations with the Soviet government ensued. A turning point came in January 1991, when Latvian demonstrators repelled efforts by special Soviet military forces to seize government buildings and restore the control of the Soviet regime. More negotiations followed, but Gorbachev’s hand was severely weakened by supportive nationalist movements throughout the Soviet Union, as well as by continued resistance of the Latvian population. In August 1991, Soviet hardliners failed in an attempt to depose Gorbachev, but the coup accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union. On September 6, 1991, the Soviet government—now in its last stages—recognized Latvia’s independence.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. As noted, the massive Latvian independence movement was motivated by ethno-nationalism, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, Latvian nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians. Mass mobilization was aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political power away from the Russian minority and toward the Latvian majority.

Lesotho 1993 (Polity only) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. Following the completion of the work of a Constituent Assembly convened by the military, elections were held in 1993, the first full elections since the Basotho National Party annulled the 1970 elections.


* Sources of Ambiguity. Weight of international pressures and scope of protest. Strong external pressures from donors played a critical role and raises doubt about the relative importance of the mass mobilization, which was also limited in scope.
The role of distributive conflict. Important, although magnified by significant international pressure. A coup in 1986 created a mixed system of government: a military regime with the king as its chief executive. Over time, tensions mounted within the government culminating in a coup in 1990 that effectively deposed the king and sent him into exile. This decision by the military was driven by growing public disaffection with the regime and a campaign that included the Church, press, and academics. On seizing power, the military convened a handpicked Constituent Assembly that was given the task of drafting a constitution. The military set the parameters of the constitutional debate and excluded a number of important party figures. However, corruption within the regime and wider economic grievances resulted in the mobilization of unions and civil society groups against the government. Repression of these strikes proved an embarrassment for external donors, who added their voices to the pressure for a transition. Yet another coup followed in April 1991, but the new government promised to abide by the findings of the Constituent Assembly. Unfolding events toward the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and ongoing civil society pressures appeared to play a role in holding the military to elections. The elections were placed in the hands of foreign (Commonwealth) advisors and appear to have been largely free and fair excepting some technical/administrative limitations.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. The military exercised quite substantial control over the Constituent Assembly and subsequent transition, but military decisions were taken against the backdrop of at least some union and civil society mobilization.

*Liberia 2006 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)*

The transition. After intense violence threatened to engulf the capital of Monrovia, rebel factions and the followers of the deposed dictator, Charles Taylor, accepted the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003. The agreement was brokered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and a force of about 15,000 UN peacekeepers. It established a transitional government that shared power and committed to elections no later than 2005. The elections were held on schedule and the winner was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who took office in 2006.

The role of distributive conflict. Extensive and very violent; although conflicts had an ethnic component, they eventually degenerated into warlordism, driven far more by “greed” than “grievance.” In 1989, a coup launched by Charles Taylor—a former regime insider—set off a civil war by initiating an invasion from the Ivory Coast. The incumbent regime, led by Samuel Doe,
based its power in a single ethnic group, the Krahn tribe and had engaged in severe reprisals against other ethnic groups. In this context, Taylor initially gained control of most of the countryside. However, the conflict degenerated quickly into much more localized battles among warlords and predatory militia units, including child soldiers. The civil war eventually killed more than 250,000 people.

In 1996, after severe fighting in Monrovia, ECOWAS intervened to broker a truce. Elections were held in 1997. Taylor won with 75 percent of the vote, but fighting again broke out—this time triggered by a rebellion among rival warlords in the north, and by Taylor’s involvement with the bloody revolutionary force (RUF) fighting in Sierra Leone. In 2003, after violence again threatened to engulf Monrovia, ECOWAS entered as a peacekeeper, backed by about 15,000 United Nations peace-keeping force. Taylor resigned ahead of the peace agreement, but was later arrested and tried by the International Court of Justice. Under international auspices, a provisional authority organized elections won by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition (elite displacement). Despite the massive violence of the civil wars, we do not see the elite-mass divisions that drive distributive conflict transitions. As in Sierra Leone (1996, 1998, which was also coded as non-distributive despite bloody internal conflicts), the Liberian civil war was primarily a struggle between rival warlords and predatory militias. The transition was brokered primarily by international organizations in the wake of Charles Taylor.

**Lithuania 1991 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition**

**The transition.** In March 1990, elections to the Supreme Soviet produced a victory for the independence movement (Sajudis) and a declaration of independence in March. The Soviet Union rejected the declaration and used sanctions and selective military actions to maintain control. After a brief attempt in January 1991 to depose the government by force, which failed, the government staged a national referendum on independence in February 1991. The Soviet Union recognized Lithuania as an independent republic in August 1991 following the failed putsch against Gorbachev.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. As in Latvia, Gorbachev’s perestroika and glastnost initiative opened the way to the organization of a reform movement (Sajudis) and to ethnonationalist demonstrations. Although these began in Latvia, they soon broadened into coordinated protest activities throughout the Baltics, led by Popular Front Organizations. The Lithuanian independence movement, like most others in the Soviet Union, was motivated by ethno-nationalist—rather than overtly economic—demands. Never-
theless, Lithuanian nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians.

In 1989 and 1990, Soviet authorities responded to the protest by allowing semi-competitive elections for provincial legislatures (Soviets). In Lithuania, the way was opened for the victory of the nationalist Popular Front in the multiparty elections to the republic’s Supreme Soviet, followed by the declaration of succession and independence in March 1990 and the legalization of multiparty competition. Tense negotiations with the Soviet government ensued. A turning point came in January 1991, when Soviet forces occupied the central TV station. Despite a number of civilian deaths, however, the government remained in power, and in August 1991, the Soviet government recognized Lithuanian independence after the failed conservative coup of August 1991.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. As noted, the massive Lithuanian independence movement was motivated by ethno-nationalism, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization. Mass mobilization was aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power away from the Russian minority and toward the Lithuanian majority.

**Macedonia 1991 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)**

**The transition.** After political reforms in 1990, the former Communist Kiro Gligorov won presidential elections in January 1991. In September 1991, the country voted for independence from the former Yugoslavia.

**The role of distributive conflict.** After Tito’s death in 1980 the Yugoslav communist party adopted a collective leadership model, with the occupant of the top position rotating annually, and strengthened the federal structure to give more authority to Yugoslavia’s constituent republics. During the 1980s, however, attempts to implement IMF-sponsored adjustments to economic decline exacerbated tensions between liberal elites within the federal government and the regional elites, and among the regional elites themselves. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Slovenian government began to withhold tax contributions to the federal government and to resist federal efforts to increase its control over the monetary system. These tensions opened the way for similar responses in Croatia.

Tensions within the federal system escalated further because of ethnic conflicts in Serbia between Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Communist League of Serbia, exploited the intra-Serbia conflicts with Serbian nationalist appeals that further alarmed elites in the other regions. The growing rift among the regional branches of the Communist Party led to

the effective dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held in January 1990 into different parties for each republic.

The dissolution of the federal party opened the way for reform communists within the regions to hold multiparty elections in 1990. In Macedonia, although the nationalist party won a plurality, the ex-communist party (SDSM) led by Kiro Gligorov forged a majority coalition in the parliament. In 1991, Gligorov was elected president and—following the lead of Slovenia and Croatia—led the government to a declaration of “sovereignty” later that year.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, preemptive. As in Croatia, nationalist sentiment was strong, but mass mobilization was not a decisive factor in the decision to hold regional elections or in the path of independence in Macedonia in particular. Thanks in part to UN peacekeepers, Macedonia did not become deeply involved in the Balkan wars.

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The transition. President Ratsikara agreed to the formation of a Constitutional Convention in 1992, which organized presidential elections in that year and parliamentary elections in 1993 (thus accounting for the differing dates of the transitions). The leader of the Vital Forces, Albert Zafy, emerged from the elections as the new head of government.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Substantial. Madagascar, one of the poorest and most aid-dependent states in the world, experienced a major economic crisis after the decline of Soviet aid in the 1980s. In 1989, the ruler, Didier Ratsikara, sought to extend his mandate in a rigged presidential election. In response, the Christian Council of Churches organized a broad opposition coalition (the Vital Force) in 1990-91, which mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in general strikes and protests and seized government buildings. Though Ratsikara had been in power since 1975, the military was too divided to suppress the emergence of armed groups (Kung Fu societies) or autonomous civil society organizations, which subsequently provided the impetus for the anti-regime protests.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Economic grievances rooted in the crisis of the 1980s spurred the general strikes and demonstrations. The Vital Force crumbled quickly, leaving Zafy isolated. This allowed Ratsikara to make a comeback, regaining the presidency in the elections of 1996.
Malawi 1994 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*

**The transition.** In 1992, President for Life Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda agreed to hold a referendum on whether to continue single-party rule or to hold multi-party elections. The referendum was held in 1993, and new presidential and national assembly elections transferred power to the opposition in 1994.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Prior to 1992, there were no opposition parties and the reach of two pro-democracy NGOs was extremely limited. In March 1992, Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter condemning human rights abuses, in effect an elite defection. The letter set off a wave of student protests and strikes, although they were effectively repressed. At the same time, a group of anti-regime exiles met in Lusaka, Zambia, and prominent trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana chose to return to Malawi to lead a domestic campaign for democracy and human rights, prompting the formation of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). His arrest resulted in a shift in donor sentiment toward the country—including the rejection of a major aid appeal—and increased external support for the pro-democracy opposition. Donors also played a crucial role in guaranteeing the integrity of the referendum and subsequent elections.

There is evidence that Banda initially sought to control the referendum process to his advantage (for example, by appointing the Referendum Committee without opposition representation). The transition was pushed along in part by the disintegration of the patronage networks that had sustained the ruling Malawi Congress Party and by the loss of control over the coercive apparatus. In 1993, the Army revolted against an attempt by Banda to transfer power to his lieutenant, John Tembo. Former insiders were the main challengers in the 1994 election, and the winner was Bakili Mazuli, who had broken from the ruling party only the year before.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. The pastoral letter was followed by some protests, the coalescing of an opposition in exile, and the formation of so-called “pressure groups” that played off the regime’s weak economic performance.

Malawi 2004 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)

**The transition.** In 2003, opposition from churches, NGOs, and donor countries induced President Bakili Mazuli to abandon attempts to extend the two terms for which he had been in power. However, his designated successor, Bingu wa Mutharika, emerged as the winner in the regularly scheduled election in 2004. Opposition parties and rivals within the ruling party initially

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challenged these results in court, but were eventually induced by political appointments to abandon these challenges.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Limited. Bakili Mazuli was the first president elected after the establishment of multi-party politics in 1994, after student protests and international pressure forced the ouster of strongman Hastings Banda. Mazuli had been an insider in the old one-party regime of Hastings Banda, and once elected, he relied heavily on state resources to perpetuate himself in power. Soon after winning reelection for a second five-year term in 1999, he began a campaign to lift constitutionally-mandated limits on a third term. Despite efforts to stack the High Court and intimidate opponents, he backed down in the face of opposition from the United States and the EU, the church, NGOs, and rival factions in his ruling party. However, Bingu wa Mutharika—the winner in 2004 with 35 percent of the vote—was Mazuli’s chosen successor. Opposition politicians and breakaway factions of the ruling party initially challenged the results in court, but the challenges faded after many of the opposition parties were incorporated into the government coalition.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, institutional. We coded the ouster of Hastings Banda and the establishment of multiparty system in 1994 as a distributive conflict transition. However, the 2004 transition is more appropriately coded as non-distributive. Mazuli’s attempt to perpetuate his rule involved some intimidation and constitutional irregularities, but was only a relatively moderate reversal of the multi-party system established after 1994. The domestic groups that forced him to back down came largely from rival politicians within his own party, rather than from the outside, and their opposition was limited primarily to court challenges. Eventually, moreover, Mazuli was able to secure the victory of his chosen successor in a regularly-scheduled election. As in 1994, finally, pressure from international donors played a major role as well. The transition, in short, resulted from intra-elite rivalries and vulnerability to external pressure.

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**Malaysia 2008 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)**

**The transition.** In general elections in March, the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition suffered a major electoral setback. It failed to retain its historical two-thirds majority of seats in the lower house, a supermajority that allowed the coalition to rewrite the constitution. The BN also lost majorities in four of eleven state governments and failed to retake a fifth. Following the elections, Prime Minister Badawi announced his decision to resign from the leadership of the National Front and was succeeded by Najib Tun Razak in April 2009. The election was widely viewed as a major setback to the ruling coalition. The
change in Polity score—from “4” to “6”—appears to reflect the fact that the election was relatively free and fair and more competitive than elections in the past and that the ruling coalition had lost its parliamentary majority and dominance of state governments.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Malaysia has long been a competitive authoritarian regime and has allowed elections to take place. Nonetheless, the government has undermined judicial independence and limited freedom of assembly, association, speech, and the press. The control of government also provided enormous advantages over opposition parties who faced significant obstacles in competing with the long-entrenched ruling coalition. In 2004 elections, the UMNO captured fully 90 percent of seats. In 2008, the election was timed so that a leading opposition figure, Anwar Ibrahim could not stand for office because of a prior ban on his political participation.

There were a number of events in the year prior to the election that might be interpreted as distributive conflict as we have defined it. Peaceful protests by the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) about the destruction of Hindu temples were broken up by force, dozens of protestors were arrested and five Hindraf leaders were detained under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act. Purely political protests were initiated by the Malaysian Bar Council and by civil society groups calling for free and fair elections. Although focused around religious and political issues, these protests occurred in the context of broader Chinese and Indian disaffection with Malay preferences under the so-called New Economic Policy initiated in 1971. The most sophisticated analysis of the electoral results suggests that the regime’s decreased majority was the consequence of non-Malay voters’ rejecting the incumbent regime in favor of secular opposition parties.

However, there is no evidence that these protests had any effect on the holding of the elections nor on the government’s approach to them; rather, analysis prior to the election suggests that the result was largely unforeseen by both government and opposition, suggesting a miscalculation of the extent of dissatisfaction with the government.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. The outcome of the regularly scheduled election appears to be the result of voter defection from the ruling party rather than overt distributive conflict that induced the regime to make political concessions.

Maldives 2008 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. Riots in 2003 over a shooting in Maafushi prison and fierce international pressure pushed strongman Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who had ruled since 1978, to lift a ban on opposition parties and allow multiparty elec-
tions. He ran in multiparty elections held in 2008, and was defeated by Mohamed Nasheed, a human rights activist and long-time adversary, who had spent years as a political prisoner.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Maldives is an archipelago of scattered islands with a population of about 300,000. Between 1978 and 2008, the Gayoom regime ruled with a moderate Islamic orientation and spurred growth through the attraction of European tourism. The regime received strong backing from India. In 1988, India sent 1600 troops to quash an incursion from Tamil militants that had temporarily succeeded in occupying the capital city, and restored Gayoom to power.

While casting a moderate image abroad, Gayoom was repressive at home, using intimidation and prison to check opponents. For most of his reign, opposition parties were banned and Gayoom ran for election unopposed. In 2003, he was preparing to run for his sixth consecutive five-year term. Opposition, however, was building up—spurred both by a democracy movement led by activist Mohamed Nasheed and a movement of more radical Islamists. Tensions mounted after an incident in September 2003, when a prison protest on the island of Maafushi led to a police crackdown and the deaths of three prisoners. There followed large demonstrations—possibly encouraged by opposition groups—and the torching of government buildings in the capital city. Gayoom went forward with the referendum that ratified a sixth term, but his regime was shaken by the rioting and under international pressure to avoid extensive repression; it announced the intention to undertake political reforms in June 2004. In August 2004, “Black Friday” protests commemorating the prison incident were the largest to date. In the ensuing years, the cabinet was restocked with younger, reform-minded, and Western educated people. In 2005, the president introduced a bill that legalized opposition parties, and multiparty elections were held at the end of Gayoom’s term in 2008.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. The riot appeared to mark a turning point. Although Gayoom remained in control of the regime for another five years, the threat of protest continued and pressed Gayoom to undertake steady progress toward political liberalization and multiparty elections.

*Mali 1992 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. In March 1991, Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure led a coup ousting long-standing dictator Moussa Traore. The new military government appointed a transition committee, which drafted a new constitution that was subsequently reviewed by a National Conference and submitted to a referendum. Elections were held in 1992, which were won by Alpha Oumar Konare and The Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Adema).
The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The origins of resistance to the regime were economic, and began with urban protests against structural adjustment measures instituted in the late 1980s, which cut against the interests of civil servants in particular. The ruling UDPM resisted calls for multiparty democracy, and subsequently three distinct opposition groups formed, coalescing into a Coordinating Committee of Democratic Associations and Organizations (CCAOD), which mobilized demonstrations in December 1990 to put pressure on the ruling party. The main union organization linked to the government party, the UNTM, also initiated strikes in January. These challenges started to divide the military between conservatives and dissenters, including Traore. Violent clashes in January and March led to over a hundred deaths and were clearly the precipitating cause of the coup. The coup leaders took the important steps outlined, including the organization of the National Conference and the coordination of the first multiparty elections (1992). In January 1992 a new constitution was also adopted, which is the founding date of Mali’s Third Republic.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Despite the fact that the military was able to play an important role in the transition process, mass mobilization was clearly significant.


and by his own head of National Security, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The
coup initially faced opposition from the European Union, the Bush administra-
tion, the African Union, and the United Nations. However, external powers
warmed to the junta after it agreed to conform to international human rights
agreements and establish a time table for multiparty elections. The credibil-
ity of these commitments was enhanced considerably by the release of political
prisoners, consultations with opposition politicians, and a pledge that none of
the members of the junta would stand in the elections. By 2006, the provisional
government was receiving considerable technical and financial support from in-
ternational NGOs and the quasi-official National Democratic Institute from
the United States. Abdalahi, the winner of the 2007 election, was believed to
have the support of the military, as well as of much of the political elite. He
came from the same dominant Arab Berber ethnic group as did the top military.
However, in 2008, the presidential guard subsequently him from office after he
attempted to dismiss a number of senior military officers.

Coding. Elite-led transition, elite displacement. Underlying patterns of racial
tension and repression did not appear to play a major role in the politics of
the transition. The conflicts occurred within the dominant ethnic elite and,
in particular, within the military in the wake of the ouster of Maaouia Old
Sid Ahmed Taya. International pressure was also very important. Although
the EU and international donors initially disapproved of the “unconstitutional”
ouster of Taya, the threat to withhold trade and aid played an important role
in pushing the junta to move toward relatively open multi-party elections.

Mexico 1997 (Polity only; see discussion of CGV coding of 2000 below)
· Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. The dominant party, the PRI, lost its absolute congressional
majority in the regularly-scheduled 1997 congressional elections following sev-
eral decades of gradual political liberalization and institutional reform. Be-
tween 1990and 1996, the PRI had incrementally transferred control over the
electoral machinery to an independent Federal Election Institute (IFE), which
 guaranteed that the 1997 elections were more free and fair than those in the
past.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Protests over electoral fraud
were a source of leverage against the ruling party, but focused primarily on the
legitimacy of the political regime. The PRI’s capacity to maintain electoral cred-
ibility was also eroded by the decline of patronage resources and the expansion
of middle-class and informal sector voters who were not fully integrated into
the corporatist system. Pressure for gradual political liberalization came as well
from the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas. Major labor unions, however,

Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies
and Electoral Institutions. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
compartido: un ensay sobre la democ-
ratización Mexicana. Mexico: D.F.
Oceano.
remained tightly linked to the ruling party, and episodes of rural unrest did not pose immediate threats to the party’s dominance or directly affect the transition. Much more serious challenges came from generalized discontent among business groups and the middle class over recurrent economic crises and painful adjustments, as well as from internal rifts within the ruling party over control of patronage. Protests about fraud, especially the blatant corruption of the 1988 presidential election, led to the establishment of an independent electoral commission in 1990 and subsequently, to incremental increases in its autonomy. However, the strongest opposition party in the negotiation of these reforms was the PAN, a center-right party backed by business elites and sectors of the middle class. The PAN was the principal winner in the 1997 congressional elections, and its candidate gained the presidency in 2000.

Coding. Non-distributive conflict transition, institutional. Although there were repeated protests against electoral fraud across the political spectrum, the government negotiated the reforms primarily with leaders of the center-right opposition.

Mexico 2000 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. An opposition candidate won the regularly-scheduled 2000 presidential election, and this election rather than the 1997 congressional elections is the basis for the CGV coding. The transition followed several decades of gradual political liberalization and institutional reform. Between 1990 and 1996, the PRI had incrementally transferred control over the electoral machinery to an independent Federal Election Institute (IFE). This in turn contributed to the turnover in the 1997 congressional elections and the loss of the presidency in 2000.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas contributed to the pressures for gradual political liberalization; and the PRI’s capacity to maintain electoral credibility was also eroded by decline of patronage resources and the expansion of middle-class and informal sector voters who were not fully integrated into the corporatist system. Major labor unions, however, remained tightly linked to the ruling party, and the episodes of rural unrest did not pose immediate threats to the party’s dominance or directly affect the transition. Much more serious challenges came from generalized discontent over recurrent economic crises and painful adjustments, as well as from internal rifts within the ruling party over the control of patronage. Protests about fraud, especially blatant corruption of the 1988 presidential election, led to the establishment of an independent electoral commission in 1990 and subsequently, to incremental increases in its autonomy. However, the strongest opposition party in the negotiation of these reforms

was the PAN, a center-right party backed by business elites and sectors of the middle class. The PAN was the principal winner in the 1997 congressional elections, and its candidate gained the presidency in 2000.

**Coding.** Non-distributive conflict transition, institutional. Although there were repeated protests against electoral fraud across the political spectrum, the government negotiated the reforms primarily with leaders of the center-right opposition; the basis for the shift in regime was the outcome of a regularly scheduled election that brought a center-right opposition candidate to office.

**Moldova 1993 (Polity only)· Elite-led transition (institutional)**

The transition. In October 1993, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova, elected in 1990, agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. These elections were held in 1994. More than 20 parties and political movements were registered in 1993, and the election was the first since independence was declared in 1991.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited by 1993, and of little direct relevance to democratization. There were major demonstrations over Romanian language rights in the late Soviet period, which in 1989, evolved into a nationalist Popular Front movement, which captured the leadership of the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. Mircea Snegur, a former Communist official, was first elected president by the Parliament in 1990 and then ran unopposed in 1991. In the early 1990s, there were violent confrontations between Romanian ethnic nationalists and Slavic-speaking regions backed by Russia. Although ethnic and—to a lesser extent—economic grievances continued to spur protests through the mid-1990s, the violence had largely subsided by 1992. Following the 1991 elections, the Popular Front began to splinter into moderate factions advocating independence and more radical factions advocating union with Romania. The temporary ascendancy of the radicals spurred violent minority protests and a Soviet-backed secession in the provinces of Gagauz and Transnistra.

But in 1993, centrist factions gained control of the Supreme Soviet and formed a government that offered a more moderate road to national independence and some representation to minorities. With defections and realignment, the representation of the pro-Romanian faction fell to only 25 seats, and the ethnic violence subsided. Parliamentary stalemates continued, however, over economic issues, and as the economy worsened, the government agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. The more moderate coalition led by communist reformers and moderate factions of the Popular Front won overwhelmingly.

Distributive conflict and regime change

Elite-led transition, institutional. Mass ethnic protest between 1990 and 1992 constituted an important part of the political landscape, but these protests focused on relations with the Soviet Union and Romania and had been brought under control by moderate politicians, overwhelmingly supported by the Moldovan population. The spur to competitive elections in 1994 came primarily because the moderate leadership was stalemated over issues of economic reform.


The transition. There is disagreement between the two datasets in the dating of this transition, and it is arguably significant in reaching a coding decision. In March 1990, Jambyn Batmonh, head of the Communist party, resigned in the face of street protests and popular demands for faster reform. In May, the new head of the party (Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat) renounced its constitutional role as the guiding force in the country, and legalized opposition parties. In July 1990, the government held Mongolia’s first multi-party elections for a parliament. However, communists won this election decisively and the parliament elected Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, the head of the reformed Communist party, to the presidency. Some opposition figures were incorporated into the cabinet. A new constitution was subsequently negotiated with the opposition in 1991 and came into effect in January 1992, but in the absence of any significant protest. Communists won again in the first multiparty election of the post-Soviet era in 1992. The 1992 elections appear to be the basis for the Polity coding.

The role of distributive conflict. Initially important, but insignificant by 1992. Street demonstrations in 1990 intensified divisions within the ruling party about whether to repress or reform, and led to the replacement of the leadership in the March 1990 Party Congress. Although the demonstrations were catalytic, reformist pressures had been building within the party since 1988, strengthened as a consequence of Perestroika and events in Eastern Europe. Opposition forces, moreover, were based primarily in academic institutions and the intelligentsia and concentrated almost exclusively within Ulan Bator. The opposition lacked a base among the herd people of the countryside. The ruling party retained control over state finances, media, and patronage, and it won an overwhelming victory in the multiparty elections of 1990, with 85 percent of the vote.

Subsequent initiatives for constitutional revision emerged in response to economic difficulties, but came from within the reformed communists, as well as from the opposition and did not in any way reflect a response to protests. The new constitution, including its electoral components, was negotiated peacefully.

* Sources of Ambiguity. Class composition of protest and nature of grievances. Despite the temporary outbreak of protest in 1990, the transitional constitution and elections were largely the result of intra-elite bargaining. Grievances appeared overwhelmingly political, and did not focus on socioeconomic inequalities. Protest played no role in the 1991 constitutional negotiations and subsequent elections.

within the legislature.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Although we do not believe that distributive conflict was central to this transition, the protests of 1990 played at least some role in moving the party toward reform.

*Nepal 1990 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding of 1999 below) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. King Birendra lifted the ban on political parties in 1990 and allowed for an interim government headed by a coalition of opposition leaders. A Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) drafted a new basic law, setting the stage for parliamentary elections in May 1991.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. In late 1989, the Nepali Congress party leadership sought to initiate a mass movement to restore democracy, motivated in part by economic grievances following the monarchy’s mismanagement of relations with India. Left and communist parties, which had previously eschewed the pursuit of democratic reforms, joined the democratic movement; four communist parties plus three other groups formed a United Left Front (ULF) to lend “moral support” to the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Demonstrations around the country were met with liberalizing concessions, but the opposition movement viewed these as inadequate. Protests in April were met by the military with violence, but in the wake of these demonstrations the king made more fundamental concessions. The parties making up the ULF chose to run separately, but the Communist Party of the Nepal was the second largest earner of votes. Land reform was advocated by all parties.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Significant political concessions by the king followed immediately in the wake of violent protests.

*Nepal 1999 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)*

The transition. Partly in response to violent protests, King Birendra lifted the ban on political parties in 1990 and allowed for an interim government headed by a coalition of opposition leaders. A Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) drafted a new basic law, setting the stage for parliamentary elections in May 1991 (see discussion of the 1990 CGV transition above). From that time through 1999, Polity coded the country as a “5” and thus just below the democratic threshold. There is nothing in the Polity description of the case


to suggest why the coding changed from 5 to 6 in 1999, but elections were held in that year on schedule and without problems, ending a long period of ineffective minority government.

The role of distributive conflict. Ambiguous. Party politics in Nepal in the second half of the 1990s played out against a backdrop of mounting violence and ultimately civil war. The United People’s Front (UPF), formed in 1996, grew out of a radical Maoist wing of the Nepal Communist Party and sought the violent overthrow of the monarchy. In addition to the class-based appeal of the UPF, the rebels also claimed to represent a number of smaller ethnic groups (of Tamang, Khumba and Magar origins) who had complained of discrimination.

However, as Mahendra Lawoti in particular argues in some detail, it is not clear that these events directly influenced democratization in general or the holding of elections in 1999 in particular. The 1994 legislative elections took place after the collapse of the Nepali Congress government. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) won the most seats and Man Mohan Adhikari became Prime Minister, though at the head of a minority government. Governments during this period were hamstrung by both party system fragmentation and internal factionalism and never enjoyed a majority. In 1998, the Communist party splintered. At the end of 1998, a one-party minority Nepal Congress Party government was installed with assurances to the opposition parties that elections would be held over the course of the year. The government scheduled elections for May and the NCP won an outright majority. The King subsequently dissolved this government in 2002; see the discussion of the 2002 reversion below.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. As with several other cases, Nepal in 1999 is partly a coding anomaly: a slight increase in the Polity score from 5 to 6 forces us to code the case as a transition. Unlike Fiji 2004, however, the relevant political event is somewhat clearer: the willingness of a minority Congress Party government to hold promised elections. However, there is no evidence that the willingness to hold the elections was the result of concessions to the rebels or other distributive pressures. To the contrary, Congress ultimately gained from the ineffectiveness of the prior Communist government on the issue, even though the Congress government ultimately proved divided and ineffective as well.


The transition. A number of discrete events could be identified with the political transition, which unfolded over several years. Following a 19-day coun-
trywide uprising in April 2006, the King was forced to reinstate the House of Representatives. In May 2006, the parliament assumed total legislative power and began to strip away royal powers and prerogatives. As a result of ongoing conflicts with the Maoists over the new constitutional order, as well as among the major parties, however, the Nepali Congress-led government, pushed Constituent Assembly elections back from May 2007 to November 2007 and then again to April 2008. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) won the plurality of votes and seats in the Assembly. At the first session of the Constituent Assembly in May, it voted to declare Nepal a federal democratic republic, thereby abolishing the monarchy; the decision was implemented in December 2007. However, complex negotiations continued over the remainder of 2007 and into 2008 over power-sharing arrangements and amendments to the constitution. Following a fifth amendment to the constitution seeking to address these issues, an indirect presidential election was held in July 2008 and parliamentary selection of a prime minister took place in August.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. In the early phase of the transition, the Maoist insurgency played a role in the reversion to absolutist royal rule (see the discussion of 2002 below, which is coded as an elite-reaction reversion). However, the mass uprising of April 2006 was clearly determinative of the King’s decision to withdraw from power. The new democratic government almost immediately issued a ceasefire and began negotiations with the Maoists, culminating in the signing of a peace accord in November 2006 and the gradual integration of the Maoists into the political system. Nonetheless, the role of mass mobilization continued through the complex negotiations over the National Assembly elections that were ultimately held in April 2008 and through subsequent debates over power-sharing arrangements and constitutional revision. For example, the Maoists left the interim government in September 2007 and threatened street protests to assure that a republic would be declared and elections held. The Maoists repeatedly used the threat of withdrawal from negotiations, as well as the mobilization of protest during the negotiations on constitutional revision as well. Minority Madhesi parties also threatened mass mobilization in support of their autonomy claims.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Both the withdrawal of the King and the subsequent course of constitutional negotiations were deeply affected by mass protests or threat of it.

Nicaragua 1984 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding for 1990 below) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. After several years of negotiations with the opposition, elections were held in 1984. The principal opposition leader, Arturo Cruz, and a coalition of conservative parties decided not to run in the election citing restrictions imposed by the regime. Nevertheless, at least some outside observers declared the election free and fair and this appears to be the basis of the CGV coding.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. A revolutionary process in which mass grievances played a central role drove the transition from Somoza to the Sandinistas in 1979. However, the democratic transition in question did not occur at that point in time, but rather after the Sandinistas had established their political dominance. Although the regime had promised a transition to more pluralistic politics, it did not face mass pressure to hold elections in 1984 and held the upper hand in negotiations with the opposition. The government’s principal objectives were to reduce opposition from private-sector groups and particularly, to bolster international support in the face of the counter-revolutionary opposition backed by the United States.

Coding. Elite-led, preemptive transition. Indirectly, the elections were arguably made possible by a mass-based revolutionary struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. The decision to hold elections and the preemptive transition, however, came from the Sandinista leadership in the face of international pressure.

Nicaragua 1990 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. The government of the dominant Sandinista Party held presidential elections in 1990, with intense international monitoring. The election was won by an opposition coalition led by Violeta Chomorro.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. By 1990, the Nicaraguan economy had been severely crippled by the war with the US-backed “contras”, an economic embargo, and the prospective loss of aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Sandinista’s decision to hold a relatively free election under international supervision was based in part on the hope that a credible election would help to end the US embargo and attract assistance from Western Europe, and partly on the expectation that it had enough public support to win. Although the opposition received substantial external assistance, its organized backing at home came primarily from business sectors and the Catholic Church, whereas


the ruling party had extensive links to domestic civil society organizations. The opposition was able to capitalize on widespread public fatigue with the war with the “contras” and the hope that a vote for the opposition would bring peace and American assistance.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, preemptive. The contra insurgency posed an ongoing threat to the Sandinista government, but its support came primarily from the United States government and conservative groups outside and inside Nicaragua. It does not fit the profile of a mass, redistributive uprising on the part of the dispossessed against an entrenched elite. The primary impetus for the 1990 elections came from strong external pressures, not threats “from below”.

**Niger 1992-3 (Polity 1992; CGV 1993) · Distributive conflict transition**

The transition. General Saibou agreed to the convening of a National Conference in July 1990. The Conference assumed the de facto power of a transitional government, drafted a new constitution and held generally free elections in March 1993. The victor was Mahamane Ousmane at the head of a coalition led by the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS).

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Seyni Kountché, in power since 1974, died in 1987, and was succeeded by General Ali Saibou. The main public sector and student unions had been subjugated by the Kountché regime, but became substantially more militant and independent after the mid-1980s. They also maintained clandestine alliances with Marxist associations appealing to the Hausa (about half the population), and to the underdeveloped northern region. In 1990, these forces backed strikes and protests against IMF austerity programs and supported the formation of left-oriented opposition parties. It was in response to these pressures that General Saibou and the military announced that the constitution would be revised, that a multi-party system would be permitted and finally that a National Conference would be convened, following the model in other Francophone states. The National Conference subsequently dissolved the Saibou government and the national assembly and drove the transition process.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Key concessions followed in the immediate aftermath of mass urban mobilization, with economic grievances playing an important role.

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* Source of Ambiguity. Class composition of protest. Unions and student organizations represented only a minuscule portion of the population.
**Niger 2000 (CGV only) - Distributive conflict transition**

**The transition.** In 1999, authoritarian ruler Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Bare was killed by his own presidential guard. Following the coup within the army, Major Daouda Mallam Wanke declared a 9-month transition plan to take place under a military Council of National Reconciliation. After extensive debate over the nature of institutional arrangements—within appointed Technical and Consultative Committees and in the press—the military imposed a solution, which was validated in a referendum in 1999. Major Wanke’s government then organized presidential and legislative elections, held in October and November 1999, and a new government, headed by Tandja Mamadou, took office as the Fifth Republic in 2000.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. In 1996, the military under the leadership of Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Bare overthrew the relatively new democratic government and dissolved the institutions of the Third Republic. The military stated its commitment to return the country to democratic rule, and appointed a new national conference, the National Forum for Democratic Revival, to seek constitutional changes that were approved in referendum. However, the military clearly intended to control both the constitutional revision and elections in the now-presidential system; when opposition forces appeared poised to challenge the military candidate in the elections, vote counting was stopped and Bare declared himself the winner. In the legislative elections scheduled for later in 1996, the opposition coalesced around a program to annull the presidential elections. A period of constant opposition mobilization followed, including protests and strikes involving students and the labor movement. The military sought to appease mounting protests with partial concessions, such as appointment of new governments and finally the holding of new elections in February 1999. However, the results were widely viewed as fraudulent, including by the international community. When Bare was assassinated by his own presidential guard, the head of the guard Major Daouda Mallam Wanke was pronounced head of state and announced the military’s intention to transition to a new democratic system.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. This transition is but one in a cycle of regime and government changes over the 1990s in which the military played a central role. However, the introduction of political changes under both Bare and Wanke occurred against the backdrop of ongoing mobilization by opposition and civil society groups, including unions. In contrast to the 1992-3 case, the protests appear wider in scope, including opposition parties challenging the corruption of the regime; we therefore do not code it as ambiguous.

Niger 2004 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. Following the drafting of a new constitution in 1999, retired General Mamadou Tandja won presidential elections in 1999 and again in 2004; CGV codes a transition in 2000 as a result (see above). Tandja was the first president of Niger to survive a full term in office, and the 2004 elections were generally considered free and fair; this turnover appears to be the basis of the Polity coding.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. In 1999, efforts by the military to impose a constitutional order that they dominated were met with widespread protest from opposition groups (see 2000 transition above). The military relented, initiating a more open process of political dialogue, the drafting of a new constitution, its approval by popular referendum and new elections. The elections for president and the legislature in 2004 were regularly scheduled, but they did mark the first time that turnover could have occurred as a result of competitive elections. The elections were generally seen as free and fair, although the opposition raised some objections to scheduling the second round presidential elections and legislative elections concurrently. Although not mentioned by Polity, elections were also held in July 2004 for 265 communes, the mayors and councilors of which had been previously appointed. There is no evidence that Tandja considered not holding the elections or that he was constrained from doing so by mass mobilization.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. Politics in Niger is clearly dominated by elites, and particularly by politicians with close ties to the military. There is some question about how democratic the country really was. Mass mobilization did play a role in forcing a more open political process on the generals in 1999, but the willingness of the government to hold elections in 2004 seemed to rest on the confidence that they could win rather than ongoing mass pressures. Tandja’s party (Mouvement National pour la Societe et Development, MNSD) dominated the communal elections and was able to forge an electoral coalition with several other minor parties to guarantee victory in the presidential election. Tandja won 40% of the popular vote in the first round of the presidential election, and 65% in the second round.

Nigeria 1999 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. Following the death of incumbent president General Sani Abacha in 1998, the military selected Abukar Abdulsalam as his successor and backed a phased transition to democratic rule over a two-year period. The transition began with political liberalization and consultations with the opposition,
and then proceeded with a succession of local, gubernatorial, parliamentary, and presidential elections. Olusegun Obasanjo (People’s Democratic Party) defeated Olu Falae (Alliance for Democracy-All People’s Party) for the presidency.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. In 1993, extensive strikes and protests forced General Babangida (1985-1993) to resign after he had attempted to extend his power by annulling the presidential elections. The transition began only five years later, after another long interval of military dictatorship under General Sani Abacha. During the Abacha presidency, the regime faced sporadic outbreaks of protest and violence, and used a combination of repression and co-optation to maintain power, for example, through the creation of new states that divided the opposition. The Abacha regime put in place a transition program, but it excluded important opposition figures and parties and ultimately was stage-managed to continue to Abacha’s own rule. Abacha died under mysterious circumstances in 1998 and was succeeded by a moderate general, Abukar Abdulsalam. By the time of Abacha’s death, continued military rule had come under strong pressure from the international community and from the military itself. Abubakar quickly moved to liberalize the political system including through the freeing of political prisoners and consultations with the opposition. He also announced that he would stick to the Abacha pledge to transfer power by October 1, 1999, a pledge that Abacha had appeared to be backing away from.

Despite Abubakar’s liberalizing moves, however, the precise nature of the transition remained unclear. Abubakar faced opposition from hardliners associated with Abacha, and some elements of Abacha’s plan for a rigged transition that would perpetuate his power (including his electoral tribunal and the five pro-Abacha political parties that had been vetted) remained in place. Although the process of releasing political prisoners had begun, Chief Abiola—the most prominent and the main opposition leader—had yet to be freed pending negotiations over whether he would claim power based on his victory in the 1993 elections. Abiola’s death in July 1998 gave rise to widespread protests and rioting.

Following the rioting after Abiola’s death, vital details of the transition were clarified and the pace accelerated. Abubakar almost immediately dismissed the cabinet appointed under Abacha, established a more independent National Election Council, and disbanded the five official parties, clearing the way for the organization of new, more independent parties. The timetable for the transfer, finally, was moved up from October to May 1999.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. It appears that Abubakar intended to liberalize the political system, in part due to international pressures and the political challenges the military faced as a result of declining economic perfor-
mance. However, he was only in office a month before Abiola was killed and his ability to carry out the transition plan in the face of hardliner opposition had not been tested. The riots seemed to strengthen the hand of the military reformers vis-à-vis the hardliners.

**Pakistan 1988 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)**

The transition. In May 1988, authoritarian leader General Muhammed Zia al-Haq dissolved the national parliament and provincial assemblies, and announced that new elections would be held in November on a “non-party” basis. However, in August, before the elections took place, the General died in a mysterious plane crash. Following Zia’s death, Acting President Ghulam Ishaque Khan announced that the elections would proceed as scheduled, and the Supreme Court ruled that parties would be allowed to participate. In November 1988, these elections brought Benazir Bhutto and the PPP coalition to power.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Following his seizure of power in 1978, Zia al-Haq had succeeded in establishing extensive control over the Pakistani military and the political regime. In 1979, his decision to execute the deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Benazir’s father) did generate mass protest in the Sindh region of the country. However, Zia aggressively repressed this movement, and it was unable to bring adequate pressure to bear on the regime for electoral changes. Responding in part to international influences, Zia lifted martial law and allowed non-party parliamentary elections in 1985, but also established extensive presidential powers including the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and to dissolve parliament.

After 1985, pressure for a normalization of politics came largely from Prime Minister Mohammed Khen Junejo, who sought to gain leverage by reaching out to opposition parties that had begun to resume activity. Growing tension with Zia led to Junejo’s abrupt dismissal in May 1988 and—after a delay—to the scheduling of “non-party” parliamentary elections. This move indicated Zia’s clear intention to control any transition process. It was the decapitation of the military leadership in the 1988 plane crash, rather than mass mobilization, that opened the way to a restoration of multi-party competition. Zia’s death provided an opportunity for Khan, the Chairman of the Senate, to claim the role of interim president and for opposition parties to run in the upcoming elections.

In the period leading up to the NRO and the October elections, the government continued to fight radical Islamic insurgents throughout the country, with periodic episodes of major violence not only in the tribal areas but in the cities as well. The continued violence pushed the US to focus on a political settlement and elections. At the same time, however, the violence also pushed toward tighter government control. After the presidential elections, violence escalated around Bhutto’s return and Musharraf imposed a state of emergency throughout Pakistan, suspended the Constitution, replaced the superior courts, and installed a caretaker government to oversee the elections, blaming the grow-
ing violence by militants. Bhutto was subsequently assassinated in December. However, both American and domestic pressures forced Musharraf to lift the state of emergency and move forward with the parliamentary elections.

The elections were a clear setback for Musharraf and his Pakistan Muslim League–Q party (PML–Q). The PPP failed to secure a majority but built a coalition including the Nawaz Sharif faction of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML–N) and parties with strong regional or religious bases (the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM, United National Movement)); the Awami National Party (ANP, People’s National Party); and a faction the Jamiat-e-the Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F, Party of the Ulema of Islam). The coalition was divided on a number of issues, but enjoyed a supermajority that would permit the impeachment of Musharraf and more fundamental democratic reforms. Protests over the judiciary continued as well as broader violence and the coalition partners ultimately moved toward impeachment. In August, Musharraf resigned.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. There are several sources of ambiguity in the case, including the fact that protests and wider violence did not break along clear distributive lines but rather appeared on political and religious grounds. The US also played an ambiguous role in the transition process, supporting Musharraf but also pushing for the elections that proved his undoing. The key precipitating factor in Musharraf’s resignation emanated from parliament, and thus the transition could be seen as intra–elite. Nonetheless, mass mobilization around the courts and violence rooted in regional interests (the tribal areas) as well as religion served as a crucial backdrop and we thus code the case as a distributive conflict transition.

Panama 1989 (CGV and Polity) · Elite–led transition (direct foreign intervention)

The transition. In December 1989, an invasion by the United States deposed and imprisoned military strongman Manuel Noriega and disbanded the base of his power, the Panama Defense Force. Guillermo Endara—the apparent victor in a presidential election held in May 1989 which Noriega had nullified—was subsequently sworn into office.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Although Panama maintained a facade of civilian government, Manuel Noriega was the de facto military ruler of Panama between 1983 and 1989. In a scheduled presidential election in May 1989, a coalition of opposition parties led by Guillermo Endara appeared to have overwhelmingly defeated Noriega’s candidate, Carlos Duque. Rather than accept this, Noriega annulled the election results and demonstrated his willingness to repress the opposition by tolerating a brutal physical attack on Endara himself. Despite unrest within some sectors of the military (there


was a failed coup attempt in October), popular protest was limited. The US invasion was spurred by growing antagonism between Noriega and the Reagan and Bush administrations over issues extraneous to democracy. Although Noriega had been on the CIA payroll, his links to drug trafficking became an increasing source of embarrassment to the U.S. government. The US used the pretext of actions against American troops and civilians to justify the invasion, which occurred in December. Within Panama, there may have been passive support for the U.S. invasion but the most notable overt reaction was looting and property damage, which lasted for a period of several weeks. Given that one of the stated intentions of the intervention was to restore democratic rule, there is no reason to link this violence to the democratization process, which simply confirmed the results of the May elections.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, direct foreign intervention. The cause of the transition was a foreign invasion, but the invasion did not appear to be motivated in any way by distributive conflicts in Panama.

**Paraguay 1989 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)**

**The transition.** In 1989, General Andres Rodriguez, backed by a coalition of military officers and a “traditionalist” faction of the ruling party, ousted aging dictator Alfredo Stroessner in a military coup. The coup leaders, headed by General Andres Rodriguez, proceeded to hold general elections in May 1989. Although the opposition was allowed to contest the elections, Rodriguez was the victor in the presidential race, and the ruling Colorado party retained an overwhelming majority in the legislature. These elections, however, appear to be the basis of the CGV coding. Further changes followed, including the election of a National Constituent Assembly in 1991, the promulgation of a new constitution in 1992 (the apparent basis of the Polity coding below), and new presidential elections in 1993.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Limited. Stroessner was overthrown in a palace coup. In 1988, he had been reelected for the eighth time, having ruled Paraguay since seizing power in 1954. By that time, serious concern had arisen within both the military and the ruling Colorado party about succession from the 76 year-old dictator’s rule. Against Stroessner’s supporters, a “traditionalist” wing of the Colorados pressed for a nonpersonalist transition to ensure the continuation of Colorado dominance. This movement gained the backing of rebels within the military led by General Andres Rodriguez, Stroessner’s second in command. Civil society had become somewhat more active in the 1980s, but the regime was not threatened by mass protest against the dictatorship; the elite remained thoroughly in control. Although international factors appeared
to play only a secondary role to the palace intrigue, after 1985, Paraguayan elites came under increasing diplomatic pressure from the Reagan administration to join the democratic wave. By 1988, there was growing concern within the military and party elite about international isolation.

Three months after the coup, Rodriguez held a snap election which he won with over 70 percent of the vote. A new constitution promulgated in 1992 limited the presidency to a single five-year term, an effort to limit the continuismo practiced under Stroessner. However, this step reflected the preferences of the “traditionalist” wing of the Colorados. In the election of 1993, General Rodriguez backed the nomination and election of Juan Carlos Wasmosy of the Colorado party. Although the election was generally considered to be free and fair, it was tainted by military threats to stage a coup if the Colorados were voted out of office. The newly-elected government, moreover, maintained continuity by appointing many Stroessner supporters to high government positions.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, elite displacement. The transition was driven by concerns within the military and ruling party about the succession from the Stroessner era and there was substantial continuity with the old regime. The international community also played a secondary role.

**Paraguay 1992 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)**

**The transition.** In 1992, a National Constitutional Assembly (elected in 1991) adopted a new constitution, which limited the presidency to a single five-year term and established the basis for a competitive presidential election in 1993.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Limited. In 1989, long-time dictator Alfredo Stroessner was ousted in a military coup led by Andres Rodriguez, with the backing of the conservative Catholic Church and the United States (see above). The issue of succession to the aging dictator was the primary motive for the coup. Rodriguez ended the state of emergency imposed by Stroessner over thirty years earlier, and held a presidential election in which he ran as a candidate of the ruling Colorado party and won with over 70 percent of the vote. In December 1991, the Rodriguez government held an election for a broadly representative National Constitutional Assembly which promulgated a new constitution in 1992; this constitution appears the basis for the Polity coding of the transition in this year. Rodriguez signed the constitution into law on June 22, 1992, and elections went forward in 1993.

It should be noted that the transition exhibited a number of continuities with the transitional military regime. Rodriguez and the military backed the nomination and election of his Colorado Party successor, Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Although the election was generally considered to be free and fair, the election


was tainted by military threats to stage a coup if the Colorado party was voted out of office. The new government did not continue the political liberalization initiated by Rodriguez and appointed a number of Stroessner supporters to high government positions.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, preemptive. The CGV coding came in the wake of the displacement of Stroessner. By 1992, a new power group was seeking to maintain continuity. The international community also played a role.

### Peru 1980 (CGV and Polity) - Distributive conflict transition

**The transition.** The military leadership agreed to elections for a Constituent Assembly, held in June 1978. The Assembly, dominated by the APRA party and other opposition forces, organized free presidential elections in May 1980. Fernando Belaunde Terry, an opposition candidate from the Christian Democratic party, emerged as the winner.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. The nationalist and populist military dictatorship established under General Juan Alvarado Velasco (1968-1973) sponsored the organization of new, corporatist labor organizations intended to counter-balance the strong union base of the APRA party, its historical adversary. However, the government was unable to gain full control over the organizations it had created, and as the economy began to deteriorate in 1973, it faced increasing opposition from both the old, APRA-based unions and its own new organizations. Labor opposition intensified divisions within the military itself, and in 1973, Velasco was replaced by a more conservative government headed by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. The new government, however, adopted more orthodox economic policies which further inflamed labor opposition and led to serious strikes in 1975 and 1976. Labor opposition reached a peak in July 1977 with a huge general strike, the largest in Peru's history. The strike forced the government to establish a firm date for a constitutional convention and set into motion a retreat to the barracks. The APRA party received the largest representation in the Assembly, which was chaired by its long-time leader, Haya de la Torre. The “new left” now independent of the military, also gained 33 percent of the votes. Strikes and other pressures from below continued through 1978 and 1979, but the momentum had shifted decisively toward a return to civilian rule.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Strong labor protest against the business-oriented policies of the Morales Bermudez government was a decisive element in the transition.
Peru 2001 (CGV and Polity) • Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. After the resignation of strongman Alberto Fujimori, in 2000, interim President Valentin Paniagua overhauled the electoral machinery and conducted a free and fair election in 2001. The winner was Alejandro Toledo, who had opposed Fujimori in the prior, fraudulent election of 2000.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited by the time of Fujimori’s resignation and the subsequent election. By the time of the scheduled 2000 presidential election, Fujimori’s autocratic regime had become increasingly unpopular. The election was marked by widespread fraud, and both international pressure and popular protests induced Fujimori to accept a runoff election. However, when evidence of fraud persisted, the opposition candidate, Alejandro Toledo, withdrew from the race, allowing Fujimori to win uncontested. Although popular protests and street demonstrations continued through Fujimori’s inauguration, they markedly subsided thereafter, and Fujimori appeared to be consolidating his power with the continued backing of military, business, and political elites. Fujimori was forced to withdraw only after the eruption of a major corruption scandal, which exposed that his intelligence chief and right-hand man, Vladimiro Montesinos, had been dispensing bribes to an opposition legislator. The scandal forced Montesinos to flee and triggered a rapid erosion of elite support for Fujimori. Faced with the desertion of his allies in the congress and with the possibility of impeachment, Fujimori suddenly resigned while on a state trip to Japan.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. By 2000, Fujimori faced widespread popular disaffection and international disapproval. He appeared positioned to withstand these pressures, however, until the corruption scandal caused the elite to withdraw its support of the regime.

The Philippines 1986–87 (CGV 1986; Polity 1987) • Distributive conflict transition

The transition. President Marcos resigned and fled the country in February 1986 in the wake of massive protests against fraudulent election results.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 and the onset of the debt crisis served to solidify the opposition to the Marcos regime. Strikes increased in 1984–85, although the union movement was split. The left also failed to reach an accommodation with the more moderate opposition, which finally coalesced around Cory Aquino and therefore played a limited role in the transition as a result. Nonetheless,


mass mobilization was clearly significant. After calling snap elections in November 1985, Marcos counted on his ability to use fraud and military loyalty to ride out any opposition. Following open efforts to steal the election by shifting the vote count to the controlled legislature, segments of the military defected and received support from a massive “people power” movement, with backing from the Church, opposition parties and civil society groups.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The left did not play a significant role in the transition and the Aquino government was moderate. However, it did openly stand for economic and social—as well as political—reforms that would address the material grievances that arose during the authoritarian period. The opposition movement was a cross-class one, including social forces representing the poor.

Poland 1989-91 (CGV 1989; Polity 1991) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. Roundtable negotiations between the martial law government of Wojciech Jaruzelski and the opposition Solidarity movement in 1989 produced a transitional agreement that reserved two-thirds of the parliamentary seats for the Communists and their allies. However, competitive elections for the remaining one-third of seats produced a smashing victory for Solidarity. In June 1989, the parliament, although still dominated by the Communists, selected Solidarity leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the first non-communist to head an Eastern European government since the late 1940s. Full parliamentary elections were held in January 1991.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. The industrial working class was the social base of the Solidarity movement, which emerged out of wildcat strikes of the late 1970s. Following a campaign of mass protest in 1979 and 1980, the regime imposed martial law and drove the movement underground. However, the social networks forged during the protests remained intact, and the risk of a renewed social explosion continued to be a serious impediment to the government’s efforts to undertake economic adjustments. The Solidarity movement resurfaced in 1988 and 1989, as economic conditions deteriorated. The movement rallied around nationalist and religious symbols as well as economic interests, but material grievances and outrage at the privileges of the communist elite were important motivating factors. Reform communists promoted the roundtable negotiations during a period of growing economic crisis, in the hopes that Solidarity leaders could be induced to share responsibility for new economic reform initiatives if they were granted electoral representation. After the sweeping victory of Solidarity candidates in the 1989 elections,

the parliament—still dominated by incumbent communists—ceded power to a new Solidarity government. The Solidarity government in turn presided over the establishment of an independent electoral commission and the first full parliamentary elections in 1991.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Although reformist communist factions played an important role in relaxing repression, the overt mobilization and electoral strength of the Solidarity movement was central to the transition.

**Romania 1990 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding of 1996 below)**. Distributive conflict transition

**The transition.** In December 1989, long-time dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was driven from office by violent riots, worker protests, and defections from within the party, military and police. The National Salvation Front, a group dominated by former Communists, seized power and held elections in May 1990.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. Protests initially broke out in Timisoara in December 1989 over ethnic issues involving the Hungarian minority, but these were joined by students and became a broader anti-regime protest. Ceausescu sought to rally support through a public appearance in Bucharest’s Revolution Square, but he was booed and heckled. Despite violent repression the protests grew in Bucharest and spread throughout the country ultimately forcing the Ceausescus to flee the capital. They were eventually apprehended, turned over to the army, sentenced to death by a military court and executed. The National Salvation Front (FSN), an interim government of Communist reformers around Ion Iliescu, initially seized political power. The FSN called for multi-party elections and lifted the ban against parties, but protests continued against the FSN monopoly of power and the media. Demonstrations against the FSN and continuing communist influence in government were countered by the FSN’s mobilization of miners, who entered the city at a number of critical junctures in 1990 both before and after the elections.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The coding is complicated by the fact that Ceausescu was ultimately deposed through a “palace coup” and by a party elite that appeared to orchestrate protest activity. Moreover, the transition to democracy was limited by continuing control of the government by former communists. However, the fall of the Ceausescus was also driven by an extraordinarily popular upheaval with obvious roots in economic grievances.
stemming from the collapse of the economy in the second half of the 1980s. Romania was the only Eastern Bloc country to overthrow its government by force and to execute its leaders.

**Romania 1996 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)**

The transition. The government of Ion Iliescu, a successor to the Communist party, was defeated in a regularly-scheduled election by Emil Constantinescu of the liberal Democratic Convention. The Polity coding is based on the fact that previous elections under the post-Communist National Salvation Front were marred by fraud and that the 1996 election was the first time the post-Communist successor party had been forced to yield power.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Although, as detailed above, mass mobilization played an important role in the fall of the Ceausescus, it was not a significant factor in the subsequent transition from the Iliescu regime. Rather, external pressure from the European Union played a pivotal role in inducing Iliescu to relax political controls in the early 1990s and to hold a clean election in 1996. In the midst of a very deep economic recession and faced with a suspension of Western assistance in 1990 and 1991, the government eased controls on the media and began to back away from the use of the Security Service and private thugs in managing the opposition. In 1993, an accession agreement with the European Union strengthened incentives to liberalize the political system, and the opposition received technical and financial support from Western foundations and NGOs. However, the transfer occurred within the context of established constitutional rules of the game.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, institutional. Romania faced severe economic difficulties in the early and mid-1990s and was therefore deeply dependent on assistance from the European Union and the broader international community. Economic difficulties spurred domestic opposition to the incumbent government, but this occurred within a previously-established constitutional framework.

Russian Federation 2000 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. The Polity coding is based on the fact that the 2000 election of Vladimir Putin was the first transfer of power from one elected president to another.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Boris Yeltsin had been elected to the presidency during the Soviet period in 1991 and was reelected in 1996. Although Polity scores improved over this period—and even during the late Gorbachev years—they never crossed the democratic threshold and in fact fell in the second term of the Yeltsin presidency as a result of concerns about corruption and fraud in the 1996 elections.

Putin was initially appointed Prime Minister by Yeltsin in August 1999 and then Acting President on the last day of the year. Just prior to the period of his political ascent, Russia had begun to recover from the 1998 financial collapse and Putin won support for exercising a “strong hand” against Chechen rebels during his interim leadership. Riding extraordinarily high support in the polls and running against a fragmented opposition, Putin ascended to the presidency in regularly-scheduled elections with an absolute majority of the popular vote (53.4 percent).

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. Despite the presence of the Chechen insurgency, there is no indication that the appointment of Putin was driven by mass mobilization against the regime. Nor was there any fundamental institutional change; the elections of 2000 were regularly scheduled. As Polity put it, justifying its coding of Russia as a marginal electoral—if not liberal—democracy, the election marked “the first peaceful and democratic transfer of power in the nation’s history” and one based on the entry of a wide array of political parties. As we note in the text, other specialists have strong doubts about the Polity coding; see Fish (2005) in particular.

São Tomé and Príncipe 1991 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. The Central Committee of the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (MLSTP), which had ruled as a single party since independence in 1975, introduced a democratic constitution that was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum in August 1990. In October 1990, Manuel Pinto da Costa was replaced as Secretary General of the party and democratic elections were held in January 1991.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. São Tomé and Príncipe gained independence in 1975 after the overthrow of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in Portugal. President Manuel Pinto da Costa, head of the MLSTP, established a Soviet-style one-party state, with strong foreign policy ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and a highly statist economic policy. São Tomé and Príncipe was a mini-state with a population of only several hundred thousand, and the regime was heavily dependent on this international support. After attempted invasions from exile groups in 1978 and 1988, Angola stationed troops on the islands, at the request of the government, and remained until 1991. It also supplied the islands with subsidized oil.

Changes in the regime were closely related to the decline in support from these external Communist patrons as well as secular economic decline associated with the regime’s statist development strategy. By the late 1980s, Pinto da Costa began to co-opt opposition elements into the ruling party and made tentative steps toward market reforms with support from international financial institutions and new donors. In late 1989, the party committed to a transition to full multiparty democracy, and in 1990, it submitted a constitution in which it relinquished its claim to a monopoly of power and opened the way to multi-party competition. Severe internal rivalries also contributed to the transition. In 1986, Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada was accused of stirring unrest against the government and was forced into exile; but internal dissension continued, however, and in 1991, Trovoada returned to lead the opposition party.

Coding. Elite-led transition, pre-emptive. The transition was precipitated by reform from above, led by reformist faction within the ruling party as sources of external support weakened.

Senegal 2000 (CGV and Polity) · Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. Abdoulaye Wade defeated incumbent Abdou Diouf in a regularly-scheduled election in 2000, the first time that elections in Senegal had resulted in the defeat of the incumbent Socialist Party.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Diouf’s defeat was a product of economic decline, the erosion of patronage resources and the defection of rural voters in the context of a political system that had been gradually liberalized over the 1980s and 1990s. The political system was opened to limited electoral opposition in 1976; widespread popular protest after a fraud-ridden election in 1988 prompted important electoral reforms that increased the leverage of the opposition and encouraged the incorporation of some of its leaders into coalitions led by the incumbent Parti Socialiste (PS). Despite these liberalizing changes, the 1993 elections still resulted in a victory for Diouf. After the elections, however, economic reforms diluted the capacity of the Socialist Party

to maintain its complex patronage networks, including with religious leaders who delivered the rural vote. The electoral outcome of 2000 resulted from the defection of several Socialist Party leaders, who left the party to contest the first round of the elections thus denying Diouf a first round victory. The rural constituencies, which voted for Diouf in 1988 and 1993, and against him in 2000, were decisive in producing the PS defeat. The opposition candidate, Wade, won in the second-round run-off.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. Although distributive issues played a role in the elections of 2000, the electoral changes that permitted this result had occurred over a decade before. There is no evidence that mass mobilization played a role in Diouf’s decision to allow the election results to stand.

Serbia 2000 (CGV; coded as Yugoslavia in Polity) · Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. Mass demonstrations in Belgrade forced Slobodan Milosevic from power, after he refused to accept his defeat in the 2000 presidential elections.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but the demonstrations were overwhelmingly directed at Milosevic and the issue of electoral fraud. Despite disastrous economic conditions, Milosevic had managed to retain power throughout the Balkan Wars with a combination of ethnic-nationalist appeals and harassment of the opposition. In 1996 and 1997, he was able to face down massive student protests against fraud in local elections. With the outbreak of the Kosovo war in 1998, however, Yugoslavia faced Western trade sanctions and then NATO airstrikes on Serbian targets. Initially, this led to an upsurge in nationalist support for Milosevic, but this eroded quickly as external pressure took a severe economic toll and forced a Western-backed settlement.

In the 2000 presidential election, Milosevic lost to opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica, but refused to relinquish power. Milosevic’s unwillingness to leave office triggered a general strike, a broad popular uprising in Belgrade, attacks on the parliament building, and the occupation of the main TV station. Security forces and Army commanders defected in the face of popular opposition, and Milosevic negotiated a transfer of power to Kostunica.

Coding. Elite-led transition. Despite the significance of the popular uprising, and the context of a wartime economic crisis, the protests were rooted in the student movement and the liberal, middle-class and were overwhelmingly focused on abuses of civil rights and the electoral process. The case therefore does not conform to the stipulated causal mechanisms in the theory.


Sierra Leone 1996 and 1998 (CGV) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)

CGV codes transitions in both years. Although discussed together here because of the proximity of the two transitions, the two cases are treated as separate observations for all summary and statistical purposes.

The transitions. The transfers of power in 1996 and 1998 were related episodes in the context of a complex civil war that began in 1991. In 1996, Brigadier Maada Bio launched a coup against the incumbent military regime (the National Provisional Ruling Council, NPRC), which was under the leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser. Following this coup, he opened negotiations with rebel forces (the Revolutionary United Front or RUF) and held elections in February 1996 that were won by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The army subsequently overthrew the Kabbah government in May 1997 (see discussion of 1997 reversion case below). The new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under Major Johnny Paul Koroma forged a new authoritarian government which included civilians disaffected with the Kabbah government and representation of the RUF. The AFRC/RUF regime was deposed by foreign intervention in 1998 and the Kabbah government re-instated.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but does not correspond with distributive conflict models and has contradictory effects on democratization. The civil war began in 1991 with the invasion of the RUF from Liberia. The RUF was a populist, even millenarian movement backed by Libya that sought to appeal to a wide spectrum of disenfranchised elements in Sierra Leone society. However, it subsequently evolved into a classic rent-seeking insurgent grouping, relying on the use of terror and exploiting its access to gold and diamonds. The proximate cause of the 1992 coup was the failure of the incumbent dominant-party regime under the All People's Congress to deal with either the RUF or the country's catastrophic economic decline. In 1995, the military junta enlisted the aid first of British and then of South African forces to push back the RUF, with some success. With pressure for the South African mercenaries to depart, civilians in the east and south organized a people's militia (kamajoi) to supplement the escorts of the army. Pressure mounted for the military to step aside altogether though not for obvious redistributive reasons and rather in protest of the military's ineffectiveness in dealing with economic issues and the insurgency. The new democratic government explicitly rejected a number of the redistributive demands of the RUF as unrealistic, even while trying to accommodate them through peace negotiations and ultimately with a peace agreement (on which the RUF reneged). The coup of 1997 was undertaken by a coalition of the military, elites who were alienated from the Kabbah government, and was supported by the RUF, which was then invited to share power. The period of AFRC/RUF rule saw an intensification of civil conflict,
atrocities on the part of the regime, and a further breakdown of the social order as civilians fled the fighting. The restoration of the Kabbah government clearly responded to internal distributive conflicts and fighting, but was largely the result of external decision-making processes. West African foreign ministers agreed in June 1997 on a three-pronged strategy to overturn the coup: dialogue, sanctions (endorsed by the UN) and the ultimate use of force by regional forces, primarily Nigerian. Following the failure of the AFRC/RUF government to honor the peace agreement, ECOMOG forces intervened and ousted it from power.

Coding. Elite-led transitions in both cases (1996 and 1998), elite displacement. The lines of conflict in Sierra Leone were intense, but they were extremely complex and did not map onto a distributive conflict story—in which democratization occurs as a result of elite concessions to mass mobilization—in a straightforward way. Although the RUF claimed to rest on a lower-class base it is not clear that it did; there was widespread support for its suppression. Regional-cum-ethnic conflicts also played some role, but they do not map clearly onto demands for democratic rule in a way that is consistent with the theory, namely, that elite concessions were a response to such pressures. Moreover, foreign intervention played a pivotal role in the second democratic transition.

**Sierra Leone 2007 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)**

The incumbent government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah organized a presidential election in which the principal candidates were Solomon Berewa of the incumbent Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and Ernest Bai Koroma of the opposition All People’s Congress (APC). In September 2007, the opposition candidate won the runoff election and subsequently took office. This was the first time in Sierra Leone’s history that an elected government transferred power to a candidate from the opposition.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The elections were held in the aftermath of a murderous civil war during the 1990s and a continuing atmosphere of unrest and violence. However, in 1998, an internationally-supervised accord restored the previously-elected Kabbah to office and established a tenuous truce. (see preceding discussion of the 1996-1998 transition). Beginning in 2000-2001, the Kabbah government gradually began to establish control throughout the country, and the rebel forces of the RUF were disarmed under the supervision of a United Nations peace-keeping force. The 2007 elections were marred by violence among youth gangs and militias loosely associated with the major parties, and the parties themselves reflected deep regional divisions

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between the North (the base of the opposition APC) and the Southern and Eastern strongholds of the incumbent party. Nevertheless, the transition occurred under the terms of the constitution and the existing peace agreement that had been struck among contending political forces in the country. Kabbah, the incumbent president, duly complied with the constitutional mandate to step down after two terms. The strong presence of international organizations—ECOWAS, the United Nations Peacekeepers, the EU and the African Union—was crucial in ensuring that the elections would be held as scheduled.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, elite displacement. The deep undercurrent of violence continued even after the official end of the civil war. Nevertheless, it did not drive the transition of government that occurred in 2007. International guarantors played a major role in this case.

**Solomon Islands 2003–4 (Polity only) · Elite-led transition**

The transition. Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza sought outside intervention to stem domestic violence. Outside parties operating under the Regional Assistance Mission—a consortium of 15 contributing countries majority-funded and led by Australia—deployed to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003 and committed to restore order and oversee new elections.

The role of distributive conflict. As in other island countries in the dataset, particularly the Comoros, there have been long-standing distributive conflicts in the Solomon Islands between the different islands in the archipelago. Most salient in this regard are conflicts between Isatabu (Guadacanal) islanders and those from Malaita. These include Malaita Islander migrants who are politically and economically active on Isatabu, both in the capital city Honiara and in the palm plantations and gold mines. In contrast to the Comoros, these conflicts have a class and redistributive component.

In the 1990s, local militias (the Guadacanal Revolutionary Army, later renamed the Isatabu Freedom Fighters) were formed to intimidate and drive Malaitans out of the island. Many Malaitans fled from the countryside to Honiara and a militant group formed to protect them: the Malaita Eagles Force (MEF). In June 2000, the MEF seized the capital and forced the resignation of Prime Minister Ulufa’alu. Manasseh Sogavare, leader of the opposition People’s Progressive Party was subsequently voted Prime Minister. The Australian-brokered Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed in August 2000. However, Isatabu militants retaliated and sought to drive Malaitan settlers from the island, resulting in the closure of a large oil-palm estate and gold mine, which were vital to exports but whose workforce was largely Malaitan.


New elections were held in December 2001 bringing Sir Allan Kemakeza into the Prime Minister's chair with the support of a coalition of parties. Nonetheless, violence continued. In April 2003, Kemakeza requested Australian intervention to provide assistance and restore law and order in the country. In July 2003, military and civilian personnel from Pacific Island Forum member states arrived under the banner of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

The purpose of the RAMSI included a mandate both to restore order and to guarantee a return to political normalcy. Legislative elections held under RAMSI supervision in April 2006 resulted a substantial loss of Parliamentary support for the People's Alliance Party (PAP) of former Prime Minister Kemakeza (2001-03). After Synder Rini, the chosen successor of Kemakeza, was elected prime minister the capital city once again fell into violence and a new coalition government was finally installed in May under former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition. The case appears to conform with a distributive conflict transition, but the underlying causal process is not observed. The political dynamic in 2003-4 does not reflect an incumbent authoritarian ruler responding to challenges to his incumbency but rather an incumbent democratic government facing anti-democratic violence, which resulted in outside intervention to sustain democratic rule.

**South Africa 1992 (Polity only) - Distributive conflict transition**

**The transition.** In 1990, the National Party government lifted the ban on the African National Congress and other political organisations. F.W. de Klerk ordered the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, and began negotiations for a political transition. The government repealed apartheid legislation, and agreed to hold free elections in 1994, leading to an overwhelming victory for the ANC.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. It is important to acknowledge that deteriorating economic conditions, international pressures, and elite defections were important in the transition. However, the actions of international actors and domestic business elites were themselves a response to the conflicts within the townships and the workplace. Growing international condemnation of the repression posed a clear challenge to the large corporations and elites that dominated the South African economy. In turn, as conflicts heated up, foreign and domestic investment declined, and the main business organizations began to press the government for political reform, a free vote, and an end to racial exclusion. Their efforts included trips abroad to confer...
with the ANC leaders in exile, and as important, calls for the release of Mandela. The ruling National Party also came under increasing pressure from its own Afrikaner base, which was dissatisfied with the economic downturn.

The distributive challenge to the regime was led by the African National Congress and its allies within the union movement, which engaged in demonstrations, strikes, and armed struggle in the fight against apartheid. The uprisings in the township can be dated to 1985-86 and corresponded with the initiation of a terrorist campaign by the ANC’s armed wing. Fighting also took place in 1988 between the ANC and its United Front allies and the Zulu supporters of the Inkatha movement. Black trade unions were legalized in 1979 and by the mid-1980s had coalesced into the Congress of South African Trade Unions, which was openly allied with the ANC. After Mandela’s release, conflicts continued within the ANC over the balance between negotiations, peaceful protest and violent action. But the power of the ANC to mobilize had been demonstrated, violence between the ANC and Inkatha persisted, and these facts cast a long shadow over subsequent negotiations.

Coding: Distributive conflict transition. Foreign pressure played some role in the transition, but there is little doubt that organized opposition from the ANC was crucial.

South Korea 1988 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. In June 1987, incumbent Vice President Roh Tae Woo announced a political reform that included direct election of the president. Subsequent negotiations between the regime and the opposition hammered out a constitutional compromise. Presidential elections were held in December 1987 and legislative elections in April 1988.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Although the movement for democracy was cross-class, including significant middle-class elements, it also included radical student groups, unions and civil society groups with a populist agenda. These groups played an increasing role in the democracy movement beginning in 1985 and continuing through early 1987, when there were large-scale protests against the death by torture of a student. After the Chun Doo Hwan regime suspended debate about direct election of the president (April 1987) and effectively nominated his successor Roh Tae Woo (June), it faced three weeks of massive protests in Seoul and elsewhere, organized by a broad coalition of democratic groups. These crested in the Great Peaceful March of the People on June 26, involving millions. Following the initial concessions by the authoritarian regime, labor mobilization increased dramatically and also influenced some elements of the constitutional settlement.


Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The protests of June 1987 were the most decisive in generating concessions from the regime, and these were effective because they were cross-class in nature and included middle class and professional participants. Nonetheless, the democratic movement included unions and populist civil society groups, as well as labor protests provided a backdrop to the elite negotiations over the constitution.

Sri Lanka 1989 (CGV only) - Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. President Jayawardene's term was scheduled to end in February 1989, and according to the constitution elections had to be held between December 4 1988 and January 3 1989. Jayawardene had extended his rule through irregular means in the past, and there was some uncertainty about whether he would do so again. In September 1988, he announced that he would not run again; presidential elections were held as scheduled. In one of his final acts as president, Jayawardene dissolved parliament and set February 15, 1989 for general elections.

The role of distributive conflict. Following the overwhelming victory of the United National Party in the 1977 general election, the new government used its two-thirds majority in Parliament to create a new constitution. The Constitution added the position of Executive President, and extended the term of elected Presidents and Parliament to 6 years from the date of the election. In 1978 Jayawardene named himself President of Sri Lanka. The first direct vote to elect a President was held in 1982, in which President Jayawardene obtained 52% of votes cast. Claiming that sections of the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party were conspiring to take power in a coup, Jayawardene imposed a state of emergency. Due to the non-concurrence of elections, the term of the parliament was due to expire in August 1983 and Jayawardene faced the possibility of his ruling United National Party losing its supermajority in parliament. He therefore proposed a referendum to extend the life of parliament an additional six years. The referendum took place on December 22, 1982 and Jayawardene won. The sitting parliament was therefore extended for six further years beginning in August 1983, and served out its mandate until the 1989 general elections, which is coded as the return to democratic rule.

The Jayawardene government is coded as authoritarian because of the declaration of the state of emergency and the questionable legality of extending the sitting parliament, even if by referendum. The question is therefore whether mass mobilization played any role in the decision to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections as scheduled in 1988 and 1989. At the time of the transition, the country was deeply riven by the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, which had been exacerbated rather than resolved by the Indian intervention in 1987.

Elections for provincial councils had been introduced in 1987 as a result of de-volution measures undertaken in connection with the India-Sri Lanka accord; these elections were certainly motivated by ethnic conflict. The government also faced pressures from Sinhalese extremists and armed leftist groups in the South.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Foreign intervention by India plays some role in this case, but the earlier elections for provincial councils suggest at least some link between the ethnic violence and political accommodation.

*Sri Lanka 2001 and 2006 (Polity only) · Elite-led transitions (institutional)*

**The transition.** Sri Lanka in 2001 and 2006 present another case—like Fiji and Nepal—of a small oscillation around Polity’s democratic cutoff. Sri Lanka moved from a “5” in 2000 to a “6” in 2001, which would technically be considered a transition. However it reverted back to a “5” from 2003 to 2005 before moving to a “6” in 2006 where it remained through the end of the data set. There is no clear reason offered by Polity for either of these improvements, but such a coding could be justified on the basis of the holding of successful elections in 2001 and the resolution of several outstanding constitutional and political issues in 2005-2006. We discuss the two cases together.

The party system is dominated by two major parties, albeit sometimes forced to rule in coalition: the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA or just PA for People’s Alliance) and the United National Party (UNP). Executive–parliamentary relations are often fraught, particularly during periods of cohabitation or divided government. President Chandrika Kumaratunga was re-elected in 1999. In the December 2001 parliamentary elections, the UNP won a majority and the post of prime minister was awarded to Ranil Wickremesinghe; the successful staging of this election and the new check on presidential discretion appears to be the basis for coding the improvement in 2001. In November 2003, President Kumaratunga suspended Parliament and took direct control over three cabinet ministries using national security as justification, based in the ongoing conflict with a Tamil insurgency (see discussion of the reversion below). In January 2004, she went farther by unilaterally extending her term in office from the end of 2005—when Presidential elections were scheduled—to 2006. She argued that she was due the additional year because she had called the 1999 elections in the fifth year of her six-year term.

In August 2005, however, the Supreme Court rejected the President’s claims and elections were scheduled for November 2005. The SLFP chose Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse to stand as president, facing off against Ranil Wick-
remesinghe as leader of the UNP; he had served as prime minister from 2001 to 2004. To win support from two small coalition parties, Rajapakse took policy positions with respect to the Tamil conflict that were more hawkish than those espoused by Kumaratunga and the PA since 1994. On the basis of this deal, Rajapakse won the presidency, but then immediately reversed his more hawkish positions to argue for continued negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Conflict with the Tamil Tigers continued through this period, but did not seem to be implicated in any of the events that might be associated with the subtle changes in the Polity coding, such as the holding of the regularly scheduled elections in 2001 and the resolution of the constitutional standoff over the extension of President Kumaratunga’s term. The constitutional issues were driven by the Supreme Court decision and the subsequent electoral dynamics surrounding Rajapakse’s effort to gain political support to win the presidency. If anything, he succeeded electorally by taking a more—not less—hawkish view of how to deal with the insurgency, even if his stance was subsequently reversed.

Coding. Elite-led institutional transitions, if these small changes can be considered “transitions” at all.

Sudan 1986 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. Following a coup in April 1985 that deposed President Numeiri, the military formed a Transitional Military Council, appointed a largely non-partisan civilian cabinet, promulgated a revised constitution and oversaw elections for a Constituent Assembly, which were held as scheduled in April 1986.

The role of distributive conflict. The Sudan case is complicated because of the multiple axes of resistance to the Numeiri regime and the civil war in the South, which did not seek democratization but succession. Efforts by the regime to introduce sharia and a more authoritarian constitution in 1983-4 met resistance from a variety of civil society forces, from professionals and some unions to secular parties and regional politicians from the South, where Numeiri’s repressive tactics had renewed fighting. Following the execution of a prominent cleric, Mahmud Muhammand Taha, a National Alliance for National Salvation was formed in 1985, representing professional and trade unions and seeking to remove Numeiri from power by civil disobedience. Deteriorating economic conditions contributed to major public protests in March and April 1985, which called for “bread and liberty”. The military split on how to respond to the protests, and immediately following them the armed forces

dosed Numairi and his party, and dissolved the national assembly.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. The sources of opposition to the Numairi regime were wide-ranging, and included general economic performance, religious grievances and secessionist pressures. However, mass mobilization in Khartoum and the resurgence of fighting in the South and elsewhere—with strong regional-cum-distributive implications—were clearly precipitating factors in the military’s decision to overthrow Numairi and initiate a transition process.

Suriname 1988 (CGV only) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. In 1988, the military agreed to legislative elections, which led to a landslide victory for civilian opponents and the establishment of a civilian government.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but international pressure also very important. After a violent military crackdown in 1982, led by Desi Bouterse, the Netherlands and the United States suspended all external aid, dealing a crippling blow to the small, aid-dependent Suriname economy. Initially, the Bouterse dictatorship had attracted support from unions, but as economic conditions deteriorated, labor moved into the opposition and engaged in widespread strikes. Additional pressure on the regime came from an insurgency over resettlement policies on the part of the descendants of runaway slaves (Maroons) in the sparsely-populated interior of the country. Faced with both external economic sanctions and popular opposition in 1985, Bouterse agreed to the appointment of a National Assembly, with representatives from business and labor, and to the legalization of political parties. In 1987, the government completed work on a new constitution that was approved by referendum in September of that year. Legislative elections were held in November 1987 and a new civilian government led by the traditional political parties took office in 1988. The Netherlands and the United States resumed economic aid. However, Bouterse remained the head of a new Military Council established under the new constitution, and continued to dominate politics.

Coping. Distributive conflict transition. The withdrawal of external assistance was a major factor in this transition, but mass mobilization along class and economic lines propelled the transition forward. Suriname was deeply divided along ethnic lines—descendants of East Indians (Hindustanis) constitute about 38 percent of the population; Creoles about 31 percent; Javanese Muslims, 15 percent, and the descendents of slaves about 10 percent—the last of which put pressure on the government. However, much of the opposition came from labor
groups that had initially been part of the ruling coalition and defected as the economy turned sour.

**Suriname 1991 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)**

**The transition.** The military government that had seized power in December 1990 agreed to hold new elections in May 1991.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Limited. In December 1990, Desi Bouterse and his allies ousted the civilian government elected in 1987 and handpicked replacements that were ratified by the National Assembly a few days later. However, the coup provoked a strong international reaction, especially from the Netherlands, the key external supporter of the Suriname economy. The military backtracked very quickly, appointing a caretaker government to organize new elections. These were held in May 1991, five months after the coup. Victory went to a broad-based coalition of the major ethnic parties and the labor-based Surinamese Workers Party, but mass demonstrations and threats were relatively limited and did not appear to play any discernible role in Bouterse's decision to reverse course.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, elite displacement. External pressure, which was also important in the 1988 transition, seemed decisive in the quick rollback of the 1990 coup d'état.

2. Europa World Year Book 2, Year.

**Taiwan 1992 (Polity only; see CGV 1996 coding below) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)**

**The transition.** In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to the time of the KMT's reversion to Taiwan, opening the way for legislative elections in December 1991. Although the KMT overwhelmingly won, the elections and the seating of the new legislature in 1992 marked an important point in the transition toward a multiparty system.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Limited. The process of political reform began in 1986 when then-president Chiang Ching-Kuo made the decision to undertake political reform and the opposition, dominated by Taiwanese, took the risk of establishing a political party (the Democratic People's Party, DPP). The DPP did subsequently play a role in pressuring the regime, but the transition was tightly controlled by the KMT as its gradual progression attests. In
1987, the KMT abolished martial law and subsequently enacted a set of new laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, association and public assembly. The KMT chaired a National Affairs Conference in 1990 that sought to forge a consensus on the main elements of political reform, including a gradual retirement of legislators who had been elected to nominally represent mainland districts and a transition to direct election of the president. In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to the time of the KMT’s reversion to Taiwan, and shortly thereafter President Lee declared an end to the state of emergency.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, preemptive. Implicit in the political opening was greater representation for the Taiwanese majority, and thus implicitly a fundamental reallocation of political power and potentially of economic resources as well. However, the KMT exercised tremendous influence over the course of the transition, and was responding to a variety of factors including the country's international isolation and political competition with the mainland as well as pressures from below. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the KMT thought it could be competitive in a post transition environment.

**Taiwan 1996 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)**

The transition. The CGV coding of the transition in Taiwan appears to be associated with the first direct elections for President in 1996.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The direct elections for the president in 1996 were the culmination of a process of political reform which began in 1986 when then-president Chiang Ching-Kuo made the decision to undertake political reform and the opposition, dominated by Taiwanese, took the risk of establishing a political party (the Democratic People's Party, DPP). The DPP did subsequently play a role in pressuring the regime, but the transition was tightly controlled by the KMT as its gradual progression attests. In 1987 the KMT abolished martial law and subsequently enacted a set of new laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, association and public assembly. The KMT chaired a National Affairs Conference in 1990 that sought to forge a consensus on the main elements of political reform, including a gradual retirement of legislators who had been elected to nominally represent mainland districts and a transition to direct election of the president. In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to the time of the KMT’s reversion to Taiwan, and shortly thereafter President Lee declared an end to the state of emergency. KMT victory in the December 1991 National Assembly election actually facilitated the transition, since it allowed President Lee Teng-hui and the KMT to pursue constitutional

reforms that placated interests within his own party. By 1994 the framework of a constitutional democracy was essentially in place, with the direct election of the president as the final step.

**Coding.** Elite-led transition, preemptive. Implicit in the political opening was greater representation for the Taiwanese majority, and thus implicitly a fundamental reallocation of political power and potentially of economic resources as well. However, the KMT exercised tremendous influence over the course of the transition, and was responding to a variety of factors including the country’s international isolation and political competition with the mainland as well as pressures from below. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the KMT thought it could be competitive in a post transition environment.

**Thailand 1992 (CGV and Polity)  ·  Distributive conflict transition**

The transition. Following the coup in 1991, the military sought to draft a new constitution with “provisional clauses” guaranteeing military influence over Parliament for another four years. The provisional clauses sparked widespread demonstrations against the government. The king intervened to restrain the military, Suchinda resigned and Parliament rescinded the provisional clauses. An interim government oversaw elections in September 1992.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Immediately following the announcement of the provisional clauses, a Campaign for Popular Democracy was formed to coordinate a variety of sources of opposition, including students but also civil society groups and those representing the poor. Political parties also ran in the March 1992 elections on anti-military platforms, but the regime doubled down by installing its own unelected prime minister and writing a constitution that gave the military and bureaucracy extensive powers. The movement against the regime expanded into major demonstrations in April and May, which the military sought to repress, including through shooting into the demonstrators. As violence peaked, the king intervened.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. The intervention of the king and the opposition of the private sector played a role, and students led the pivotal protests. However, the anti-authoritarian movement was broad and included slum organizations and NGOs representing the poor, as well as religious and other organizations protesting corruption and money politics. The intervention of the king followed directly from mass demonstrations.

Thailand 2008 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. Given CGV’s focus on electoral turnover as the basis of its codings, the Thai transition in 2008 appears to be the result of the decision by the military government to hold elections in December 2007 and the formation of a new government by the opposition People’s Power Party in February 2008. However, the subsequent conflict over the PPP government and its ultimate fall in the face of mass mobilization and judicial intervention raise some question about whether 2008 should be treated as a transition at all. The Polity coding falls precipitously from “9” to “-5” following the 2006 coup but returns only to a score of “4” by 2008 and the Constitutional Court action could be interpreted as a civilian coup. We code the case on the assumption that the seating of the PPP government is responsible for the CGV coding, but note the anomaly that the government is ultimately ousted later in the year.

The role of distributive conflict. Not significant in the transition to nominally democratic rule and the assumption of office by the PPP, but significant—and diverse—thereafter as middle class and elite forces challenge the new government. In September 2006, populist politician and prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra (of the Thai Rak Thai or TRT party) was overthrown by the military with support from the King; see discussion of the reversion below. The military-led Council for National Security (CNS) installed an interim prime minister and promised new elections for no later than December 2007. The CNS oversaw the drafting of a new constitution, which sought to fundamentally limit the scope of democracy and of the TRT in particular. Protest against the constitutional drafting and ratification process was suppressed. The constitution passed in a popular referendum in August 2007 with strong constraints on any opposition.

New general elections under the 2007 constitution were held as agreed in December 2007 and the CNS kept its promise to formally disband, although with the new powers contained in the 2007 constitution. The populist political forces represented by the TRT regrouped into the new People’s Power Party and won the largest number of seats in the new legislature. The leader of the PPP, Samak Sundaravej, who had openly campaigned as the successor to Thaksin was elected prime minister in January 2008. We see no evidence that mass protest had anything to do with the military’s decision to withdraw. A more plausible interpretation is that the military believed it could continue to control the government through constitutional changes and ongoing checks on parliamentary power; Polity does not code the new government as democratic.

The new government came under assault almost immediately from its opponents both inside and outside the government, calling into question whether 2008 should be considered a transition at all. In contrast to the distributive conflict theory, however, the source of the protest was middle class, elites and their
proxies. First, the military acquiesced and even encouraged the reformation of the so-called “yellow shirt” movement or People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Protests crystallized around the government’s proposal to amend the 2007 constitution. In late June, the opposition filed a no-confidence motion in parliament, which the government survived. The PAD proposed its own constitutional amendments that would reduce the proportion of directly-elected members of Parliament thus disenfranchising the poor rural base of the TRT-PPP coalition. These pressures escalated in August with mass mobilization and seizure of government buildings by the PAD and a constitutional court ruling in September which accused Prime Minister Samak of financial irregularities. The PPP ultimately succeeded in nominating Deputy Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat as PM to replace Samak.

Violence escalated again in October and November with seizures of Parliament and the airport. The government, courts and ultimately the military finally moved against the highly-damaging PAD actions. In December, however, the Constitutional Court ruled to disband all three parties in the PPP coalition, an effective coup against the government. The opposition Democrat Party quickly announced that it had enough support from defecting coalition partners of the PPP to form a government and Abhisit Vejjajiva was elected the new Prime Minister.

Coding. Elite-led transition, preemptive. Mass mobilization did not appear to play any role in the military’s decision to transition to a semi-democratic regime; to the contrary, the military appeared to believe that they could control the Thaksin forces. Mass mobilization played a subsequent role in the fall of the PPP government, which arguably marked a reversion from more to less democratic rule and did not occur as a result of mass mobilization by lower class groups. To the contrary, middle-class and elite reaction to a democratically-elected populist government was the central dynamic of the second half of 2008.

Turkey 1983 (CGV and Polity) - Elite-led transition (preemptive)

The transition. At the time of the coup in 1980, the military stated that its intervention would be of limited duration. In 1981, the junta appointed a Consultative Assembly charged with devising a new constitution. In 1982, that document was submitted to a referendum. The Consultative Assembly also wrote an electoral law that established new political parties. In October 1983, the military transferred power to the new government despite the defeat of its favored candidate.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Violent conflict between left and right had been a feature of Turkish politics in the late-1970s. In the after-

math of the coup, however, the military government undertook a wide-ranging purge of the government—arresting all major political leaders—brutally repressed unions and extremist groups and suspended all societal organizations. As the military gradually reopened the political space in early 1983, new parties formed around established politicians but most were vetoed by the military. Although the military government was clearly surprised by the electoral victory of the one opposition party it had allowed to function—the Motherland Party—there is no indication that threats of mass mobilization influenced the decision to let the election results stand. Moreover, despite the surprising victory of the opposition the military retained veto power over the new government in a number of respects. Those prerogatives were subsequently weakened in the face of social challenges, but such challenges did not influence the timing of the transition itself.

Coding. Elite-led transition, preemptive. The military withdrew on a pre-announced schedule, believing they could control the process. Despite the electoral setback, the military was able in the short-run to shape the constitution, the party and electoral system and military prerogatives to conform with its interests.

Uganda 1980 (CGV only) · Elite-led transition (elite displacement)

The transition. The transition occurred in the wake of the Tanzania-Uganda war and the deposing of Idi Amin by victorious Tanzanian and Ugandan forces. Following a period of internecine conflict within the Ugandan military forces that had participated in the conflict, a transitional structure oversaw bitterly contested elections in December 1980, which were won by Milton Obote’s Uganda Peoples Congress.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. By 1978, Amin’s base of support began to shrink significantly as a result of his own erratic behavior toward supporters and the general decline of the economy after years of neglect and abuse. In 1978, Amin faced a mutiny from within the military and when he sought to put it down some of the mutineers fled across the Tanzanian border. Amin then claimed that Tanzanian President Nyerere had been behind the coup and Amin invaded Tanzanian territory and formally annexed a section across the Kagera River boundary in November. Nyerere launched a counterattack, joined by Ugandan exiles united as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). Despite support from Libya and Tanzania, the UNLA took Kampala in April 1979. Amin fled the country.

The period following the ousting of Amin was characterized by intense competition and fighting for power among contending military and political factions.

Before the liberation of Kampala, Tanzania assisted in forging a transitional government by convening a Unity Conference of twenty-two Ugandan civilian and military groups. The Conference established the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) as the political representative of the UNLA military forces and named Dr. Yusuf Lule, former principal of Makerere University, as head of the UNLF executive committee. Lule subsequently became president, advised by a temporary parliament, the National Consultative Council (NCC) but was seen as too conservative by some factions. In June 1979, the NCC replaced Lule with Godfrey Binaisa who expanded the NCC. However, Binaisa ran afoul of military factions within the UNLF who had started to build private armies, which, in turn, were harassing and intimidating opponents, and he was therefore removed in May 1980 by the Military Commission of the UNLF in what amounted to a military coup. The coup was engineered by supporters of Milton Obote, who returned to Uganda and effectively took control of the transition process. Because the Military Commission, as the acting government, was dominated by Obote supporters, the opposition faced formidable obstacles. Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress won the elections, which, despite an endorsement by the Commonwealth Commission, were widely viewed as fraudulent.

Coding. Elite-led transition, elite displacement. Despite widespread disaffection with Amin and some mass mobilization, the transition was effectively engineered by self-interested political and military elites.

Ukraine 1991 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition*

The transition. This case represents one of six cases in which former Soviet Republics were coded as democracies from the time of their independence. Ukraine held relatively free elections in 1990. Ukraine’s declaration of independence followed on August 24, 1991 and came in direct response to the August 19th coup attempt in Moscow, when conservative Communist leaders sought to restore central Communist party control over the USSR. The declaration was followed by a proposal for a national referendum issued jointly by majority leader Oleksandr Moroz and opposition leader Ihor Yukhnovsky. The referendum won overwhelmingly, securing 90% of the vote.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with ambiguous objectives. Reform communism in the Ukraine got a late start, with the formation of a pro-Gorbachev group (Rukh) only in 1989; hardliners in the party even sought to nip this effort in the bud. The focus of the reformers and other opposition forces that joined together into a Democratic Bloc, was initially political reform. The Supreme Soviet elections of March 1990 became a focal point;
the bloc won 108 of 450 seats. It openly argued for a multiparty system, but was bitterly denounced by the Communist majority and Gorbachev. Protests and mass events accompanied these political developments, including a human chain, large music festivals, demonstrations and strikes by miners issuing both economic and political demands. In October of 1990, open demonstrations began in the form of a tent city and large-scale marches in Kiev, joined by workers from one of Kiev’s largest factories in one demonstration and forcing the resignation of some key hardliners.

However, the substantive emphasis of these protests was mixed, and changed rapidly over time. While the initial interests of Rukh were political, and limited largely to groups of intellectuals, the movement rapidly transformed into a nationalist movement, supported if not led by the ruling elite itself, with a very broad, cross-class appeal. Kravchuk, former ideology chief of the party and ultimately the first president, quickly took hold of the nationalist issue over the course of 1990. In July 1990, the Ukrainian legislature voted for sovereignty, following Yeltsin’s lead. In a March 1991 referendum, the electorate sent mixed signals—simultaneously voting for a renewed union with the Soviets and for sovereignty—and severely dividing the dominant communist bloc. However, the vote was not deeply politicized along ethnic lines: only very weak relationships can be found between the share of Ukrainian and Russian voters and the vote on both questions. The Crimea—with a strong Russian majority—did pursue autonomy within the Ukraine and mobilized fears of “Ukrainization” but in the referendum for independence, even a majority in the Crimea voted for independence.

By the summer of 1991, support for sovereignty was overwhelming and when the coup occurred in Moscow in August 1991, the former communists were able to lead the movement toward independence in alliance with the minority opposition.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. It is not entirely clear on what grounds the Ukraine is coded as a democracy in 1991, but it is plausible that pressures from below kept the Communist majority from cracking down harder on the opposition and closing down the political system altogether.
in the same year an agreement was reached to hold early elections in 1994, leading to a victory for former minister Leonid Kuchma over president Leonid Kravchuk; these elections appear to constitute the basis for the transition coding in 1994 even though the agreement to hold the elections was reached earlier.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Transitional elections in 1991 elected Leonid M. Kravchuk, former chairman of the Ukrainian Rada and ideology secretary of the Communist Party, to a 5-year term as Ukraine’s first president. At the same time, a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union was approved by more than 90% of the voters. Despite the fact that communists managed to maintain power, Polity codes the 1991 transition as a 6 (prior to that time, Ukraine was coded by Polity as part of the Soviet Union).

In 1992, Kravchuk undertook a number of reforms designed to establish Ukrainian sovereignty from Russia; the economy went into a steep decline. In late 1992, Kravchuk dismissed his first prime minister and appointed Leonid Kuchma in his place, a move that was ratified by the Rada. Kuchma sought emergency powers for six months in November (through May 1993) in order to push through a more aggressive reform program. He was overwhelmingly granted these powers by the Rada, which permitted him to suspend elements of the constitution and issue decrees with respect to the economy culminating in a major reform program in early 1993. These actions appear to be legal because they were ratified by the parliament and therefore should not constitute the source of the reversion.

When Kuchma’s powers expired in May 1993, he asked that they be extended; he was concerned that his reform efforts were being undermined by parliamentary control over the central bank and the State Property Fund. This time, the Rada overwhelmingly rejected the extension of further decree powers. Kuchma threatened to resign and Kravchuk responded with a decree on June 16 establishing a temporary “Extraordinary Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers” to deal with economic matters; it is this decree and subsequent actions by Kravchuk vis-à-vis the parliament in late 1993 that appear to be the source of the slight shift in coding.

The issuing of the decree coincided with a massive strike by coal miners in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, and was followed by complex political maneuvering between the president and parliament. The demands of the striking miners included not only increased wages and mine safety but also a call for a national referendum of confidence in the president and parliament. In response to the demands of the strikers, Kravchuk removed Kuchma, replaced him with an official sympathetic to the miners, and agreed to early parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in 1994. Parliament initially rejected Kuchma’s resignation and the conflict between the two branches over policy

prerogatives lasted for several months. It was finally resolved, however, when the Rada voted for a movement of no confidence in Kravchuk’s Cabinet of Ministers and accepted Kuchma’s removal. This set in train a period in which reforms were reversed in the run up to the elections, which Kuchma won.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition/elite reaction reversion. This is an anomalous case, because the reversion and transition seem to overlap almost exactly in time; the conflict between the branches of government and the decision to hold the elections are compressed. The case has important elements of an intra-elite conflict because communists dominated the Rada. Nonetheless, the decision to hold elections in 1994 appears to be driven by pressure from the miners in the context of a deep economic crisis. Notwithstanding the importance of intra-elite maneuvers, it is this pressure that leads us to code this as a distributive conflict transition. We also note the deep regional conflicts between the Russophile east and south, where the reconstituted communist party drew its strength, and the Ukrainian nationalists in the west. However, although these differences were of major importance in the later “color revolution”, they did not appear to play the same role in the conflicts described above.

**Uruguay 1985 (CGV and Polity) · Distributive conflict transition**

**The transition.** In 1984, the military entered into formal negotiations with a coalition of center and left parties, resulting in an agreement to hold competitive elections and return power to civilian government.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. Unions and other civil society groups derailed prolonged military efforts to transfer office to civilian elites that it could continue to control. Initial efforts to impose a new constitution were rejected in a referendum held in 1980; in 1982, primary voters again rejected an attempt to place allies at the head of the traditional political parties. Despite these setbacks, however, the military continued to seek control over a transition in negotiations with the traditional parties. At this point, the military’s efforts were disrupted by the explosion of popular protests and strikes, led by the union movement. A massive general strike in January 1984 was especially important in strengthening the bargaining power of the opposition. The military responded by permitting the inclusion of left parties and unions into the opposition coalition and agreed to abide by the results of relatively free and competitive elections.

**Coding.** Distributive conflict transition. Military defeats in the 1980 constitutional referendum and the 1982 party primaries opened the way to labor protest.
However, labor protest played a pivotal role in blocking continued military efforts to maintain control over the election of a civilian government.

Yugoslavia 2000 (Polity only; coded as Serbia in CGV dataset) · Elite-led transition (institutional)

The transition. Mass demonstrations in Belgrade forced Slobodan Milosevic from power, after he refused to accept his defeat in the 2000 presidential elections.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but the demonstrations were overwhelmingly directed at Milosevic and the issue of electoral fraud. Despite disastrous economic conditions, Milosevic had managed to retain power throughout the Balkan Wars through a combination of ethnic-nationalist appeals and harassment of the opposition. In 1996 and 1997, he was able to face down massive student protests against fraud in local elections. With the outbreak of the Kosovo war in 1998, however, Yugoslavia faced Western trade sanctions and then NATO airstrikes on Serbian targets. Initially, this led to an upsurge in nationalist support for Milosevic, but that eroded quickly as external pressure took a severe economic toll and forced a Western-backed settlement.

In the 2000 presidential election, Milosevic lost to opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica, but refused to relinquish power. Milosevic’s unwillingness to leave office triggered a general strike, a broad popular uprising in Belgrade, attacks on the parliament building, and the occupation of the main TV station. Security forces and Army commanders defected in the face of popular opposition, and Milosevic negotiated a transfer of power to Kostunica.

Coding. Elite-led transition (institutional). Despite the significance of the popular uprising, and the context of a wartime economic crisis, the protests were rooted in the student movement and the liberal, middle-class and were overwhelmingly focused on abuses of civil rights and the electoral process. The case therefore does not conform with the stipulated causal mechanisms in the theory.

Zambia 1991 (Polity only) · Distributive conflict transition

The transition. In July 1990, members of the Kaunda cabinet defected from the regime and entered into a coalition with opposition leader Frederick Chiluba, head of the copper workers union. Kaunda agreed to call multi-
party elections in 1991—thinking he would win—and lost overwhelmingly to Chiluba.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. As in a number of cases in Africa, fiscal crisis eroded the patronage resources of the state and pushed the Kaunda government toward structural adjustment policies that stirred popular protest. Beginning in 1989, deep recession and adjustment initiatives were met by strikes by copper workers unions, students, and postal workers, as well as urban rioting. The union confederation that led the protest had formerly been tightly linked to the ruling party and had been a pillar of the old regime. In this capacity, however, they had acquired financial and organizational resources that allowed them to mobilize against Kaunda.

Kaunda initially hoped that he could diffuse the opposition by scheduling a referendum on “multipartism” that would nonetheless confirm support for the dominant party he had built, the United National Independence Party. This plan was derailed, however, in the face of widespread opposition and rioting over the lifting of maize meal subsidies in June 1990. The regime then began planning for a snap multiparty election, hoping to divide the opposition and allow the ruling party to retain its dominance in a more plural setting. The opposition coalition organized itself as the National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy in July 1990 (later the Movement for Multiparty Democracy or MMD), spearheaded by the labor movement, but with the support of business and lawyer groups. The MMD subjected Kaunda to a crushing electoral defeat.

Coding. Distributive conflict transition. Although the transition had support from both business groups and external donors, and was triggered in part by elite defections, those defections were in turn the result of pressures from unions and civil society groups mobilized around economic as well as political grievances.
The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Urban rioting and labor pressures had forced strongman Kenneth Kuanda to accept multiparty elections in 1991 won by labor leader Frederick Chiluba (see Zambia 1991). A series of multiparty elections followed this transition, but for the next decade, Chiluba and the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) deployed patronage and intimidation to dominate the electoral process. In 2001, rivals within the ruling party forced Chiluba to abandon an attempt to win a third term, and he was arrested for corruption in 2003. Chiluba's successor—Levy Mwanasawa—was also from the ruling party and had won the 2001 presidential election, but the regime liberalized politically in subsequent years. Mwanasawa was reelected in 2006 in an election that was also marked by fraud, but he faced strong opposition from Michael Sata, who ran with populist appeals that resonated strongly in the capital and the copper belt. In 2008, Mwanasawa’s sudden death from a stroke created a potential crisis for the system. However, as noted, the leadership within the ruling party organized an election to choose his successor. The election was less marred by fraud than previous ones, and was closely contested. Again, Sata was the leading opponent, appealing to an urban populist base. However, the Vice President Rupiah Banda, of the ruling party, again deployed formidable patronage resources to prevail.

Coding. Elite-led transition, institutional. Notwithstanding the populism of the main opposition candidate, both the earlier ouster of Chiluba and the initiative for subsequent elections were primarily driven by struggles within the ruling MMD.

REVERSIONS FROM DEMOCRATIC RULE

We identify three types of reversion from democratic rule: “elite reaction reversions”, which conform most clearly with the distributive conflict theory; “populist” reversions, which also show signs of distributive conflict but result in left- rather than right-wing dictatorships; and “weak democracy” reversions in which distributive conflict process are not in evidence.

Reversions would conform to the proximate causal processes of the distributive conflict model—and be what we call “elite reaction reversions”—only if both of the following conditions are evident:

• Clear evidence of redistributive actions on the part of the government or pressures on the government to take such actions;

• And either an overthrow of the incumbent government in response to redistributive policies or a reversal of democratic rule by incumbents in response to redistributive threats from parties or organized social forces outside the government, including from mass mobilization.

Notes on the coding rule.

• We include in elite-reaction reversions cases in which incumbents institute various restraints on political and electoral competition or political liberties in a pre-emptive way: in order to prevent coalitions with explicitly redistributive aims from taking office or to limit lower-class mobilization.

• Elite reaction reversions can occur without a change in officeholders if incumbents restrict electoral competition or place limits on political and civil liberties; this is the process we call “backsliding.”

Populist reversions are cases in which the incumbent government is overthrown not by elites seeking to limit redistribution but by populist leaders promising more extensive redistribution.

• Like elite reversions, populist reversions are characterized by evidence of distributive conflicts prior to the reversion, either between the government and opposition within the government or between the government and parties, organized social forces or collective violence outside of it.
• Although populist reversions are identified by promises of more extensive redistribution and appeal to lower class groups, they need not be followed by populist policies.

Weak democracy reversions are those in which broad distributive conflict processes are either absent altogether or appear to play a minimal role in the decision to overthrow democratic rule. These might arise in a number of ways:

• Authoritarian challengers might exploit wide disaffection with the performance of democratic incumbents and invoke broad grievances that cut across class interests, such as institutional stalemate and government ineffectiveness, economic performance, corruption, political scandals or other grievances that have wide cross-class appeal.

• Alternatively, reversions might result from purely intra-elite processes. The military—or factions within it—stages a coup against incumbent democratic office-holders because of loss of budget, prerogatives or career concerns. Competing economic elites might mobilize military, militia or other armed forces against democratic rule because of intra-elite—rather than distributive—challenges, such as the elimination of prerogatives or rents.

Notes on the coding rule.

• Weak democracy reversions may be accompanied by signs of distributive conflicts, but can be distinguished by the nature of the appeals that authoritarian challengers make and primarily by the target of the intervention. In particular, cross-class reversions are not directed at the redistributive actions of the government or distributive conflicts, but rather at general government performance.

• Moreover, weak democracy reversions must involve support or “active acquiescence” on the part of significant parties and organizations representing the poor and economically excluded. In the absence of such support or in the face of active resistance on the part of lower-income groups and their representatives, we assume that the reversion is likely to be “elite reaction” in form.

• Although not relevant for the coding, we argue that the underlying causal processes associated with this weak democracy reversion process include histories of praetorianism, weak institutionalization and economic crises.

Table 6 lists all of the reversions in the CGV and Polity datasets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CGV Year</th>
<th>Polity Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bangladesh 2007 2007
Belarus 1995
Bolivia 1980
Burundi 1996
Central African Republic 2003
Comoros 1995
Congo 1997 1997
Dominican Republic 1994
Ecuador 2000
Ecuador 2007
Fiji 1987
Fiji 2000
Fiji 2006
The Gambia 1994
Ghana 1981 1981
Guatemala 1980
Haiti 1991
Haiti 1999
Honduras 1985
Mauritania 2008
Nepal 2002 2002
Niger 1996 1996
Nigeria 1983 1984
Pakistan 1999 1999
Peru 1990 1992
Russia 2007
Sierra Leone 1997
Sri Lanka 1982
Sri Lanka 2003
Sudan 1989
Suriname 1980
Suriname 1990
Thailand 1991
Thailand 2006 2006
Turkey 1980 1980
Uganda 1985
Ukraine 1993
Venezuela 2006
Zambia 1996

| Total         | 25 | 27 |

Tables 7 and 8 show the distribution of reversions in the CGV and Polity datasets respectively.
Table 7: Distribution of CGV Reversions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Reaction Reversions (n = 6)</th>
<th>Populist Reversions (n = 3)</th>
<th>Weak Democracy Reversions (n = 16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolivia 1980</strong></td>
<td>Ecuador 2000</td>
<td>Bangladesh 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji 2000</strong></td>
<td>Suriname 1980</td>
<td>Comoros 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nepal 2002</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congo 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thailand 2006</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guatemala 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey 1980</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritania 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan 1999</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone 1997</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suriname 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda 1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Reactions lasting &gt;2 years</th>
<th>Populist Reversions lasting &gt;2 years</th>
<th>Weak Democracy Reversions lasting &gt;2 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.0% of all reversions</td>
<td>12.0% of all reversions</td>
<td>64.0% of all reversions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.1% of reversions</td>
<td>15.8% of reversions</td>
<td>63.1% of reversions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cases in *italics* returned to democracy within two years.
Table 8: Distribution of Polity Reversions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Reaction Reversions (n = 11)</th>
<th>Populist Reversions (n = 4)</th>
<th>Weak Democracy Reversions (n = 12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji 1987</td>
<td>Haiti 1999</td>
<td>Fiji 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan 1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40.7% of all reversions           14.8% of all reversions           44.4% of all reversions
38.9% of reversions of 3 points or more                    50.0% of reversions of 3 points or more

Cases in *italics* move from above to below 6 in the Polity coding by less than 3 points.
**Armenia 1995 (Polity only) · Elite reaction reversion**

The reversion. Polity does not explain the reversion coding, but it appears to be associated with creeping authoritarianism on the part of the incumbent president in the form of attacks on the opposition and the drafting and passage of a Constitution that concentrated his power in advance of elections held in 1996. Those elections were widely deemed to be fraudulent.

The role of distributive conflict. The population of Armenia overwhelmingly voted for independence in a September 1991 referendum, followed by a presidential election in October 1991 that gave 85% of the vote to Levon Ter-Petrossian. Ter-Petrossian subsequently revealed a more repressive face, including accusations about the integrity of the opposition (and its ties to the Soviets in particular), a series of political assassinations and ultimately a broad sweep against the opposition in the run-up to parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring 1995. From 1994, the government faced mass mobilization in the form of rallies and demonstrations around political issues; these were compounded in 1995 as the country slid into a severe economic crisis. In July of 1995 a strongly contested constitutional referendum pushed through a major revision that gave the president vast powers, including the capacity to declare emergency powers and wide ranging control over the judiciary. Concurrent parliamentary elections for the National Assembly were characterized by international observers as “free, but unfair” but Polity notes that the subsequent 1996 presidential elections were characterized by election observers for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as suffering from severe irregularities.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. Armenia is a classic backsliding case. Protests centered initially and largely on political issues, but came to encompass economic issues and corruption as the economy deteriorated in 1995. However, we believe it falls generally within the parameters of distributive conflict models because of the presence of widespread economic distress and demands on the government that it could not manage—or chose not to manage—through standard democratic processes.

**Bangladesh 2007 (CGV and Polity) · Weak democracy reversion**

The reversion. Following efforts by the incumbent BNP government to manipulate the management of elections, the country experienced widespread civil unrest, including strikes and other forms of violence. The military intervened and declared a state of emergency in January 2007.
The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but not a direct motive for the coup (see explanation below). According to the constitution, incumbent Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, whose term ran from October 2001 through October 2006, was required to appoint a caretaker government as her term came to an end in order to prepare for elections. She turned to a partisan Supreme Court Justice, who was forced to resign in the face of deadlock over the electoral roadmap between the BNP and the main opposition party, the Awami League. Violent protests erupted in which a number of people were killed. Zia then appointed the sitting president from her own party to play this caretaker role. In January 2007, the Awami League and its coalition partners announced a boycott of the election, triggering widespread civil unrest and repeated strikes (hartals) that shut down the country. The military intervened and President Iajuddin Ahmed declared a state of emergency in January 2007; civil liberties were curtailed, and elections were postponed indefinitely.


Belarus 1995 (Polity only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. According to Polity, “Alyksandr Lukashenko was originally elected president of Belarus in competitive multiparty elections in 1994. Since that time Lukashenko has carried out a rolling coup. The basis of this judgment is significant constraints placed on electoral politics and efforts to overrule both the legislature and the constitutional court through the issuing of executive decrees.” This is a classic case of backsliding by an incumbent.
The role of distributive conflict. Minimal. Belarus’ declaration of independence in 1991 was reluctant; unlike other post-Soviet states, the nationalist movement was weak and the bulk of the population favored continuity with the Soviet era and even incorporation with Russia. The liberal and nationalist opposition subsequently had difficulty wresting power from the government of Prime Minister Kyebich, which was largely made up of former communist functionaries. The Supreme Soviet repeatedly beat back calls for a referendum on its dissolution, but did agree to shorten its term to hold parliamentary elections in 1994. The elections, held under a constitution drafted by the incumbent government, generated a surprise result when Kyebich was soundly beaten by populist Alexander Lukashenko, who ran as a youthful anti-corruption crusader.

Once in office, however, Lukashenko moved swiftly to consolidate power at the expense of both the opposition and the legislature. The legislative elections held in May 1995 were characterized by a number of irregularities. By early 1995, Lukashenko had established control over the entire state administration, the economy, and the media, and had imposed an “information blockade” on the activities of the opposition. He also imposed restrictions on campaign spending and coverage of the elections in the media. Lukashenko further undermined the opposition by combining the May 1995 parliamentary balloting with his first referendum, which included proposals for making Russian an official language and for replacing post-independence national symbols with Soviet-era ones—issues that mobilized voters who felt nostalgic about communist rule. The referendum proposals passed easily, and not a single liberal opposition candidate (BPF) won a seat in parliament. The majority of seats went to the communist and agrarian parties, with two smaller opposition factions—liberals and social democrats—gaining control of one-fifth of the seats. The communists and the agrarians eventually joined the democrats in opposing Lukashenko, in part over constitutional prerogatives.

The second likely source of the change in Polity coding is Lukashenko’s formal usurpation of powers. The Constitution stipulated that the authority of the old parliament would formally expire when a new parliament held its first session. However, since the new parliament could not be formally convened because turnout had fallen short of constitutionally stipulated thresholds, the old parliament reconstituted itself. Lukashenko denied these parliamentary deputies access to government funds, triggering a constitutional crisis. In October, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the reconvened parliament, which then passed new electoral laws to regularize the outcome of the election ex post by lowering turnout requirements; the Court deemed these moves legal as well. President Lukashenko ignored this ruling, refused to recognize the parliament, and began to rule by decree. During its first year, the Constitutional Court reviewed 14 presidential decrees and ruled 11 of them illegal. The president not only ignored these rulings, but issued an edict compelling the government and local authorities to disregard the Court’s rulings and adhere to his decrees.

Although subsequent events fall outside the coding year, they are germane in understanding the nature of the new order. In 1996, Lukashenko sought to regularize presidential rule through a new referendum, which amended the constitution to extend his first term in office from four to seven years, concentrated power in the hands of the presidency, replace the unicameral Supreme Council with a much weaker bicameral legislature, and gave presidential decrees the status of law, meaning that they would supersede acts adopted by the legislature. The prerogative of appointing members of the Constitutional Court and the Central Election Commission (CEC) was also transferred from parliament to the presidency. The 1996 referendum passed with wide support but was deemed fraudulent by outside observers.

**Coding.** Weak democracy reversion. Lukashenko was initially elected on a populist platform, initially suggesting that his subsequent actions might be undertaken for redistributive reasons. However, there is no evidence of overt distributive conflict and Lukashenko’s subsequent actions seem more like a pure power grab vis-à-vis the legislature rather than actions undertaken with redistributive policy intent.

**Bolivia 1980 (CGV only) · Elite reaction reversion**

**The reversion.** A right-wing military faction led by General Luis Garcia Meza deposed acting President Lidia Guiler on July 17, 1980, in the wake of the victory of leftist Hernan Siles in an election held earlier that year.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Substantial. The resignation of longtime dictator Hugo Banzer in 1978 opened the way to a turbulent period of elections, labor conflicts and military conspiracies. Elections in 1979 produced a political stalemate; all candidates fell short of 50 percent of the vote required to win outright, and none could gain the backing of a legislative majority necessary to win the presidency. After a rapid succession of military and civilian governments, the Congress appointed Lidia Guiler, the head of the chamber of deputies, as interim president. In 1980, a new election led to the congressional victory of a left-of-center coalition, and the new legislature chose Hernan Siles as president. Siles was backed by the radical miners’ union and by left parties, and had run for office as a strong critic of IMF adjustment programs. Before he could take office, however, a military faction linked to the right-wing dictatorship of Hugo Banzer deposed Guiler and installed a military dictatorship headed by Garcia Meza. Garcia Meza, though highly corrupt, held out the Pinochet regime as the model he sought to emulate.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. Bolivian society was deeply divided between the left and right. Siles, as noted, had the backing of working class unions and left-wing parties; Garcia Meza was linked to the right. External factors were also important: the Garcia Meza regime was also deeply implicated in cocaine trafficking and other forms of corruption. Nevertheless, this was clearly a right-wing coup against a government committed to a more populist course.

Burundi 1996 (CGV only) - Elite reaction reversion

The reversion. After a massacre of over three hundred Tutsis by radical Hutu rebels in 1996, the third in a succession of weak Hutu presidents went into hiding in advance of a military takeover. A Tutsi, Pierre Beyoya, who had previously held power from 1987 to 1992, headed the new military government.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial. Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratic president in our sample period, died in an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1994 and his successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed in a suspicious plane crash in the same year bringing Sylvestre Ntibantunganya to office. Throughout this period, weak Hutu presidents had to contend with the effective veto power exercised by the Tutsi-dominated military and Tutsi political and economic elite. Recognizing the delicacy of presiding over a praetorian state with entrenched Tutsi interests, Ndadaye did everything in his power to avoid the perception that he would redistribute in favor of the Hutu. Assurances included the appointment of a Tutsi vice president and cabinet ministers. Nonetheless, a series of actions had the appearance of favoring co-ethnics. The administration sought to reverse contracts and concessions made by Tutsi governments that affected military, state, and private Tutsi interests, sought reforms in the military to reduce Tutsi dominance, and displaced Tutsis in the civil service and local administrations. In October 1993, the military assassinated Ndadaye, setting in train a civil war that would continue for over a decade, claim 150,000 lives, and constitute the backdrop for the continuing military role in political life.

Despite the assassination of Ndadaye, government stumbled along, first under Cyprien Ntaryamira (died in 1994), and then under Sylvestre Ntibantunganya. Despite the nominally democratic coding, Burundi’s Polity score averaged zero. It is difficult to argue that the country was really governed by the nominally-elected government at all; rather, according to Weissman “Burundi was largely controlled by an uneasy coalition of the army, various Tutsi militia, UPRONA hardliners, and small Tutsi parties.” Ironically, an important trigger of the actual coup that marked the 1996 reversion was an effort on the part of the president and prime minister to secure more robust international protection for the
government at a summit meeting of regional heads of state.

Gross ethnic inequities, the ascendance of a Hutu government, and redistributive measures—however modest—certainly suggest that elite-reaction dynamics were in play and we code the case as an elite-reaction reversion. However, as we argue in the text, it is important to underline that features we associate with the weak democracy syndrome were also at work: praetorianism, weak institutionalization and a severe ongoing crisis that was both cause and consequence of the civil war.

**Coding.** Elite reaction reversion. The violence—although not attributable to or endorsed by the government—provided the excuse for a return of the Tutsi minority to power and the wider setting was one in which a weak Hutu government generated a backlash from the Tutsi military and economic elites.

**Central African Republic 2003 (CGV only) • Populist reversion**

The reversion. Ange-Felix Patasse, who won elections held under the supervision of UN peacekeepers in 1993 and 1999, was overthrown in a coup by Francois Bozize. Bozize dissolved the government, the national assembly, and the constitutional court. He established a broadly based provisional government, and a new constitution provided for multiparty elections, but Bozize continued as ruler throughout the rest of the decade.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with populist outcome. In 1999, Patasse had won UN-supervised elections that were deemed “free and fair” by international observers. However, the CAR was one of the world’s poorest countries, and a very weak state was unable to control widespread militia violence, foreign incursions, and periodic rebellions. Patasse had counted heavily on French troops to maintain himself in power, and when the French withdrew in 1998, he turned to Libya for support, offering long-term access to the country’s gold and diamond resources. Although most of the violence was perpetrated by predatory groups interested primarily in plunder, strong ethno-regional rivalries were also components of the conflict. Patasse, the elected incumbent, was based in the Sara tribes of the northern savannah region, and he tended to exclude the rival Yahoma people of the south from positions of power. Conversely, his challenger, Francois Bozize, had support primarily in the south.

Bozize launched his rebellion in October 2002, invading the country from Chad, where he had taken refuge. His army consisted of only about 1,000 men, mostly from Chad. However, Patasse was unable to count on the support

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of civil servants or of the military, who had been unpaid for months. Bozize’s troops entered Banqui, the capital, in May 2003, and declared the formation of a provisional government that would transition to democracy. His coup was initially welcomed in Banqui, but that quickly dissipated as the victorious army began to loot the city. The provisional government did consult with a wide array of groups and supervised the ratification of a new constitutions and elections in 2005. However, Bozize—after initially promising not to run for office—won the presidency in a run-off and used the resources of incumbency to maintain himself in power.

**Coding.** Populist reversion. Similar to a number of other African civil war cases, conflicts in the CAR involve fluid alignments and foreign entanglements that are difficult to categorize. The country has a long history of praetorianism and civil conflict (see Douglas-Bowers). Ongoing ethnic conflict, however, was important in this case (although both the Sara and the Yahoma were minorities). Because of the importance of underlying ethnic rivalries and because Bozize did initially appear to have a degree of popular support vis-à-vis Patasse, we code this as a populist reversion although numerous elements of a weak democracy operate.

**Comoros 1995 (CGV only) - Weak democracy reversion**

The reversion. In September 1995 Said Mohammed Djohar was overthrown in a coup led by a foreign mercenary, Bob Denard. Within a week of the coup, however, French troops had restored Djohar to power and established a government of national reconciliation. Under internationally-monitored elections held in March 1996, Mohamed Taki was elected president.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial, but not a direct motive for the coup. Since its independence in 1975, the Comoros has been characterized by chronic political instability, with more than 20 coup attempts. An important figure in the history of this instability was the French mercenary Bob Denard. Denard headed the first president’s presidential guard and had a variety of business interests in the country. He was also believed to have had close relations with French authorities, who acquiesced in his activities for a variety of strategic reasons ranging from support for his mercenary operations in Mozambique and Angola to the utility of the Comoros as a base for circumventing the embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa. The broader context of the coup arguably involved a core distributive conflict in the archipelago over federalism and central control. Formal political power was centralized under President Ahmed Abdallah’s second presidency (1978–1989). When Abdallah was assassinated (by Denard), his successor Said Mohammed Djohar sought...
to undertake modest democratizing reforms including re-introducing a multiparty system, restoring the office of prime minister, and restricting the presidency to two terms. The federal orientation of the state was also revived, but the government nonetheless faced inter-island conflict, political mobilization against the regime, and a series of coup attempts. The French government ultimately withdrew its support and generated an additional crisis by requiring visas for Comorian citizens seeking to enter the island of Mayotte, an island in the archipelago that had voted at independence to remain a French dependency.

Congo 1997 (CGV and Polity) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. In early October 1997, after months of armed confrontations between rival political forces, president Pascal Lissouba was overthrown by invading Angolan troops backing former dictator Sassou Nguesso.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial, but not a direct motive for the coup. From its election in 1992, Lissouba’s democratic government had been plagued by deep ethno-regional tensions, which erupted into near-civil war in 1994 and 1995 and burst out again in the middle of 1997. The main protagonists were three ethnically-based parties: The National Alliance for Democracy (URD) led by Bernard Kolelas and drawing its support primarily from Bankongo and Lari ethnic groups; the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (AND), led by Pascal Lissouba and based mainly in the southern regions of Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou; and the former ruling party, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT), headed by Sassou Nguesso, the dictator deposed in 1992 with a base mainly in the north of the country (Clark: 72). An alliance between the AND and the PCT—both vaguely left-of-center parties—allowed Lissouba to win the presidency in a runoff election in 1992. However, the two groups quarreled over the allocation of cabinet seats. The PCT withdrew from the government and formed an opposition coalition with Kolelas’ URD, its former adversary. A tense standoff ensued, in which Kolelas declared the legislature dissolved and the AND-PCT opposition declared his move illegal.
The crisis was temporarily averted by an agreement, mediated by the military, to form a unity government that would oversee new elections in 1993. In that election, however, charges of fraud led to the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict in Brazzaville and the formation of rival militias in different sections of the city. In 1994, mediation by France, the OAU, and Gabon, produced a truce between Lissouba and Kolelas, but Sassou remained in opposition and continued to arm his followers throughout the rest of 1994 and 1995. Presidential elections scheduled for 1997 increased the tensions among and within the contending groups. In June 1997, President Lissouba’s forces surrounded Sassou’s compound in Brazzaville, and Sassou ordered his militia to resist. A bloody, four month conflict ensued, leading to an invasion by Angolan troops and Sassou’s restoration to power.

**Coding.** Weak democracy reversion. The complex conflicts among the parties appear to be rooted in the distributional consequences of regional and ethnic representation in the government. However as in all of the African civil war cases discussed in Chapter Seven, it is difficult to distinguish social, economic and institutional interests; as Polity notes, in the run-up to the 1997 elections, “the armed forces of the Congo, split between supporters of Lissouba and Sassour-Nguesso, joined the private militias in an all-out civil war.” Control over oil resources also loomed heavily in the interests of the competing parties. The reversion thus does not map easily onto any of the models we have described. However, the reversion marks a return to the status quo ante in which Sassou’s coalition—which had been elected—is restored at the expense of new entrants; this restoration is the basis for our coding. As in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the “democratic regime” that was overthrown was exceedingly weak.

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**Dominican Republic 1994 (Polity Only) · Elite reaction reversion**

The reversion. After 16 years of relatively open multiparty elections, Joaquin Balaguer resorted to electoral fraud in 1994 to maintain himself in office and to block the victory of populist figure Jose Francisco Pena Gomez.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Balaguer had dominated political life in the Dominican Republic since 1966, and extensively resorted to fraud and intimidation to win elections, and co-opt or intimidate opponents. Nevertheless, under strong pressure from the Carter administration, he agreed to relatively free elections in 1978 and to the victory of opposition candidates. Politics became more competitive from that point onward, and the Dominican Republic crossed the 6-point Polity threshold. In the 1986 elections, Balaguer regained the presidency in the midst of a severe economic crisis, capitalizing on widespread opposition to a government IMF program and on anti-Haitian

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nationalist appeals. Taking a populist stance and continuing to resist IMF adjustments, he won again in relatively free elections in 1990.

Civil society opposition to Balaguer’s corrupt regime grew in the early 1990s, however. The use of fraud in the 1994 elections elicited protest from most quarters of Dominican society, but much of the protest was led by Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, a black Dominican who directed his attacks against the lighter-skinned elites of Dominican society. As noted in the preceding section on transitions, Balaguer was constrained in August 1994 to agree to hold new elections in 1996 in which he would not run. Nevertheless, until he finally yielded office, his government continued to undermine civil liberties and dissent through fraud and strong-arm tactics.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. As noted in our discussion of the 1996 transition, although cronyism, patronage, and corruption were enduring features of Dominican politics, elections had been relatively free since 1978 and there were expanding opportunities for political dissent. Balaguer’s attempt to fix the 1994 election was a step backward in that regard. Although Balaguer himself had earlier resorted to anti-IMF forms of economic populism, we code this as an “elite reaction” reversion because his opposition in 1994 came primarily from the left.

Ecuador 2000 (CGV only) - Populist reversion

The reversion. In the wake of street protests by CONAIE, the main organization representing indigenous peoples in Ecuador, and opposition from junior military officers, President Jamil Mahaud fled the country. CONAIE and military rebels formed a short-lived “junta of national salvation” but within a day had given way to the transfer of presidential power to the vice-president, Gustavo Naboa, in accordance with constitutional requirements.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with populist outcome. The late 1990s had been characterized by severe economic difficulties and street protests that led Congress to oust three presidents from office before they had completed their term. Jamil Mahaud came to office in 1998 with the support of rightist and center-right parties. In response to sharply declining oil prices and a severe financial crisis, Mahaud temporarily banned withdrawals on bank accounts and in 1999 adopted the United States dollar as the country’s official currency. The dollarization decree triggered strong street protests and the storming of the Congress building, led by CONAIE, the country’s largest indigenous organization. The protest was joined by a group of junior military officers, led by Lucio Gutierrez. In coalition with CONAIE leaders, they formed the short-lived junta of “national salvation” Under pressure from the

United States, however, the junta collapsed in less than 24 hours, but Mahaud was forced to flee the country and was replaced by his vice-president, Gustavo Naboa.

Coding. Populist reversion. The coup proved to be an extremely short-lived interruption of constitutional politics. Nevertheless, it was clearly motivated by dynamics characteristic of a populist reversion: there is strong evidence of distributive demands by political forces identified with the left, targeting a government pursuing “neoliberal” reforms.

Ecuador 2007 (Polity Only) · Populist reversion

The reversion. After a stand-off with the opposition in Congress, newly-elected President Rafael Correa proposed the creation of a constitutional assembly, dismissed opposition legislators attempting to block his plan, and then ousted nine Supreme Court justices who ordered the reinstatement of the legislators. In April 2007, Correa went forward with a referendum that elected a new ‘Citizens’ Assembly’ to write a new constitution. The Assembly, controlled by Correa’s supporters, declared the Congress in recess and delegated broad power to Correa to pursue his political agenda.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with populist outcome. Correa’s election and successful confrontation with the Congress and Courts capped almost a decade of highly polarized political struggle. Beginning in 1997, three successive elected presidents had been forced out of office—the last two as a result of massive street protests (see Ecuador 2000 reversion and 2002 transition) led by Ecuador’s increasingly powerful indigenous movement, CONAIE. Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, had been one of the leaders of the brief populist reversion in 2000 and was elected president on a populist platform in 2002; but in 2005, popular protest and military opposition forced him from office as well. Capitalizing on the broad disaffection with the prevailing system, Correa was swept into office in 2006, winning 57 percent of the second-round vote. Having run as an ‘anti-system’ candidate, he then proceeded to confront existing congressional and judicial institutions and to concentrate increasing power in his own hands.

Coding. Populist reversion. During the late 2000s, Rafael Correa emerged as one of the leading figures of the ‘populist left’ in Latin America. As discussed, he came to power on a wave of popular protest. Although his popular support was distinctly ratified in competitive elections, his time in office was characterized by challenges to constitutional checks and attacks on the press.

**Fiji 1987 (Polity only) • Elite reaction reversion**

The reversion. The 1987 general elections resulted in a victory for the Labour Party-National Federation Party Coalition victory, ending the post-independence monopoly of the Alliance party. The new Bavadra government was toppled by a first military coup in May, which tried to reinstall the defeated Mara government and introduce a variety of constitutional changes that would strengthen the political power of native Fijians. When these ambitions were thwarted by both domestic and international opposition, Major-General Sitiveni Liganamada Rabuka launched a second coup in September, which severed the relationship to the Crown by declaring Fiji a republic and installing a Military Administration.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Although centrist politicians in both major political blocs had sought to maintain multi-racial appeal, the major parties became more ethnically polarized, pulled in part by the emergence of more stridently nationalist indigenous Fijian parties (including dissenting factions of the National Federation Party and the Western United Front in particular). Ethnic conflict was overlaid with class conflict over the Alliance’s treatment of labor; the trade union-backed Labour party, which sought to advance a class-based multicultural platform, was launched in July 1985 in response to policies seen as adverse to the interest of both public and private sector workers. In addition to labor issues, the Labour party took a populist stance on other economic issues, including public ownership of key industries and the Fijian involvement in sectors dominated by foreigners, such as tourism. The NFP did not stand for Indo-Fijian ascendance, but they did seek to limit political-constitutional arrangements and other policies that unduly favored one group or the other. Further evidence of the distributive nature of the conflict came in the immediate aftermath of the election when a militant indigenous force, the Taukei Movement, launched a carefully-orchestrated campaign to break the newly elected government. Within a week of the election, Fiji was rocked by a violent spate of arson, sabotage, roadblocks and protest marches, which was the partial pretext for the military-led overthrow of the Bavadra government in May.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. As with other ethno-nationalist cases, we take a permissive view of the nature of distributive conflict. In this case, a government with a significant Indo-Fijian participation was clearly seen by sectors of the indigenous community as posing a redistributive challenge to existing prerogatives. As the Polity coding puts it, “following the coups, Rabuka moved to ensure that the country was ruled by indigenous Melanesians and had enshrined this dominance in a new constitution introduced in 1990.”

**Fiji 2000 (CGV and Polity) · Elite reaction reversion**

The reversion. On the anniversary of the formation of a new democratic government in 1999, the Prime Minister and a number of other members of parliament were taken hostage by ethnic Fijian nationalist George Speight and a small handful of gunmen. A political standoff ensued for nearly two months, during which the President dismissed the sitting government. The Fijian military ultimately seized power and brokered an end to the coup. The military and Great Council of Chiefs named an interim government, which was followed by the restoration of the constitution in early 2001 and new elections.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Speight by no means enjoyed unconditional backing among the Fijian community, which was deeply divided in the wake of the coup. However, his intervention did reflect a coalition of Fijian interests—both elite and mass—that rejected the Chaudhry government and sought to re-establish institutionalized political and economic preferences for indigenous Fijians. As the Polity coding notes, the Constitutional Review Committee set up to revise the 1997 Constitution was “designed to guarantee ethnic-Fijian domination of the government, a core demand of the Speight-led coup attempt.” Speight’s backers included politicians who had lost their seats in the 1999 elections as well as a new generation of business groups, but it also unleashed broader resentments by segments of the Fijian popular sector; the coup was followed by looting and violence on the streets of Suva, flight of Indo-Fijians, and the destruction of schools and places of worship.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. The case does not conform perfectly to the stylized model of an elite reaction, but it clearly was related to inter-communal tensions that had a distributive component.

**Fiji 2006 (Polity only) · Weak democracy reversion**

The reversion. On 5 December, 2006, the leader of the Fijian military Commodore Frank Bainimarama staged a bloodless coup against the Fijian-dominated Qarase government.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial, but not directly linked to coup. Despite the ethnic conflicts noted in the prior reversions, racial motives appear limited in this case or implicated only very indirectly. During the second half of 2005 the head of Fiji’s military, Frank Bainimarama came into conflict with the government over several pieces of legislation, including

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one that appeared to grant amnesty to those involved in the 2000 coup—a distributive conflict reversion which Bainimarama had put down—and another that sought to grant coastal property rights to Fijian owners. In the May 2006 elections, the United Fiji Party (SDL) of Laisenia Qarase again defeated the Fiji Labour Party. However, in contrast to the party’s failure to implement power-sharing agreements in 2003-4 (see discussion of 2004 transition), Qarase actively courted Labour participation in the cabinet, putting party leader Chaudhry in a difficult position and splitting the party. Qarase subsequently moved forward with his plans to pass the two controversial bills and also sought to relieve Commodore Bainimarama of his military command. The coup followed.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. On the one hand, Bainimarama—although an ethnic Fijian—genuinely appeared to oppose the ethnic-based policies of the Qarase government and initially received at least some support on that score including from politicians from a number of parties that joined his interim government. He claimed that the December 2006 coup was aimed at correcting the ethnic imbalances that had been created by the three previous coups and at dismantling chiefly dominance and political corruption within government. He also sought to challenge the power of the churches, which had contributed to ethnic divisions. On the other hand, the coup appears to more centrally reflect an intra-elite Fijian conflict between the military and the political establishment. There were ongoing turf wars between Qarase and Bainimarama over the role of the military more generally, and his role in particular. The return to electoral democracy was continually delayed and Bainimarama’s objectives became more vague and open-ended. International reaction to the coup and its stated objectives was also unanimously skeptical and negative, and the country was ultimately expelled from the Commonwealth.

The Gambia 1994 (Polity only) · Weak democracy reversion

The Reversion. On July 22, 1994, junior military officers, led by then-lieutenant Yahya Jammeh and his Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), overthrew the government of President Dawada Kairaba Jawara and his People’s Progressive Party (PPP) was overthrown in a bloodless coup. Two years later, Jammeh staged controlled elections in which he and his newly-formed party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction, won.

The Role of Distributive Conflict. Minimal. At the time of the coup, the government of Dawada Jawara was the longest surviving multi-party democracy in Africa. This success was rooted in the cooptation of opposition politicians and an elaborate system of patronage and corruption that limited the traction


of alternative parties. From 1992, however, the government was embroiled in a series of embarrassing corruption allegations that unfolded against a backdrop of declining economic performance. These allegations included the weak performance of a government asset management company set up to recover losses from the failure of the Gambia Commercial and Development Bank, in which a number of rich Gambians were implicated; a scandal at the Gambia Cooperative Union that implicated Dawada Jawara’s favored successor within the PPP and Dawada Jawara’s lavish personal expenses on overseas trips. These problems were compounded by grievances within the small military force over pay.

Jammeh appears to have fashioned himself to some extent after Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. However, his central justification for the coup centered less on populist or redistributive claims than on the corruption of the incumbent government; perhaps the central plank in the new government’s platform was the formation of a number of investigative panels. In contrast to the early populist phase of the Rawlings government, Jammeh continued to delegate substantial power to the technocrats and undertook a number of public goods initiatives, including the construction of schools and roads. Although incumbent politicians and certain professional groups, such as the lawyers’ guild, strongly opposed the coup, opposition parties and the youth provided the new regime with a base of support. Nonetheless, the combination of sanctions from major donors, growing domestic opposition from civil society groups and two coup attempts within the army itself led the regime to set up a National Consultative Committee (NCC). In February 1995, Jammeh accepted the NCC recommendation for a more rapid transition back to democratic rule, setting the stage for the managed constitutional referendum and elections of 1996 through which Jammeh extended his power.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. This case corresponds closely to a type of authoritarian reversion in which there is appeal to cross-class interests. The military did not tap classic distributional grievances but rather the overall performance of the regime, and its corruption in particular. Although the coup was not popular among many civil society groups, particularly political and professional ones, it did enjoy some support among opposition parties and the youth.

Ghana 1981 (CGV and Polity) · Populist reversion

The reversion. On the last day of 1981, a military coup led by Jerry Rawlings overthrew the elected government of Hilla Limann. Rawlings then established the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to rule the country, dissolved parliament, and banned all political parties.
The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with populist outcome. At the time of the democratic transition that transferred power to Limann in 1979, Rawlings had signaled his willingness to re-enter politics if the new democratic government failed to perform. By the time of the coup, the economy had badly deteriorated, and the Limann government faced strikes and confrontations with workers over back pay and a painful austerity program. Rawlings took power with the backing of militant student organizations, unions, and left social movements. Upon seizing power, Rawlings actively solicited the support of these forces by placing representatives of radical left organizations on the military’s Provisional National Defense Council and by creating a raft of populist consultative organizations (Jeffries 1992).

Coding. Populist reversion. Rawlings’ populism only aggravated Ghana’s economic problems, and the military regime ultimately reversed course entirely and vigorously embraced the “Washington consensus”. However, the initial overthrow of the democratic regime clearly appealed to, and mobilized support from, left, populist and lower class groups.

Guatemala 1982 (CGV only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. In March 1982, General Efrain Rios Montt deposed elected incumbent General Romeo Lucas Garcia in a CIA-backed coup d’état. The coup effectively negated the victory of Angel Anibal Guevara, the official party candidate in the presidential elections held earlier in the month.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but not a direct motivation for the coup. Romeo Lucas Garcia had been freely elected in 1978, but his government had engaged in political repression and the assassinations of major progressive opposition figures. Despite worsening human rights conditions, his government received millions of dollars in US military and economic aid, and public backing from the Reagan administration. In 1981, Garcia presided over the onset of a repressive campaign against the Mayan population. The coup d’état led by Rios Montt was initially welcomed by the general population and even sought to appeal to the peasant population, albeit in order to prevent their defection to insurgents. However, Montt’s military junta soon inaugurated a “beans and guns” campaign of terror and intimidation against the guerilla movement as well as a genocidal attack on the Mayan population.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. The existing government was deposed amid fears that the incumbent government would be ineffective to manage distributive conflicts involving the large indigenous population. However, the
coup did not reflect an elite reaction against a government that was itself engaged in redistributive politics; to the contrary, the Romeo Lucas Garcia regime had already moved in a hardline and anti-democratic direction. Although the Rios Montt government initially enjoyed some broad support, its initial appeals appear to have been largely tactical as the government moved quickly in an extreme right-wing direction, aimed at extirpating insurgent opposition. As Demarest shows, intra-military factionalism and material interests played heavily into the coup as well.

Guinea-Bissau 2003 (CGV only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. In September 2003, the military launched a coup against the nominally democratic but highly ineffective and corrupt government of Kumba Yala.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The 2003 coup came in the wake of increasing evidence of the utter ineffectiveness and corruption of the Yala government. The National Assembly had been dismissed in November 2002, resulting in a prolonged budget crisis of concern to donors, as civil servant salaries went unpaid generating protests and strikes; these were called off following the coup. Parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2003 were repeatedly postponed; the trigger to the coup was the announcement that they would be delayed for the fourth time. Yala was accused of favoring his own Balante ethnic group (30 percent of the population, including most of the army) to the detriment of the Muslims who are almost half of the population. Nonetheless, it was the army that overthrew him, signaling much broader concerns.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion with an appeal to cross-class support and ultimately yielding a more democratic outcome. The military intervened in order to reverse the political decay under a nominally democratic government and did so with wide support, including from the international community. The army quickly signed an agreement with the country’s main political and civil society groups to set up a National Transitional Council, which served as an interim legislative body, and handed over executive power to a caretaker administration. Legislative elections were held in March 2004 and the transition was completed in July 2005 with the holding of presidential elections.

**Haiti 1991 (Polity Only) · Elite reaction reversion**

The reversion. In September 1991, Colonel Raoul Cedras led a military coup against Jean-Claude Aristide, who had been in office since February of that year. This case is an episode in an ongoing domestic and international struggle over the role of the Jean-Claude Aristide (see Haiti transitions in 1990 and 1994 above).

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Aristide was a populist leader who had led opposition to a succession of military rulers and had been elected in December 1990 with very wide popular support. His charismatic appeal to the popular sectors was a source of extreme anxiety to Haitian civilian elites, who viewed him as a dangerous demagogue. Military officials saw him as a serious threat to their access to rents, and an attempted coup in January 1991 sought to block his inauguration as president. The enmity between the military and the president deepened further when Aristide attempted to restructure the high command and to eliminate local agents of extortion and control within the Army and police. This direct attack on military privilege precipitated the coup of September 30.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. Although Aristide’s populism raised serious questions about his commitment to democracy, his wide mass appeal posed a clear threat to military and civilian elites, and this motivated his ouster from office.

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**Haiti 1999 (Polity only) · Populist reversion**

The reversion. In January 1999, President Rene Preval dismissed the Chamber of Deputies and all but nine members of the Senate and ruled by decree for the remainder of his term.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with populist outcome. As noted in the prior entries on Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected by a wide margin of the popular vote in 1990, but was overthrown only seven months later by elite groups and the military. In 1994, he was restored to the presidency with broad popular support and with the military backing of the United States and the international community. His government, however, also relied heavily on intimidation and harassment of his opponents. The governing party, the Lavales Political Organization (OLP) gradually split into a moderate and more radical faction. Aristide left the party to form the Lavales Family (FL), leaving the OLP in opposition and the parliament stalemated.
After winning a highly tainted election in 1995, Aristide’s handpicked successor, Rene Preval, assumed the presidency, but Aristide remained a power behind the throne. Preval continued the campaign of intimidation against the opposition, but was increasingly hamstrung by legislative opposition from the former governing party, the OLP. From June 1997 until its dismissal, the legislature refused to confirm a series of nominees for prime minister, and the government was paralyzed. Preval exploited disaffection to dismiss the government. After dismissing the legislature, Preval appointed a cabinet dominated entirely by his and Aristide’s Lavales Family (FL).

In the run-up to the election of 2000, Preval appointed an electoral council comprised of FL partisans. Legislative elections held in May 2000 were overwhelmingly won by the FL, but were marked by blatant fraud and condemned by the OAS.

**Coding.** Populist reversion. By 1999, intimidation and terror were significant instruments of political control. However, much of the opposition to Aristide’s erratic slide into authoritarianism came from the elite and international actors, and he retained a considerable reservoir of support within the popular sectors of Haitian society. Preval’s seizure of power in 1999 was a “populist-authoritarian” initiative that exploited the stalemate of the government and paved the way for Aristide’s return to the presidency in 2000.

**Honduras 1985 (Polity only) · Weak democracy reversion**

The reversion. In the run up to presidential elections scheduled for 1986, the incumbent president, Roberto Suazo Cordova, precipitated a constitutional crisis. Although subject to term limits, he attempted to prolong his control of the presidency by engineering the nomination of Oscar Mejia Arellano, a close ally in his faction of the Liberal party.

The role of distributive conflict. Very limited. The protagonists, as had been the case in the past, were elite political factions and the military. Suazo’s attempt to evade term limits led to a struggle with his opponents in Congress over control of the Supreme Court. Factions of both the ruling Liberal party and the opposition National Party voted to dismiss five of the president’s allies on the nine-member court and to replace them with opponents. Suazo, in turn, sent troops to surround the Congress building, detain the new president of the Court, and arrest the four other new justices. The legislators who voted to replace the old judges were charged with treason. The Congress in turn responded with new legislation that censured the president and sharply restricted his ability to control the choice of presidential candidates.

The standoff was broken through negotiations brokered by the military in a complex agreement that allowed elections to go forward as scheduled in 1986. The agreement was structured in a way that prevented a victory for Suazo’s ally, but allowed the candidate of another Liberal party faction, Jose Azcona, to defeat the National Party opposition with only 27 percent of the vote.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. Like the earlier transition in 1982 and the later one in 1989, this was the product of an elite game, mediated by the military establishment. Unable to coordinate ex ante, the political and military elite were able to coordinate ex post and enforce their preferred outcome. Broader civil society had only limited involvement. The designation of this episode as a reversion, it should be noted, is an artifact of the Polity coding scheme and marks only a small shift from a 6 to a 5. Ironically, in 1990, Suazo’s successor oversaw the first transfer of the presidency to an opposition party candidate, and the Polity score was raised again to a 6. (See above, the Honduras transition, 1990).

Lesotho 1998 (Polity only) - Omitted from the dataset

In the 1993 elections the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) won all of the seats in the National Assembly and Dr. Ntsu Mokhele became prime minister; see the discussion of the 1993 transition above. While most independent observers viewed these elections as “free and fair”, the Basotho National Party (BNP), which was supported by members of the former military regime, protested the outcome of the polls. In 1994 a coalition of forces involving factions within the military, supporters of ex-King Moshoeshoe II and the BNP pressured King Letsie III to dismiss the BCP-led government, dissolve the National Assembly, and return the throne to his father. Violent protests by BCP supporters led to the political intervention of troops from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Under intense pressure from these states to resolve the political crisis, the Mokhele government was reinstated. In January 1995, King Letsie abdicated his throne in favor of his father.

In 1997, Prime Minister Mokhele broke from the BCP and established a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy Party (LCD), taking a majority of BCP parliamentarians with him. As a result, the BCP became the minority opposition in the National Assembly. Refusing to accept its opposition status, remaining members of the BCP refused to attend Assembly sessions and organized opposition to LCD rule. Despite this opposition, the LCD—now under the leadership of Pakalitha Mosisili—won an overwhelming victory in regularly-scheduled National Assembly elections in 1998, capturing almost all seats.

Lesotho shows a change in Polity score from 8 in 1997 to 0 in 1998. The 0 coding for Lesotho in 1998 is an artifact of the Polity coding scheme. The country has an original coding of “−77” for 1998, one of two transition years in the Polity data set that have this coding. −77 codings are defined as “interregnum or anarchy” and are mechanically converted into a neutral 0 so that the country year could be used for statistical purposes. However, it is not clear from the Polity description of the case that a “0” coding is warranted and we have therefore removed the case from the data set.
Claiming that the elections were rigged, opposition parties engaged in violent street protests to destabilize the government, resulting in the death of over a hundred citizens. As during the crisis in 1993-94 opposition party members also appealed to disgruntled army factions and sought to persuade King Letsie to dissolve the National Assembly and install a government of national unity. Despite the claims of the opposition, independent observers could not confirm that the voting was rigged. Rather the problem was the first-past-the-post electoral system; with 60 percent of the popular vote the LCD won seventy-eight out of eighty parliamentary seats.

The political violence of 1998 was ultimately stopped by the intervention of troops from Botswana and South Africa. The LCD government agreed to hold new elections within 18 months, establishing an Interim Political Authority (IPA) in December 1998 consisting of two members from each of the country’s twelve main political parties. After a prolonged period of foot-dragging by the LCD government, national elections were finally held in May 2002 under a new electoral system designed to give smaller parties a greater voice in parliament.

The 1998 elections were regularly scheduled and outside observers were not able to determine that they were fraudulent. The transition during this year was to an Interim Political Authority that represented all parties, and that transition was driven by a combination of mass mobilization and violence and outside intervention. However, it is not clear that the year should be coded as a 0. There is no reversion, as defined as an incumbent executive, military, or outside political force taking control of a democratic government and subverting it. For this reason, we have chosen to omit the case from the dataset.

*Mauritania 2008 (CGV only) · Weak democracy reversion*

The reversion. Elections held in March 2007 were the first relatively free and fair elections in the country and brought Sidiould Cheikh Abdalahi to the presidency with 53% of the vote, over long-time opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah. When Abdalahi attempted to dismiss senior military staff in August 2008 he was overthrown by the presidential guard. A military junta, the Higher State Council (HSC) was established to rule the country led by Gen. Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who had been a leading figure in the 2005 coup that had toppled the country’s first president, Ahmed Taya.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Socially, the Muslim country is highly stratified between an Arab elite and black Africans, many of whom, referred to as Haratines, are descendants of former African slaves. This group suffers from various forms of discrimination but has not been able to play a major role in the country’s politics. Despite the establishment of multiparty politics in Mauritania in 1991, politics have in fact been dominated by competing military factions within the Arab elite. In the first nominally democratic

election in 1992, the leader of the incumbent junta, Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya gained the presidency and was subsequently re-elected but increasingly ruled by force and ultimately held power until 2005, when he was overthrown by the military in a bloodless coup. In the wake of the coup, the Military Council for Justice and Democracy was established to govern the country for a maximum of two years. The Military Council was mandated with the task of overseeing the country’s transition to democracy. Colonel Ely Ould Mohammed Vall, once one of Taya’s closest aids, was named leader of the Military Council and organized the 2007 elections that brought Sidiould Cheikh Abdalahi to power. His overthrow in 2008 was followed by a quite similar cycle. Coup leader General Abdel Aziz promised new elections and a return to civilian government but then announced he would stand for elections himself. In the wake of a threatened boycott by opposition parties and politicians, a national unity government was brokered in 2009 paving the way for elections that Abdel Aziz won.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. In the Polity dataset, Mauritania never surpasses the democratic threshold. The coup of 2007 was only the most recent of intra-military conflicts and did not appear to reflect either Arab-black divisions or the increase in radical Islamist violence.

Nepal 2002 (CGV and Polity) · Elite reaction reversion

The reversion. In October, the King sacked the Prime Minister Sher B. Deuba and nominated a royalist politician to head a nine-member interim government with a mandate to restore law and order, hold mid-term elections and the election of the local bodies—which had been dissolved in July—and address the growing Maoist insurgency.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. At the end of 1998, a one-party minority Nepal Congress Party government was installed to oversee elections scheduled for May 1999. The NCP won an outright majority, the apparent reason for the change of Polity coding from “5” to “6” in that year (see discussion of 1999 transition above). In 2001, Crown Prince Dipendra murdered his father, the queen and other members of the royal family in a failed attempt to seize the throne. Dipendra died in the process, and his uncle, Gyanendra, ascended to the position. These events fueled the insurgency, which became increasingly violent and attracted more support.

In May 2002, the King dissolved the legislature at the request of Prime Minister Deuba, in order to prepare for new elections. However, the King and the legislature also clashed over an extension of the state of emergency that had been put in place in November 2001; the Congress Party was deeply divided

over the issue. As the Maoist insurrection in the country escalated in the summer of 2002, the King agreed to postpone legislative elections for 14 months. The parties in the legislature proposed that an all-party government rule in the interim, a proposal that the King rejected. In the face of mounting violence and a stalemate between the King and legislature, the King assumed full executive powers, ultimately forming a government in June of the following year headed by a pro-monarchist politician, Surya Bahadur Thapa, and drawing on other politicians from smaller parties.

**Coding.** Elite reaction reversion. Although the conflict between the King and legislature has intra-elite elements, a key issue in that conflict was how to handle the mounting insurgency. Given its fundamentally class-oriented nature and its objective of ousting the monarchy altogether, this appears a classic case of an elite reaction reversion.

**Niger 1996 (CGV and Polity) · Weak Democracy reversion**

The reversion. In January 1996, the army, led by Ibrihim Bare Manassara overthrew incumbent president Mahamane Ousmane, who had been elected in 1993. Mainassara subsequently claimed victory in a rigged election that barred all of the main opposition candidates from competing and he held power until his assassination in 1999.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. From 1993 to 1996, president Mahamane Ousmane of the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) headed the government. Following the elections, Osmane appointed Mahamadou Issoufou as prime minister; Issoufou had been backed by the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS), a party that had campaigned on a left-of-center platform and had been a leading actor in the deposing of the one-party government of Ali Saibou. Nevertheless, the new democratic government faced the same economic and political constraints as its authoritarian predecessor, including dependence on conditional IMF support and escalating conflicts with the unions and students. In 1994, confrontations with the main union federation escalated with the devaluation of the French franc, leading to threats of a general strike. The government responded with a crackdown that severely weakened the union movement. The crisis forced Issoufou to resign as Prime Minister. The PNDS withdrew from the governing coalition and aligned with Saisou’s National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD), the old ruling party.

Faced with the collapse of the governing coalition, Osmame called a new election in 1995. In alliance with its former adversary—the PNDS, the old ruling party—the MNSD emerged as the victor. The division between President

Ousmane and the new parliamentary majority, led by Prime Minister Hama Amadou, paralyzed the government. The economic situation continued to deteriorate, while the government itself remained stalemated and unable to act. The military intervened in January 1996 in the context of the government’s attempts to impose a tax reform sponsored by the World Bank and labor calls for a general strike. Bare cited the constitutional crisis and political stalemate as the reason for the coup, and there is evidence that this was also the perception of much of the population. “By the time the coup took place the legitimacy and credibility of the democratic process and of its principal players was so thoroughly undermined that it was greeted in many circles, at least initially, with relief …Even among (labor and student) associations that had played so key a role in ending the previous military regime, there were no calls for mass demonstrations” (Charlick:73) and some student and labor groups even rallied in favor of the coup.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. Although the government did face some protest from unions and students, these sectors did not represent the interests of marginalized groups; to the contrary. The student organization represented mainly university students (about 0.7 percent of the total university-aged population), and the unions represented about 39,000 civil servants. The grievances of these groups centered in part on programs proposed by the international financial institutions that would have reallocated spending to the rural sector and primary schools (Gervais:102). The central motivation for the coup does not appear to have been the need to dampen distributive conflicts but rather the institutional stalemate of a deeply divided government. The existence of some support for the coup provides further justification for this coding.

Nigeria 1983–84 · CGV 1983; Polity 1984 · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. The civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was overthrown by a military coup led by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari on the last day of 1983. The differences in the codings in the two datasets appear to simply rest on how the reversion is timed.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The coup occurred in the context of severe economic deterioration driven by the decline of petroleum prices and a widespread loss of confidence in the willingness or capacity of a highly corrupt government to cope with it. However, there are no indications that the takeover was motivated by class or ethnic demands on the state, or by significant involvement of civil society. The most consequential divisions were within the elites, most notably, among the military, clientelistic politicians, and the business class that had formed the core of the ruling class during


CNG 1985; Polity 1984 · Weak democracy reversion
the oil boom of the 1970s. When oil revenues collapsed, the ruling coalition fragmented under the competing claims for patronage. The inability of the hegemonic party to reconcile these conflicting interests, argues Augustine Udo (1985: 337), came to a head in a blatantly corrupt election in 1983, which exposed “unprecedented corruption, intimidation, and flagrant abuse of electoral privilege by all parties”. The leader of the coup, Major General Muammar Buhari, was—like his predecessors—tied closely to the Muslim north and had held a high position within the deposed government, although he came from a different, minority ethnic group.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. There is little evidence that factional rivalries within the military were connected with broader conflicts that could be modeled in elite–mass terms, whether engaging class, ethnic, or regional interests.

**Pakistan 1999 (CGV and Polity) · Weak democracy reversion**

The reversion. A military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf deposed the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Poverty, regionalism, and ethnic divisions provided the backdrop for the overthrow of the democratic regime, but were not directly implicated in its demise. For a decade prior to the coup, the democratic regime had been characterized by a cutthroat rivalry between two major, clientelistic parties, Benazir Bhutto’s slightly left of center PPP and the Muslim League headed by Nawaz Sharif. Each regarded election to office as an opportunity to retaliate against their political opponents. Throughout this period, the military also continued to exercise substantial political influence as a self-proclaimed arbiter and guardian of national sovereignty.

The direct seizure of power by General Musharraf in 1999 reflected another cycle of institutional weakness inviting praetorian intervention. In 1997, Sharif was elected to office with a very large parliamentary majority, which he used to undermine and bar Bhutto for elective office and to dismiss hundreds of her political appointees. The prime minister overreached with respect to the military, however. A failed attempt by the armed forces to seize strategic heights near the Kashmiri town of Kargil resulted in a humiliating defeat and bitter political recriminations of responsibility for the fiasco. In an attempt to counter threats from the armed forces, Sharif dismissed the Musharrorf, the commanding general, while he was traveling on official business. Musharraf refused to accept the decision and successfully rallied the military establishment to his side. When he returned home, he seized power after Sharif unsuccessfully attempted to prevent his plane from making an emergency landing.

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Coding. Weak democracy reversion. This was a case of bitter conflict within the military and political elites.

Peru 1990–2 (CGV 1990; Polity 1992) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. In 1992, incumbent President Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress, gave the Executive Branch all legislative powers, suspended the Constitution, and gave the president the power to enact various reforms. Fujimori subsequently called elections for a new congress in 1993. Fujimori received a majority in this new congress, which drafted a new constitution.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The “self-coup” engineered by Fujimori and the military was motivated in part by the desire for a freer hand in pursuing neoliberal reforms and to repress the left-wing terrorism of the Shining Path insurgency. Nevertheless, this does not meet the criteria for an elite reversion. Fujimori initially faced opposition from United States and international lending organizations, as well as business sectors that feared international isolation (Mauceri 1995: 29–30). It was partially in response to these pressures that Fujimori moved to institute at least a facade of constitutional government. Moreover, although the unions and the political left opposed the coup, their organizations had been decimated by the hyperinflation and economic collapse of the late 1980s and they themselves enjoyed little popular support. On the contrary, the large majority of the Peruvian poor were attracted by a leader who promised to deal with the economic crisis and the insurgency with a strong hand. In 1992, one survey showed that almost 76 percent of low-income people supported Fujimori’s plan for constitutional reform (Rubio 1992, 7, cited in Weyland 1996, fn. 16.). Fujimori subsequently gained an overwhelming victory in the 1993 elections to the constituent assembly. Although undertaking economic reforms, Fujimori also strengthened his electoral base through the expansion of clientelistic anti-poverty programs as the economy revived.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. Fujimori drew support from a wide cross-section of Peruvian society.

Russian Federation 2007 (Polity only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. Russian President Vladimir Putin evaded constitutional limits on a third term with the election of a handpicked successor, Dmitri Medvedev and retained effective political control as Prime Minister. Parliamentary elections held in 2007 were heavily rigged in favor of Putin’s United Russia party in order to insure the legislative majority necessary to orchestrate this outcome.

The CGV coding of this case is in error; the coup d’état that overturned the democratic regime occurred in 1992.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. On the surface, there are similarities to the “populist” competitive authoritarian regime established in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. Putin had substantial support from lower-income sectors outside the urban centers, and has faced increasing opposition from middle-class groups based in Moscow and Petersburg. However, Putin’s political power during the 2000s rested on support that stretched across the social spectrum, including from allied business elites, regional bosses, and a significant portion of the Russian electorate.

There is considerable debate about whether Russia ever deserved to be categorized as democratic, but Russia was awarded a Polity score of 6 in 2000, after Putin acceded to the presidency in a relatively free election. Once in the presidency, however, he undertook a series of steps that chipped away at the protections of constitutional democracy. These included constitutional reforms that centralized control over federal units, electoral laws that established a dominant single party (United Russia), restrictions on public demonstrations, and selective arrests and harassment of opposition challengers. Tightening control was especially visible in 2007, with the stacking of the electoral commission and parliamentary elections of highly questionable legitimacy—steps that paved the way for the “deal” between Putin and Medvedev.

**Coding.** Weak democracy reversion. Although Putin has faced some challenges from middle-class and some business reformers, his support for his political rule and authoritarian practices was relatively broad based.

*Sierra Leone 1997 (CGV only) · Weak democracy reversion*

The reversion. The military under the leadership of Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew the Kabbah government and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which sought to share power with the insurgent RUF.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but does not map to elite-mass cleavages. The Sierra Leone reversion is one of a cluster of African civil war cases that we discuss in Chapter Seven of *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. The externally supervised power-sharing agreement that underpinned multiparty elections in 1996 was fragile and the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, leader of the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) never really gained control of the country. The nominally democratic government explicitly rejected a number of the redistributive demands of the RUF as unrealistic, even while trying to accommodate them through peace negotiations and ultimately with a peace agreement (on which the RUF reneged). The overthrow of the government largely reflected internecine rivalries within

### Footnotes


### Further Reading

the coercive apparatus. During the run-up to the 1996 election, the military had been increasingly plagued by desertions, low morale, and cooperation with the rebel forces engaged in the illegal diamond trade. With the loyalty of the national military in doubt, the Kabbah government increasingly relied for protection on civil militias that had formed in response to the growing violence and announced plans to substantially reduce the size of the armed forces. The coup of May 1997, which brought Major Johnny Paul Koroma to power largely reflected these inter-elite conflicts.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. The new government had the support of at least some segments of the rebel force (the RUF), which was quickly invited to share power with the new junta. However, the RUF relied heavily on terror, conscription, and diamonds rather than popular support and it was both feared and resisted in the areas in which it operated. Thus, the cleavages in Sierra Leone by no means map easily onto an elite-mass model of distributive conflict.

**Solomon Islands 2000 (Polity only) · Omitted from the dataset**

As in other island countries in the dataset, particularly the Comoros, there have been long-standing distributive conflicts in the Solomon Islands between the different islands in the chain. Most salient in this regard are conflicts between Isatabu (Guadalcanal) islanders and those from Malaita. Since being brought in by US forces to help drive out remnants of the Japanese army from Guadalcanal in 1942, Malaita Islanders remained politically and economically active on Isatabu, both in the capital city Honiara and in the palm plantations and gold mines.

Native Isatabu Islanders mobilized their resentment toward the Malaita islander presence in the 1990s and demanded special compensation from the central government for hosting the capital. When that was denied, local militias (the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army, later renamed the Isatabu Freedom Fighters) were formed to intimidate Malaitans and drive them out of the island. Many Malaitans fled from the countryside to Honiara and a militant group formed to protect them: the Malaita Eagles Force (MEF).

Since its first post-independence election in 1980, the Solomon Islands has been coded as democratic by Polity. The national election of August 1997 resulted in Bartholomew Ulufo’alu’s election as Prime Minister, heading a coalition government, which christened itself the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change. Clashes between the militias escalated in 1998–9 when Isatabu militants began attacking homesteads and workplaces of Malaita islanders. To deal with this crisis, the Parliament enacted a 4-month state of emergency in June 1999, which extended the arrest and search powers of the police.


In June 2000, the MEF seized the capital and forced the resignation of Prime Minister Ulufa’alu. Manasseh Sogavare, leader of the opposition People’s Progressive Party was subsequently voted Prime Minister. However, six Members of Parliament had been prevented from attending the parliamentary session at which the Prime Minister was elected, allegedly due to intimidation by the MEF. The Australian-brokered Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) brought militant groups together to agree a ceasefire on 3 August 2000. Isatabu militants retaliated, however, and sought to drive Malaitan settlers from the island, resulting in the closure of a large oil-palm estate and gold mine which were vital to exports but whose workforce was largely Malaitan. According to Polity, “anarchy ensued”—apparently the basis for the coding.

New elections were held in December 2001, bringing Sir Allan Kemakeza into the Prime Minister’s chair with the support of a coalition of parties. Kemakeza attempted to address the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, but widespread lawlessness and violence prompted a formal request for outside assistance, which was unanimously approved by parliament in 2001. In July 2003, the Australian Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deployed to the island.

In contrast to Lesotho, there is some justification for coding the Solomon Islands as reverting from democratic rule in 2000. The opposition exploited the seizure of the capital by the MEF and elected a government of dubious constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, there is some more limited justification for treating it as a distributive conflict case, although the differences between the competing island factions do not appear to have a vertical or class structure. However the coding of 2000 as a “0” is given by the initial “-77” coding of the case as “anarchy” and not by the political developments of that year. We therefore have omitted the case from the dataset.

Sri Lanka 1982 (Polity Only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. President Jayawardene had been elected in October 1982, but he risked the loss of his supermajority in scheduled elections in August 1983. He declared a state of emergency and exploited his parliamentary supermajority to call for a referendum extending the life of the sitting parliament without elections until 1989. Although of dubious constitutionality, the referendum won majority support.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. Following the overwhelming victory of the United National Party (UNP) in the 1977 general election, the new government used its two-thirds majority in Parliament to create a new constitution. The Constitution added the position of Executive President, and extended the term of elected Presidents and Parliament to 6 years from the date of the election. In 1978 Jayewardene named himself President of Sri Lanka.
The UNP enjoyed a supermajority in parliament. Due to the non-concurrence of elections, the term of the parliament was due to expire in August 1983. Jayawardene was fearful, however, that elections could result in the UNP losing that supermajority; this subsequently became apparent when he only managed to garner 52% of the vote in the first direct presidential election in October 1982. In order to maintain the parliamentary supermajority of the UNP, Jayawardene decided to use a constitutional amendment to extend the life of parliament without holding direct elections. The Supreme Court ruled (4-3) that the term of the parliament could be extended if the bill was both passed by a supermajority and submitted to referendum. After the presidential elections in October, however, Jayawardene declared a state of emergency claiming that sections of the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party were conspiring to take power in a coup despite the fact that no evidence was ever turned up suggesting this was the case. The referendum took place on December 22, 1982 and Jayawardene won. The sitting parliament was therefore extended for six further years beginning in August 1983, and served out its mandate until the 1989 general elections (which is coded as a return to democratic rule in the CGV dataset but not in the Polity dataset).

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. The Jayawardene government experienced some of the first serious violence surrounding the Tamil issue in 1981 following the introduction of direct elections to District Development Councils in 1981. More violence was to follow in 1983 as the country started its descent into civil war. However, there is no evidence that the ethnic violence spurred the declaration of a state of emergency, or that emergency powers were introduced for the purpose of managing distributive ethnic or other conflicts. The declaration seems a self-interested measure on the part of the incumbent president and his parliamentary backers to retain power.

Sri Lanka 2003 (Polity only) · Elite reaction reversion

The reversion. As we saw above in the discussion of the transitions in 2001 and 2006, Sri Lanka presents a case of small oscillations around the democratic cutoff. Sri Lanka moved from a “5” in 2000 to a “6” in 2001, but reverted back to a “5” from 2003 to 2005 before moving to a “6” in 2006 where it remained through the end of the data set. In contrast to the transition coding, the basis for the reversion coding is clear. In November 2003, President Kumaratunga suspended Parliament and took direct control over three cabinet ministries using a national security justification based on the resumption of the Tamil insurgency.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but not following the causal lines of distributive conflict models. In February 2002, the government and
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) reached a ceasefire agreement brokered by Norway. The government lifted the ban on the LTTE, which paved the way for the resumption of direct negotiations in September. The political cohabitation agreement complicated the negotiations, however, because Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and the UNP favored partial devolution as a solution to the conflict while President Kumaratunga’s alliance (UPFA) and Sinhala nationalists were opposed to such concessions. The talks broke down in April 2003 and in October the LTTE issued a detailed peace proposal calling for devolution and the creation of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) with broad powers. The LTTE proposal triggered a strong reaction from nationalists who accused Prime Minister Wickremesinghe of weakness in dealing with the LTTE. The declaration of the state of emergency and the direct assumption of control over the ministries of mass media, interior and defense were justified as a means of dealing with the LTTE from a position of strength. The UPFA and the president then sought to bribe politicians to defect so that the President could effectively control parliament. These efforts failed and the Prime Minister continued to insist that he could not negotiate without controlling key portfolios and particularly defense. These divisions ultimately led to an effective suspension of negotiations.

Wickremesinghe subsequently formed an alliance with the United People’s Freedom Alliance (JVP), which favored a tougher line and called for new elections in April 2004. The elections resulted in victory for the UPFA.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. The Tamil insurgency has a strong regional redistributive component. The justification for President Kumaratunga’s intervention was to undermine the more accommodating line taken by the Prime Minister.

Sudan 1989 (CGV and Polity) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. In June 1989, the military undertook a coup that replaced Sadiq al-Mahdi’s all-party coalition with the Revolution Command Council (RCC) under the leadership of General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. The RCC suspended the 1986 transitional constitution, dissolved the Constituent Assembly, dissolved all political parties, trade unions and professional organizations, and took possession of their assets.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial, but in the context of widespread grievances against the performance of the democratic government. Immediately following the elections of 1986, it became clear that the new democratic government had inherited an economy in a state of virtual collapse. External
creditors initially refused to provide additional support, and both before and after an agreement with the IMF was reached in 1987 the country witnessed widespread protests related to rising prices and austerity measures. The question of whether the new government would retain the 1983 sharia laws also created substantial polarization between Muslim supporters and regional parties, including particularly from the South, and secular parties and civil society groups. Despite the expectation that the new regime would result in a resolution of the insurgency in the South, the most significant actor in that conflict—the Sudan People’s Liberation Army—signaled that it viewed the new government as little better than its authoritarian predecessor and escalated conflicts, in turn generating a hardline response in return. The conflict in Darfur also began, including not only the rebellion but, demonstrations in Khartoum itself.

However, the disaffection with the government can also be seen as general. The new democratic government rested on extremely complex and fragile electoral coalitions, and broke up twice in within three months in 1987, after which the Sudan was technically without a government for almost a year. The rapid deterioration of the security environment including both the conflicts in Darfur and the South as well as terrorist attacks by foreign forces all contributed to a general sense of instability. The appeals of the new military leaders suggested an attempt to placate general grievances and did not necessarily aim at a simple repression of distributive conflicts; for example, the military promised to re-open negotiations with the rebel forces in the South. The RCC described its takeover as a ‘revolution of the people’, who had suffered years of ‘verbal rule which is devoid of action and beset by economic deterioration, the high cost of living and bad security conditions’. It claimed that the previous regime had failed to deal with the economy, corruption, political instability, and disorder in Darfur and the South, and Sadiq al-Mahdi was blamed for the Sudan’s increasing regional diplomatic isolation. The RCC declared, “This is a revolution with a pan-Arab orientation, neither to the left nor to the right. It is non-partisan, non-factional, non-tribalist, and non-racial.”

**Coding.** Weak democracy reversion. Despite multiple axes of distributive conflict, the reversion was based on cross-class appeals.

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### Suriname 1980 (CGV only) · Populist reversion

**The reversion.** In February 1980, 16 noncommissioned officers led by Desi Bouterse overthrew the elected government of Prime Minister Henk Arron.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant, but with populist outcome. Shortly after Suriname gained full independence from the Netherlands, Henk
Arron was elected Prime Minister in a coalition of parties representing the Creoles (about 31 percent of the population), and the Javanese Muslims (about 15 percent). Independence had led to a massive emigration of Hindustanis (about 38 percent of the population), but the coup appeared to be motivated as much by a quest for power and spoils as by ethnic conflict. Bouterse had to defeat a Hindustani-backed coup led by Wilfred Hawker in 1981, and he became deeply implicated in drug trafficking over the course of his political career. The coup set into motion a decade of political turbulence. However, Bouterse's government espoused a vaguely leftist orientation. Initially, it gained support from representatives of students and the labor movement, who joined a military-led National Revolutionary Front, although these had moved into opposition by 1984.

Coding. Populist reversion. Greed and gangsterism were major elements in Bouterse's political activity. Despite international opposition, however, he remained a powerful presence on the political scene for decades (see description of 1988 and 1991 transitions and the 1990 reversion). In 2010, he won the election for the presidency. In the mid-1980s, his regime was opposed by broad sectors of civil society as well as external powers. However, his leftist orientation and the initial support he received from labor warrants a coding of populist reversion.

Suriname 1990 (CGV only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. In December 1990, military officers forced the resignation of the civilian government elected in 1987, appointing replacements loyal to the military establishment.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. This was a short-lived—and ultimately unsuccessful—grab for power on the part of Desi Bouterse (see the description of the 1991 transition above). After the election of a civilian government in 1987, Bouterse remained head of the Military Council and a major influence behind the scenes. As the plot unfolded, Bouterse resigned suddenly from his position on the pretext that the government had failed to protest the Dutch government’s refusal to allow Bouterse to enter the Netherlands. Within days of Bouterse’s resignation, his allies on the Military Council ousted the incumbent government and restored Bouterse as head of the military. As discussed in the description of the 1991 transition, the Dutch, the OAS, and other external donors reacted quickly with strong economic sanctions, and the military was forced to hold new elections in 1991.

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Thailand 1991 (CGV only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. General Suchinda Kraprayoon ordered the arrest of Prime Minister Chatchai on charges of corruption and incompetence, and assumed the position himself.

The role of distributive conflict. Limited. The 1991 coup in Thailand was undertaken by a military faction that bridled under both the existing military leadership and the efforts of the elected Assembly to exercise greater control over military spending and prerogatives. Thailand had gone through a gradual process of democratization in the 1980s, particularly with measures taken in 1983 that eroded the powers of the appointed senate through which the both bureaucrats and the military were represented. When Prime Minister Prem stepped down in 1988 it opened the way for the election of Chatchai, himself also from the military. Once in office, Chatchai took a number of policy measures that appealed to particular class interests, such as raising the minimum wage for government workers, protecting private sector workers and taking the first steps towards the introduction of social security. “Up country” elected officials were primarily concerned with channeling patronage resources to disadvantaged parts of the country, but they were linked closely to elite business interests. Although the distribution of income had deteriorated in Thailand during the economic reforms of the 1980s, left parties remained confined to the fringes of political life and a long-standing rural insurgency had petered out.

However, the central issues motivating the coup did not appear to hinge on these issues, but on civil-military relations and the military presumption that they should continue to exercise a veto-player role in the political system. Tensions increased over the course of 1989-90 between the government and the military over the issue of corruption. The precipitating events behind the coup, however, appear to have been an investigation into an alleged assassination plot against senior public figures in 1982 that implicated the military and Cabinet changes by Chatchai that would have eroded military autonomy and perhaps signaled personnel changes.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. The coup had the effect of galvanizing mass opposition, which subsequently played a role in the transition back to democratic rule. There is no evidence, however, that the coup was a response to

popular pressures for redistribution; the coup was mainly an intra–elite conflict between the military and the government.

**Thailand 2006 (CGV and Polity) · Elite–reaction reversion**

The reversion. On September 19, 2006, the Royal Thai Army overthrew the government of elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with populist outcome. Populist tycoon Thaksin led his Thais Love Thais party (Thai Rak Thai, TRT) to its first electoral victory in January 2001 and to a second landslide win in February 2005 with over 60 percent of the vote and (in coalition with a smaller allied party) more than three-quarters of the seats in the National Assembly. Beginning in the fall of 2005, a loose coalition of political forces began to coalesce against Thaksin on a variety of grounds, including not only corruption but a semi–authoritarian style of rule that included emergency law in the South, a weakening of media freedoms and an assault on the integrity of nominally independent monitoring agencies and commissions. These anti–Thaksin forces, which grew into a broad–based social movement called the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), included Bangkok–based urban elites, classically liberal intelligentsia and civil society groups, the old nobility, sections of the private sector, the bureaucracy, the military, and ultimately the monarchy of King Bhumibol Adulyadej as well.

Street demonstrations against the Thaksin government began in September 2005, but increased dramatically following the revelation that Thaksin had sold his controlling stake in the Shin Company, a telecommunications firm that had benefited from state concessions without incurring any tax obligations. With continuing protests, Thaksin dissolved parliament in February in order to hold snap elections in April as a kind of referendum on his rule. The elections showed the same margins as in 2005, but in fact saw substantial defection from the Thaksin coalition. A number of irregularities—if not outright violations of electoral law—resulted in some constituencies not being represented and a Constitutional crisis. Thaksin sought to mollify the opposition by meeting with the King and calling for a constitutional revision and a grand coalition. These offers were rejected by an increasingly militant PAD, which threatened to continue protests until he was removed from office. The King ultimately intervened by calling the results of the election into doubt and involving the courts to investigate electoral fraud. Added to these mounting problems were conflicts with the military over the handling of the protests, the emergency in the South and prerogatives.

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**Turkey 1980 (CGV and Polity) - Elite reaction reversion**

The reversion. The elected government of Suleiman Demirel was overthrown in September by a military coup. The armed forces established a five-member National Security Council (NSC), appointed a civilian cabinet, and extended martial law to the entire country.

**The role of distributive conflict.** Significant. Turkey in the late 1970s was a classic case of both political and social polarization playing out against rapidly deteriorating economic circumstances. Parliament was increasingly stalemated by conflicts between Demirel’s ruling conservative Justice party (AP) and the more left-wing Republican People’s party (CHP), led by Blent Ecevit. However, both parties seemed to excuse increasingly violent actions undertaken by parties and groups on the extremes of the system, including the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation party, led by Necmettin Erbakan, and the extreme right-wing National Action party (MHP) of former General Alparslan Tarkes. Martial law had already been imposed in a number of provinces because of the Kurdish insurgency, and in January 1980, the military issued a list of demands, including the formation of a broad-based coalition government and passage of anti-terrorism laws that would expand military discretion. Although Demirel appeared to accept these demands, he was unable to push them through the legislature. The precipitating events leading up to the coup included Erbakan’s attendance of a mass public rally of Islamic fundamentalists at which he called for the restoration of the Shariah and a speech by Ecevit to a trade union gathering in which he appeared to condone mass mobilization and even violence.

Uganda 1985 (CGV only) · Weak democracy reversion

The reversion. President Milton Obote was overthrown in a coup lead by Acholi commander, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Basilio Olara Okello.

The role of distributive conflict. Substantial, but not a direct motive for the coup. The country faced significant ethnic conflicts, but they were not implicated in the reversion in the way predicted by distributive conflict theories. Obote came to power in 1980 in an election that was orchestrated by the military (Kasozi et al., pp. 136-142). Obote’s main ethnic base of support was the Langi. He himself came from that tribe, as did most of the military elite. He also drew support from the Acholi (about 4 percent of the population), who constituted much of the military rank-and-file. He proceeded to rule through severe repression of the opposition, which, in 1981, led to a breakout of a violent civil war that had a strong ethnic base. The main challenge to Obote came from a guerrilla movement, the National Resistance Movement (NRA). This drew much of its leadership from an educated elite, but had an ethnic base among the Baganda people and Tutsi refugees, as well. The guerrilla army relied primarily on hit-and-run tactics and initially gained only limited territory. In addition to the Baganda (the largest single ethnic group, about 16 percent of the population), groups that had been favored by Idi Amin (especially people of the West Nile) and the Banyarwanda were also severely victimized (Kasozi et al. 176-186). Deaths from Obote’s military campaign against the insurgents and these groups left an estimated 100,000 and 300,000 people dead.

As military causalities mounted, ethnic rivalries between the Langi and the Acholi increased. The latter claimed they had born the brunt of the fighting and alleged that the government had favored the Langi in its promotions. The rivalries within the military came to a head after the death of Oyite Ojok the Langi commander of the military force. Obote appointed another Langi, and attempted to counter Acholi opposition by building up a paramilitary Special Forces Unit, dominated by Langi. After Obote ordered the arrest of Lieutenant General Basilio Olara Okello, the lieutenant general, mobilized troops and entered Kampala on July 27, 1985, forcing Obote to flee the country.

Coding. Weak democracy reversion. Although the backdrop for the reversion was severe intra-ethnic conflict and civil war, the coup was not the result of either the triumph of the insurgency or elites disaffected with the distributive policies of the government. Rather, the perpetrators of the coup were disaffected members of the ruling coalition, where splits within the military were the decisive factor. In addition, it is hard to see this as a reversion of democracy, given the corrupt and brutal character of Obote’s government.

The reversion. This case represents two subtle changes in Polity rankings in two years: a reversion in 1993 (from “6” to “5”) and a transition in 1994 (from “5” to “7”; see discussion above). The 1993 reversion takes the form of presidential assumption of extraconstitutional powers and ongoing conflict between the president and parliament over their respective powers, particularly regarding economic policy. However, in the same year an agreement was reached to hold early elections in 1994, leading to a victory for former minister Leonid Kuchma over incumbent president Leonid Kravchuk. These elections appear to constitute the basis for the transition coding in 1994, even though the agreement to hold the elections was reached earlier.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant. Transitional elections in 1991 elected Leonid M. Kravchuk, former chairman of the Ukrainian Rada and ideology secretary of the Communist Party, to a 5-year term as Ukraine’s first president. At the same time, a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union was approved by more than 90% of the voters. Despite the fact that communists managed to maintain power, Polity codes the 1991 transition as a “6” (prior to that time, Ukraine was coded by Polity as part of the Soviet Union).

In 1992, Kravchuk undertook a number of reforms designed to establish Ukrainian sovereignty from Russia; the economy went into a steep decline. In late 1992, Kravchuk dismissed his first prime minister and appointed Leonid Kuchma in his place, a move that was ratified by the Rada. Kuchma sought emergency powers for six months in November (through May 1993) in order to push through a more aggressive reform program. He was overwhelmingly granted these powers by the Rada, which permitted him to suspend elements of the constitution and issue decrees with respect to the economy culminating in a major reform program in early 1993. These actions appear to be legal because they were ratified by the parliament and therefore should not constitute the source of the reversion.

When Kuchma’s powers expired in May 1993, he asked that they be extended; he was concerned that his reform efforts were being undermined by parliamentary control over the central bank and the State Property Fund. This time, the Rada overwhelmingly rejected the extension of further decree powers. Kuchma threatened to resign and Kravchuk responded with a decree on June 16 establishing a temporary “Extraordinary Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers” to deal with economic matters; it is this action and subsequent actions by Kravchuk vis-à-vis the parliament in late 1993 that appear to be the source of the reversion coding.

The issuing of the decree coincided with a massive strike by coal miners in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, and was followed by complex political maneuvering between the president and parliament. The demands of the striking miners included not only increased wages and mine safety but a call for a national referendum of confidence in the president and parliament. In response to the demands of the strikers, Kravchuk removed Kuchma, replaced him with an official sympathetic with the miners, and agreed to early parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in 1994. Parliament initially rejected Kuchma’s resignation and the conflict between the two branches over policy prerogatives lasted for several months. However, it was finally resolved when the Rada voted a movement of no confidence in Kravchuk’s Cabinet of Ministers and accepted Kuchma’s removal. This set in train a period when reforms were reversed in the run up to the elections, which Kuchma won.

**Coding.** Elite reaction reversion. As noted above, this is an anomalous case, because the reversion and transition seem to overlap almost exactly in time; the conflict between the branches and the decision to hold the elections are compressed. The case has important elements of an intra-elite conflict because communists dominated the Rada. However, the case is ambiguous because Kravchuk appeared less reformist than Kuchma, raising the question of whether his accretion of powers was not for populist ends: to slow—rather than accelerate—the reform process. Nonetheless, we interpret his decree of mid-1993 as an effort to assume powers needed to undertake economic reforms that were unpopular, and thus code it as an elite reaction reversion.

**Venezuela 2006 (Polity only) · Populist reversion**

The reversion. The National Assembly, exclusively controlled by Chavez supporters, unanimously endorsed lifting the two-term limit on the presidency and allowed Chavez to run for a third term. In December 2006, the Assembly granted Chavez sweeping powers to rule by decree for a period of 18 months.

The role of distributive conflict. Significant, but with populist outcome. The successful extension of Chavez’s term noted by Polity for 2006 was an important step in the ongoing consolidation of Chavez’s personal power. A constitutional convention elected shortly after Chavez’s election in 1998 created a unicameral legislature which granted the power substantial decree powers. During the first several years, however, Chavez faced severe challenges from the old political elites, business leaders, and the union establishment—including an attempted coup d’état, a prolonged strike by petroleum workers, and an unsuccessful recall referendum in 2004. The onset of the oil boom in 2003 was crucial in allowing Chavez to withstand these challenges and to build a large base of popular support through the expansion of social welfare programs. In the legislative...
elections of 2005, the opposition decided on a boycott, leaving Chavez’s supporters with full control of the National Assembly and Chavez with the votes necessary to change the constitution at will. In December 2006, previous term limits were waived, Chavez was elected to a third term, and he was granted sweeping powers to rule by decree for a period of eighteen months. Chavez continued from that point to face periodic opposition challenges, including a defeat in a referendum on constitutional changes that would have increased his unilateral authority even more. Nevertheless, the election victory and decree powers won in 2006 were significant markers in the erosion of constitutional limits and Venezuela’s evolution toward a “competitive authoritarian” regime.

Coding. Populist reversion. Chavez has been a highly polarizing political figure who retained substantial support among low-income sectors of the Venezuelan population and was strongly opposed by much of the middle-class and the elite. Although the causes of the deterioration of Venezuela’s long-standing democracy are complex, Chavez’s rise to power and the consolidation of virtually unilateral authority over the political system was clearly driven by his populist appeal.

Zambia 1996 (Polity only) · Elite reaction reversion

The reversion. Relying on an overwhelming legislative majority, President Chiluba pushed through a series of constitutional amendments in May 1996 that made former president Kenneth Kaunda ineligible to run for office. In the November 1996 elections President Chiluba easily defeated a weakened and fractured opposition.

The role of distributive conflict. Ambiguous. In October 1991, in the first multiparty election in more than twenty years, Kaunda lost the presidency to Frederick Chiluba, leader of the newly formed Movement for Multiparty Democracy Party (MMD). Chiluba came to power in part by exploiting disaffection with structural adjustment policies that Kaunda—his predecessor—had pursued since the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, on coming to office the Chiluba government initiated one of the more aggressive structural adjustment programs on the continent, including lifting of exchange controls, major cuts in public expenditure, and the privatization of more than 250 parastatals. These measures split the union movement—some unions had allied with the MMD—and provided a natural focal point for the opposition. Liberalizing measures generated opposition, including localized mobilizations, throughout the first half of the 1990s.

In 1996, Chiluba proposed constitutional changes that were clearly designed to limit the prospects that Kaunda would run again. The changes required a
presidential candidate to be born of two Zambian citizens by birth or descent, and National Assembly candidates to give up their chieftancy: Kaunda’s parents were Malawian and the vice president of his party was a chief. In legislative elections held simultaneously with presidential balloting the MMD secured an overwhelming victory, winning 131 of 150 National Assembly seats. While there was no evidence of substantial or widespread vote rigging or fraud, and it is doubtful that Kaunda would have won, the overt manipulation of the country’s constitution for political ends seriously eroded the democratic character of executive recruitment in Zambia. Moreover, the new government also took a number of restrictive actions with respect to civil society groups.

Coding. Elite reaction reversion. The main motive of the constitutional changes appears to be political: to exploit the advantages of incumbency in order to maintain power, a pattern seen in a number of weak African democracies. Nonetheless, we code the case as an elite reaction reversion because of the existence of mobilized resistance to the policy course of the regime, even if it was relatively ineffective.

