

CHAPTER ONE

A Leap in the Dark

MUSLIMS AND THE STATE IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY EUROPE

JUST OVER 1 PERCENT of the world's 1.5 billion Muslims reside in Western Europe, yet this immigrant-origin minority has had a disproportionate impact on religion and politics in its new and former homelands. The Muslim population ballooned in just fifty years from some tens of thousands to 16 or 17 million—approximately one out of every twenty-five Western Europeans—in 2010. During the formative decades of this settlement (1960–1990), Europeans permitted foreign governments and NGOs from the Islamic world to have a free hand in shaping Muslims' religious and political life. But persistent integration difficulties and sporadic terrorism persuaded European governments that their laissez-faire approach had far-reaching unintended consequences on host societies' way of life. Between 1990 and 2010, authorities across Europe belatedly acknowledged that the once-temporary labor migrants—and now, their children and grandchildren—are part of the permanent demographic and political landscape. Their earlier hesitation incurred costs, however, and their newfound sense of ownership is plagued by ambivalence. With projections showing continued demographic growth before leveling off at 25–30 million people (or 7–8%) in 2030, Western European governments have no choice but to look upon their Muslim minorities today as angels imprisoned in a block of marble: a community of new and future citizens whose contours are still being sculpted.¹

As European Muslims have become more numerous and visible in public life in the past decade, national governments have expended time, effort, and resources on pursuing policies that would encourage the integration of these immigrant-origin populations. The consolidating instinct of the nation-state has been in full resurgence, as governments across Europe conspicuously pursue the preservation of national identity, social cohesion, and "guiding culture." Measures have ranged from religious restrictions—such as banning burkas, minarets, or headscarves—to civic impositions, like mandatory language and integration courses and citizenship tests. In the realm of state-mosque relations,




Figure 1.1. Largest Muslim Minorities in Western Europe. Note: These seven countries account for more than 90 percent of the approximately 16.3 million Muslims in Western Europe. Sources: Casa Arabe 2009; Haug et al. 2009; Kerba 2009; Laurence and Vaisse 2006; European Muslim Network 2007; European Parliament 2007.

European governments have encouraged the development of national forms of Islam by way of formal councils and consultative bodies. If there was ever a mythical postwar era of “multiculturalism” in which host societies sent mixed signals to new arrivals about the cultural expectations of national citizenship, a new and more demanding phase has replaced it.

For host societies like Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, Islam in Europe is no longer just a matter of ginger diplomacy with former colonies or current trading partners: the integration of Muslims has become a nation-building challenge of historical significance. This religious minority is novel for its sheer scale and swift pace of migratory settlement: Muslims now make up 4–8 percent of their national populations—and several times that proportion in some cities (see figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3). Foreign governments and transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to compete for influence over the Islamic diaspora, but Muslims’ permanent settlement in Europe now places this competition squarely within domestic politics.

In important respects, European countries have been here before: in the past two hundred years, Jews, Catholics, Protestants, working classes, women, and other ethnic minority or migrant groups once absent from the body politic gradually acquired full citizenship and in many cases were granted “group” access to representative institutions. Not all groups




Figure 1.2. Muslims as a Percentage of Western European Population. Sources: Casa Arabe 2009; Haug et al. 2009; Kerba 2009; Laurence and Vaisse 2006; European Muslim Network 2007; European Parliament 2007.




Figure 1.3. Muslims as a Percentage of Population in Selected Western European Cities. Source: "Muslim Population in European Cities (a compilation of statistical sources)", <http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2007/11/muslim-population-in-european-cities.html>.

(or host societies) made the transition without difficulty, and in different contexts those challenges also produced radicalism, persistent integration problems, or political violence. Integration never depended purely on individual equality before the law. In the words of a nineteenth-century historian, "The real touchstone for success . . . was its collective emancipation."²

The institutional responses during these earlier moments of "emancipation" left behind an architecture of state-society relations and consultative mechanisms which governments today have restored to facilitate the integration of Muslim communities. European nation-states now face an added challenge in comparison with the past: the persistence of foreign interests that keep a hand in European Muslim life. Today, the interaction of religion policies in Europe and the Muslim world has geopolitical resonance.

During the half-century since the first guestworkers arrived, official and nongovernmental religious organizations originating in the Islamic world supplied funding and personnel in support of rival political-religious tendencies in European mosques and cultural centers. Diasporas play a decisive role for the main countries of emigration—Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey—some of which are still in an intermediate phase of political and economic development. For them, Europe is home to 50–85 percent of their nationals living abroad: roughly four million Turks, three million Algerians, three million Moroccans, and two million Pakistanis.³ These European residents remain a reservoir of support or opposition for homeland regimes, including the remittances and investments that make up a significant portion of homeland GDP as well as extremist elements that plot political violence at home. Europe's Muslims have also been the target of extensive missionary work by transnational Islamist movements—based in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, but also in Europe—who aim to strengthen their own religious hegemony within the international *ummah*. Viewed from the capitals of the Islamic world, the Muslim diaspora vacillates between the role of budding vanguard or potential rearguard.

The crucial years of 1989–1990 provided an early glimpse of a newly politicized minority—during the first headscarf affair, the Rushdie Affair, the first Iraq war—and national governments in Europe soon afterward began to take "ownership" of their Muslim communities. In particular, they initiated the process of bringing Islamic leadership into state-church institutions to mitigate the religion's "foreignness" and to gain regulatory oversight over mosques and prayer rooms. After leaving them outside domestic institutions, public authorities across Europe have come to encourage Muslims to embrace national citizenship and to pursue the institutional adaptation of Islamic organizations.

Nonetheless, Muslims' long-term integration into European politics and society is a work in progress. Across the region, a lively debate rages over Islam's compatibility—and Muslims' ability and willingness—to accept the rule of law and the separation of religion from the public sphere. The populist right wing's growing share in several major immigration countries reflects mounting anxiety about the threat posed to national identity and national security by a permanent and growing Islamic minority. Several major fault lines of international conflict of the last forty years lie in the Middle East, which has amplified the significance of Muslims' political and religious orientations in Europe as an issue of domestic and international interest.

Many Muslims living in these countries, in turn, feel stigmatized by growing antagonism toward their religious background—negative feelings about Muslims reached 35–60 percent in a recent European study—and so they experience an increasingly scrutinized existence.⁴ A flurry of restrictive legislation marked the first decade of this century: governments passed laws to prohibit mainstream religious symbols such as minarets and headscarves, as well as less widespread cultural practices associated with the Islamic world like burkas, polygamy, and forced marriages. Official and informal opposition to mosque construction is increasingly commonplace, as is the conditioning of naturalization on “moderate” religious practice.

The repressive measures that have put Muslim communities on the defensive, in fact, belie a broader trend toward greater religious freedom and institutional representation for Islam in Europe over the last twenty years. The gestures of restriction and toleration are complementary and part of a unified process. European Muslims are experiencing the throes of a distilled and abbreviated era of emancipation: a dual movement of expanding religious liberty *and* increasing control exerted over religion.⁵ Every religious community that has joined the national fabric accepted certain restrictions on its freedoms and autonomy at the moment of recognition: from the use of local clergy who preach in the local language, to abandoning distinctive dress in the public sphere.⁶ As Muslims are transitioning from a majority-immigrant to majority-citizen group, European states have begun the effort to relieve what they consider excessive pressures of foreign political or religious influences.

This dual movement is most visible in the officially encouraged “privatization” of religious practices—the nineteenth-century injunction, for example, to “be a man in the street and a Jew at home . . . a brother to your countrymen and a servant to your king”⁷—that other religious communities have also experienced during the modern era. The variegated experience of post-Emancipation Jewish minorities in

Europe also illustrates the dangers of unresolved tension between individual and collective rights. This is reflected in the preoccupation that communities must effectively sacrifice their distinctiveness and collective identity in the name of legal and political equality, compounded by the sinking fear that they may never entirely escape suspicion and persecution. With the contemporary restrictions of visible Islamic symbols, host societies trace the outer limits for practices which they consider beyond the pale. But there is much more *within the pale* that is now treated as routine. Until 1990, European Muslims existed in a pre-emancipatory state: adult migrants (and sometimes their native-born children) enjoyed highly circumscribed political rights, subject to limits on freedom of assembly and association, to voting, holding public office, and public employment.⁸ The basic rights and freedoms granted to religious communities, too, were largely out of reach in the absence of citizenship. Between 1990 and 2010, European governments implemented new policies, raising standards and expectations for the integration of newcomers, but they have made citizenship more accessible and increased both individual *and* collective equality before the law for those who were already there.

Today, national interior ministries across Europe help oversee and coordinate the routinization and banalization of Islamic religious practices in Europe (what one French Muslim leader has called “the right to indifference,” in opposition to “the right to be different”): the financing and construction of mosques; the civic integration of imams; the appointment of Muslim chaplains in prisons, the army, and hospitals; the design of religious curriculum in publicly funded schools; and the celebration of major holidays and religious events—from lamb slaughter for Eid al-Adha to the pilgrimage to Mecca. There are now thousands of Islamic houses of worship—2,100 in France, 2,600 in Germany, 1,200 in the UK, 661 in Italy, 450 in Spain, 432 in the Netherlands⁹—and thousands of imams who preach and lead prayer in these mosques. Muslim schoolchildren are increasingly free to choose an Islamic education class at school or to attend a publicly subsidized Islamic school, and Islamic theology chairs in public universities—to train religion teachers as well as prayer leaders—are gradually being endowed. These developments are not yet on a par with other religious communities, but they are the rights and privileges—from the controversial to the mundane—that make up the business of state-mosque relations.

Contemporary Islam Councils are the culmination of a search for “moderate” yet legitimate interlocutors who can negotiate a representative bargain with the state in exchange for a monopoly on a set of narrowly defined religious issues. Together, these policies aimed to ensure

that both public claims and private practices associated with the group are accorded similar rights—and are subject to similar restrictions—as any other recognized group under national law.

However difficult and unique the contemporary difficulties with Islamic groups could appear, the challenges today's governments face and the strategies they have adopted echo earlier institutional interactions with "new" groups of citizens. European states have pursued a twofold strategy of incorporation toward Muslims in the early twenty-first century—full citizenship followed by institutional organization—similar to what they did for nineteenth-century emancipated Jews and for the newly enfranchised working classes in the early twentieth century. First, governments have sought to establish the bases for participation in state and society as equal citizens, irrespective of affiliations an individual may privately hold. Second, they endeavored to bind the group's associations to the state through formal relations and corporatist institution-building. The political philosopher Wendy Brown has observed the paradoxical nature of this sort of recognition: it "redraws the very configurations and effects of power" from which the individuals were apparently being freed.¹⁰

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

European countries have rich and complex pasts with the Islamic world, including cultural, intellectual, and commercial exchange, but also more than a millennium of reciprocal conquest and colonization. The historic settlement of a permanent Muslim minority in Western Europe, however, took place in a period of relative peace and prosperity between the mid-twentieth-century retraction of European empires and the end of the Cold War. With the exception of the relatively small number who sought refuge from persecution in their countries of origin, today's European Muslim populations are the result of voluntary economic migration and its aftermath.

Western European economies stimulated by the Marshall Plan were in full expansion in the 1960s, and governments secured foreign manual labor in a series of bilateral accords as Europeans looked to states with which they had former colonial ties or earlier diplomatic alliances as natural sources of manpower: for the United Kingdom this was Pakistan and India; for France, it was Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; for Germany, it was Turkey. The predominantly Muslim Mediterranean basin and South Asian subcontinent provided most of the temporary workers who satisfied the growing domestic and international demand for mass manufactured goods: from automobiles and pharmaceuticals,

to textiles and household appliances. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the “Muslims of Europe” were a single male group.

The worker rotation schemes in place functioned as planned for a decade: men came and went, and remittances were sent to the old country, where homes were built and families were supported. The workers lived in dormitories, and socialized or prayed with one another in clubs sponsored by their countries of origin. Despite the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Algeria (Harkis), Iran, or Turkey (Kurds), for example, the predominant host society policies were consistent with a straightforward “guestworker” arrangement, and the Muslim presence did not raise domestic political antennae. The expectation of *temporary* migration meant that governments avoided the question of Muslims’ status in European societies and treated Islam as the religion of foreigners. Every European government, whether it overtly embraced “multiculturalism” or not, accepted foreign funds and allowed outside authorities—from Morocco and Turkey to Saudi Arabia and Libya and beyond—to exert influence on the religious practices of their local Muslim population.

But an unplanned if unsurprising development took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the economy soured, first due to a small recession and then major stagnation following the oil shock of 1973. Europeans raised the immigration drawbridge and foreign workers could no longer rotate in and out at will. They stayed, and with the aid of high court rulings across Europe in the mid-1970s, began to bring over spouses, children, fiancées, and other family members. Within a decade, the relatively self-contained and low-maintenance male population was transformed into a more dynamic and unwieldy minority of men, women, children, and extended families.

The precise number of immigrant-origin individuals of Muslim background living in Western Europe today is elusive, but national estimates total approximately 16–17 million (see figure 1.4 for geographic distribution).¹¹ Muslims’ natural population growth helped slow demographic decline in Europe, but it also raised policy questions that a temporary male laborer population never had: from social welfare, education, and health care, to cultural and religious adaptation to the host society. Instead of continuing to build “bridges to the homeland,” European governments realized they would have to get more involved if they wanted to influence the design of durable edifices that others were constructing on their territory.¹²

The Swiss novelist Max Frisch’s remark that Europeans were startled to find that they had “called for guestworkers, and human beings came instead” took on special meaning in several significant policy areas in the 1990s.¹³ The unexpected settlement of an Islamic-origin minority



Figure 1.4. Distribution of Muslims in Western Europe. Source: *Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe*, Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life, © 2010, Pew Research Center. <http://pewforum.org/>.

has raised a set of fundamental questions dear to concerned observers and political scientists alike, and which this book attempts to tackle: How do democratic governments cope with the emergence of new religious communities? How are new groups of citizens incorporated? What is the appropriate relationship between religious diasporas and their countries of origin or with international religious movements? How are challenging or threatening ideologies from abroad reconciled with the domestic rule of law? And finally, what is the relationship between governments' policies and groups' integration outcomes?

It may seem at times that the political and social integration of Muslims in Europe has already failed spectacularly. This century's first decade brought a succession of grim news, from bombings in Britain and Spain to assassination in the Netherlands, from French riots to German unemployment, prompting observers to declare a grave crisis of previous models of immigrant integration.¹⁴ Second- and third-generation immigrants experience disproportionately high unemployment, widespread social discrimination, and feeble political representation in local and national institutions. The French scholar Gilles Kepel commented that Europe faces an urgent choice: "either we train our Muslims to become global citizens, who live in a democratic, pluralist society, or on the contrary, the Islamists win, and take over those Muslim European constituencies. Then we're in serious trouble."¹⁵ This captures the *raison d'état* that inspires current policies toward Islam but misstates the relevant policy arena: European governments want to fashion *national* citizens who are *less* globally interlinked. To use an analogy from the first era of modern state-building, today's states attempt to make Frenchmen, Germans, or Italians out of Muslims—as previous generations undertook the state-building process of turning "peasants into Frenchmen," Jews into "*Israëlites*," or Christians into "good citizens."

Between 1990 and 2010, governments across Western Europe actively sought to facilitate this alchemy by integrating Islam into state-church relations: a progressive reclaiming, domestication, and national orientation has taken place. During those twenty years, organized Islam in Europe progressed from being unregulated, unrecognized, and underfunded to coming under state oversight and receiving its associated benefits and restrictions.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM COUNCILS

The most striking illustration of a Europe-wide move toward the "domestication" of Islam—and the summit of the process of institutional recognition—came with the development of national consultations

with prayer spaces and civil society organizations. Between 1990 and 2010, national interior ministries established local and national “Islam Councils”—from the French Council for the Muslim Religion, the Spanish Islamic Commission, the Belgian Muslim Executive, the Italian Islamic Consultation, to the German Islam Conference—comprising the religious leadership of foreign governments, NGOs, and prominent Muslim citizens active in their territories (see table 1.1). The creation of these councils guarantees equal access to religious freedoms at the same time that they exert control by placing the state in the familiar role of broker and guarantor of religious freedoms.

The parallel development of Islam Councils in these countries was the result of key policy actors finding similar solutions to similar problems. European governments have created local and national councils to resolve practical issues of religious freedom and infrastructure—imams, chaplains, mosques, education, halal food, etc.—for their Muslim citizens and residents. But the essence of state-mosque relations is a twofold struggle on a higher plane: first, to free European Muslims from direct foreign government oversight. And second, to induce the “moderation” of the religious organizations linked to transnational Islamist movements. Governments’ goal is to diminish the foreign ties of Islamic prayer spaces and leadership, and to attract the participation of “moderate” political-religious movements within state-mosque relations. To understand the ambition of these councils, one needs to take into account not only the evolution of religion policy in Muslim-majority states between the moment of modern state formation and the departure of emigrants in diaspora, but also the ways in which Islamic movements have been transformed upon contact with the institutional parallelism they have encountered across Europe. European governments are not just reconciling Islam with the western democratic state; they are tampering with a fragile equilibrium in the respective host countries and entire Islamic world, intentionally or not.

Government ministries involved in this consultation process do not presume the existence of some essential “Muslim” waiting to be white-washed into a mythical “citizen.” But regardless of Muslims’ diversity of national origin, piety, and religious affiliation, governments in Europe have nonetheless come to see “their” Muslims as a community, a collectivity, and the object of public policymaking. Religion was not the first or only trait that governments took on: outreach programs in favor of naturalization, linguistic integration, civic knowledge, and political participation have all had their day. But religion policy in particular allows European governments to gradually take “ownership” of their Muslim populations because it grants them unique influence over organizations and leadership within this hard-to-reach minority. European

TABLE 1.1
Islam Councils in Western Europe

| <i>Name</i> | <i>Date founded</i> |
|---|---------------------|
| Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ, Austria) | 1979 |
| Islamiska Samarbetsrådets (IS, Sweden) | 1990 |
| Comisión Islámica de España (CIE, Spain) | 1992 |
| Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique (EMB, Belgium) | 1994 |
| Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM, France) | 2003 |
| Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO, Netherlands) | 2004 |
| Consulta per l'Islam in Italia (CII, Italy) | 2005 |
| Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK, Germany) | 2006 |
| Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB, United Kingdom) | 2006 |

states exercise an unusual amount of regulatory control over state-church issues from the controversial to the mundane: entry/residence visas for clergy and diplomatic religious counselors, tax breaks and nonprofit status for religious organizations, construction permits for prayer space, the licensing of slaughterhouses. Administrators are not engaged in the special accommodation of Muslims; they are incorporating Islam into pre-existing state-church institutions. European governments are trying to create the institutional conditions for the emergence of an Italian or German Islam, e.g., rather than just tolerating Islam “in” Italy or Germany.

Councils are also often pointed to as a way to deny oxygen to religious extremists who allege a general Western hostility to Islam. State-mosque relations reinforce religious freedom and create a shared sense of belonging by reaching out to respected religious leaders in Europe and ensuring that Muslims can fully practice their faith in European contexts. By bringing Islam in, these governments hoped to diminish the risks of the exposure of Europe’s Muslims to the globalized marketplace of religious ideas, poor socioeconomic integration, local religious tensions, and the shortcomings of Europeans’ other integration policies. This layered agenda was, I argue, expressed in policies that grant religious rights to Muslims while affirming the state’s oversight authority and the rule of law.

While important milestones in the “citizen-ization” of Europe’s Muslim population and the “naturalization” of Islam have been achieved, the situation remains in flux. The status and role granted within the Councils to a select group of mosques and other religious organizations—i.e., those who represent Muslim positions on everyday “religious questions”—remain among the most contentious and pressing issues in European politics today. In a debate rife with speculation and extrapolation, state-mosque relations are happily grounded in concrete facts and measurable relationships and institutional behavior. This permits the evaluation of the growing track record of Islamic organizations’ most sustained encounter with democratic institutions outside the Muslim-majority world. Do Islamic groups adapt to Western institutions or not? How have governments attempted to shepherd this process? This book examines the constructive and interventionist side of Europeans’ Islam policies: the organization of Islamic groups for state-mosque relations.¹⁶

The Islam Councils were created to bring state-mosque relations out of the embassies and Foreign Affairs ministries, and into domestic political institutions. Broadly speaking, consultations have also succeeded in bringing the groups indirectly associated with political Islam in Europe (e.g., Muslim Brotherhood, Millî Görüş, Jam’aat-i Islami) to accept the conditions of participation and join in council elections. The councils establish participants’ citizenship *bona fides*, encourage the reconciliation of religious observance with the rule of law and the institutionalized expression of dissent, and meet the demand of Islamic religious associations for recognition and interest representation. The councils provide a channel of communication between religious groups and the state, which is necessary to establish a framework for Muslims’ religious equality in European countries, but they have also proven useful in times of crisis or cultural tensions. These institutions may be destined for obscurity—just like the nineteenth-century Israelite consistories or the trade union-oriented Labor Councils before them—but they serve an important purpose at the time. The creation of Islam Councils marks a breakthrough as significant and peremptory as a common European currency or the laying of a mosque cornerstone in a city center. From this moment on, Islam is an integral part of the political landscape (figures 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 show Islam Councils at work in France, Germany, and Italy).

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF: FROM OUTSOURCING TO INCORPORATION

Despite their historical, institutional and cultural differences, the seven European countries with the largest Muslim minorities—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom—



Figure 1.5. Election of the Bureau exécutif of the *Conseil français du culte musulman*, 2003. Source: © Bernard Godard.

have followed remarkably similar pathways to managing their relations with Islam and they display parallel policy developments. The specific mechanisms differ according to the institutional and political features of each country, but state-mosque relations in all of them share broad characteristics: a first stage (1960–1990) when European governments



Figure 1.6. Meeting of the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, 2010. Source: © Fotografie Katy Otto / Deutsche Islam Konferenz.



Figure 1.7. Meeting of the *Consulta per l'Islam italiano*, 2006. Source: © Yahya Pallavicini.

outsourced the management of Islam. And then, a second stage (1990–2010) during which European countries pursued the *incorporation* of religious NGOs, Embassy Islam, and other Muslim notables by way of the creation of an Islam Council.

The second stage repeats the patterns of relationship that the emancipation and eventual “citizen-ization” of the Jewish communities of these countries took following the Napoleonic example. It also resembles in many of its central mechanisms the neo-corporatist strategies more familiar from the political-economic realm. Governments have treated the challenge of Islam not primarily as a problem of human rights but as a subtle task of administration: to build a framework for state-society relations that would isolate religious affairs from the social, economic, and political bases of Muslims’ integration. How to provide Muslim chaplains to prisons and the army, where to bury the Muslim dead, or how and where to construct mosques and train imams were the issues that drove the response of the European states to Islamic communities. This book stresses the omnipresent needs of democratic states for advice about such issues and for the search for “moderate” and “representative” interlocutors to provide that advice: the result is a portrait of state-society relations that aims to bring the discussion back to its fundamentals.

Any consideration of how different European governments have attempted to institutionalize Islam must first recognize the underlying goals of a government that initiates this process. Why would a state accommodate the practical requirements of religious communities? Al-

though some stentorian voices will always warn that religious accommodation is the equivalent of political capitulation, it paradoxically has actually been the painful method through which the modern state has asserted itself: first, by changing the nature of individuals' relationship to organized religion; and second, by explicitly requiring religious communities to subordinate religious law to the national constitutional order. Here, accommodation is a mechanism for securing a community's respect for state authority. It is an act that enables and legitimates a collective subnational—or supranational—identity, certainly, but it is also a process of political control.

There is no perfect historical analogy for the settlement of millions of Muslims and the development of complex layers of religious organizations. But the emergence of Muslims as a permanent segment of national society has evoked familiar questions about the relationship between religious faith, political ideologies, and loyalty that European states have encountered before: How to persuade civil-society organizations to operate within the framework of domestic laws? How to reduce the influence of potentially seditious ideologies? How to create a unified interlocutor to channel community demands? Similar or even greater challenges to their authority and political legitimacy confronted European nation-states in the relatively recent past: Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish minorities in the period of nation-formation, and the newly enfranchised working classes after the industrial revolution and during the consolidation of the modern state.

In earlier centuries, statesmen had objected in different national contexts to the collective emancipation of the Catholics, Protestant or Jews or, later, the working classes, on the grounds that the trans-border fealty of these communities threatened national political unity. Their presumed sympathies with foreign powers—e.g., Jewish Britons for the Ottoman Empire, French Protestants for the German states, German Catholics for Rome, Italian workers for Moscow—endangered and slowed these groups' equality before the law. Although the scale of Jewish migration from Central and Eastern to Western Europe never approached the magnitude of arrivals from the Muslim world, the percentage of Jews in some Western European cities did approximate the proportion of Muslims in urban areas today.¹⁷ Political Catholicism, furthermore, was viewed by governments as a mortal danger to nascent liberal states in the nineteenth century – sometimes leading to the prohibition of specific religious orders.¹⁸ The millions of working-class voters who flirted with international revolutionary movements in the early decades of the twentieth century were similarly perceived as a threat to constitutional orders in Western Europe, leading to restrictions on the political activities of trade unions and political parties.¹⁹

There is ample precedent for the struggle of twenty-first-century politicians in contemporary Europe to disentangle Islamic organizations from their international linkages and root them in domestic institutional contexts. Democratizing countries in Europe responded to political tensions related to social class and religion—and parliaments' inadequacy at resolving them—in the form of top-down negotiation with economic and religious interest groups, respectively, —over the heads of “the people's” elected representatives and “modify[ing] in fact the sovereignty of parliament.”²⁰ Extra-parliamentary consultation has a long pedigree, beginning with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century profession-based and religious corporatism through postwar race-oriented, agricultural, and trade union-oriented neo-corporatism. By institutionalizing Islam today, states convey their interest in reforming religion or in transforming how citizens relate to their religion. Olivier Roy writes that this implies a “westernization” of religious belonging “in a theological sense, i.e. its dogmatic content” and “in forms of religiosity: the relationship of the faithful to a universal liturgy.”²¹

Scholars currently argue either that there are big differences between the Islam policies of European countries or that the countries are converging toward international norms. I distinguish my approach from that of path dependency enthusiasts, post-nationalists, and the disciples of convergence theory by placing the nation-state back at the center of discussions of religious politics. This framework is rooted in my empirical finding that European policy responses to Muslim communities have not been dictated by “inherited” institutional traits,²² nor by post-national forces such as supra-national regulation or shared values,²³ nor by cross-national convergence toward more inclusive citizenship rights.²⁴ Across a striking range of countries, Islam Councils are the instrument through which Islamic organizations and the state now cooperate on a broad and substantive range of issues, including appointing chaplains in prisons and the armies, the civic education of imams, mosque construction, faculty chairs, religion teacher training as well as symbolic roles like sitting on public broadcasting or overseeing halal slaughter rituals.

The richest data in this book come from the French, German, British, and Italian cases for which I was able to conduct extensive fieldwork and interviews; but a conscientious effort was made to include the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain—where I spent shorter periods of time—and other European cases as often as possible. The cross-national parallels in state-mosque relations that I observe across these countries owe nothing to a unified or coordinated approach, but are rather a case of similar solutions being pursued in the face of similar challenges—a concept that an Italian politician once referred to as “convergence

parallele"—for their own separate, national reasons. A broad, uncoordinated effort of institution-building is under way. The parallel development of Islam Councils shows that governments do not simply reproduce existing policy regimes, like trains barreling down pre-set tracks to different destinations. The primary sources of public policy are self-interest and realism, that motivate states to change: we are witnessing the assertion of national sovereignty, with a modicum of cross-border learning. The trend toward the active integration of Muslim communities across Europe today is that governments have treated relations with Islamic representatives in similar terms across divergent national contexts. These developments have not entailed a loss of national sovereignty; indeed, they reflect a shared affirmation of the nation-state's supremacy.

One might counter this argument with the alternative hypothesis that the creation of some sort of Islamic interlocutor is an almost inevitable response to terror attacks, which would privilege another explanation, namely: 9/11, 3/11, and 7/7. The violence committed by Islamic extremists—including longtime European residents and citizens—on three days in the early years of the twenty-first century has had an undeniable impact on the development of state-mosque relations, and had major consequences for perceptions and treatment of the religious community in state and society. But while terrorism focused the minds of officials and has served as a catalyst for the overtures to Muslim communities, the process of state-building that would encompass the new Muslim minority had already been under way for a decade before September 2001.

Islam Councils in European countries differ from one another in two important dimensions: the ambit of their working agenda and the ideological breadth of their participants. In some cases, councils are intended to "represent" only the mosque-going public, and the working agenda is strictly limited to state-church affairs (France). In others, the councils cover issues that affect all Muslims regardless of formal religious observance, such as religion in public schools (Germany and Italy), and the working groups are more likely include topics like social values and gender relations. Since these are institutions with unique internal voting mechanisms, the way governments designed electoral systems determines the proportion of seats ultimately assigned to representatives of Embassy Islam, religious NGOs, or other Muslim notables. In particular, the invitation to Islamist groups to participate has sometimes been linked to their acceptance of a "values charter." There is also variation in the councils' respective bureaucratic efficiency and religious governance at the local or national levels, but they share striking institutional commonalities—and have remained relatively stable

through internal leadership alternation and successive left- and right-leaning national governments.

Governments have altered their approaches to Muslim communities over a fifty-year period, as a function of domestic politics, international relations, and exogenous shocks (including terrorism), and Islamic religious actors have responded to these policy shifts by adapting to national political opportunity structures. State-mosque relations have shaped the nature of Muslim leaders' political participation and the extent of Islam's integration in their respective national settings. Countries that successfully pursued *incorporation* have elicited moderate political participation from Political-Islam groups, and Embassy Islam actors have adapted their diaspora outreach to fit the new domestic contexts of Islam in Europe. Both categories of religious leaders have adjusted the style and content of their religious activities to fit the new institutional contexts of national Islam Councils.

In a broader theoretical context regarding the survival of the nation-state, this book presents evidence that the state is alive and well in the age of globalization. Islam-related conflict in the public sphere is often portrayed as evidence of weak or defensive states overrun by transnational religious movements. But the European Muslim experience is marked by robust state responses, in line with Stephen Krasner's view that "globalization and state activity have moved in tandem."²⁵ Just because Islam remains a transnational phenomenon does not mean that is intractable to the Western democratic state's purposes.

In the sustained effort to integrate Muslim leaders and mosques into local and national state-Islam institutions, the contemporary European nation-state appears not as a "weathervane" being spun around by shifting gales, nor as a neutral broker among competing interests, but rather as an interested actor that structures the incorporation of new interests.²⁶ Two decades of increasingly assertive policies toward organized Islam in Europe, between 1990 and 2010, militate against the image of states meekly acquiescing to the unplanned settlement of an adversarial religious minority. This book contributes to the growing evidence that states remain important actors despite the ascendance of market ideals and transnational forces.²⁷

The development of state-mosque relations has already borne some fruit. Many practical accommodations are now in place that reconcile Islamic practices with the European *Rechtsstaat*. The nascent Islam Councils have been forged and tested by crises—headscarf and burka bans, homegrown terrorism, blasphemy controversies, national identity debates—and survived. Whether they will arrive at a stable equilibrium and enter historical posterity is a test of the relevance and strength of the national state to filter the transnational forces exerted on its citi-

zens in a globalized world. For now, it is unfinished work, and even the adaptation of transnational networks to domestic contexts can sometimes have ambiguous effects.

One significant irony of the new integration-minded approach is the degree to which Europeans' state activism has inspired countries in the Muslim-majority world to revitalize ties with their emigrant diasporas in Europe. In the last ten years, southern Mediterranean governments have institutionalized outreach to their national communities living abroad, mirroring the inroads that Western European governments have tried to make within these same population groups. Contrary to earlier expectations from the social science literature that political, economic, and religious links between successive generations of migrants and erstwhile sending states tend to diminish over time, there has been an unexpected resurgence of governmental activity for citizens abroad—including expanded access to elections, investment opportunities, and religion services.²⁸ Former sending countries have brought to life a growing thicket of emigrant-oriented bureaucracies, where hundreds of officials are charged with the para-diplomatic duties of maintaining political, economic, and religious ties with their respective communities of origin residing in Europe.

Even though Islam Councils have been established, it would be misleading to assume that a new era of domestic normalcy is completely under way. Homeland governments in North Africa, Turkey, and outside actors in the broader Middle East are still a highly influential force on Islam in Europe. This trend is at tension with the spirit of rhetorical consensus: the fostering of a "German" Islam, "French" Islam, "Italian" or "British" Islam, etc. The mosques and Islamic leadership sanctioned by Islam Councils are still overwhelmingly foreign-run and foreign-staffed. Regular meetings of European ministers with officials in the Islamic world—from Ankara to Islamabad, and Rabat to Cairo—have led, in particular, to the sustained practice of importing imams and funding for mosque construction.²⁹ At the same time that European ministers declared Islam to be an integral part of their respective national fabrics, they have continued to extend and renew foreign influence over their Muslim minorities—often for compelling pragmatic reasons but to the detriment of their institution-building efforts.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The body of chapters between the introduction and conclusion is divided into thirds. Chapters 2 and 3 introduce the main Islamic "actors" in Europe—including foreign envoys and transnational dissident

networks—and describe how they got there and how European Islam policies at the time of their arrival influenced their position within Muslim communities. Chapters 4 and 5 treat the theoretical bases of creating consultative councils and offer an empirical profile of how European countries arrived at parallel policy responses with the creation of Islam Councils. Chapters 6 and 7 evaluate the performance of the Islam Councils, how they have influenced the political behavior of religious organizations, and where they fit into the broader question of Muslim integration into European politics and society.

Chapter 2. European Outsourcing and Embassy Islam: *L'islam, c'est moi*. European governments refrained from active intervention during the initial phase of state-mosque relations (1960–1990), during which they tolerated—and formalized—foreign embassies' free reign over the development of Islamic religious infrastructure. In this first period, Europe conceded minority rights to Muslim labor migrants in exchange for foreign governments' guarantees of economic stability (e.g., trade and oil supply) and European political influence in the greater Middle East. The Embassy Islam networks exported imams, built mosques, and established domestically registered federations in Europe to extend the reach of the official homeland religion. European governments allowed this for practical reasons—the foreign sponsors had the experience and resources to provide religious infrastructure for Muslims—and in part to avoid a less desirable alternative: the imams who represented Islamist opposition in their home countries might import a revolutionary or violent form of the religion to Europe. There were clear electoral and geopolitical disincentives—from potential instability in North Africa, Turkey, and the Middle East, to insurgent right-wing parties at home—against engaging this new Muslim minority as if it were to be a permanent segment of national society.

Scholars have made much of German-speaking countries' use of the term *Gastarbeiter* (guestworker) to contrast the immigrant integration experience there compared to, say, that of Britain or France, where citizenship was granted more casually—what Brubaker called the “genealogical” versus “geographic” boundaries of European nations.³⁰ A little understood fact of Muslims' settlement—and the lag in Europeans' policymaking with regard to integrating them—is that they were broadly viewed as “guestworkers” in nearly every host society. Even in self-described immigration societies like Britain and France, governments hoped that the newcomers would return home. They actively pursued expulsion policies and return migration incentives that prevented a view of the immigrant community as a permanent presence from taking hold well into the 1980s. This coincided with an expansion in sending states' exportation of official religion in furtherance of their ties

with diaspora populations, on whose cash remittances they depended and whose Islamic activism they feared.

Chapter 3. A Politicized Minority: *The Qur'ân is our constitution*. The third chapter addresses the growth of Political Islam and transnational religious NGOs in Western Europe. While the European receiving states were granting a de facto monopoly of religious representation to the diplomatic envoys of immigrants' sending states, competing networks of well-organized activists with a more conservative, politicized view of Islam also flourished on the margins of religious community life.³¹ Political-Islam federations also provided prayer spaces, imams, lecturers, and social activities and established what may best be described as an Islamist subculture. Although such organizations may represent a relatively small membership base in terms of the local Muslim population (usually only 2–4 percent), they often control a sizable proportion of the registered Muslim religious associations and prayer spaces—sometimes as many as one out of three—where mosque-going Muslims congregate to socialize and pray.

Many of these federations' leaders share indirect descent from the Muslim Brotherhood and dissident religious–political movements in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and elsewhere. They are the putative heirs of divisive figures of international Islamism like Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Necmettin Erbakan, and of the brotherhood movements that in the broader Middle East have portrayed Islam as an “all-inclusive system of religion, world and state.”³² Their success has reinforced fears that they will encourage native-born European Muslim generations to disregard the rule of law in favor of a higher calling: “*al-Qur'ân dusturna*” (the Qur'ân is our constitution). Islamist spokesmen objected to images of the Prophet Mohammad in British novels, Italian frescoes, and Danish caricatures, or in operas in Geneva and Berlin. They encourage “modesty” among young women, and push for their right to wear headscarves and skip physical education class. To some observers, they are pursuing the creeping Islamization of Europe.

Chapter 4. Citizens, Groups, and the State. The fourth chapter places European governments' relationships with contemporary Muslim communities into historical and theoretical context, by reviewing earlier encounters with new categories of citizens and state-building challenges. For the past two centuries, the religion bureaus of interior ministries across Europe have asserted state authority by structuring and mediating the activities of religious organizations. Against the view that the accommodation of religious communities is the equivalent of “capitulation,” this chapter shows that formal recognition has been the method through which the modern state has historically asserted its authority over new citizen groups. The view that Islam is inherently

incompatible with, or otherwise presents an unprecedented challenge to, state authority in western democracies is critically examined. The chapter brings together summaries of literature on intermediary associations and the recognition of trade unions, with the establishment of representative bodies for Jewish and other religious communities. These historical examples demonstrate that the granting of political rights and equal citizenship—of the franchise and the right to hold office—were earlier supplemented with corporatist or public law status: extra-parliamentary representation. These cases yield insights into the institutional architecture of contemporary State-Islam consultations.

Seen in this light, the efforts to assert state sovereignty over transnational Islam look very similar to earlier moves to create centralized interlocutors for religious and even socioeconomic affairs. The corporatist methodology for interest management and mediation is a three-step process: setting preconditions for participation, selecting participants from available leadership, and defining the working agenda and electoral method. This process signals the state's goals of integration in each step, echoing the reasoning that invited syndicalists, trade unions, Jews, and other religious communities into the state apparatus. Governments aim to change the nature of individuals' relationship to organized religion and/or political groups by institutionally rooting it in a *national* context and requiring the subjugation of religious law—or revolutionary ardor—to the constitutional order.

Chapter 5. The Domestication of State-Mosque Relations. The fifth chapter discusses the creation of Islam Councils in response to a series of integration-related alarm bells that sounded at the end of the Cold War. Nineteen eighty-nine was a watershed year that initiated a second phase of state-mosque relations, after which governments sought to reassert state sovereignty over transnational Muslim networks. There were several confrontational events involving Islam in the international arena that year. First, the Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced an unfavorable fatwa against the Indian-British author Salman Rushdie for his allegedly blasphemous novel *The Satanic Verses*; then, three headscarf-wearing girls were expelled from a junior high school outside Paris; and finally, that same year, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan.³³ The post-Communist void in central Asia would soon reveal to Europe the extent of Saudi (and later, Turkish) institutional and financial deployment and proselytizing outside of the Muslim-majority world. These events pointed all eyes toward the European territory itself, where Islamic organizations had begun to expand. The events of 1988–9 reverberated within Muslim communities across the continent, and opened local governments' eyes to the reality of transnational memberships among the minority populations. Soon thereafter, the allied war

to drive Iraq out of Kuwait provoked further ripples across Muslim populations—where there was some expression of sympathy for President Hussein and lack of understanding for the Saudi alliance with the U.S.-led coalition.

Between 1990 and 2010, each country under examination experienced this process somewhat differently, but the similarities of the challenges and institutional responses far outnumber the distinctions. This period has seen the reassertion of nation-state sovereignty over the informal influence of international religious NGOs and foreign embassies. This phase of Muslim incorporation has been about undoing the power arrangement of the 1970s and 1980s that had privileged Saudi Arabia and other Muslim “sending” states in the practice of Islam in Europe—in addition to reining in the unregulated associations of transnational “political” Islam active on national territory. During this second phase of state-mosque relations, Interior Ministries initiated consultations with a broader swath of Muslim representatives, expanding their contacts with Muslims well beyond the “official” Islams of the homeland. This required delicate negotiations in which authorities felt a need to tread lightly, and comprised not just diplomatic representatives (who remained crucial) but also civil society organizations—including international NGOs affiliated with Political Islam.

Chapter 6. Imperfect Institutionalization: Islam Councils in Europe. This chapter examines the second round of state-mosque relations that produced institutionalized Islam Councils. Interior ministries provided the first impetus to organize Islam as a “national” religion, and the government-led consultations established a variety of national councils between 1992 and 2006, from the *Conseil français du culte musulman*, to the *Comisión Islámica de España*, to the *Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique*, to the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, to the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board in Britain, to the *Consulta per l’Islam italiano*. These national processes are not identical: many place more weight on the role of Embassy Islam and foreign government representatives (e.g., Belgium, Germany, France, Spain), while others rely more heavily on handpicked local civil society organizations (e.g., Italy, United Kingdom).

The cases exhibit strong evidence of institutional parallelism as states seek similar types of alliances. The central commonality of these state-Islam consultations is that they are held with the administrators and delegates of prayer spaces, large mosques, and Islamic religious federations—i.e., not with Muslim *political* leaders. The consultations serve two principal purposes: to routinize and de-politicize Muslims’ religious practices, and to force opposing movements within organized Islam (notably, Embassy Islam and Political Islam) to work together under the neutral brokerage of the state.

Chapter 7. The Partial Emancipation: Muslim Responses to State-Islam Consultations. The seventh chapter addresses the achievements of state-mosque relations and the “incorporation” outcomes that can be measured so far. What is the stability and performance of Islam Councils across the countries? How have these policies conditioned integration outcomes and political moderation, and what impact do they have on the long-term prospects of Muslims’ everyday integration in Europe? After earlier chapters’ emphasis on the State, this chapter empirically traces the effects of European policy approaches and finds that they have had a dramatic effect on Muslim communities: their domestic orientation, their reformed organizational structures, their outspoken distancing from violence and radicalism, and their outward commitment to playing by the rules of the game. Host societies as well as Muslim community leaders—and the scope of their agendas—have been transformed by the experience of institutional integration.

Muslims in Europe today have yet to experience full political integration—their residual foreign citizenship will prevent that until a majority are European citizens over the voting age—but increasing numbers of leaders are being received in the halls of power. The predominant scene of state-Islam interactions is not just of unabated conflict but of government officials sitting down with Muslims to address issues associated with domestic Islamic observance. As a result of meticulous institution-building by Interior Ministries across the continent, these meetings are no longer the ad hoc gatherings of foreign dignitaries they once were. In practice, authorities have effectively opened up communications channels that serve both as a sounding board for the putative Muslim community and as a temporary substitute for the millions of citizens and residents of Muslim origin who are, for the time being, without significant electoral representation. Islam Councils have even begun to achieve some concrete instances of “domestication,” such as the oversight of halal slaughter, the nomination of chaplains in the military, the organization of religious education in public schools, the endowment of university departments of Islamic theology, and civic training for imams.

Both the diplomatic religious networks and Political-Islam networks have been profoundly changed by their experience in Europe, in unforeseen ways. The content of “Embassy Islam” has been both multiplied and adapted to the new circumstances of state-mosque relations. And some Islamist groups in Europe have showed signs of a practical-minded evolution. The Islam Councils have begun to demonstrate that over time, a new politics of distinctly European state-mosque relations can emerge.

Chapter 8. Muslim Integration and European Islam in the Next Generation. The concluding chapter discusses the future prospects for Muslims’

political and social integration. A number of the social, cultural, and political adjustments that will characterize Europe in coming generations are already under way, although often the results are not visible to the naked eye. This chapter examines the pre-electoral political behavior and earliest known voting preferences and demographic future of the postcolonial—and post-guestworker—Muslim minorities of Europe. The chapter argues that the most serious threats to successful emancipation—violent extremism among Muslims and right-wing nativism among “host societies”—may ultimately be weakened by a confluence of demographic trends and old-fashioned integration processes. The key development will be that as the proportion of Muslims of foreign nationality residing in Europe decreases (because of the increasing share of native-born Muslims), European countries’ democratic political institutions increasingly will take effect.

The normalization of Muslims’ participation in political life will give a small voice in government to Muslim advocates of all partisan stripes. And the routinization of Islamic religious observance will diminish the significance of religious inequality as a mobilizing issue in Muslim identity politics. National Islam Councils will slowly domesticate the religious leadership, rooting it in a European context, and Muslim politicians will gradually be brought into traditional political institutions.

The advent of a large class of voting Muslim citizens will also contribute to the flowering of a rich civil society. The discussions of Muslims’ future in Europe and the compatibility of Islam and democracy—that is, of the question “Can Muslims be good citizens?”—will become less abstract, less hypothetical. The answer to that question will no longer be sought in the publicly stated good intentions of Muslim leaders, on one hand, or in the rabble-rousing of nationalists or Islamists prophesying clashes yet to come, on the other. Conflicts over public prayers, unsanitary animal slaughter, and radical proselytizing in prisons and sermonizing in mosques will be addressed and mostly resolved by the practical accommodations and administrative oversight of governments across the continent. Integration problems will persist, but discussions of how to resolve them will no longer be crudely couched in terms of the clash of civilizations.

CASE SELECTION AND A DISCLAIMER

This book distills the perspective and insights gained from more than a decade of research in four languages and nine countries. Most of the comparative analysis is conducted on empirical data compiled during nearly three years of fieldwork in Western Europe: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,

whose collective Muslim-origin population accounts for roughly 14 million of the approximately 16–17 million Muslims in Europe, as well as during short research visits to Morocco and Turkey. I conducted more than two hundred interviews with civil servants, politicians, diplomats, and ministers; religious federation leaders and local community presidents; and imams and sheikhs—before and during the state-Islam consultation process—and became familiar with the perspectives, complaints, and aspirations of Muslim minorities and their majority societies.³⁴ The sample of host countries examined is not exhaustive of the European Muslim experience but includes: countries with variations of three different state-church regimes; with relevant colonial histories and without; with Muslim populations that are either predominantly South Asian, Turkish, or North African, i.e., the three main sources of Muslim migration to Europe.

The story of European Islam is about much more than geopolitics and state-building processes discussed in this book. It is wrapped up in complex daily local realities that cannot be fully captured by a work whose aim is to generalize and offer a view of the broad trends. The cross-national parallels I describe, by their nature, impose a “model” on messy empirical data. The book contributes to the existing literature by offering a 30,000-foot view of what is happening across Europe: why European state-mosque relations and “organized Islam” look the way they do in the early twenty-first century. My generalizations will occasionally unfairly lump subtle actors into the two principal categories: “Political Islam” and “Embassy Islam.” The usefulness of this shorthand is mostly in the context of understanding the composition of Islam Councils, but they also give a broad sense of a given organization’s acceptance of the political status quo and degree of religious observance. My aim is to give a detailed overview of continental patterns, which sometimes means I do not capture the subtle interiors of every rectory or religious affairs office.

The criterion for placing mosques and federations in the Embassy Islam category is whether the leader serves at the pleasure of a foreign government, and whether the mosque is effectively used as a drawing room of the embassy—these are useful heuristics for the broader attempt to measure foreign governments’ influence on the religious landscape in a given country. Despite the internal diversity of Embassy Islam, I hope that the next chapter will demonstrate why it is a useful category. The Political Islam category, similarly brimming with diversity, includes any organization with ties to Jama’at-i Islami, Muslim Brotherhood, and Millî Görüş—which, along with a handful of other groups, have been referred to collectively as “the new Muslim Brotherhood” in the West—although individual leaders and members may re-

pudiate entire swaths of those amorphous movements' partisan and ideological platforms in various contexts.³⁵

The template of "religious community" that this book applies to a set of nationally and ethnically heterogeneous minority populations with varying degrees of piety or communitarian identity will strike a discordant note for some readers. Ultimately, the integration problems faced by the descendants of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries are not only religious in nature, and in many ways it is unfair to refer to these populations as "Muslims" or to call the leadership of Islamic organizations—mosques and federations, etc.—"community leaders." One could write an entirely different book about "secular" leadership, and those Muslim-origin politicians who refuse the religion template entirely.³⁶ This book's framework takes advantage of the institutional opportunity structure of state-mosque relations, as they are the only official contact point for millions of Muslims at the cusp of emancipation, without access to traditional political resources (parties, elections, and public bureaucracies).

State-mosque relations in Europe stand at a critical juncture between national and international organizational and political influences. This period shares features of the dynamic process that Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan observed at the moment when universal suffrage was granted in the interwar period, during which ideological cleavages were "frozen" in place for much of the remaining century.³⁷ The jockeying of foreign governments and international NGOs is a contest to set the conditions in which the first fully enfranchised Muslim citizens of Europe come of age, and it will influence the shape of state-mosque relations—and the integration of European Muslims—for generations to come. The two categories of religious actors that are the focus of the policies under examination—Embassy Islam and Political Islam—are not the only relevant movements active in European Islam, but taken together, the federations under these two mantles account for large majorities of "organized" Muslims who have registered religious associations. They are the movements that have tried to confederate the mosques and Islamic houses of worship of Europe and who have sought recognition by European states. They are also the main forces in competition to dominate the institutional life of state-mosque relations, and thereby to speak on behalf of religious—and often, political—questions for millions of Muslims. The policy choices made by European governments during this molten era will be critical to the success of the emancipation process under way.