

CHAPTER ONE

Interpreting Governance

ONCE you start to listen out for the word “governance,” it crops up everywhere. The Internet faces issues of Internet governance. International organizations promote good governance. Hospitals are introducing systems of clinical governance. Climate change and avian flu require innovative forms of global and transnational governance. Newspapers report scandalous failures of corporate governance.

Unfortunately, the ubiquity of the word “governance” does not make its meaning any clearer. A lack of clarity about the meaning of governance might engender skepticism about its importance. The lack of clarity lends piquancy to questions such as: How does the concept of governance differ from that of government? Why has the concept of governance become ubiquitous? What is the relationship of governance to democracy? How do policy actors respond to the challenges of governance?

This book attempts to answer these questions. It argues that:

- The concept of governance evokes a more pluralistic pattern of rule than does government: governance is less focused on state institutions, and more focused on the processes and interactions that tie the state to civil society.
- The concept of governance has spread because new theories of politics and public sector reforms inspired by these theories have led to a crisis of faith in the state.
- Governance and the crisis of faith in the state make our image of representative democracy implausible.
- Policy actors have responded to the challenge of governance in ways that are constrained by the image of representative democracy and a faith in policy expertise.

While these arguments might seem straightforward, we will confront a host of complexities along the way. These complexities often reflect the limited extent to which we can expect concepts such as governance to have fixed content. “Governance” is a vague and contested term, as are many political concepts. People hold different theories and values that lead them, quite reasonably, to ascribe different content to the

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concept of governance. There are, in other words, multiple theories and multiple worlds of governance, each of which has different implications for democracy.

I have responded to this complexity in part by mixing general discussions of the new governance with specific case studies that locate Britain in various comparative and international contexts. In the particular case of Britain, this book argues that:

- The concept of governance evokes a differentiated polity that stands in contrast to the Westminster model.
- The concept of governance has spread because new theories of politics and also public sector reforms inspired by these theories have eroded faith in the Westminster model.
- A shift of perspective from the Westminster model to the differentiated polity poses challenges for the constitution and public administration.
- Policy actors have generally responded to these challenges by promoting reforms that remain constrained by the Westminster model and a faith in policy expertise.

DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION

My aims are primarily diagnostic. I identify trends and problems in current democracy. Governance undermines old expressions of representative democracy including the Westminster model. Policy actors typically remain trapped by the image of representative democracy buttressed now by a faith in policy expertise. Their policies restrict democracy. Representative governments struggle to direct the policy process. An illusory expertise crowds out citizen participation.

While this book is mainly diagnostic, it contains prescriptive arguments. Just as the diagnosis points to modernist theories as a source of current problems of democracy, so the prescription involves turning away from these theories. Modernist social science has restricted democracy. Interpretive social science may be a cure.

Interpretive social science certainly shifts our perspective on the relationship of knowledge to the state. Modernist social scientists generally see only how their theories analyze the state. An interpretive approach enables us also to see how social science partly constitutes the state. It may be controversial to argue that social science makes the world as well as analyzing it. But the argument is obvious: if policy actors form policies using formal or folk theories from social science, then social science partly constitutes those policies.

Approaches to social science do not have logically necessary relationships to democratic theories and practices. However, my diagnosis suggests that historically modernist social science has undermined faith in representative democracy and led policy actors to turn increasingly to an expertise based on modernist social science itself. My prescriptive hope is that an interpretive social science may reveal the limitations of this expertise and encourage more pluralist and participatory forms of democracy.

These diagnostic and prescriptive arguments reflect a historical narrative about the changing nature of social science and democratic practice. The new theories and worlds of governance are part of a long process of rethinking and remaking the modern state. My diagnosis narrates the shift from developmental historicism to modernism. My prescription advocates another shift to interpretive social science, dialogue, and participation.

Much of the nineteenth century was dominated by a developmental historicism in which the state appeared as a consummation of the history of a nation that was held together by ties of race, language, character, and culture. This developmental historicism promoted the following three ideas. First, the state was or at least could be the expression of the common good (or public interest) of a nation (or people) that was bound together by prepolitical ties. Second, social science grasped the character of any particular state as a historical product of a prepolitical nation. Third, representative institutions enabled citizens to elect and hold accountable politicians who expressed, acted on, and safeguarded the common good of the nation.

The modern literature on governance rose as developmental historicism gave way to modernist social science. Modernist social science undermined older views of the state and nation. Instead the literature on governance exhibits the following three ideas. First, the state is fragmented, consisting of self-interested actors or complex networks. Second, social science explains policy outcomes by appealing to formal ahistorical models, correlations, mechanisms, or processes. Third, representative institutions are at most a small part of a larger policy process in which a range of actors, many of whom are unelected and unaccountable, negotiate, formulate, and implement policies in accord with their particular interests and norms.

If the new governance is part of a process of profound historical importance, it still remains up to us to make the future out of current circumstances. How should we do so? This book promotes an interpretive theory of governance that promotes the following three ideas. First, the state is fragmented, consisting of complex networks of actors inspired by different beliefs formed against the background of competing traditions. Second, social science can offer us only stories about how people have

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acted and guesses about how they might act. Third, representative institutions should be supplemented less by appeals to an allegedly formal and ahistorical expertise and more by alternative forms of democracy.

My adherence to an interpretive theory of governance thus leads me to question the wisdom of recent attempts to remake the state. Modernist theories of governance typically suggest that the cracks in representative institutions can be papered over by policy expertise. Rational choice theory and institutionalism often appeal to expert knowledge that promotes nonmajoritarian institutions or networks. In contrast, I adhere to an interpretive theory that undermines the modernist notion of expertise and suggests we should be thinking instead about how to renew democracy.

Clearly my prescription reflects my diagnosis. The appeal to interpretive social science and participatory democracy rests on the account of the way modernist social science influences democratic governance. Equally, however, the diagnosis reflects the interpretive social science I prescribe. Aspects of the prescription are important to a proper understanding of the diagnosis. Thus, this book has a somewhat circular structure. The rest of this chapter introduces the interpretive approach to social science that informs the ensuing diagnosis of problems of democratic governance. The final chapter returns to this interpretive approach and participatory democracy as possible solutions to these problems. Readers who get impatient with philosophy may want to skip directly to the next chapter, avoiding my justification of my approach and going straight to the start of my narrative.

INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE

There are various ways of defining interpretive social science.¹ Sometimes interpretation appears primarily as a matter of method. Interpretive methods contrast with quantitative ones or with both quantitative and qualitative ones. Advocates defend them as superior to these other methods or at least as necessary supplements to these other methods. The argument is often that only methods such as observation, interviewing, and discourse analysis can reveal the rich texture of human life. Interpretive methods are, in this view, the route to a level of factual detail that other methods miss. Advocates defend interpretive studies either as a means of checking and fleshing out broad generalizations or as the only

¹ The tension between interpretation as method and philosophy recurs in D. Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea, eds., *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006).

way of discovering the facts. Their methodological concept of interpretive social science leads them to spend much time worrying about the objectivity of their data, the rigor of their analyses, and the criteria for evaluating their work.

In my view, however, interpretation is primarily about philosophy. Interpretive social science derives from a historicist philosophy—but a more radical historicism than the developmental one I mentioned earlier. Historicism refers generally to a belief that we can discuss human cultures and practices adequately only as historical objects. Historicist modes of reasoning became commonplace in the nineteenth century. Social scientists conceived of human life as being inherently purposeful and intentional. Yet nineteenth-century historicism remained developmental, conceiving of purposes and intentions as guided by fixed principles. While different social scientists relied on slightly different principles, the most commonly accepted ones included liberty, reason, nation, and state. These principles guided social scientists in selecting the facts to include in their historical narratives. They defined nineteenth-century histories. They inspired a belief in the unity and progressive nature of history.

Radical historicism does away with appeals to principles that lend necessity and unity to history.² The result is an emphasis on nominalism and contingency. Nominalism refers here to the idea that universals are just names for clusters of particulars. In social science, aggregate concepts do not refer to natural kinds with essences, but only to a series of particular people and actions. Radical historicists reject uses of concepts that refer to types of state, society, economy, or nation as if they had an essence that defines their boundaries and explains other aspects of their nature or development. They reject reifications. All social life is meaningful activity. Moreover, a rejection of reifications highlights the contingency of social life. Activity is not governed by either formal reified concepts or teleological principles. Social life consists of a series of contingent, even accidental, actions that appropriate, modify, and transform the past to create the present. Radical historicists reject determinism, whether it reduces activity to economic factors or to reified structures and institutions.

An emphasis on nominalism and contingency leads radical historicists to an antinaturalist analysis of social explanation. Radical historicists may accept a naturalist ontology according to which humans are part of nature and no more than part of nature. But radical historicists typically argue that the social sciences require a different form of explanation from the natural sciences. As Clifford Geertz famously claimed, social science

² Compare M. Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

needs to be “not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”³

Positivists once defended naturalism by arguing that causal explanations are valid only if they fit observations, and meanings are irrelevant because they are not observable.⁴ Today, however, most modernist social scientists accept that actions have meanings for those who perform them, and even that agents act for reasons of their own. The naturalism of these modernist social scientists differs from the antinaturalism of interpretive social science in the role given to meanings in social explanation. Naturalists want meanings to drop out of explanations. They might argue that to give the reasons for an action is merely to redescribe it; to explain an action, we have to show how it—and so perhaps the reason for which the agent performed it—conforms to a general law couched in terms of social facts.

In contrast, radical historicists, emphasizing nominalism, dismiss social facts as reifications. They argue that actions are meaningful and meanings are holistic. They then take holism to entail a distinctive contextualizing approach to social explanation. Social scientists can explain people’s beliefs and actions by locating them in a wider context of meanings. Meanings cannot be reduced to allegedly objective facts because their content depends on their relationship to other meanings. Social science requires a contextualizing form of explanation that distinguishes it from the natural sciences. We elucidate and explain meanings by reference to wider systems of meanings, not by reference to reified categories such as social class or institutional position, and not by construing meanings as independent variables in the framework of naturalist forms of explanation.

When modernist social scientists let meanings drop out of their explanations, they are usually hoping at least to point to classifications, correlations, or other regularities that hold across various cases. Even when they renounce the ideal of a universal theory, they still regard historical contingency and contextual specificity as obstacles that need to be overcome in the search for cross-temporal and cross-cultural regularities. Naturalists characteristically search for causal connections that bestride time and space like colossi. They attempt to control for all kinds of variables and thereby arrive at parsimonious explanations.

In contrast, radical historicists, emphasizing contingency, argue that the role of meanings in social life precludes regularities acting as explanations. Radical historicists do not deny that we can make general statements covering diverse cases. They reject two specific features of a naturalist view of generalization. Radical historicists deny, first, that

³ C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.

⁴ E.g., J. Watson, *Behaviorism* (New York: Norton, 1924).

general statements are a uniquely powerful form of social knowledge. They believe that statements about the unique and contingent aspects of particular social phenomena are at least as apposite and valuable as general statements. Generalizations often deprive our understanding of social phenomena of what is most distinctly and significantly human about them. Radical historicists deny, second, that general statements actually explain features of particular cases. Just as we can say that several objects are red without explaining anything else about them, so we can say that several states are democracies without their being democracies explaining any other feature they have in common.

Radical historicists conceive of human action as inherently particular and contingent. They oppose social explanations that appear to appeal to ahistorical causal mechanisms. Much current philosophy supports their antinaturalist commitment to contextualizing explanations.⁵ Today the naturalism of the positivists has been almost entirely replaced by philosophical analyses such as those of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson. Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of a word cannot be elucidated in abstraction from the context in which it is used.⁶ Davidson then argued that social science presupposes ideas of choice and contingency that are incompatible with the forms of explanation found in natural science. Actions are explained by reasons in a way that implies actors could have reasoned and acted differently. Actions are products of contingent decisions, not the determined outcomes of lawlike processes.⁷

ON CASES AND GENEALOGIES

A commitment to interpretive social science informs the logical form of my arguments. Many social scientists think in terms of methods, not the logic of arguments. However, just as I argued that interpretive social science is primarily philosophical rather than methodological, so I now want to describe my approach to democratic governance in terms of the logical form of its arguments rather than method. Interpretive social science does not require any particular techniques of data collection. But

⁵ Yet when modernist social scientists discuss causality and explanation, they typically ignore the resurgence of antinaturalism, discuss only naturalist perspectives, and refer exclusively to works on the philosophy of science and dated ones on the philosophy of social science. E.g., H. Brady, "Causation and Explanation in Social Science," in J. Box-Steffensmeier, H. Brady, and D. Collier, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 217–70.

⁶ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972).

⁷ D. Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

it does require social scientists to adopt contextualizing and historical forms of explanation. Indeed, radical historicism reminds us that modernist correlations, classifications, and models are not properly speaking explanations; they are just more data that social scientists need to explain using contextualizing and historical narratives. Correlations and classifications become explanations only if we unpack them as shorthand for narratives about how, for example, beliefs fit with other beliefs in a way that made possible certain activity. Models may appeal to beliefs and desires, but they are mere fables; they become explanations only if we accept them as accurate depictions of the beliefs and desires that people really held in a particular case.

The logical form of my arguments differs from modernist social science in the use of case studies and historical context. Interpretive social science challenges the idea that case studies can serve as evidence in favor of formal and ahistorical theories. Modernist social science typically aims at formal theories that describe a social logic or lawlike regularity that follows from the essential properties of a type of actor, institution, or situation. So, for example, social scientists might define governance by reference to one or more essential property, such as multiplying networks. They might argue that this property characterizes all cases of governance. Then they might argue that this property explains other features of governance, such as the state's growing reliance on steering and regulation as opposed to direct oversight and control. The quest for formal theories means social scientists often use cases as systematic evidence. They worry about the selection of their cases. They try to make their cases appropriately systematic, random, similar, diverse, typical, or extreme, according to the content of the formal theory they want to test.⁸

An interpretive approach undermines the very idea of formal theories and so the idea that cases are best conceived as systematic evidence for such theories. An emphasis on nominalism precludes appeals to allegedly essential properties and so comprehensive theories or midlevel hypotheses couched in formal terms. Interpretive social science often aims instead at drawing attention to an aspect of the world that has gone largely unnoticed. Interpretive social science appeals to a case or series of cases to illustrate an aspect of the world rather than as systematic evidence of its extent or inner logic. The result is a new way of seeing—a new picture or concept rather than a new formal theory. Wittgenstein wrote here of using examples to pick out a pattern of family resemblances without appealing to a comprehensive theory.⁹ The examples have a range

⁸ E.g., J. Gerring, "Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis," in Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, 645–84.

⁹ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, sections 63–69.

of similarities at various levels of detail, but they do not have any one essential property or set of properties in common. We do not master the new concept by discovering a rule that tells us when to apply it. We do not recognize the new pattern by devising a formal theory that explains it. Our grasp of the concept lies in our ability to provide reasons why it applies to one case but not another, and our ability to draw analogies with other cases. We recognize the pattern when we can discuss whether or not it is present in other cases.

Interpretive social science often uses cases as illustrative of patterns rather than systematic evidence of formal theories. There is nothing intrinsically troubling about a rather ad hoc approach to cases. Cases legitimately may be cherry-picked to illustrate the aspect of the world the social scientist wants people to see. In this book, I rely mainly on cases from Britain, but I also add a sprinkling of comparative cases. These comparative cases are not meant to provide systematic and sustained evidence that Britain is somehow representative of a broader social logic. Nor do the comparative cases purport to identify or stay within a specific geographical range within which a social logic operates. Instead, the comparative cases, stretching from police reform to good governance in developing countries and from Australia to Haiti, are an admittedly unsystematic attempt to help us see a picture. They illustrate the presence in various aspects of current policymaking of particular ideas and discourses—a continuing commitment to representative democracy along with forms of expertise associated with modernist social science. I describe this pattern in abstract terms. I use case studies to illustrate it. If readers recognize the pattern, they will be able to draw analogies to other cases, but I hope they will remain nominalists and resist the temptation to treat cases as systematic evidence for a midlevel hypothesis or general theory.

To reject formal theories is not to renounce the ambition to explain. It is just that the emphasis on contingency requires interpretive social scientists to rely on historical explanations rather than formal ones. So, I offer a historicist explanation of the cases of policymaking being influenced by a commitment to representative democracy and forms of expertise associated with modernist social science. Modernist social science and the broader culture associated with it have inspired changes in the state that have weakened democracy. Sometimes I point to the influence of particular social scientists on policy makers. But I am not arguing that politicians or even their advisers are remarkably well-read in social science or even understand and believe the formal theories developed by social scientists. My argument is more about the culture in which we live. The ideas that inspire modernist social science have folk as well as technical forms. As rational choice theorists develop technical models based on assumptions about the self-interested nature of action, so many of us

have a folk idea that politicians and even bureaucrats and public sector workers are likely to be trying to increase their pay or shorten their working hours even at the expense of the public good. My narrative thus refers to a general cultural shift. New concepts of rationality both highlighted problems in older democratic theories and encouraged people to respond to these problems by drawing on knowledge and strategies associated with modernist social science.

This historicist explanation of current patterns of democratic governance is, more specifically, a genealogy. The very style of this book resembles other genealogies. I try to offer a bold, sweeping, and provocative argument that relies on historical narratives and illustrative cases to change the way we see current ideals and practices. I try to unsettle without necessarily specifying a detailed alternative. Genealogies denaturalize beliefs and actions that others think are natural. Genealogies suggest that ideas and practices that some people believe to be inevitable actually arose out of contingent historical processes. The critical nature of genealogies consists in their thus unsettling those who ascribe a spurious naturalness to their particular beliefs and actions.

Neither policy makers nor modernist social scientists are much inclined to reflect on the historical sources of their beliefs. Policy makers often suggest their reforms are inherently reasonable at least given the circumstances. Modernist social scientists often portray their formal theories as natural, correct, and applying across time and space. In contrast, my genealogy suggests that the reforms seem reasonable and the formal theories correct only because of a tacit background of assumptions that have contingent historical roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To expose these assumptions is to denaturalize and unsettle current democratic practice and current social science.

A SUMMARY OF THE BOOK

This book offers a genealogy illustrated by specific cases from Britain and elsewhere of the relationship between the new governance and democracy. The general argument is that while the new governance challenges representative democracy, current attempts to deal with this challenge are constrained by the lingering effects of modernist ways of thinking about constitutionalism and public administration. The specifically genealogical argument is that these modernist ways of thinking have contingent historical roots of which their exponents are generally unaware.

Part 1, on the new governance, provides much of the historical background, offering a detailed account of the new theories of governance and the reforms they have inspired. In chapter 2, I discuss the histori-

cal emergence of modernist social science and the modern state. Developmental historicism seemed increasingly implausible during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Social scientists questioned the principles that had guided earlier narratives of the state and nation. Skepticism about these principles left social scientists with facts but no way of making sense of the facts. Social scientists rejected historicist modes of thinking and if only by default turned to formal modes of analysis. Economic and sociological concepts of rationality came to dominate. This shift from developmental to modernist analyses altered the concept of the state and over time the nature of the state. Social scientists increasingly highlighted the role played by factions and special interests in policymaking. Many appealed to a neutral bureaucracy to guard the common good. A hierarchic bureaucracy represented the public interest, scientific expertise, and rationality. Bureaucratic accountability began to replace responsible government as a key conceptual feature of democracy. Yet, by the late 1970s, the modern bureaucratic state was itself in crisis. The new governance of markets and networks has risen as an attempt to resolve this crisis.

Chapter 3 provides a more detailed survey of the main theories of governance. Typically these theories rely on modernist social science to make sense of the crisis of the modern bureaucratic state. The economic concept of rationality spread from neoclassical economics to rational choice theory. Rational choice draws on the assumptions and techniques of neoclassical economics and decision theory to analyze social life more generally. The sociological concept of rationality inspires a range of social theories that attempt to explain actions by reference to reified accounts of social norms or structures. Prominent examples in the study of governance include the new institutionalism (or at least its historical and sociological variants), systems theory, and regulation theory. Chapter 3 also returns to interpretive social science as an alternative to approaches premised on either the economic or the sociological concept of rationality. I look specifically at how interpretive social scientists make sense of the crisis of the state and the rise and nature of the new governance.

In chapter 4, I turn to the new worlds of governance that are associated in various ways with modernist theories. The theories encouraged us to see aspects of governance that were already present. More important for us, the theories also encouraged policy makers to respond to the crisis of the state by introducing reforms that reflected the theories. It is useful here to distinguish between two waves of reform. The first wave was indebted to theories associated with the economic concept of rationality. Neoliberalism and rational choice inspired attempts at privatization and marketization and the spread of new styles of management. The second wave of reforms owed more to theories tied to a sociological concept of

rationality. People inspired by institutionalism and systems theory struggled to make sense of the pattern of governance arising out of first-wave reforms. Social scientists increasingly rethought institutional and systems theories in terms of networks. Their understanding of the new governance and their promotion of networks helped inspire a turn to joined-up governance, partnerships, and whole of government agendas. Chapter 4 concludes by drawing on interpretive social science to develop an alternative decentered account of the emergence of new worlds of governance.

Part 1 provides the historical background to cases in which policy actors respond to the new governance by bolstering representative democracy with new forms of expertise. Part 2, on constitutionalism, turns to some of these cases. It examines the challenges the new governance poses to democracy and the ways policy actors have responded to these challenges. The cases focus on the continuing adherence of policy actors to old ideals of representative government.

In chapter 5, I describe some of the problems that the new theories and worlds of governance pose for democratic theory and responses to them. I emphasize that issues of good governance occur for developed countries as well as developing ones. The growth of networks and markets raises questions about the health of democratic institutions in all states. The questions include how to think about and reform public service, representative institutions, accountability, and social inclusion. Different theories of governance usually inspire different responses to these questions. Rational choice theorists with their debt to the economic concept of rationality often play down the need for democratic practices. Some defend the rationality of extending the role of nonmajoritarian institutions to areas that previously were subject to democratic control. Institutionalists and others indebted to the sociological concept of rationality typically cling to the old picture of representative government, attempting to redefine ideals such as accountability to fit the reality of the new governance. Finally, an interpretive social science may encourage us to pay greater attention to participatory innovations as ways of dealing with the problems posed by the new governance.

Chapters 6 and 7 provide more specific case studies of how policy actors are responding to some of the democratic problems raised by the new governance. The cases illustrate my general argument that policy makers are clinging to representative ideals supplemented by modernist forms of expertise. Chapter 6 looks at constitutional reform in Britain. I show how New Labour's reforms remain limited by a preoccupation with representative democracy and even a lingering adherence to the Westminster model. The reforms are all about representative assemblies and elections. They reflect liberal and Fabian traditions of socialism. New Labour has shown little interest in the dialogic and participatory reforms associated

with nongovernmental and pluralist traditions of socialism. Chapter 7 turns to judicial reform, concentrating on Britain but also looking at the United States, Europe, and international relations. Judicial reform too reflects New Labour's preoccupation with representative democracy and lingering adherence to the Westminster model. Yet, judicial reform is also generally an attempt to respond to the new governance by increasing the role of legal expertise at the expense of democratic decision making.

Part 1 makes a broad historical argument about the new governance and democracy. Part 2 illustrates the argument with various cases related to constitutional issues. Part 3, on public administration, further illustrates the argument with cases related to public policy. I examine the ways in which the new governance challenges policymaking before showing how attempts to respond to this challenge also rely on old ideas of representative democracy bolstered by modernist forms of expertise. The topics covered—joined-up governance and police reform—are illustrative. They were chosen with an eye on the concept of the state. The state is often conceived as consisting of legislative, judicial, and executive branches and as having a monopoly of legitimate force inside its territorial borders. Part 2 discusses legislatures and the judiciary. Part 3 then looks at joined-up governance because it is a clear attempt to modernize the executive and administrative aspects of government, and policing because it is an obvious example of legitimate force. Collectively parts 2 and 3 cover the main activities of the state in making, implementing, and enforcing law.

In chapter 8 I describe problems that the new theories and worlds of governance pose for public policy and show how responses to these problems typically draw on the new theories of governance. The new governance poses the problem of how the state can implement its policies given a proliferation of markets and networks in the public sector. Once again the different theories of governance typically inspire different responses to this problem. Rational choice theory usually encourages market solutions that reduce the role of the state in implementing policies. Institutionalists are more likely to explore a range of strategies by which they hope the state can manage and promote organizations and networks. Their greater skepticism about market rationality also leads to greater emphasis on regulation and policy learning. Finally, interpretive social science may promote an alternative that gives pride of place to dialogic approaches to public policy.

Chapters 9 and 10 provide more specific case studies of how policy actors are responding to some of the administrative problems raised by the new governance. The cases illustrate my general argument that policy makers often draw on modernist forms of social science to respond to the new governance. Public policies reflect neoliberalism, rational choice,

institutionalism, and network theory with their advocacy of markets and networks. Chapter 9 tackles the spread of joined-up governance and whole of government agendas. I trace New Labour's debt to institutionalism and network theory, showing how this debt appears in the attempt to modernize governance. I trace a similar pattern in Australia's whole of government agenda, Homeland Security in the United States, and the efforts of the international community to intervene in fragile states. Chapter 10 looks specifically at police reform in Britain and the United States. I trace the fortunes of a neoliberal narrative associated with the economic concept of rationality and a community narrative associated with the sociological concept of rationality. I argue that the role of expertise in police reform helps explain its failings. The fallacy of expertise bedevils public policy.

The concluding chapter returns to the themes of this introduction. It begins by summarizing my diagnosis of the historical roots of some contemporary problems of democracy. Thereafter I offer some prescriptive reflections. With social science, I place hope in an interpretive approach that replaces economic and sociological concepts of rationality with one of local reasoning. With democratic practice, I place hope in greater participation and dialogue as alternatives to, respectively, representation and expertise. No doubt my recommendations for democratic practice will disappoint some readers by being too vague. My recommendations are limited in part because of lack of space—a normative theory of democracy would require another book. But they are also vague because, as should by now be clear, I do not believe in the kind of expertise offered by modernist social science. If we reject the mantle of expertise, we may admit to not being able to say that such and such an approach to policy-making will solve our problems. If we advocate democratic participation, we may also want to argue that citizens, not social scientists, should decide how we try to solve our problems and what forms of participation to adopt. Let me put the point more starkly than I feel committed to: social scientists should limit themselves to diagnosis and critique, leaving prescription and decision making to participants in the relevant democratic practices.