CHAPTER ONE

Forcible Regime Promotion, Then and Now

> We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.
>
> —George W. Bush, *January 2005*

"REGIME CHANGE": THE UNGAINLY PHRASE was once a technical neologism used by social scientists to signify the alteration of a country's fundamental political institutions. Now, around the world, it is a political term, and a polarizing one. For the verb "change" has come to imply the coercion of outside powers.[1] Regime change requires a regime changer, and in Afghanistan and Iraq the changer-in-chief has been the United States.

America's costly efforts to democratize these countries have continued under the presidency of Barack Obama, but President George W. Bush's Second Inaugural Address remains the most striking effort to frame and justify America as regime changer. Bush's critics, of course, were not impressed by the speech. The Iraq regime change in particular was not going well and seemed destined to end badly. The critics were legion, but they were not united. Some, the realists, thought Bush's policy of promoting democracy by force to be radical and moralistic, innocent of the essential nature of international relations, bound to bring on disaster. It can never be the case that America's "deepest beliefs" and "vital interests" are the same. A fundamental realist tenet is that states must always trade off some measure of their values for the sake of the national interest. Bush was departing dangerously from established prudent statecraft. He not only talked in idealistic language, he believed and acted upon it.

Setting aside, for the moment, the merits of these U.S-led wars—and there is much to criticize about each—are the realists correct? Are these wars really so extraordinary? Do states only rarely use force to try replace other states' domestic regimes? Figure 1.1 suggests otherwise.[2]

The figure depicts the frequency by decade of uses of force by one state to alter or preserve the domestic regime of another state over the past



Figure 1.1 Foreign impositions of domestic institutions, 1510–2010

five hundred years. By regime I mean not simply a state's government or rulers but, following David Easton and his colleagues, its "institutions, operational rules of the game, and ideologies (goals, preferred rules, and preferred arrangements among political institutions)."[3] Some of these were what I call ex ante promotions, in which the chief object was regime promotion. Others were what I call ex post promotions, in which the initial attack was for other reasons—typically to gain strategic assets in wartime—and then, following conquest, the occupying military imposed a regime on the occupied state. Some cases are difficult to classify as exclusively ex ante or ex post. The total number of cases is 209; tables listing each promotion are below. Figure 1.1 represents raw numbers and does not control for the number of states in the international system. It also treats the estates of the Holy Roman Empire as states (see chapter 4), which affects the numbers prior to the empire's abolition in 1806. It tallies only uses of force for the purpose of altering or preserving a domestic regime; it ignores other means of promotion such as economic inducements, threats, covert action, and diplomacy. The target of regime promotion must be allowed to remain (nominally) a state; I do not include conquests that incorporate targets into empires.

Over the centuries, states have forcibly promoted domestic regimes in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Depending upon time and place, they have promoted established Catholicism, Lutheranism, and

Calvinism; absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, and republicanism; communism, fascism, and liberal democracy; and secularism and Islamism. As I discuss below and throughout this book, cases of forcible regime promotion tend to cluster in time and space. The temporal and spatial patterns in the data tell us much about why states practice this particular policy. But the initial point is simply that forcible regime promotion is common enough that we can call it a normal tool of statecraft. Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, which appear later in this chapter, list each case.

President Bush faced a second set of critics, who took a less tragic view of world politics. His more liberal or idealist opponents insisted that Bush was in fact a cold and disingenuous realist. The rhetoric about freedom and tyranny masked the familiar self-aggrandizement of the American empire. The United States was replaying the old Anglo-Russian Great Game in Afghanistan and making a play in Iraq for Persian Gulf oil and the subordination of Iran. Democratization was a cover for domination.

But even if it is the case that the administration was acting out of pure self-interest in Iraq or Afghanistan, does it follow that Bush and his advisers did not care whether these countries ended up with democratic or constitutional regimes? If not, they certainly went to great lengths to continue the charade. It would have been much more efficient to set up new, more pliable dictators in place of the old ones. Figure 1.1 suggests that there have been scores of cases in which governments made calculations similar to those of Bush, spending dear resources to change a target state's regime and not simply its leadership. In fact, as I make clear in the chapters that follow, governments or rulers who use force to promote an ideology abroad nearly always believe it is in their interests to do so. They believe that they are shaping their foreign or domestic environment, or both, in their favor. Furthermore, although it is an open question whether the Bush administration was correct regarding Iraq, history shows that governments who try to impose regimes on other countries are usually right, at least in the short term. Conditions sometimes arise under which it is rational for a government to use force to change or preserve another country's domestic regime; when an intervention succeeds, the government that did the promotion is better off, the country it governs more secure.

We have here, then, something much larger than the Bush Doctrine or the war on terror or an attempt to democratize the Muslim world. We have regularity, a historically common state practice, which is surprisingly under-studied. It is a highly consequential practice, for it involves the use of force. It entails violations of sovereignty, a building block of the modern international system.[4] It is not a trivial practice or an afterthought, but a costly policy—costly not simply in its use of the promoting state's resources but in the way it can exacerbate international conflicts.

Indeed, as will become evident, forcible regime promotion can be a self-multiplying phenomenon, making great-power relations more violent and dangerous. A Habsburg invasion of Bohemia in 1618 to suppress a Protestant uprising spiraled into the Thirty Years' War. In 1830, an Anglo-French intervention on behalf of the liberal Belgian revolt alienated Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and raised the prospect of great-power war. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to shore up a communist regime caused the thawing Cold War to return to a deep freeze. Forcible regime promotion can create all manner of problems in world politics even as it mitigates short-term difficulties. On the other hand, foreign regime imposition can yield benefits to the states that practice it by helping them entrench their hegemony.[5] It can also produce periods of stable relations among great powers, as in the decades following 1648, 1815, and 1945.[6] So how do we explain this regularity? What causes forcible regime promotion?

Governments tend to impose regimes in regions of the world where there is already deep disagreement as to the best form of government. They also tend to do it in moments when elites across societies in the target's region are sharply dividing along ideological lines, a condition I call *transnational ideological polarization*. Ideological polarization means that elites temporarily have unusually strong preferences for either ideology A or competing ideology B and strong preferences for aligning with states that exemplify their favored ideology. Such polarization can present governments with either or both of two incentives to use force to promote regimes. The first is what I call *external security* or a government's desire to alter or maintain the international balance of power in its favor. When elites across states are highly polarized by ideology, a government of a great power can make a target state into an ally, or keep it as one, by promoting the right ideology. The great-power ruler may also have a rival that exemplifies the competing ideology and has a parallel incentive to promote that ideology in the target; in such cases, each great power has an incentive to pre-empt the other by promoting its ideology.

The second incentive I call *internal security*, or a government's desire to strengthen its power at home. Internal security is at play when transnational ideological polarization reaches into the great power itself and jeopardizes the government's hold on power by rousing opposition to its regime. Precisely because the threat is transnational, the government can degrade it by attacking it abroad as well as at home. By suppressing an enemy ideology abroad, it can remove a source of moral and perhaps material support for enemy ideologues at home. It can make domestic ideological foes look disloyal or unpatriotic if they oppose this use of force. It can halt or reverse any impression elites may have that the enemy ideology has transnational momentum.

By no means has transnational ideological polarization been a constant feature of the past half-millennium; at many times elites cared relatively little about regime loyalties or ideologies. What triggers polarization, and hence forcible regime promotions, is either of two types of event. The first is *regime instability* in one or more states in the region. By regime instability I mean a sharp increase in the probability that one regime will be replaced by another via revolution, coup d'état, legitimate government succession, or other means; or a fresh regime change that has yet to be consolidated. Regime instability triggers transnational ideological polarization via demonstration effects, or the increasing plausibility among elites that other countries could follow suit by likewise undergoing regime instability. The second type of triggering event is a *great-power war*. A great-power war may have little to do initially with ideology, but if the belligerents exemplify competing regime types then their fighting will be seen by elites across societies as implicating the larger ideological struggle, and those elites will tend to polarize over ideology. Many of the promotions in figure 1.1 were triggered by regime instability; many others, mostly captured by the tall bars, tend to come during and after great-power wars.

The transnational nature of ideological polarization is crucial: elites across countries segregate simultaneously, and in reaction to one another, over ideology. Furthermore, they tend to polarize over a set of two or three ideologies that is fixed for many decades. Indeed, figure 1.1 depicts three long waves of forcible regime promotion, and these roughly correspond to three long transnational contests over the best regime. The first wave took place in Central and Western Europe between the 1520s and early eighteenth century, and pitted established Catholicism against various forms of established Protestantism. The second took place in Europe and the Americas between the 1770s and late nineteenth century; the regimes in question were republicanism, constitutional monarchy, and absolute monarchy. The third took place over most of the world between the late 1910s and 1980s, and the antagonists were communism, liberalism, and (until 1945) fascism. Today, a fourth struggle runs through the Muslim world, a struggle pitting secularism against various forms of Islamism. It is that struggle that helped pull the Bush administration into using force in Iraq and Afghanistan. But figure 1.1 also shows historical gaps, when no such contest over the best regime cut across states. During those gaps states used force regularly, but not to impose regimes on other states.

That forcible regime promotion occurs in such patterns—long waves over many decades, followed by long gaps—and that within each long wave the regimes being promoted are within the same fixed set, requires that we push the explanation further, to a macro-level of analysis. What explains these long waves of promotion? I argue that during each of these long waves a social structure was in place in the regions in question that heavily conditioned the preferences and actions of elites, including rulers of states. That structure was the transnational regime contest itself. Elites held a general understanding that there was such a contest stretching across their region, that it was consequential, and that at some point they might have to choose sides. It was not simply that some states had one regime and others had another, for that is typical in world politics. What made a contest was the existence across states of networks of elites who wanted to spread one regime and roll others back. These I call *transnational ideological networks* or TINs, and they were one type of agent who perpetuated the structure. Another type of agent was the rulers who ordered forcible regime promotion, because such promotion continued to energize the TINs and keep alive the general notion that there was an ongoing contest across the region over the best regime. Structure and agents were endogenous: the structure helped cause the agents to bring about forcible regime promotion, and promotion by those agents helped perpetuate the structure.

If these social structures are so consequential, but come and go (however slowly), then we must push the explanation even further: Why do these transnational regime contests arise when and where they do? Why do they persist as long as they do? Why do they fade away when they do? To complete my arguments I offer an evolutionary model analogous to Thomas Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions. A transnational contest over the best regime emerges in a region when the region's predominant regime type is beset with an accumulation of serious anomalies, but sufficient numbers of elites still adhere to it. Reformers and status quo advocates spiral into hostility and a state adopts a new regime. Over the course of a contest still other new regime types may emerge and capture states. The contest endures as long as no one regime is manifestly superior to its competitors. When one or more contending regimes encounters sufficient serious anomalies, however, elites will abandon it and affiliate with the surviving regime. This model is "ecological," appealing to the social and material environments of governments and other agents. Although ideologies can go on for some time shaping the environment, eventually exogenous material and social factors push back.

In sum, I advance arguments on a micro-level of analysis, concerning individual regime promotions, and a macro-level, concerning the transnational social structure that makes those promotions more likely. As I discuss in chapters 7 and 8, my arguments have a great deal to say about ongoing American promotions of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the 1920s, the Muslim world—particularly in Southwest Asia and North Africa—has been going through a transnational struggle over the best regime. The antagonists are various forms of Islamism, which insists that positive law derive directly from divine law or *Shariah*, and various forms of secularism. Like the other ideological contests, this one is complex. But it does implicate the foreign alignments of Muslim states, with Islamist networks tending toward extreme anti-Americanism. The Islamism-secularism contest is by no means responsible for America's heavy presence in the Middle East—oil and Israel are the two most obvious factors—but it did help cause the two regime promotions that are the most costly aspects of that presence. One of the most grievous mistakes of the Bush administration was to think that the United States could somehow transcend the Muslims' ideological contest. Americans have found themselves regarded, at least by Islamists, as entrants into that contest, co-belligerents with the secularist enemy. The United States is not ending the struggle, but helping perpetuate it.

This book, then, is not simply about regime change. It is about grand contests over the best regime that cut across entire regions. It is, in effect, an alternative history of the past five centuries of international relations. I do not offer a teleological story in which humanity is being pulled in a particular direction. But I do claim that international history, viewed through this lens, exhibits some clear macro-patterns. A region is dominated for decades by a single regime type. Eventually that type enters a crisis and faces one or more competitors, and a long struggle ensues in the region over the best regime. That struggle both helps cause, and is sustained by, forcible regime promotion. One regime type emerges as manifestly superior, and the struggle ends with the domination of that regime. Eventually the pattern is repeated. The events that trigger these patterns are themselves unpredictable, but once a trigger is squeezed the results are, broadly speaking, predictable. Following Jon Elster, I aim at mechanistic rather than at covering-law explanation. I cannot provide a complete list of necessary and sufficient conditions for forcible regime promotion; the world is too fraught with contingency for that. I do argue that promotion tends to happen when certain conditions are present.[7]

My arguments do not explain all of the cases in figure 1.1. A number of forcible regime promotions by the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean in the first third of the twentieth century had little or nothing to do with transnational ideological movements. I discuss these briefly in chapter 6. The vast majority of cases, however, are susceptible to my arguments.

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This book is the first to consider forcible regime promotion as a general international relations phenomenon. But I am certainly not the first to have argued that states fight over ideas or that those ideas have changed over time. Martin Wight observed that the past half millennium of international history could be divided into normal and revolutionary periods, with the revolutionary periods roughly corresponding to my three long waves in figure 1.1.[8] Raymond Aron contrasted homogeneous and heterogeneous international systems along similar criteria.[9] K. J. Holsti has mapped out the changes in issues over which states have fought over the past several centuries.[10] David Skidmore and his colleagues have published pathbreaking work on the importance of "contested social orders" in international relations.[11] Mark N. Katz has illumined the dynamics of revolutionary waves across societies.[12] J. H. Leurdijk has given exhaustive treatment to forcible intervention and its purposes, including the promotion of political systems.[13] And many scholars, from Richard Rosecrance[14] and George Liska[15] a generation ago to Stephen Walt,[16] Mark Haas,[17] Gregory Gause,[18] and others more recently, have written on the systematic effects of ideology on threat perception and conflict. As will be clear in chapters 2 and 3, I also borrow and build upon theoretical tools that others have fashioned, including analysis of agent-structure endogeneity, of transnational networks, and of positive feedback and path-dependence.

For all of these debts and syntheses, my arguments about forcible regime promotion do contradict various international relations theories at significant points. I emphasize two—one concerning realism and the other concerning constructivism. Realism, I argue, cannot give good reasons why states should impose regimes on other states; in fact it gives good reasons why they should not do so. Realism abstracts from states' domestic properties, apart from their military power (which is always relative). That is because realists insist that domestic properties, including regime type, have no systematic, generalizable effects on international relations. Thus, when states incur expected costs by using force to alter other states' regimes, they are doing something beyond the predictive power of realism. For some versions of realism, forcible regime promotion is anomalous. For others, it should only happen to the extent that states are externally secure and have the luxury of indulging domestic constituencies that want to export the regime.[19] Thus, it is no accident that the United States promoted democracy in Haiti in 1994, because in 1994 U.S. security was high and the country could afford to spend resources in that sort of way.

The trouble is that, as I explicate further below, forcible regime promotion tends to happen more when international security is scarce, as in hot or cold war, rather than when it is plentiful. The U.S.-Haiti case is unusual; more typical are promotions and counter-promotions by states seeking to increase their security and extend their power. Indeed, I limit my dependent variable to uses of force on sovereign states (see this book's appendix for coding rules) in part because those are anomalous for at least certain versions of realism. States use cheaper, less lethal methods to promote regimes abroad, and of course imperial powers often try to alter the political institutions of the lands they colonize, but realists are less concerned with these cheaper activities. My arguments in chapter 2 and case studies in chapters 4 through 7 explicate my differences with realism. I certainly agree that rulers seek to gain, hold, and extend their states' power; but I maintain that the ways they pursue power are constrained by ideas and the transnational networks that carry them.

My argument may be taken to be constructivist in its emphasis on the structural properties of ideological contests, but it takes issue with a strong strand within constructivism I call social-interactionist. Social interactionism takes the view that social structures, while powerful, are usually susceptible to change by creative agents. No constructivist is so naïve as to think that any agent at any time and place can change long-established mind-sets and practices. But many scholars in that school of thought argue for fairly general and common conditions for structural change. My own argument is what Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro call "ecological," laying out relatively rare and stringent conditions for structural change.[20] The point is not merely academic, for as I argue in chapter 8, social interactionism implies policies toward ideological adversaries, such as radical Islamists, that are at odds with my own. No doubt norms in some social realms may change without ecological changes, but I argue that transnational contests over the best regime are not among their number.

This book thus falls squarely within the large category of recent international relations scholarship insisting that "ideas matter." As several scholars recently have observed, few dispute that ideas "matter," in part because "matter" is such an imprecise verb. But disagreements endure over whether ideas are causal (external to actors) or constitutive (part of who actors are), and, if causal, which ones under what conditions. I treat ideas as causal, as structures that heavily condition actors' options, but as consequences as well of large, dimly understood social and material changes. In contrast to most constructivist work, which emphasizes "good" or "progressive" or "emancipatory" ideas—the ideas that modern liberal analysts like—I focus on all manner of political ideas, including many that exclude persons and groups. I am answering the call some constructivists have issued to study the effects of ideas decidedly alien to any liberal or social-democratic notion of shared human purpose or progress.[21] Indeed, it is clear that even ideas that are presented by their advocates as progressive and inclusive are taken by their foes to be hegemonic and exclusive. All of these ideas are vital to an explanation of crucial aspects of international politics. If scholars are truly to take ideas seriously, they must include ideas of which they disapprove, and recognize that those of which they do approve are not necessarily as universal as they think.[22]

Patterns in the Data

Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 list the universe of cases of forcible regime promotion since 1500 in the Western states system, which became global in the twentieth century. (See this book's appendix for criteria of inclusion.) A number of significant patterns emerge from the data.

Forcible Regime Promotion Is Common

The most obvious fact is that forcible regime promotion is a fairly common practice of statecraft in the modern international system. In each case at least one state used force in order to alter or preserve another's domestic regime, either by direct invasion or by occupying the target state following victory in a war. Cases in which multiple states intervened on the same side are counted once; cases in which two or more states intervened on opposite sides are counted as two cases. It is worth noting that forcible regime promotions have been common in times and places that I do not cover in this book. Thucydides describes cases in Greece in the fifth century B.C. During the Corcyræan civil war, the Athenians intervened on behalf of the commoners, the Spartans on behalf of the oligarchs.[23] In medieval Italy, the Guelphs promoted commercial republicanism, the Ghibellines oligarchy, often in one another's cities.[24]

Three Waves, Three Ideological Struggles

Forcible regime promotion has been especially common in three long periods: between 1520 and 1650, 1770 and 1850, and 1917 and the present day. Non-forcible regime promotion, which is more difficult to trace over the centuries, has probably been even more common. During the Cold War, for example, the Americans and Soviets commonly used economic incentives and subversion to alter foreign states' regimes; these attempts do not appear in the data. These three long periods are generally regarded as ideologically charged. Indeed, part of what we mean by "ideologically charged" is that relatively more forcible regime promotion took place during these times.

The types of regime promoted over time have varied considerably, but in a given period the types were usually two or three. During the first wave (1520–1650), Catholic and Protestant princes struggled to establish or maintain regimes of their own type in other polities. A monarch would often send troops or ships to a polity torn by a civil war between Catholics and Protestants and fight on behalf of one side. Typical were promotions by Elizabeth I of England on behalf of Protestantism in Scotland (1559–60), France (1562–63, 1585, and 1590–91), and the Netherlands

Table 1.1
Forcible Regime Promotion, 1510–1700

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?**	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
1	Hesse		x	x	Mainz & Würzburg		1528	
2	Hesse et al.		x	x	Württemberg		1534	
3	Hesse, Saxony, et al.		x	x	Münster	x	1535	
4	Hesse, Saxony, et al.		x	x	Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel		1542	
5	HRE et al.	x	x	x	Lutheran estates		1546	
6	France	x		x	Scotland	x	1559–60	
7	England		x	x	Scotland	x	1559–60	x
8	England		x	x	France	x	1562–63	
9	Palatinate		x	x	France	x	1568	
10	France,	x	x		Netherlands	x	1572	
	England,		x	x				
	Scotland,			x				
	Nassau		x	x				
11	Palatinate		x	x	France	x	1576	
12	Palatinate		x	x	Netherlands	x	1578	
13	Spain,	x		x	Ireland	x	1578–80	
	Papal States			x	(England)			
14	HRE	x	x	x	Aachen	x	1581	
15	Spain,	x	x	x	Cologne	x	1583–89	
	Bavaria			x				
16	Palatinate,		x	x	Cologne	x	1583-89	x
	Netherlands			x				
17	England		x	x	France	x	1585	
18	Palatinate		x	x	France	x	1587	
19	Spain	x	x	x	England		1588	
20	Spain	x	x	x	France	x	1589–98	x
21	England	x	x	x	Netherlands	x	1585–1611	

Table 1.1 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?**	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
22	England	x	x	x	France	x	1590–91	
23	HRE	x		x	Aachen		1598	
24	HRE	x	x	x	Transylvania		1604–6	
25	HRE, Bavaria	x	x	x	Donauwörth	x	1606–10	
26	Passau/Strassburg			x	Cleves-Jülich		1609–10	
27	Nassau,			x	Cleves-Jülich		1609–10	x
	England,	x		x				
	France	x						
28	Prot. Union		x	x	Strassburg		1609	
29	Cath. League		x	x	Strassburg		1610	x
30	HRE	x	x	x	Transylvania		1611–13	
31	Netherlands		x		France	x	1616	
32	Spain, Bavaria	x		x	Bohemia, Moravia	x	1618–22	
33	Prot. Union		x	x	Bohemia, Moravia	x	1618–22	x
34	Transylvania		x	x	Habsburg Hungary	x	1619	x
35	Poland		x	x	Habsburg Hungary	x	1619	x
36	Transylvania		x	x	Lower Austria	x	1620	
37	HRE	x	x	x	Upper Austria	x	1620	
38	HRE	x	x	x	Palatinate		1623	
39	Cath. Lg.		x	x	Upper Austria		1620–25	x
40	Cath. Lg.		x	x	Upper Palatinate		1621	x
41	Spain,	x		x	Valtellina	x	1620–26	
	HRE,	x		x				
	Genoa			x				
42	Gray Leagues,		x	x	Valtellina	x	1621	x
	Bern, Zürich,			x				
	Venice							
43	Baden		x	x	Lower Palatinate		1622	x
44	Spain	x	x	x	Jülich		1622	

Table 1.1 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?**	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
45	Transylvania		x	x	Habsburg Hungary		1623	
46	Spain	x	x	x	Netherlands		1624–29	
47	Denmark			x	Lower Saxony		1625–29	
48	England	x		x	Palatinate		1625	x
49	France	x		x	Valtellina		1624–25	x
50	Transylvania		x	x	Moravia		1626	
51	Bavaria		x	x	Moravia		1626	x
52	Spain	x	x	x	France	x	1627	
53	England	x	x	x	France	x	1627–29	x
54	France	x	x	x	England		1627–29	
55	HRE	x	x	x	Lübeck		1629	
56	HRE	x	x	x	Ratzeburg	x	1629	
57	HRE	x	x	x	Schwerin	x	1629	
58	HRE	x	x	x	Mecklenburg		1629	
59	HRE	x	x	x	Brandenburg		1629	
60	HRE	x	x	x	Magdeburg		1629	
61	HRE	x	x	x	Halberstadt		1629	x
62	HRE	x	x	x	Verden		1629	
63	HRE	x	x	x	Bremen		1629	
64	HRE	x	x	x	Merseburg		1629	
65	HRE	x	x	x	Naumburg		1629	
66	HRE	x	x	x	Meissen		1629	
67	HRE	x	x	x	Minden		1629	
68	Sweden	x		x	Magdeburg		1630	x
69	Cath. Lg.		x	x	Saxony		1630	
70	Sweden	x		x	Frankfurt		1631	
71	Sweden	x		x	Mainz		1631	
72	Saxony		x	x	Habsburg lands		1631	
73	Sweden	x		x	Bavaria		1633	
74	HRE,	x		x	Württemberg		1634–38	
	Bavaria		x	x				

Table 1.1 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?**	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
75	France	x		x	Valtellina		1635	x
76	Sweden	x		x	Habsburg lands		1639–45	
77	Transylvania		x	x	Habsburg lands		1644–45	
78	HRE	x	x	x	Transylvania		1644–45	
79	France	x		x	Netherlands		1672–78	

* During the Thirty Years' War, central Europe experienced general war; cases only count here if violence was clearly used to promote a regime.

Habsburg lands denotes areas directly ruled by the Habsburgs.

The Catholic League and Protestant Union each comprised various German princes.

HRE refers to the troops of the Holy Roman Emperor.

Netherlands refers to the United Provinces, the Protestant state independent of Habsburg rule as of 1572.

Sources: Ronald Asch, *The Thirty Years' War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe* (New York: Macmillan, 1997); Karl Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World-Empire*, trans. C. V. Wedgwood (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939); Claus-Peter Clasen, *The Palatinate in European History 1555–1618* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469–1716* (London: Penguin, 2002); Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, vol. 1, *The Reformation* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965); Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Evan Luard, *War in International Society* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986); David Maland, *Europe at War 1600–1650* (London: Macmillan, 1980); Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); idem, ed., *The Thirty Years' War,* 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1997); D. H. Pennington, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1989); N. M. Sutherland, *Princes, Politics, and Religion, 1574–1589* (London: Hambledon, 1984); R. B. Wernham, *Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485–1588* (New York: Norton, 1966).

(1572–1603); and by Philip II of Spain on behalf of Catholicism in Cologne (1583–89), England (1588), and France (1589–94).

During the second wave (1770–1850), governments imposed republican (non-monarchical), constitutional-monarchical, and absolute-monarchical regimes. In the 1790s, French governments forcibly installed republican regimes in a number of small neighbors. Napoleon (r. 1799–1815) tried to impose his particular type of bureaucratic-rational institutions, and at various times his enemies tried to reverse his promotions. In 1814–15, the victorious anti-French coalition reestablished monarchy in France. In the following three decades, the typical international intervention consisted of an absolute monarchy (Austrian, Russian, Prussian, and sometimes French) invading a weaker state in Germany, Italy, or Iberia and defeating or overturning a republican or constitutional revolution. In

TABLE 1.2
Forcible Regime Promotion, 1701–1879

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?*	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
1	France	x	x	x	England	x	1702	
2	Prussia	x	x	x	Austria		1740	
3	Russia	x	x		Poland	x	1768	
4	France, Turkey	x x			Poland	x	1768	x
5	France	x			United States	x	1778	
6	France, Sardinia, Bern	x	x x		Geneva	x	1782	
7	Prussia	x		x	Netherlands	x	1787	
8	Prussia	x			Liège	x	1790	
9	Russia, Prussia	x	x	x	Poland	x	1792-93	
10	France	x		x	Austria		1792-97	
11	France	x		x	Prussia		1792-97	
12	France	x	x	x	Britain		1793-97	
13	Britain	x		x	Corsica	x	1794	
14	France	x	x	x	Netherlands		1795	
15	France	x	x	x	Bologna, etc.	x	1796	
16	France	x		x	Lombardy, etc.		1797	
17	France	x	x	x	Genoa		1797	
18	France	x		x	Rome		1798	
19	France	x	x	x	Switzerland		1798	
20	France	x		x	Naples		1798	
21	Britain	x		x	Naples		1799	x
22	France	x		x	Tuscany		1801	
23	France	x		x	Cisalpine Rep.		1803	
24	France	x	x	x	Helvetic Rep.		1803	
25	France	x	x	x	Italian Rep.		1804	
26	France	x	x	x	NW Germany		1804	
27	France	x	x	x	Lucca		1805	
28	France	x		x	Tyrol		1805	
29	France	x	x	x	Spain		1806	

Table 1.2 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?*	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
30	France	x	x	x	Batavian Rep.		1806	
31	France	x	x	x	Neuchâtel		1806	
32	France	x	x	x	Württemberg		1806	
33	France	x	x	x	Baden		1806	
34	France	x		x	Bavaria		1806	
35	France	x		x	Frankfurt		1806	
36	France	x	x	x	Naples		1806	
37	France	x	x	x	Nassau		1806	
38	France	x		x	Hesse-Cassel,		1807	
				x	Brunswick, et al.			
39	France	x		x	Poland		1807	
40	Britain	x		x	Sicily		1811	
41	Austria,	x		x	France		1814	
	Prussia,	x		x				
	Russia,	x		x				
	Britain	x	x	x				
42	Austria,	x	x		Switzerland		1815	x
	Prussia,							
	Russia,							
	Britain							
43	Austria	x		x	Naples	x	1821	
44	Austria	x	x	x	Piedmont	x	1821	
45	France	x	x	x	Spain	x	1823	
46	Britain	x		x	Portugal	x	1826	
47	Spain	x		x	Portugal	x	1826	
48	Austria	x	x	x	Modena	x	1831	
49	Austria	x	x	x	Parma	x	1831	
50	Austria	x	x	x	Papal States	x	1831-32	
51	Britain,	x		x	Spain	x	1833-39	
	France	x	x	x				
52	Britain,			x	Portugal	x	1834	
	Spain	x	x	x				

TABLE 1.2 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?*	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
53	Britain,	x		x	Portugal	x	1846-47	
	Spain		x	x				
54	France,	x		x	Papal States	x	1849	
	Austria,	x	x	x				
	Two Sicilies,		x	x				
	Spain			x				
55	Prussia	x	x	x	Saxony	x	1849	
56	Austria	x		x	Tuscany	x	1849	
57	Prussia	x		x	Bavaria	x	1849	
58	Prussia	x		x	Baden	x	1849	
59	Russia	x	x	x	Transylvania	x	1849	
60	Austria	x		x	Sardinia	x	1859	
61	France	x		x	Mexico		1862-67	

Sources: Jeremy Black, *Eighteenth-Century Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); T.C.W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars* (New York: Arnold, 1996); Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon 1799–1815* (London: Arnold, 1996); idem, *Europe after Napoleon: Revolution, Reaction and Romanticism, 1814–1848* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Charles J. Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon* (London: Longman, 1995); George Childs Kohn, *Dictionary of Wars*, rev. ed. (New York: Facts on File, 1999); J. H. Leurdijk, *Intervention in International Politics* (Leeuwarden, The Netherlands: B.V. Eisma, 1986); Evan Luard, *War in International Society* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986); R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America 1760–1800*, vol. 2, *The Struggle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).

a few cases, however, constitutional monarchies—usually Britain, sometimes joined by France during its constitutional periods—used force to promote their regime and block the spread of absolutism.

During the third wave (1919–today), governments forcibly exported liberal democracy, communism, or fascism. The wave began when various allies from the First World War tried to overturn Bolshevism in Russia; there quickly followed Soviet attempts to spread Bolshevism to neighboring Finland, Poland, and Iran. In the 1930s, Spain was a target for the Italian, German, and Soviet governments. The aftermath of the Second World War saw a cascade of forcible promotions by the governments of both superpowers on weaker states in Europe and Asia. In subsequent decades, the Soviets intervened on several occasions to uphold commu-

Table 1.3
Forcible Regime Promotion, 1880–Present

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?*	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
1	U.S.	x	x	x	Cuba	x	1899-1901	
2	U.S.	x	x	x	Cuba		1899	
3	U.S.	x	x		Cuba	x	1906	
4	Britain,	x		x	Albania	x	1912	
	Russia,	x						
	Germany,	x		x				
	France,	x						
	Austria-Hungary,	x	x	x				
	Italy		x	x				
5	U.S.	x	x	x	Mexico	x	1914	
6	U.S.	x	x	x	Haiti	x	1915	
7	U.S.	x	x	x	Dom. Rep.	x	1916	
8	U.S.	x	x	x	Cuba	x	1917	
9	U.S.S.R.		x	x	Finland	x	1918	
10	Germany	x	x	x	Finland	x	1918	x
11	Britain,	x		x	U.S.S.R.	x	1918	
	U.S.,	x		x				
	France,	x		x				
	Japan,	x	x					
	Italy			x				
12	France,	x	x	x	Hungary	x	1919	
	Romania			x				
13	U.S.S.R.		x	x	Poland		1920	
14	U.S.S.R		x	x	Iran	x	1920	
15	Germany,	x		x	Spain	x	1936	
	Italy			x				
16	U.S.S.R.				Spain	x	1936	x
17	Germany	x	x	x	Slovakia		1939	
18	Germany	x	x	x	France (Vichy)		1940	

Table 1.3 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?*	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
19	Germany	x	x	x	Croatia		1941	
20	U.S., Britain	x		x	Italy		1943	
21	Britain	x		x	Greece	x	1944	x
22	U.S.,	x		x	France		1944	x
	Britain,		x	x				
	Canada			x				
23	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Bulgaria	x	1944	
24	U.S.,	x	x	x	W. Germany		1944	
	Britain	x		x				
25	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Poland		1944	
26	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Romania		1944	
27	U.S.S.R.	x		x	Albania		1944	
28	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	E. Germany		1945	
29	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Yugoslavia	x	1945	x
30	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Czechoslo.		1945	
31	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Hungary		1945	
32	U.S.	x		x	Japan		1945	
33	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Iran	x	1945	
34	U.S.	x			South Korea		1945	
35	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	North Korea		1945	
36	North Korea		x	x	China		1947	
37	U.S. et al.	x			South Korea		1950	
38	China,		x	x	South Korea		1950	x
	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x			1950	
39	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	E. Germany	x	1953	
40	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Hungary	x	1956	
41	U.S.	x			Lebanon	x	1958	
42	Britain			x	Jordan	x	1958	
43	Egypt		x	x	North Yemen	x	1962	
44	N. Vietnam		x	x	Laos	x	1964	
45	U.S.,				Laos	x	1964	x
	Thailand		x					

Table 1.3 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?*	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
46	France	x			Gabon	x	1964	
47	U.S.,	x			S. Vietnam	x	1965	x
	S. Korea,			x				
	Thailand,		x	x				
	Philippines,		x	x				
	Australia,							
	New Zealand							
48	U.S.	x	x		Dom. Rep.	x	1965	
49	U.S.S.R,	x	x	x	Czechoslo.	x	1968	
	Poland,		x	x				
	Hungary,		x	x				
	Bulgaria,		x	x				
	E. Germany		x	x				
50	South Yemen		x	x	Oman	x	1968	
51	Britain,	x			Oman	x	1968	x
	Iran,							
	Jordan							
52	N. Vietnam		x		Cambodia	x	1970	
53	U.S.,	x			Cambodia	x	1970	x
	S. Vietnam		x					
54	Cuba			x	Angola	x	1975	
55	South Africa		x		Angola	x	1975	x
56	Israel		x		Lebanon	x	1975	
57	Syria		x		Lebanon	x	1976	
58	Vietnam		x	x	Cambodia	x	1978	
59	Tanzania		x	x	Uganda		1979	
60	U.S.S.R.	x	x	x	Afghanistan	x	1979	
61	Iraq		x	x	Iran		1980	
62	Iran		x	x	Iraq		1980	
63	U.S. & Jamaica	x	x	x	Grenada	x	1983	
64	U.S.	x		x	Panama	x	1989	

TABLE 1.3 *(continued)*

Case	*Promoter*	*Great Power?*	*Close Neighbor?*	*Promoter's institutions?*	*Target(s)*	*Target unrest?*	*Year(s)*	*Counter-Promotion?*
65	U.S. et al.	x			Somalia	x	1993	
66	U.S.	x	x	x	Haiti	x	1994	
67	Nigeria		x		Sierra Leone	x	1997	
68	U.S. et al.	x		x	Afghanistan	x	2001	
69	U.S. et al.	x		x	Iraq		2003	

Sources: George Childs Kohn, *Dictionary of Wars*, rev. ed. (New York: Facts on File, 1999); Raphaël Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944); J. H. Leurdijk, *Intervention in International Politics* (Leeuwarden, The Netherlands: B.V. Eisma, 1986); Evan Luard, *War in International Society* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986); Martin McCauley, *The Khrushchev Era, 1953–1964* (New York: Longman, 1995); On War Internet site, http://www.onwar.com/; Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

nist regimes. Both superpowers also extended the practice to the Third World. The leaders of weaker states, often at the behest of a superpower, also promoted domestic regimes by force; most striking is perhaps Cuban intervention in far-away Angola. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, American governments have continued to promote liberal-democratic regimes by force.

Whose Regime Type?

In most cases interveners promoted their own institutions.[25] In the first wave, Catholic rulers generally sought to establish Catholicism, Protestant rulers Protestantism. France was officially Catholic, but under the Edict of Nantes (in effect from 1598 to 1685) it tolerated Protestants; in Valtellina, its rulers promoted toleration.[26] In the seventeenth century, absolute monarchies occasionally promoted their institutions against oligarchy and republicanism; then France's republican government imposed republicanism upon small border states, and the monarchies at war with France tried to reestablish monarchy there. Napoleon imposed his hybrid Bonapartist regime on conquered states. From the 1820s through 1849, absolute monarchs imposed their institutions in Italy and Germany, while the constitutional monarchies of Britain and France promoted their system. In the twentieth century, communist, fascist, and liberal-democratic governments typically promoted their own institutions.

Exceptions do occur, however. French monarchs intervened on behalf of the Lutheran Germans and Calvinist Dutch in the late sixteenth century, and joined the Thirty Years' War on the side of the Protestants in 1635. In Liège in 1790, the King of Prussia intervened ostensibly to restore the prince-bishop, but in the event preserved the liberal revolution.[27] Louis-Napoleon of France, a secular republican (at that point), restored the papal monarchy in the Papal States in 1849 (see the case study at the beginning of chapter 5). In South Korea, South Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Laos, and Cambodia, U.S. governments forcibly promoted authoritarian institutions. (As is well known, America used various other means to support anti-communist dictators in many other states during the Cold War, a point discussed in chapter 6.)

Great-Power Promoters

Most promoters are governments of great powers, or states with significant relative military capability. Those that are not tend to govern regional powers. From 1555 through 1648, Spain was Europe's leading military power; its kings forcibly promoted institutions nine times. The kings of France, which regained its status at or near the top of Europe after its civil wars ended in 1598, forcibly promoted institutions seven times. The monarchs of England, a minor power until the late 1580s, at which time it joined the great powers, did so in nine cases. The most prolific promoter was the Holy Roman Emperor, who used troops twenty-four times to restore Catholicism in Protestant imperial estates.[28]

In the second wave, France's rulers were promoters in thirty-six of the sixty-two cases. In most years prior to 1815, France was Europe's leading power; between 1799 and 1814, when seventeen of its promotions took place, it came close to conquering Europe. Most of the remaining promotions were carried out by the rulers of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Britain, the other four great powers. Occasionally an Iberian or Italian ruler would participate in a forcible promotion as an accomplice to a great power.

In the third wave of forcible promotion (1910 to the present) also, great powers participated in a majority of the seventy-one promotions. The United States has been a great power throughout the period, and its governments promoted institutions in twenty-five cases. The leaders of the Soviet Union, a great power from 1917 until its disintegration in 1991, promoted institutions in nineteen cases. The rulers of Germany, a great power until 1945, promoted institutions in six cases. Governments of Great Britain, a great power until 1945, promoted regimes in eight cases. In contrast to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the rulers of minor states such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, and

Syria promoted institutions by themselves (although with Soviet support in the case of the first three). A related point that comes as little surprise is that promoting states tend to be much stronger militarily than targets.[29] This is especially true during the second and third waves of institutional promotion. France was the predominant intervener between 1790 and 1815, a period when it was Europe's most powerful state. During the Concert period, when the five powers were roughly equal, each promoted institutions only in states much weaker than itself. In the twentieth century, almost all promoters chose weaker targets.

Measuring power differentials during the first period is difficult, although in many cases, such as when the rulers of the Empire, Spain, France, or the confessional leagues intervened in a small German state, it is beyond doubt that promoter was more powerful than target. One strikingly determined small German promoter was the Electoral Palatinate, whose rulers in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were militantly anti-Catholic Calvinists skilled at cobbling together Protestant coalitions. In a few cases it is probable that the target had more aggregate power than the promoter, for example, when in 1562–63 England's Elizabeth I sent troops to aid the Huguenots in the French civil war. What made France weak at this time was that same civil war.

Target Instability

In at least thirty-one out of the seventy-nine cases in the first wave, intervention was preceded by an uprising, revolution, civil war, or coup d'état in the target.[30] English and French rulers intervened in Scotland in 1559 after the heavily Calvinistic lower Scottish nobility declared a Protestant kingdom.[31] Spanish and English monarchs intervened in the French and Dutch civil wars. In Donauwörth, a free town near Bavaria, the Emperor and dukes of Bavaria invaded after Catholics began rioting against the Protestant town council.[32] During the Thirty Years' War itself, targets were almost always internally divided between Catholics and Protestants, often violently so.

In the second wave in figure 1.1, twenty-eight out of the sixty-one cases were preceded by civil unrest in the targets. Strikingly, between 1815 and 1849, all twenty promotions were carried out following rebellions in the targets. In the third wave, thirty-one of the sixty-nine targets were already experiencing civil strife. Early in the twentieth century, targets in Latin America and Europe were all torn by domestic wars or insurrections. During the Cold War, the Soviets invaded East Germany following an insurrection there. In most Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American cases, targets were undergoing civil wars, often exacerbated and encouraged by outside financial and logistical support.

By no means did all forcible institutional promotions follow high civil unrest in the target. In the tallest spike in promotion, the Habsburg re-Catholicizations of many German states in 1629–30, the targets were mostly fairly settled Protestant states. Napoleonic France usually invaded states with no violent internal conflict. Nazi Germany's forcible promotions were similar, as were many of those of the Soviet Union and United States in the 1940s. No Iraqi unrest preceded the U.S.-led attack in 2003. The Soviets invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia after reformers peacefully began altering institutions. Even in a majority of these cases, however, target states had a cohort of elites who desired the institutions that the intervener was promoting. The promoters did not simply march in unless some important elites wanted them there.

When Security Is Scarce

The incidence of forcible institutional promotion tends to rise steeply during periods of great-power struggle, either hot or cold wars. In figure 1.1, the three tallest spikes come in the Thirty Years' War, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the Second World War and early Cold War; in each of these, forcible institutional promotion averaged more than ten cases per decade. The middle and late Cold War featured five or more cases per decade. Periods of relative international security, such as 1815–1914, feature moderate or low amounts of forcible institutional promotion (with the exception of 1848–49). The correlation with high systemic insecurity is far from perfect. Most notably, the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when Louis XIV's bid for mastery of Europe was opposed by a coalition of states, featured very little forcible institutional promotion. No forcible regime promotion took place in the First World War until the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Clusters of forcible promotion are not identical to great-power wars.

Still, the correlation of promotion and great-power conflict raises the question of whether many of these promotions are truly puzzling. If a great power is at war and it occupies a smaller state for strategic or tactical reasons, then is it surprising that it would impose its regime on the occupied state? Setting aside the possibility that regime promotion or ideological conflict helped cause the larger war, the target is already subdued, and perhaps regime promotion is an afterthought or default policy for the occupying military. In that case, dozens of promotions in the dataset—including the dramatic spikes in the 1620s, 1790s and 1800s, and 1940s—would be epiphenomenal of power politics and should drop out of the data or be classified separately. In other words, perhaps some of the data—promotions that are triggered by domestic unrest in the target—are apples, while other—promotions that follow a wartime occupation—are oranges, and the oranges are easily subsumed under a realist explanation.

The distinction is significant, and I recognize it by noting in chapters 4 through 7 which cases are ex ante (following domestic unrest) and which ex post (following a wartime occupation). But it is wrong to assume that wartime or postwar regime promotions are costless or epiphenomenal. Any option concerning post-occupation order in a conquered or liberated state bears opportunity costs. Hence we see much variation across history in how occupying powers handle the regime question. Machiavelli, who knew something about conquest and state power, lays out three options for a prince who occupies a city or principality: ruin it; live there personally; or "let them live by their own laws" while "taking tribute from them and creating within them an oligarchic state which keeps them friendly to you." Machiavelli does not even consider foreign regime promotion except oligarchy, and that not for any ideological purpose.[33] So the assertion that promoting one's own regime is a default policy or an afterthought encounters trouble from a founding father of realism. Forcible regime promotion is not an uninteresting artifact of great-power conflict; it is costly and begs for an explanation.

Why do states not always pursue one of Machiavelli's three options, and instead promote their own regime or a regime opposed to their ideological enemies? The Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II in the 1620s, the French Directory and Napoleon in the 1790s and 1800s, the Americans and Soviets in the 1940s: all could have simply let the states they occupied retain their own regimes. The same is true for the Bush and Obama administrations in Iraq and Afghanistan: why do these U.S. leaders not simply assume that these states have learned their lesson, let Iraqis and Afghans work out their own regimes, and strike bargains with those regimes? In each case, the occupying government must judge that the benefits from spending resources in imposing a regime outweigh the costs. At the time of this writing, at least, the Obama administration judges that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would be bad enough to justify the expenditure of still more American blood and treasure; Afghanistan must have a new regime. We must inquire, then, into the variables that enter these cost-benefit calculations. I argue that in each case the rulers of the occupier judged that their own security, internal or external or both, was at stake.

In Their Own Backyards

In the first wave, sixty-four out of the seventy-nine promotions were in states either bordering the promoter or across a narrow body of water from it; in the second wave, thirty-six out of sixty-one; in the third, fifty-nine out of sixty-nine. In the first wave the King of Sweden promoted Protestantism in German lands across the Baltic Sea. In all three waves English or British monarchs promoted institutions in France; in the first and third, in the Low Countries as well. The United States has done a majority of its promotions in the Caribbean and Central America.

Distant promotions are relatively rare. In the first wave they include kings of England and Spain in the Palatinate in 1620 and 1621 and the Swedish king's promotions in southern Germany in the 1630s. In the second wave they include French and Turkish rulers in Poland in 1768–72; the King of Prussia in the Low Countries in the late 1780s; the monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in France, and vice versa, through most of the 1790–1814 period; the British government in Naples in 1799; France's Napoleon in Poland in 1807; the British government again in Sicily in 1811, and in Portugal in 1826, 1834, and 1846–47; and Napoleon III of France in Mexico 1862–67. In the third wave, distant promotions include the Allied governments in Russia in 1918–-22; the French in Hungary in 1919; the Germans and the Soviets in Spain in 1936–39; Britain in Greece in 1944–45; the various American promotions of liberal democracy in Europe and Japan after the Second World War; U.S. promotion of anti-communist authoritarianism in South Korea, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; France in Gabon in 1964; Britain in Oman in 1968–75; Cuba in Angola during 1975–91; the United States and others in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

Strategic Targets

Across time, many targets stand out as having geopolitical consequence. Some targets contained or bordered vital military, naval, or trading routes. Valtellina, a valley of the Adda River in Lombardy (now in Italy) that was a target several times during the Thirty Years' War, was of consequence to Spain, France, and the Emperor because it provided an east-west pass through the Alps. Britain and France intervened in Spain in the Concert period, as did Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union in the late 1930s; Spain's significance to Mediterranean naval traffic is obvious. Territories also gain strategic importance from their natural resources. A number of twentieth-century promotions were carried out in the oil-rich Middle East. One should recall too that the strategic importance variable has an endogeneity problem: state B may acquire strategic importance for state A when A's rival state C treats B as if it already has such importance.[34] Thus, the aggregate data may not capture the strategic importance of



Figure 1.2 A stylized long wave

many targets. Of course, the strong association between the propinquity of two states and the probability that one will promote institutions in the other may also be attributed to strategic interest.

Toward an Explanation

These patterns suggest a number of things. Governments, it seems, care about the ideologies or regimes of other states, sometimes enough to use force and risk wider war; but they only do so under some conditions. They are more likely to do so when insecure, in territory of strategic significance, when the expected costs are relatively low, and often in reaction to rivals' actions. That they tend to do so in clusters in time and space suggests that sometimes, far from being socialized out of the practice, states find the practice fruitful and worth repeating and imitating. The evidence of five centuries makes it difficult to maintain that rulers who spread ideologies are simply irrational or possessed by ideological zeal. We seem to have a phenomenon in which ideas and material power interact.

Another conclusion warranted by figure 1.1 is that foreign regime promotion occurs in micro- and macro-cycles. On the macro-level it occurs in three long waves. On the micro-level, within each wave its incidence varies. Figure 1.2 is a stylized depiction of these two types of cycle, a long wave that contains several short waves.

The solid curve represents the actual (stylized) frequency of forcible regime promotion. The dotted curve is a rough average of the height of the solid curve and represents a long wave. The two curves are obviously related—the dotted is a simple function of the solid—but because they occupy different levels of analysis, I shall give them separate analytical treatment. Chapter 2 concerns the micro-level, the changes in slope in the solid curve. Chapter 3 concerns the macro-level, the changes in slope in the dotted curve.

As the summary of my arguments earlier in this chapter suggested, both curves take their shapes in part because of *feedback loops* connecting agents and their environments. Forcible regime promotion is sometimes self-perpetuating, and so is the absence of such promotion. Sociologists have long trafficked in arguments about feedback loops and path dependency. More recently, economists and political scientists have come to use them. The essential insight is that the social outcomes or equilibria are not always optimal, even taking into account agents' coordination problems. Instead, actions taken at time t can restrict the options available at time t+1, resulting in a suboptimal equilibrium. What actors did in the past constrains what actors can do now.[35] On the micro-level (the solid curve), transnational ideological polarization is an example of a feedback loop at work: elites adhering to one ideology find that they must coalesce more tightly in response to the tighter coalescence of elites adhering to a rival ideology. A feedback loop also connects forcible regime promotion with the very transnational ideological polarization that causes it: promotion exacerbates polarization, making more promotion more likely. On the macro-level (the dotted curve), a transnational ideological struggle both causes and is caused by the agitations of ideological networks and governments that impose regimes abroad. On both levels I pay a great deal of attention to exogenous events that can trigger these action-reaction cycles.

Plan of the Book

In chapters 2 and 3, then, I explicate my arguments about the causes of forcible regime promotion. In chapter 4 I examine the period between 1510 and 1700 in Europe. For most of these years, the struggle between Catholicism and various forms of Protestantism was prominent. The contest emerged when the medieval political system, a complex overlapping set of political loyalties that granted a great deal of power to the Papacy and Catholic clergy, began to encounter a series of serious anomalies in northern Europe. With the emergence of Lutheran regimes in Germany in the mid-1520s there began many decades of on-again, off-again forcible regime promotion as transnational networks labored to spread their regimes and princes were implicated in the struggle. In the 1540s emerged Calvinism, a more militant type of Protestantism. The ideological contest had its miserable zenith in the Thirty Years' War. The struggle over the best regime finally faded in the latter half of the seventeenth century as it became clear that a new type of regime, religious toleration—practiced to great profit by the Dutch Republic—was superior to an intolerant Catholic or Protestant one. Princes gradually ceased to fear the advance of a rival form of Christianity. Neither peace nor religious skepticism came to Europe, but religion ceased to be a *casus belli.*

Chapter 5 treats the years between 1700 and 1900 in Europe and the Americas. Although England (Great Britain after 1707) was a constitutional monarchy, and the Netherlands remained a nominal republic, the predominant regime was absolute monarchy as exemplified by Louis XIV. “Enlightened Absolutism” began encountering serious anomalies in the middle of the century, as it seemed to impoverish its subjects and bankrupt the state. A constitutionalist movement gained momentum, and then republicanism emerged as a contending regime as well when the United States and then France adopted it. Regime instability, particularly in France, gave rulers powerful incentives at various times to march troops abroad to spread their regime type. Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1814–15, republican and constitutionalist networks remained in Europe and triggered several waves of revolution and regime promotion. The spectacular revolutions of 1848 disrupted the decades-old regime contest by raising the specter of a more radical, socialist republicanism. By the 1870s, elites in most European great powers had negotiated new regimes that were, broadly speaking, reformist conservative, and for several decades almost no forcible regime promotion took place.

In chapter 6, I examine the twentieth-century struggles over individual, class, and state. The predominant reforming conservative regime that took hold in the 1870s was increasingly beset by anomalies in the eyes of the increasingly important labor organizations. The 1917 revolution in Russia produced the world’s first communist state, and a small wave of forcible regime promotion ensued. Within a few years fascism, an anti-Bolshevik, anti-constitutionalist regime, had taken over Italy. Communist and fascist transnational networks threaded through much of the world, with Nazi Germany becoming the fascist exemplar by the mid-1930s; Spain soon became a site of dueling promotions. The vanquishing of fascism in 1945 left communism and liberal democracy, and both the Soviets and the Americans carried out many forcible regime promotions in nearly every part of the world. The long contest over the best regime ended in the late 1980s, as communism had clearly proven unable to compete with liberal democracy.

Chapter 7 examines the contemporary struggle within the Muslim world—particularly in North Africa and Southwest Asia—between Islamism and secularism. In the early twentieth century the manifest decline of the Ottoman Empire, generally seen as the caliphate or empire established by the Prophet Muhammad, had produced a legitimacy crisis.

Elites in Turkey began to reject traditional Islamic institutions in favor of secular Western ones, and following the trauma of the First World War the caliphate was abolished and the Turkish Republic was established. The Turkish example inspired Iran in the 1920s; in the early 1950s secularism took hold in much of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia emerged as the exemplar of traditional Islam, which evolved into a more assertive ideology of Islamism; the Iranian Revolution of 1979 established that country as an Islamist rival to the Saudi monarchy. Forcible regime promotions have taken place in Lebanon, North Yemen, Iran, and Iraq. A schism within Sunni Islamism between pro- and anti-Westerners led the latter to launch a series of terrorist attacks on the United States and other Western countries, and U.S.-led regime promotions followed.

In chapter 8, I offer conclusions from these cases and my arguments. I contend that my arguments are more consistent with the cases than are key claims of realism and of certain varieties of constructivism. I follow with implications for the general study of international relations. I discuss emerging ideological struggles in Latin America and the republics of the former Soviet Union. I close by returning to the struggle within Islam and how it might end.