

## CHAPTER ONE

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### Replacement and Replication

A miniature love story frames the discovery that a certain Boutades, a Sikyonian potter at Corinth, once made: he manufactured the first portrait image on behalf of his daughter, “who was in love with a young man; and she, when he was going abroad, drew in outline on the wall the shadow of his face thrown by a lamp. Her father, having pressed clay onto this, made a relief that he hardened by exposing it to fire along with the rest of his pottery” (Pliny *HN* 35.151).

Although doubtless fictional, the anecdote poses perhaps the most critical question that an ancient image asked of its viewers: should they perceive the manufactured object as a replacement for the missing original, or could it do no more than reproduce the model’s external appearance? Read one way, the terracotta functions as a substitute for the departing lover, and so belongs together with the many statues in Greek myth and history that serve as re-presentations of the absent and the dead, standing in for the lost party and maintaining communication between those separated by time and space. The efficacy of these kinds of images, I suggest, depends on a particular construction of the bond between the subject and the figurine, a bond that need not rest on any visible mimetic likeness, but on a notion of substitution, equivalence, or sympathy. In Pliny’s tale, the beloved and his image do not so much resemble one another as exist in a relation of metonymy, both formal and more loosely defined; here the face of the youth stands proxy for his entire person, but any portion of his person, any object associated with or belonging to him, could do as well.<sup>1</sup> The part assumed by the shadow in the episode confirms that contiguity, not similarity, plays the leading role; not an exact visible replica of the body, the *umbra* none-

<sup>1</sup> Here I borrow from the categories explored particularly in Jakobson 1987a: 95–114. As he argues, all linguistic operations are determined by two models, one based on similarity (the metaphoric way), the other on contiguity (the metonymic way). He then briefly re-evokes these terms in his discussion of statues (1987b: 318–67). Brillante (1988: 21) also applies these terms to his discussion of Greek images but focuses only on the metonymic bond. For someone deeply rooted in such metonymic modes of thought, the figurative representation can literally supplant the original; in the case of aphasics affected with “selection deficiency” (an inability to perform acts of linguistic selection and substitution), discussed by Jakobson (1987a: 102), the presentation of a picture of an object actually causes the suppression of its name.

4 × Replacement and Replication

theless forms an intimate, though separable, element of the subject's identity.<sup>2</sup>

But within Pliny's story lies a second, and potentially less positive, account of the nature and function of images. The tale belongs to an exploration of the origins of *similitudines*, and Pliny caps the anecdote with a discussion of the properly historical Lysistratos of Sikyon (brother of Lysippos), who distinguished himself by creating more accurate and less idealizing representations of his models than his predecessors (35.153). An emphasis on exact imitation transforms the role of the plaque and grounds its consoling powers in its capacity to furnish a portrait likeness, a "photograph," which reminds the maiden of the distant youth. Where contiguity and metonymy determined the link between the original and the representation that worked as a replacement device, now similarity and metaphor supply the necessary adhesives. The terracotta mimics the beloved, and the closer the visible resemblance, the more successful the antidote to Boutades' daughter's grief.

United in this episode, the two facets of the image show how their coexistence within a single object need not preclude a deep antinomy. If the representation can summon up the beloved through contiguity, then the shadow's role in generating the terracotta does nothing to impair its efficacy. According to the many uses to which a man's shadow may be put, it not only forms a part of himself, but also can serve as one of the most decisive expressions of his vitality:<sup>3</sup> very much in the manner of the image, it, too, supplies a substitute or replacement for a missing party, and holds out to lovers a means of assuaging their longing for an absent object of desire.<sup>4</sup> But if the figurine claims to offer a mirror likeness of its living subject, then Boutades' choice to work after the *umbra* introduces an unwanted breach between the original and the copy.<sup>5</sup> The portrait now stands as a flawed imitation, an image of an image, a *faux-semblant* at two removes from the reality it claims to depict. Sharpening the distinctions between statues as metonymic and metaphoric accounts is the second defect the representation harbors. Boutades' daughter captures no more than the outlines of the lover (*lineis circumscrisit*), and the potter fills the mold he makes with an interior of clay. The portrait image based on resemblance fails to house the inner essence of the sub-

<sup>2</sup> On ancient views of the shadow as contiguous with but distinct from the individual, see Bettini 1992: 53–58.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: 53–54.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*: 56–57; see particularly Ar. *Nub.* 973–76. Brillante (1988: 26 and n. 6) observes the same function for footprints or other traces.

<sup>5</sup> The term *umbra* is probably a translation from the Greek *skia* (Schweitzer [1932] 1963 includes the passage among those that he believes Pliny took over from Xenocrates). On the parallel ambiguity of the term *skia* in the Greek tradition, see Rouveret 1989: 20.

ject, just as a shadow traces only the contours of the body. A variant on the story introduces yet another reason for the vacuity of the final *typus*: even as Boutades' daughter takes the likeness, her beloved sleeps, his vital spirit absent from the body.<sup>6</sup>

Greek philosophers and rhetoricians of the late classical and post-classical period would develop terms for the two modes of viewing that this “first” portrait image puts into play. Where the depiction is perceived as linked to its source by virtue of an intrinsic property, where it shares with the signified an essential and enduring quality, it provides an *eikōn*, a stepping stone pointing to the original that gives the viewer access to a hidden or absent reality. To the realm of *eidōla*, imperfect, even deceptive versions of the truth, belong figures that depend on a purely visible resemblance, that limit themselves to external contours.<sup>7</sup> But for the statues that populate the archaic and early classical sources, these polarizations fail to capture the scenarios that the texts describe. Whether authors cite real-world images familiar to their audiences or imagine fabulous creations that come from the hands of divine and legendary artisans, the figures they envision cohabit or oscillate between the “eiconic” and “eidolic” realms. The image's relation to the original turns out to combine both metonymy and metaphor, and the manufactured work proves so handy a vehicle for poets, philosophers, and dramatists to work with precisely because it hosts the multiple and shifting positions that all representations—phantoms, words, an actor on the stage among them—occupy vis-à-vis the originals for which they stand in. That contemporary statue-makers fashion sculptures that stimulate, address, and respond to the issues posed in the texts will be the additional suggestion that this chapter makes.

## Replacing the Absent

### *The Statue as Double*

Archaeological evidence that long predates written accounts demonstrates the role of the statue as a replacement figurine that doubles for the dead.<sup>8</sup> In a grave at Midea (modern Dendra) excavators discovered

<sup>6</sup> Athenagoras *Leg.* 17.2.

<sup>7</sup> Saïd (1987: 310) suggests that the difference is already present in the morphology of the two words; both are formed on the same root \**wei*, but only the *eidōlon* signals its origin in the sphere of the visible (it derives from the root \**weid*, which expresses the idea of seeing). Saïd and Vernant (1990b) agree on the distinction between *eikones* and *eidōla* in Platonic and later thought; their debate turns about the question of whether this distinction was already present in archaic notions of figurative and imagistic representations.

<sup>8</sup> For this, Picard 1933; see, too, the long list of examples in Schweitzer [1940] 1963: 121–29.

6 × Replacement and Replication

a Bronze Age burial chamber inhabited by two statue menhirs occupying the place of a missing corpse. A seventh-century grave in Thera, also without a human body, contained a pair of stone images interred together with the customary grave goods,<sup>9</sup> and a fifth-century “pot-burial” unearthed in Italian Lokri yielded a clay bust of a woman, again an apparent substitute for the dead’s absent body.<sup>10</sup> From the literary sources of the fifth century come several examples of characters of myth and history buried in effigy when their corpses could not be found. Herodotus records the Spartan custom of preparing an *eidolon* of a king who had died abroad in battle (and whose body presumably went missing) and of bringing the statue home for burial with due honors (6.58.3). Euripides’ Helen has a similar stratagem to propose when she asks permission to conduct funeral rites for the supposedly drowned Menelaus according to the customs of her native land.<sup>11</sup> When a puzzled Theoklymenos asks the widow how she aims to bury a mere *skia* (*Hel.* 1240), Helen replies that she will fashion a cenotaph from the garments that would normally cover the corpse (1243). Perhaps the same logic of substitution lies behind the tale preserved in later sources of the death of Alkmene: first Hermes caused her body mysteriously to disappear, and then he placed a block of stone in the chest where the corpse previously lay.<sup>12</sup>

The impetus for making a substitute for the missing person and performing his or her symbolic (re)interment may have two sources: first, the belief that the *psuchē* of the dead cannot find its rest in Hades until the body has received appropriate burial (as Patroklos explains in *Iliad* 23.70–74); and second, the need to appease an unquiet soul, angry at the circumstances of its death and its deprivation of the customary honors and rites it could properly expect (the sentiment to which Ores-

<sup>9</sup> Kurtz and Boardman 1971: 247–59; Faraone 1992: 82–83. These statues, several discussions suggest, provide the earliest known Greek examples of *kolossoi*, images whose particularized function was to re-present and stand in for an absent or dead individual (see Benveniste 1932; Picard 1933; Roux 1960; Vernant 1983). This interpretation has been disputed (Roux 1960; Ducat 1976), since several *kolossoi* cited in the sources carry no such associations. I believe (with Ducat 1976) that the practice was more generalized, and that there is no need to restrict this power only to those images described as *kolossoi*. Certainly in many instances *kolossoi* do play a marked “replacement” or doubling role, but so, as we shall see, do many other images that the sources describe as *agalmata*, *eikones*, or even *eidōla*.

<sup>10</sup> Kurtz and Boardman 1971: 259, fig. 56.

<sup>11</sup> As Benveniste (1932: 122) notes, the practice of making replicas seems to cluster in Doric areas of Greece.

<sup>12</sup> Ant. Lib. 33 (citing Pherecydes); Paus. 9.16.7. In a different scenario, Diodorus Siculus describes how, after the death of Hephaestion, lieutenant and friend of Alexander, each one of the generals offered figurines of gold and of ivory of the dead that were to be placed alongside the body (17.115.1). Cf. Hdt. 2.130.2.

tes and Electra appeal when they attempt to rouse the ghost of Agamemnon in Aeschylus's *Choephoroi*). The Spartan general Pausanias joins this group of the wrathful dead. After he perished from starvation in the temple of Athena Chalchioikos, the Delphic oracle ordered the Spartans to escape from the pollution provoked by his end by reburying the general's body at the very spot where he died, and by "giving back two *sōmata* to the Goddess in payment for one." The city responded by dedicating two bronze statues to Athena "as a replacement for Pausanias" (Thuc. 1.134–35). Later, less sober accounts of the same event suggest that the images played a cardinal role in appeasing the anger of the general: both Plutarch and the anonymous author of the *Letters of Themistocles* introduce them as a device for exorcising the ghost of Pausanias that was haunting the temple entrance and terrifying people away.<sup>13</sup>

As the examples of Pausanias and others illustrate, the creation of a doubling image can correct the disturbance that certain forms of death generate. But the dead are not the sole constituents served by these replacement figures; such objects may also grant communities permanent access to the powers that certain individuals host in both life and death. In Herodotus's account of the fate of Kleobis and Biton, the two exemplary sons no sooner lay down to sleep in a temple after performing their heroic service to their mother and the goddess Hera than they "never rose more." No mention of the bodies of the youths, nor of their burial or grave site, follows; instead, the narrator rounds off his tale by noting that "the Argives made statues of them and dedicated them at Delphi, as of two men who were best of all" (1.31.5). On a second occasion, Herodotus encounters an individual whose uncanny appearances, disappearances, and death-that-is-no-death again conclude with the raising of a statue: Aristeas, or his corpse, twice vanishes from sight, and returns a third time in the form of a *phasma* that orders that an image be set up on the shamanlike man's behalf (4.14–15).<sup>14</sup> In both narratives, the signal feats that the characters perform during their lives indicate their possession of a talismanic force that sets them outside the limits that men regularly observe. In each instance, too, Herodotus invests the statue that takes the place of the mysteriously missing body (and some form of translation is what the different stories seem to imply<sup>15</sup>) with a quasi-sacred status,<sup>16</sup> suggestive of its capacity to actualize

<sup>13</sup> For these, see pp. 10–11 and note 25 below.

<sup>14</sup> Here, as so often, we find the conjunction of statue and ghost (a point to which I shall return on several occasions).

<sup>15</sup> In later stories, the notion of mysterious translation and replacement by a statue becomes something of a leitmotif. For two examples, Ant. Lib. 13 and 40.

<sup>16</sup> Aristeas's image is set up (and the verb *hidrutai* at 4.15.4 is that regularly used for raising images of gods) at the recommendation not just of Aristeas, but also of the Delphic oracle, and it stands alongside an *agalma* of Apollo within a sacred space demarcated by

8 × Replacement and Replication

the individuals' power at the site and to make it continuously accessible to those who have erected the monument.

The motifs punctuating Herodotus's two tales find an echo and clarification in a context where images still more clearly function as replacement figurines designed to preserve the talismanic properties that their originals host. Miraculous disappearances, revenants, unlikely deaths, and outstanding feats of strength are all the stuff of the legends surrounding a series of athletic victors, most clustering in the early fifth century, who were elevated to the rank of cult heroes,<sup>17</sup> and in each instance the tale makes plain the intimate, near-symbiotic bond between the athlete and his image. Theagenes of Thasos, Olympic victor in 480 and 476, was honored with a bronze statue standing in the agora of his native city. Flogged by an enemy after the athlete's death, the statue toppled down on its assailant and, on being convicted of homicide, was thrown into the sea. Famine fell on the Thasians until, on the advice of the Delphic oracle, they recovered the statue, restored it, and worshiped Theagenes with divine honors (Paus. 6.11.6–9). The statue of one Euthykles, a Lokrian victor, suffered mutilation after its subject had been charged with betraying the interests of his city. Once again, blight and famine fell on the community, and the Lokrians were instructed by the Delphic oracle to honor the dead athlete and to offer sacrifices to his statue equivalent to those paid to the image of Zeus (Callim. fr. 85 [*dieg.* II 5] Pfeiffer). The tales of Astylos of Kroton, double victor at Olympia in 488, and of Oibotas of Dyme, the first Achaean victor at Olympia and winner of the running race in 756, confirm the very close identification between the victor and his image that these other scenarios presuppose. The anger the Krotonians felt when Astylos had himself proclaimed Syracusan (supposedly to gratify the dynast Hieron) after his further victories in 484 and 480 prompted the destruction of the athlete's statue together with the transformation of his house into a prison (Paus. 6.13.1). Oibotas, furious at being deprived of a proper *geras* for his achievement, condemned the Achaeans to defeat in all subsequent Olympic games. Only with the elevation of a statue to the athlete some three centuries after the event did the Achaeans end their long exclusion from the winners' rolls; thereafter, Pausanias reports

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bay trees. However, note that in this story, as in the tale of Kleobis and Biton, the author uses two different terms for statues of men and gods: the mother of the Argive youths prays to the *agalma* of Hera, while the images of her sons are called *eikones*; in the second instance, Aristeeas receives an *andrias* beside the *agalma* of Apollo.

<sup>17</sup> Kurke (1993: 154) persuasively argues that Herodotus presents Kleobis and Biton (called *aethlophoroi* at 1.31.2, and participants in their own kind of race) according to this athletic victor model. For these stories of athletes, Fontenrose 1968; S. Lattimore 1987; Kurke 1993. For the temporal concentration of these tales, Bohringer 1979.

(7.17.14), all would make sacrifices at the tomb of Oibotas before competing at Olympia, and victors would wreath his image standing in the Altis.

To punish or honor an individual by means of the treatment dealt out to his statue assumes the object's capacity to represent, in symbolic fashion, the absent original. Nowhere does this substitution work more powerfully than in the case of the lead, clay, and wax "voodoo" images already deployed in the curse rituals practiced in fifth-century Athens and other parts of Greece.<sup>18</sup> By binding and/or mutilating the effigy, and then placing it in a box to be buried in a grave or another site, the aggressor hoped to contain or restrain his actual victim's vital faculties. One such figure excavated from a fifth-century Athenian grave has its hands twisted behind its back, while the arms of a small lead statuette of a man found in a tomb from the Kerameikos of the early fourth century are similarly pinioned behind its back.<sup>19</sup> In other instances heads have been wrenched to one side or completely turned about, and feet twisted or bound together. The distortions do not so much seek to inflict this specific form of suffering on the victim (any more than the often crudely shaped dolls involve attempts to copy the appearance of those against whom they are deployed) as to immobilize his powers of action, speech, and thought, and so to render him impotent in those judicial, erotic, commercial, and agonistic spheres where the figurines chiefly operate.

A symbolic substitution or contiguity again determines the role of images in oath rituals in archaic and classical times. An inscription from Kyrene in Libya records how seventh-century colonists leaving for Africa from their home city of Thera would fashion images (*kolossoi*) from wax and throw them into the fire while pronouncing the prescribed formula: "May he who does not abide by this agreement, but transgresses it, melt away and dissolve like the images, himself, his seed, and his property" (*SEG* 9.3).<sup>20</sup> The efficacy of the ritual depends on the statuettes' capacity to re-present the oath-takers, and not merely to symbolize but rather to prefigure the perjurer's eventual fate.<sup>21</sup> In a par-

<sup>18</sup> Faraone (1991b: 189–90) suggests two archaic bronze figurines from Tegea may already have served this end. For detailed discussion of the phenomenon, see also Faraone 1991a; Graf 1997: 134–69.

<sup>19</sup> For these and other examples, Faraone 1991b: 190–91.

<sup>20</sup> For text, bibliography, and discussion of dating, Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 5–9, no. 5, ll. 44–49. For analysis, Gernet 1981: 170–71. For another instance of melting a figurine, Graf 1997: 165.

<sup>21</sup> As Louis Gernet (1981: 171) comments of the rite, "If the threat is not merely postponed, or if something is at once accomplished by the fire, it is because the contracting party himself is immediately brought under obligation through his 'double.'"

10 × Replacement and Replication

allel, although more mild and retroactive, form of self-consecration, Athenian archons who have committed perjury must dedicate at Delphi statues of gold, of equal height or weight to their own body (Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 55.5; Plut. *Solon* 25.3; cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 235d–e). Rather than give over their persons to the god, the officials offer substitutes, “stand-ins” for the guilty parts of themselves.<sup>22</sup>

In one final scenario, the statue’s capacity to substitute for its model allows it to counteract the powers of a different, but no less potent, kind of double. A second law from Kyrene, first discovered in the city’s Roman baths and preserved in abridged form by a fourth-century redactor, records the practice of erecting *kolossoi* as a means of ridding a householder of an unwanted *hikesios epaktos*, or visitant sent by spells, come to haunt his home.<sup>23</sup> The third provision reads:

But if he does not know his name [he shall address him], “O *anthrōpos*, whether you are a man or a woman,” and having made male and female *kolossoi* from either wood or earth he shall entertain them and set beside them a portion of everything. When you have done the customary things, take the *kolossoi* and [their] portions and deposit them in an uncultivated glen. (*SEG* 9.72.117–21)

By first appeasing and then removing the images that double for the *hikesios*, the individual effectively drives the phantom from his home. Later Greek sources confirm the use of statues in such ghost-banning rituals, most notably at Orchomenos, where the phantom of the dead Aktaion was wreaking havoc on the land. Following the injunctions of the Delphic oracle, the townspeople fashioned an *eikōn* not of Aktaion but of the ghost (*eidōlon*), and bound this to the rock where the revenant would regularly appear (Paus. 9.38.5). Pausanias’s story not only signals the “fixative” powers of the image,<sup>24</sup> which succeeds in trapping and holding the ghost, but suggests the deeper affinities between these two doubling manifestations: in a clear instance of a magical use of like to combat like, the *eidōlon* finds its match in the *eikōn*, which operates according to the same laws of contiguity. This antagonistic combination of image and ghost makes additional sense of the two bronze statues erected by the Spartans after Pausanias’s death. Not only designed to appease the general, they could additionally expel the phantom that haunted exactly the spot in the temple where the victim had died. Indeed, the later sources make the ghost-repelling role of the images quite plain: as Plutarch explains in his *Lectures on Homer*, the Spartans sum-

<sup>22</sup> See Vernant 1990a: 77.

<sup>23</sup> Here I follow the interpretation and translation suggested by Faraone (1992: 81–82) and Parker (1983: 348).

<sup>24</sup> For more on this, see chapter 3.

moned Thessalian *psychagōgoi* to rid themselves of the ghost, and the anonymous author of the *Letters of Themistocles* states still more explicitly that a revenant of Pausanias was exorcised “by means of bronze statues” (5.15).<sup>25</sup>

### *Relations between the Model and Replacement Figurine*

In his description of Pausanias’s end, Thucydides constructs the connection between the general and the images set up on his behalf in particular fashion: the Spartans dedicate the two bronze figures to Athena “in place of” or “in return for” Pausanias (*hōs anti Pausaniou*, 1.134.4). This turn of phrase, indicating that the statues not only stand in for the dead but also compensate both him and the goddess for a life taken away, returns in many other literary and epigraphic sources that affirm the meaning behind the expression; where statues act as replacement figurines, the emphasis often falls on their equivalence in function and/or value to the original, and on the restitutive or recompensary powers that this bond can put into play. As Jean-Pierre Vernant explains, the object’s capacity to instantiate not so much the physical appearance of its model as his properties and worth allows the image to assume a role within a larger and more extensive dynamic of exchange:

Without resembling him, the equivalent is capable of presenting someone, of taking his place in the game of social exchanges. It does so not by virtue of similarity with the external aspect of the person (as in a portrait), but through a sharing in “value,” a concordance in the matter of qualities tied to prestige.<sup>26</sup>

Many of the conventions and schemata that archaic and early classical statue-makers employ follow from an object’s designated role: displaying the value, status, and social connections surrounding the individual for whom it stands in, the image allows its subject and/or commissioner to negotiate and display his relations with his fellow men and with the gods.

Inscriptions on grave monuments regularly include the term *anti* to indicate that the marker not only functions as a *sēma*, a metonymic sign

<sup>25</sup> Plut. fr. 126 in schol. Eur. *Alc.* 1128; and Plut. *Mor.* 560e–f. On these texts, see Fontenrose 1978: 129–31; Faraone 1992: 83. On the parallels between the two accounts of Pausanias’s end, Burkert 1963: 48–49, esp. n. 67.

<sup>26</sup> Vernant 1990a: 75. (“Sans lui ressembler, l’équivalent est susceptible de représenter quelqu’un, de prendre sa place dans le jeu des échanges sociaux. Il le fait, non par vertu de similitude avec l’aspect extérieur de la personne (comme dans un portrait), mais par une communauté de ‘valeur,’ une concordance dans l’ordre des qualités liées au prestige.”) As Kris and Kurz ([1934] 1979: 77) have argued, a disregard for verisimilitude goes hand-in-hand with the role of the image as replacement figurine: “The ‘stronger’ the belief in the magic function of the image, in the identity of picture and depicted, the less important is the nature of that image.”

12 × Replacement and Replication

that announces the continued presence of the deceased in the world of the living,<sup>27</sup> but in some way replaces the cardinal properties that have been removed, and so variously compensates the dead, the individual mourner, and the community for the loss.<sup>28</sup> But the written message often does no more than spell out the symbolic content of the image itself, which issues its own directives for the pronouncement of certain descriptive terms and acts in the manner of a visual formula. In a particularly close coincidence between a verbal epithet and fashioned form, the father of one Kleoboulos erects a *kouros* on his son's behalf, "to stand in place of/in return for his virtue and moderation" (*ant' aretes ede saophrosunes*, *CEG* 41).<sup>29</sup> As discussions of *kouroi* regularly point out, the marble youths' physical forms supply unmistakable declarations of the very properties the description privileges, visibly displaying through their flawless physiques, upright bearing, and general air of disengagement the typically aristocratic values of *aretē* and *sophrosunē*. The generic qualities of the *kouros* further promote its ability to dictate the terms in which it should be viewed: the tenacity of the schema, the conservatism of its formal development, and the absence of any overly personalizing features all allow the statue to deliver the same culturally determined message wherever it is raised.

But a generalized assertion of aristocratic excellence does not exhaust the meaning embedded in the appearance of the *kouroi* that proliferated in sixth-century Greece. Their defining physical characteristics also bear a striking resemblance to the attributes that Homer had assigned to the heroic young men who fought in the front ranks of the Achaean and Trojan forces, also young, beautiful, and long of hair;<sup>30</sup> and legs and thighs, the locus of a warrior's speed and battle strength, receive equal prominence in both the plastic images and the poet's songs. An epitaph on a sixth-century monument to an Athenian named Kroisos (fig. 1) reiterates the visual coincidence between the epic hero and latter-day youth in verbal terms, using hexameter phrases proper to Homeric diction to lament the dead as it commemorates his service as a fighter in the vanguard where the legendary warrior also took his place: "Show pity beside the marker of dead Kroisos, whom raging Ares once destroyed in the front rank of battle" (*CEG* 27).<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> For this, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 141.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Vernant 1990a: 79–82; Ducat 1976: 243.

<sup>29</sup> For other examples of the image as a return for some particular virtue, see *CEG* 139 and 167.

<sup>30</sup> D'Onofrio 1982: 163–65; Vernant 1982. See, too, my discussion of the figures on pp. 212–16.

<sup>31</sup> Stewart (1997: 66) points out how the terms of the epitaph deliberately evoke the world of the epic hero.

To acknowledge the dead's proximity to the heroes of a bygone age is also to grant him a particular place and status in the community at large. Those who risk their lives for their polis or country by standing in the vanguard, as Sarpedon's remarks at *Iliad* 12.310–28 already make plain, and Tyrtaeus 9.23–42 affirms, are owed benefactions and honors both while they live and after their death, a conspicuous tomb among them. Not merely a statement of the martial valor of the dead, the statue presents itself as a prize justly awarded him, a recompense for his special merits and for the part that he has played in endeavors on his city's behalf.<sup>32</sup> Both the location of many *kouroi* vis-à-vis their tombs, and the accompanying inscriptions, which employ the standard expressions found on other votive objects (*katatithēmi* and *epitithēmi*), demonstrate their additional function as *gerata*, offerings of particular privilege that reflect the subject's social persona and remunerate him in both symbolic and tangible terms for effort expended.<sup>33</sup> Such self-declared gifts offer visible assertions of the continuing relationship of reciprocity between the dead, his family, and the larger community to which he belonged.

While men display their excellence in battle, marriage represents a woman's proper sphere of activity and her *telos*. The image that refigures and compensates the dead maiden or wife attempts to restore what has been taken away and to preserve the social relations that defined her in life. Most simply, an inscription from a mid-fifth-century grave stele found on Amorgos reads, "I lie here a Parian stone *anti gunaikos*" (*CEG* 153), while in more complex fashion the *korē* raised for Phrasikleia, carved in the latter half of the sixth century by Aristion of Paros, calls attention to what has been lost in death:

~ Ε ... Ε ∅° Ε . ° ° ° Ε∅ Ε ,  
 δ Ε α ι ~ Ε λ ~ ' Ε. (*CEG* 24)<sup>34</sup>

[This is/I am] the *sēma* of Phrasikleia. I shall forever be called maiden (*korē*), since in place of marriage this name is what the gods have allotted me.

Deprived of the possibility of wedlock, the girl receives by way of recompense the *geras* of perpetual maidenhood, which the statue and its

<sup>32</sup> If, as Stewart (*ibid.*: 68–70) argues for the Attic *kouroi*, the image owes its popularity to its ability to promote the standing of an aristocracy feeling the volatility and insecurity of its own position, then these declarations of the service the elite can render the community seem particularly well-pitched.

<sup>33</sup> Detailed by d'Onofrio 1982: 148–50, 162. However, note the objections that Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: 144) raises, and her reminder of the differences between the grave monument and offerings to the gods.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 7.649 for a later echo.

14 × Replacement and Replication

iconography visibly assert:<sup>35</sup> itself modeled as a virgin or *korē*, the figure also holds a lotus at its breast by way of symbol of its continued and eternally unplucked state. Like the words of the inscription, the rosettes below each breast, and the additional lotuses, alternately half-open and closed, that wreath the maiden's crown signal a blossoming into womanhood even as they affirm that this *floraison* has yet to occur. Together the different elements cohere in making the metonymic representation a visualization of the maiden in her social role,<sup>36</sup> preserving her at the very threshold of the marriage to which she could once have aspired.

Like the *kouros*, too, the image of Phrasikleia offers the viewer an enduring statement of the status and economic worth of the dead, and of the transfer of wealth that the bestowal of her person on a husband would have involved. The *korē*'s elaborate crown, her rich jewelry, and the belted peplos that she wears (featuring a meander winding around the neck and down the sleeves, and skillfully cut rosettes over the remainder of the fabric) all attest to the material resources of her family,<sup>37</sup> and her carefully bound and styled hair matches the overall elegance of the figure. The maiden's very stance demonstrates her adherence to conventions determining the behavior of a marriageable girl from the social elite: the statue gathers its skirts as it steps in a gesture that Sappho reproaches a country girl for not knowing how to perform (fr. 57 LP).

Where the funerary monument seeks to compensate the dead, the votive image aims to return something in kind to the gods who have granted, or are encouraged to grant, a desired good, and more generally promotes continuing relations of reciprocity between the divine and human parties to the exchange. The object has two chief stratagems for achieving its several ends: its visual and verbal demonstration that it is commensurate in value to what has been, or will be, received, and its visible reenactment of the original donation, which perpetually reminds the god of the favor given and might additionally persuade the recipient to behave in kind. For a votive image which stands proxy for the benefaction itself and so declares the dedicator solvent vis-à-vis the gods, ps.-Aristotle cites the statue of one Diphilos set up by his son on the Acropolis and records the inscription carved on the piece: "Anthemion, the son of Diphilos, has dedicated this statue to the gods, when from the status of *thēs* he had been raised to the status of a knight (*thētikou*

<sup>35</sup> For more on this aspect of the image, p. 238.

<sup>36</sup> Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 251; according to her argument, the *korē* as funerary monument is only raised on behalf of unmarried girls.

<sup>37</sup> Svenbro (1988: 17–18) even suggests that the dead maiden belonged to the Alkmeonid family.

*anti telous hippad' ameipsamenos*)” (Arist. [Ath. Pol.] 7.4).<sup>38</sup> The image, portraying the individual accompanied by his horse, confirms the change in social and economic standing and presents to the gods by way of thanks an object that displays exactly the rank they have given to the donor. Anthemion, of course, enjoys an additional benefit from the design he has selected; the statue also announces his status to mortal visitors to the sacred site and follows the examples of other offerings that still more patently boast the social standing of the donor.<sup>39</sup>

Other images announce themselves equivalent to some aspect of the gift bestowed, again restoring parity between the partners to the transaction. As votive object, the *korē*, exhibited in its fine clothing and rich ornaments, supplies a fitting return for economic benefits, and the accompanying inscription frequently reiterates its visual fulfillment of this role. So a potter named Nearchos dedicates a *korē* “as a tithe of his works to Athena” (CEG 193), and a fisherman celebrates an exceptionally good venture by setting up “this *korē* as a tithe of the catch that the ruler of the sea with the golden trident gave him” (CEG 266; cf. 205).<sup>40</sup> The small bronze statuette dedicated by one Mantiklos around 700 also offers the god a portion of the donor’s wealth, but does so not only to satisfy an earlier vow (as the term “tithe” probably implies),<sup>41</sup> but also in the hope of stimulating an answering, and commensurate, gift: “Mantiklos dedicated me to the far-shooting Lord of the Silver Bow, a tithe. You, Phoibos, give some pleasing favor in return” (CEG 326).

The terms of Mantiklos’s petition are carefully chosen: asking for a “pleasing return (*chari/-ettan amoib[an]*),” the figurine signals its participation in the bonds of *charis* and *chreos* that join parties to a gift exchange (cf. CEG 371). Other dedications similarly invite the gods to appreciate the gift’s beauty and worth in order to affirm their role as vehicles or catalysts for the two-way transaction. An image destined for Artemis on Paros and presented by Demokudes and Telestodike at the

<sup>38</sup> Obviously ps.-Aristotle has got something wrong here; the statue must be commemorating Anthemion, not his father. For this, see Vernant 1990a: 79–80.

<sup>39</sup> So a sixth-century inscription found in the flutings of an Ionic column from the Acropolis uses the epic *euchesthai* to make its vaunt: “Alkimachos dedicated me, this pleasing gift, as a vow to the daughter of Zeus; he boasts that he is the son of a noble father, Chairion” (CEG 195). For this, see Depew 1997: 237.

<sup>40</sup> That the fashioned *korē* is particularly suited to take on the part of object given in exchange Osborne (1994a: 92) suggests: real-world girls ripe for marriage are objects that regularly circulate among men, constructing and maintaining social and economic relations between the different parties.

<sup>41</sup> As noted by Depew 1997: 240.

end of the sixth century uses standard archaic votive diction when it describes itself as an *agalma*, an object that through its high quality and craftsmanship inspires delight in its viewer and should prompt the goddess's own reciprocal gift of *charis* (*CEG* 414); and a contemporary *boustrophēdon* inscription from Boeotia styles its gift a "beautiful thing of delight (*kalon agalma*) for Far-Darting Apollo," and then goes on to make its request for *aretē* and wealth (*CEG* 334). Just as the prayer formula regularly establishes the speaker's credentials before framing its wishes, so the image, which supplies a visible manifestation of these credentials, proclaims its fitness to petition the god.

The visual schemes adopted by many archaic and early classical votives still more immediately announce and realize these relations of give and take. Alongside the common ex-votos that take the simple form of a replica or depiction of the sacrificial animal or food brought to the god, more elaborate representations appear, showing the worshiper bringing these gifts.<sup>42</sup> Sometime around 560, one Rhonbos set up on the Athenian Acropolis an approximately life-sized marble statue featuring an individual (Rhonbos himself?) devoutly bearing his sacrificial calf to the sanctuary, and the larger-than-life ram-bearer from Thasos (c. 600) seems engaged in the same act of devotion. Whether the donor really had offered up such a animal or had only commissioned a statue depicting such a deed, the image lastingly reenacts the moment of dedication and invites both immortal and mortal viewer to appreciate the petitioner's status, wealth, and privileged relation to the god. In like fashion, many *korai* dedicated on the Athenian Acropolis carry offerings of crowns, fruits, flowers, rabbits, or birds; often holding the objects in their outwardly extended hands (and perhaps these hands would originally have pointed toward the altar),<sup>43</sup> the maidens perform a visually focalizing gesture that patently declares the act of giving. An inscription from an early archaic statue group from Samos made by one Geneleos (fig. 2) affirms that in many instances the gift-bearing *korai* were more precisely designed to stand in for their absent donors: identifying one such *korē* and her function, the extant lines read, "I am . . . oche, who has also dedicated it to Hera."<sup>44</sup>

By leaving an enduring simulacrum of his or her votive-bearing person in the sacred space, the petitioner guaranteed that the god would witness the offering on his visits to the sanctuary and, seeing and accepting the gift, enter into the desired relationship with the giver. The votive reliefs that first appeared around the end of the seventh century

<sup>42</sup> For these, Van Straten 1995 and Depew 1997: 247–52.

<sup>43</sup> For this suggestion, Depew 1997: 249.

<sup>44</sup> Richter 1968: 49–50, nos. 67 and 68, figs. 217–24.

and came to serve as more affordable alternatives to the expensive, frequently large-scale images contribute a fresh element to the scheme: by including a depiction of the god in the act of accepting the offering, they not only perpetuate the original moment of donation, but also signal the gift's successful receipt.<sup>45</sup> Whether set up to thank the deity for answering an earlier prayer or to lend tangible presence to a newly framed petition, the relief shows that contact between mortals and immortals has been established, and that the god, by virtue of attending the ritual, and even on occasion receiving the object the mortal holds out, is now obligated to respond. Perhaps the scenes depicted on the plaques possess one further dimension: parallel to the prayer whose midsection or *argumentum* aims to cajole and even compel the deity to grant the request, representations of the gods in the moment when they willingly receive the proffered gift and listen to the *euchē* accompanying the gesture seek to persuade and manipulate the divine viewer into adopting precisely this stance.<sup>46</sup>

For one final instance of a coincidence between a statue's visual configuration and its assumption of the role, social status, and divine and human relations its subject possesses, I return to the victory images cited earlier. Chiefly commemorative in intent, the statues raised in the Altis, the sacred precinct of Zeus at Olympia, seem also to have had a votive function: as many commentators note, Pausanias's use of the term *anathēmata* to describe the images sits oddly with his statement that they were among the honors bestowed on the athletes rather than dedications to Zeus (5.21.1, 5.25.1), and the bases of early victor monuments found at Olympia regularly employ the standard votive formula *anethēke* to evoke how the objects were set up.<sup>47</sup> Since, as Pindaric odes endlessly assert, the athlete owes his win as much to divine favor as to his own efforts, the deity requires a thank-offering for answering the contestant's spoken or unspoken prayers.<sup>48</sup> The earliest preserved epigram from an Olympic victory monument dating to the first half of the sixth century suggests the precise nature of the return that is owed: declaring itself "equal in height and thickness to the victor" (CEG 394), the life-sized image substitutes for the person of the athlete who haz-

<sup>45</sup> Depew 1997: 250–52.

<sup>46</sup> For the "persuasive" power of representations, see pp. 105–6.

<sup>47</sup> So the statue base of Tellon, victor in 472, and the inscription of Agiadas, victor in 488. For these, and discussion of the issue, S. Lattimore 1987: esp. 248 and 252, with full bibliography in his n. 24.

<sup>48</sup> Note that the inscriptions do not style the images thank-offerings for actual vows, but athletes regularly made sacrifices before competing and may well have accompanied them with a vow. Pindar may incorporate this element of the occasion in his repeated claims to have made a *euchē*—that has since been answered—on the victor's behalf.

18 × Replacement and Replication

arded his person in the competition, and whose triumphant emergence from the *agōn* stands testament to the tutelary presence of the god presiding over the event.

Whether set up at the site of the competition and or in the victor's native town, such a monument also tangibly embodied a different relationship of reciprocity: in its function as *geras*, the victory image gave return for the athlete's effort and financial outlay not just on his own but on his city's behalf, and supplied a marker of the community's gratitude for (and pride in) an achievement whose glory enhanced its own local and national standing.<sup>49</sup> Because the *chreos* that the city owed its native son appears embedded in the statue, the artifact becomes an obvious lightning rod when the two-way flow of goods and services suffers dislocation. In several of the tales surrounding heroized athletes, citizens angry at an athlete's failure to act as public benefactor vent their wrath on his image, sometimes mutilating the object, sometimes destroying it or expelling it from the community. The Lokrian Euthykles, whose statue was defaced, stood accused of receiving bribes to betray his city, while the Krotonian Astylos, whose statue was pulled down, had deprived his fellow citizens of their due portion of glory when he had himself proclaimed Syracusan instead of from his native town. The flogging dealt out to the image of Theagenes of Thasos, which was subsequently thrown into the sea, may have been a mark of the political divisions within the city, and of the athlete's participation in the pro-Athenian faction during his lifetime.<sup>50</sup> Only a renegotiation of the roles of both parties within the relationship through the person of the replacement image restores the broken equilibrium and guarantees that the reciprocal benefactions will resume their flow.

To look upon the victory monument was instantly to apprehend how the image embodied not just the athlete's achievement, but also this network of relations of *charis* and *chreos* binding him and his fellow citizens. Manifesting the physical excellence and beauty (external or internal) that are the *sine qua non* of triumph in the games,<sup>51</sup> the statue also regularly wears either the victor's fillet, bestowed on him immediately after the win, or the crown that he received in the concluding ceremonies; additional emphasis falls on the ribbon or wreath when the sculptor imagines his subject with his hand raised to touch the ornament, as does the Motya charioteer (fig. 3) or the copy of the lost

<sup>49</sup> The eagerness of citizens to raise victory monuments in the Altis at Olympia even long after the demise of the athlete himself suggests that the images were promoters of a city's standing, and one among several symbolic instruments used in bids for civic prestige; see discussion of the issue in chapter 5.

<sup>50</sup> For this, Bohringer 1979: 8–11.

<sup>51</sup> For a more detailed account of these dimensions, see chapter 4.

Diadoumenos of Polykleitos (fig. 4). The focus on one or other of these two literally “crowning” moments closely coheres with the function that victory images were designed to fill. If the bestowal of the ribbon or wreath signaled the individual’s acquisition of the quasi-talismanic force that legends and anecdotes assign to him,<sup>52</sup> then the reenactment of the event in plastic form visibly declares the image invested with the same status and powers, and draws attention to its capacity to represent the original as a source of beneficial power that can foster the community’s well-being.

The terms found in some of the inscriptions included on the statue bases suggest a second message issued by the visual design. Following what seems to be standard diction in the classical and postclassical period, an epigram dated to the first half of the fifth century directs the viewer to look at the Olympic victor Theognetos, “who crowned the city of good fathers” (Ebert 35 4 *Anth. Pal.* 13.15). The formula has a literal as well as metaphoric significance, alluding to the common practice whereby the victor would, on his return home, dedicate his prize at the shrine of a local god or hero,<sup>53</sup> and so symbolically share the glory he had acquired with the city at large. The image’s appearance, with its hand raised to touch the marker of the win, would denote its subject’s readiness to make the viewer participant in his *kudos* and to allow him to reap his share of the benefits accrued. The honor the citizen has granted the athlete in permitting the setting up of an image on his behalf has been duly answered by a reciprocal act of *charis* on that statue’s part.

## Replication and Its Limits

### “Seeing In”

The victory statue does not rely on iconography alone to transport the viewer back to the original crowning ceremony and its aftermath; just as the messages included on votive objects reiterate the prayers spoken on the occasion when the donor presented his gift, so the inscriptions accompanying the images closely match the words that the sacred herald delivered as the winner stood to claim his prize, and recreate the audible as well as visual milieu belonging to the bygone event. Together the several elements combine to make the subject of the monument present in the viewer’s own space (or, more properly, the viewer present in the athlete’s), eliding and even annulling the distance between the inanimate object and a living reality. But the act of “presentification,” which many of these replacement images seem so effectively to perform,

<sup>52</sup> As argued in Kurke 1993.

<sup>53</sup> For this practice, *ibid.*: 140 and n. 35.

20 × Replacement and Replication

does not exclude their possession of a second dimension: the inscriptions that designate the votive, funerary, and honorific statues *agalmata*, or cite the name of the artist and mention the occasion of their setting up, recall their character as material and aesthetic objects, the products of the craftsman’s shaping hand and a source of pleasurable viewing for mortal and divine audiences.

The double response that these artifacts invite repeats itself still more prominently in a second group of images that exist outside the ritual, ceremonial, and magical contexts drawn on so far, and whose impact, the sources suggest, depends not least on their capacity exactly to transcribe a visible reality, to act as accurate imitations of the appearances of the things they portray. First conceived in the fantasies that epic poets weave, such skillfully modeled objects possess an almost miraculous verisimilitude and semblance of life. But unlike the *eidōla* critiqued by later philosophers, these representations do not set out to mask their “factual” nature, nor do they seek to dupe their audiences by persuading them of the reality of the pictured scene; instead, they combine their ability to call an absent body or event most vividly to mind with an emphatic declaration of their own materiality and *poiēsis*, the process of manufacture that imposes itself on the spectator and actually enhances the pleasure he experiences from the work.<sup>54</sup> In the terms developed by modern critics, the viewer is prompted to see the object *in* the image, rather than the image *as* the object it represents; far from mistaking the replication for reality, he apprehends both the material and representational aspects of the account.<sup>55</sup>

The cunningly fashioned brooch that the disguised Odysseus cites in his conversation with Penelope wins the viewers’ applause:

ἴ ἄ ἄ            ο ἔ            ἔ ἴ            ^ ο            ,  
 ο    fl ἄ                            ἔ ἴ ο            ο°  
 ἄ            ο ο            ο fl            ο1    b ἄ ἄ    q fl  
    ο ο            ο°    ἴ    ο°  
    ἄ            ἄ    fl e b 1ἄ ο    α °    - ἄ            ,  
    ἴ            ο                            b                            e            ἴ            ,  
 ἄ a            ° ο ο            ἄg            ἄo                            ο. (*Od.* 19.225–31)

Godlike Odysseus wore a purple cloak of wool, double thick; but on it was fashioned a pin of gold with double clasps, with a *daidalon* in front: a hound was holding in its forepaws a dappled fawn, preying on it while it struggled.

<sup>54</sup> For this response in reference to painting, see the arguments in Neer 1995.  
<sup>55</sup> The distinction between “seeing in” and “seeing as” was first formalized in Wollheim 1980: 205–29. For its application to ancient art, Neer 1995: 124 and Stewart 1997: 43–44.

All were marveling at it, how though they were gold, the one preyed on the fawn throttling it, but the other struggled with its feet as it tried to flee.

Combined in the single piece, several kinds of image “magic” are at work. For the poet’s listeners, there is no mistaking the doubling (or “eiconic,” to use the later term) power of the brooch, which so neatly foreshadows Odysseus’s attack on the helpless suitors in the home and anticipates his address to his dogged heart after his conversation with Penelope is done. But what impresses the internal audience, whom the speaker includes in his narrative, is the seeming animation of the animals.<sup>56</sup> Dog and fawn engage in a continuing struggle, each moving and reacting to the other’s motions.

In his description of the viewers’ response, the beggar pinpoints the source of their enjoyment more minutely: juxtaposed with and punctuating the account of the “life” that the figures in the brooch seemingly possess, the object’s artistry (its character as *daidalon*) and its materiality (“how though they were gold”) emphatically appear. The “dappled” quality of the fawn spans the two dimensions: most immediately referring to the appearance of the animal’s variegated or spotted hide, it also calls attention to the quality of *poikilia*, the element of adornment and embellishment that all fine works of art should display. It is the meeting of these two facets that prompts the wonder that the audience experiences: it marvels at how a prominent and self-assertive *technē* can coexist alongside, and in no way dilute, an act of presentification, a creation of *phusis* from inanimate matter.

More famously than the ornament that the beggar cites, the shield of Achilles also astonishes, terrifies, and charms viewers with its brilliance and the vivacity of its scenes. The singer describes the forged individuals who populate its surface as living men, who dance, sing, quarrel, and exist in real time and space. Heaping on detail after detail, and replicating the events portrayed in minute form, the artist makes the fabricated figures real presences, participants in the audience’s contemporary world. But once again the description does nothing to occlude the manufactured quality of the object; instead, the poet chooses to privilege Hephaistos’s artistry by imagining the god in the act of forging and decorating the shield, and throughout his account he underscores the paradox of representations that straddle the divisions between art and life, now talking of the images as though they were alive, now calling attention to the craftsmanship involved. One of the most astonishing features of the design is the depiction of the half-mown field, the cut part distinguished (“the earth darkened behind”) from the area still to

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Vernant 1996: 391–92.

22 × Replacement and Replication

be reaped so that the harvesting appears to occur before our very eyes. But a reminder of the *technē* on which the marvel depends follows immediately as the poet signals the act of representation: the black earth is “*like to ground that has been ploughed, for all that it was gold; such was the wonder of the forging*” (*Il.* 18.548–49; emphasis added).<sup>57</sup> In a more riddling conjunction of reality and artistry, the poet makes the metal selected for the visualizations sometimes jibe with and sometimes closely approximate the material that might be used for the real-world object: golden talents are naturally figured in gold (507), vines stand out through poles of silver (563), and Hephaistos sets about his field ditch a fence of tin (565).<sup>58</sup>

In a similar manner, although with a slightly different balance between the “factual” and representational, the author of the ps.-Hesiodic *Scutum* would display the shield of Heracles as a *thauma*-inducing work (140, 224, 318) and, more obviously than the Homeric poet for whom Hephaistos’s work is still in genesis, portray the finished surface as though the audience confronted a living scene. Again movement, voice, and sound punctuate the account as the audience follows the flight of Perseus (222) and hears the sharp cries of the women on the walls (243), the marriage song (274), the gnash of Fate’s teeth (160); blood drips from the dead boars lying in the midst of their seemingly living companions, who move forward, their manes bristling, as they advance on the pack of lions drawn up against them (170–74). But once again, the poet simultaneously distances the viewer from the images, repeatedly recalling the technical aspect of the product with references to the gold, silver, tin, adamant, and other metals used in its creation, and scattering the terms *hōs* and *ikelos* throughout the description to signal the representation involved. In a particularly striking instance of the split-level response the artifact provokes, the noise that issues from the patently material surface depends on the (apparent) motion of the figures that it displays: as the Gorgons run in pursuit of Perseus “on the pale adamant, the shield rang sharp and clear with a loud clanging” (231–33).

### *Crossing the Limits*

In the representations cited so far, the poet carefully balances the images’ wonderful similitude with the no less astonishing element of

<sup>57</sup> Elsewhere the illusion is allowed to continue undisturbed, as when we witness the two lions gulping the black blood of the ox, or the dancers dancing. Other places where the poet recalls the audience to a proper sense of the manufactured nature of the shield include 539 and 574.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. 522, 598.

craftsmanship that they hold out for show. But the Homeric and Hesiodic songs are populated by another, more riddling group of artifacts, which, even as they retain their patently manufactured character, confound the two dimensions simultaneously exhibited by the brooch and shields and prohibit the kind of “seeing in” that these objects invite. In this second instance, artistic technique does not so much coexist alongside the real presences that seemingly inhabit the images as recreate or even generate life, thereby naturalizing its art and achieving a meld between *phusis* and *technē* so seamless that the viewer has no means of determining where the divisions between them might fall. From this confusion, a series of enigmas follows, concerning both the status of the representation vis-à-vis its model and the positive or negative charge that such “recreations” carry. While the act of *poiēsis* may be neutral in and of itself, the *chrēsis* or use that determines the product’s design and application often involves a deliberate treachery or deceit.<sup>59</sup>

On a number of occasions, the Homeric gods go about fabricating figures or *eidōla* so identical to their originals that the viewer must succumb to what remain no more than illusions. When Diomedes threatens Aineas’s life in *Iliad* 5, Apollo swiftly intervenes to save his protégé; removing the Trojan from harm, he fashions (*teuxe*) an *eidōlon* that is like to (*ikelos*) Aineas, wearing armor such as his (445–50) and substituting for the hero on the field of battle. In similar manner, the *eidōlon* of Iphthime modeled by Athena in *Odyssey* 4 replicates the original in her *demās* (*demās d’ ēikto gunaiki*, 796) and enjoys the powers of speech and motion that should characterize the living; only the contents of her message, and her sudden disappearance when her words are done (839), alert Penelope to the visitor’s true status.<sup>60</sup> Although they stand in for the absent, these phantoms differ from other notional and real replacement figurines on several scores: now their efficacy depends on their perfectly imitating the visible appearance of the characters for whom they act as proxy, and on their replicating the properties that seemingly indicate life. The surface resemblance linking the *eidōlon* to its prototype finds an analogue in the account that the poet supplies of how Athena disguises herself as Deiphobos to give Hector false hope in his combat with Achilles: now the goddess appears “like to” (*eikuia*) the Trojan, having taken on his *demās* and *phōnē* (*Il.* 22.227). The bond of similitude remains the same, whether it joins a crafted object to its original or an individual to the persona whose appearance he or she

<sup>59</sup> On the importance of *chrēsis* as opposed to *poiēsis*, Vernant 1983: 260–61.

<sup>60</sup> Note the contrast between the evanescence of the apparition and the solid character of the *stathmos* by which she stands (838–39).

24 × Replacement and Replication

assumes. This continuity highlights the paradox at the heart of the Homeric *eidōla*: the element of manufacture in no way dilutes their “liveliness,” but rather signals the manner in which any person or thing can undergo a process of “being made like” before appearing in a certain guise before an audience’s eyes.

A more detailed account of the seamless match between *technē* and *phusis*, and of the way in which both surface attributes and internal qualities can be generated from without, belongs to Hesiod’s two narratives of Pandora’s fabrication. When the gods turn to vivifying the object they have fashioned and adorned in the manner of a vessel, they continue to employ the same techniques (and the poet many of the same expressions, particularly the verb *tithēmi*) that they used for the still-inanimate surface; and while some of the quickening properties are placed inside Pandora’s cavity, others, and most critically the life force that is *charis*, are applied to the figure’s exterior precisely in the manner of the more tangible ornaments.<sup>61</sup> Nor does Hesiod mark any break between the terms used for the inanimate creatures decorating the crown that Pandora wears in the *Theogony* account—*daidala* also emanating *charis*, wondrous to see and “like to living beings with voice” (581–84)—and the fully vivified woman herself. Life, it seems, can also be a matter of manufacture, of qualities that the craftsman adds from without.

As the gods go about their work, Pandora not only becomes an animated object, but also acquires an autonomy that the Homeric *eidōla* lack. The independent nature of the object molded by the gods appears already in Zeus’s blueprint for the design when, at lines 62–63 of the *Works and Days*, he orders Hephaistos to fabricate a figure and to make it “like to (*eiskein*) the immortal goddesses in its face, the lovely fair form of a maiden.” The structure of the phrase contains the enigma as Zeus begins by directing Hephaistos to take a goddess for his paradigm, but then concludes by describing a very different product: Hephaistos will create no replica divinity, but a being without precedent, the archetypal lovely fair form of the first mortal maiden.<sup>62</sup> As Zeus continues to deliver his instructions, the initial correspondence between Pandora and the divine model becomes ever more remote. She will ex-

<sup>61</sup> Saintillan (1996: 320) defines *charis* as “l’ensemble des valeurs que doit réunir en elle la vie pour pouvoir être dite la plus vivante” (“the totality of attributes which life must unite in itself in order to be considered the most lively”). For more on Pandora’s ornamentation, see chapter 4.

<sup>62</sup> See West 1978: ad loc. for commentary on the syntax of the phrase. As Loraux (1993: 82 and n. 60) points out, the *parthenos* is actually an object that only comes into being with Pandora’s own genesis; when we look for an original behind the “copy,” we draw a blank.

hibit the external markers of godhood—radiance, rich clothing, dazzling ornaments—but her thievish and canine disposition (67) suggests a closer affinity with the world of beasts. When the several deities gather to build the image, the shadowy divine counterpart moves still further from the scene. If the lavish adornments recall the gleaming appearance of divinities, Hephaistos sets out to fashion the figure “like (*ikelon*) to a modest maiden” (71), the same phrase that is used in the shorter version of events at *Theogony* 572.

Even before the gods vivify their figurine, the fashioned maiden poses the question of similitude. Although a replacement insofar as Zeus conceives her as a return for the fire that has been withdrawn (*anti puros*, *Theog.* 570) and invests her with some of the same properties as the missing element, Pandora also stands as a novel creation; constituting a new category that has no original independent of herself, she cannot be classified as a replica or a simulacrum. Expressions such as *ikelos* and *eiskein* used in the account may cover a variety of relations between their two terms, including not only equivalence and similarity but also difference and autonomy.<sup>63</sup> As Daniel Saintillan and Jean-Pierre Vernant have argued, the fact of Pandora’s likeness or *mimēsis* does not define her as a faux-semblant, a secondary copy of an absent archetype, but looks more fundamentally to her place within the novel condition that her coming instaurates. Henceforth, they suggest, all mortals belong to a realm of resemblance rather than that of the immediate now made exclusive to the divine sphere: “Venir au jour, se donner à voir, *c’est toujours pour [vivant mortel] revêtir une ‘semblance’*; et cette semblance devra être en l’occurrence *la sienne propre*.”<sup>64</sup> Pandora’s manufactured quality, in addition to framing her as substitute for the article Zeus has withdrawn, looks to her participation in this post-Mekone world; as several episodes in the Homeric songs indicate, the individual who

<sup>63</sup> See Loraux (1993: 82), who remarks of *ikelos*, “The word does not always establish a link of resemblance between two objects, or a relationship of conformity between an image and its model. Instead, at times, it indicates a curious, undoubtedly pre-Platonic kind of *mimēsis*, composed of identity and participation.” In *Iliad* 5.450, *ikelos* appeared in connection with the *eidōlon* of Aeneas that Apollo forged, like to the hero in appearance, but quite independent of the original seated safely beyond the battlefield. And at *Od.* 13.156–57 Zeus suggests that Poseidon satisfy his desire to punish the Phaeacians for having ferried Odysseus home and terminate the city’s sea power by “making their ship into a rock like (*ikelos*) a swift ship near the land.” Poseidon’s subsequent petrification of the vessel follows Zeus’s advice to the letter: the stone is both like to and different from the former ship, retaining its visible form, but stripped of the capacity for motion that gives the object its defining property.

<sup>64</sup> Saintillan 1996: 343, italics in the original. (“To come into the light, to show oneself for view is always for [a living mortal] to put on an ‘appearance’; and this appearance should be under the circumstances *one’s very own*.”) Cf. Vernant 1996.

26 × Replacement and Replication

(re)assumes an identity withdrawn or diminished does so when the gods, behaving explicitly in the manner of craftsmen fashioning works of art, endow him with the properties necessary to restore him to a likeness to himself.<sup>65</sup>

In all these scenarios, art appears invested with the capacity to naturalize itself, using its technical resources to recreate and promote what gives an animate creature his or her claim to life. Because the act of craftsmanship serves as the source of the liveliness that the figures possess, these images block the split response that other works of art permit and deny the viewer the chance to practice the “seeing in” earlier described: to observe the radiance and charm applied to Pandora’s fashioned body, or to hear the words that the gods have placed inside her in the manner of her external ornaments, is simultaneously to acknowledge the fact of her vivified presence. Nor is the mode of viewing that Pandora and the *eidōla* impose presented as benign. The Achaeans on the battlefield are gulled into directing their blows at the phantom Aineas, while Hesiod explicitly identifies Pandora as a *dolos* and snare (*Theog.* 589, *Op.* 83), designed as a response to Prometheus’s earlier trick at Mekone, and a *kalon kakon* (*Theog.* 585) that answers the deceitful sacrificial bundle wittingly chosen by Zeus. In this instance, Hesiod has moved smoothly from one form of deception to another, aligning what begins as an artistic ruse with a different kind of sleight of hand: the treacherous character of the image comes to depend not on the fact of illusory imitation (Pandora is, after all, quite explicitly styled the first mortal *parthenos*), but on the object’s capacity to host a split between a surface appearance and inner reality, to assume an exterior that belies what exists below. The disjuncture that modeled goods allow is the problem to which the classical sources will return.

### Developments in Late Archaic and Classical Statuary

Pandora, the shields of Achilles and Heracles, the ornamental brooch of Odysseus, and the crafted *eidōla* dispatched by the gods have no existence beyond the imaginary worlds that the poets and myth-makers construct. But in exploring an artifact’s relation to a visible or living reality and determining how closely an image might replicate the properties of sentient things without exceeding its inanimate status, the Homeric and Hesiodic songs anticipate the experiments that sculptors of the late archaic and early classical period would undertake. Heirs to the traditions that the epic sources describe, the historical statue-makers create representations whose imitation of living bodies comes tempered

<sup>65</sup> For these instances, Vernant 1996: 384–86.