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Introduction

Three days before the 2015 UK General Election, the Labour Party found itself in hot water: It had to defend a Birmingham campaign event that featured separate seating for men and women. The rally, attended by a majority Muslim audience, was meant to shore up Labour support in Birmingham's ethnically diverse parliamentary constituencies, which are home to more than 200,000 Muslims. Instead of promoting its platform, the Party had to respond to accusations that in aggressively courting the Muslim vote it was turning its back on "a century or more of advancements for women's rights." As pictures of the segregated seating arrangements circulated through the news media, a Labour spokesman meekly countered that "Labour fully supports gender equality in all areas of society and all cultures."¹ Most of the charges were made by political opponents seizing an opening to damage the party just before polling began, but they stung for a reason: Over the last several decades, the Labour Party has made strong appeals to Muslim voters, and in its pursuit of votes it has chosen to empower patriarchal, traditional forces much more than it has promoted egalitarian, progressive voices.

What explains these outcomes? When do parties include groups that provoke opposition from core voters? And when does the inclusion of new groups cause parties to compromise fundamental ideological commitments?

These questions are highly relevant across diverse democracies. In the United States, Republicans and Democrats struggle with how to best respond to a growing Hispanic electorate. Across American cities, already fragile elec-

1. The first quote comes from Nigel Farage, former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP); Tory candidates also condemned the event and called into question Labour's commitment to gender equality (Walker 2015).

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toral coalitions between whites and blacks are being further tested as this new group enters the fray.² In Canada and Australia, both traditional immigration countries, immigrant-origin ethnic minorities remain significantly underrepresented in politics. The same is true in most European countries.³ Here, problems related to immigrants' sociopolitical incorporation have been very salient. More than 50 million residents living in Western Europe today were born abroad, and many hail from outside Europe.⁴ Immigration has transformed the continent's ethnic and religious make-up, and it has stoked fierce controversies about how to best address this new cultural diversity.

The main object of these debates has been the "Muslim Question." Europeans fret that Muslims will not integrate into domestic societies and politics. Because of their religiosity, communalism, social conservatism, and illiberalism, critics allege, Muslims are not ready to participate in the politics of advanced liberal democracies.⁵ Anti-Muslim prejudice among voters also runs high.⁶ At the same time, parties face growing electoral incentives to garner Muslim support. In many Western European countries, the largest group of naturalized citizens originates from countries where Islam is the dominant religion (see Figure 1.1), a trend that recent refugee inflows from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq will only reinforce. Muslims are thus beginning to constitute sizable portions of domestic electorates, especially at the subnational level. In Britain, 17 municipalities have Muslim populations that exceed 15 percent of the population, and in 2016 the city of London elected its first Muslim mayor.⁷ In Berlin, one in four residents has a migration background, and among this population those with Turkish roots form the largest group. In Cologne, 120,000 residents are estimated to be Muslim, while in Vienna this number stands at roughly 216,000. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Muslims make up about 12 percent of the population.⁸ In Brussels, nearly one in five residents is of Muslim faith.⁹

2. Abrajano and Hajnal (2015); Edsall (2015).

3. Bloemraad (2013).

4. These figures are from the year 2011; see OECD (2013). Here and below I define Western Europe as countries belonging to the EU-15 (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), as well as Norway, and Switzerland.

5. For discussions and counterclaims, see, for example, Cesari (2013), Joppke (2004), Klausen (2005), Modood (2009), Norton (2013), Parekh (2008), Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), and Sniderman et al. (2014).

6. See, e.g., Adida et al. (2014, 2010), Bleich (2009), Ford (2011), and Helbling (2012).

7. These figures are based on the 2011 UK census.

8. On Berlin, see Rockmann (2011); on Cologne, see von Mittelstaedt (2009); on Vienna see Aslan et al. (2014, 20); on Amsterdam and Rotterdam, see CBS (2009, 130).

9. This number refers to the Brussels Capital Region; see Fadil (2013, 100).




FIGURE 1.1. Citizenship Acquisitions in 10 Western European Countries, by prior Nationality (2001–2011)

Note: For each country, this figure shows the percentage of citizenship acquisitions by applicants' prior nationality for the three groups with the largest number of citizenship acquisitions. The selected countries are the ten West European countries that have received large-scale migrant inflows since the 1960s. *Source:* OECD (2013).

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TABLE 1.1. Muslim Political Representation in Municipalities across Countries

	Austria	Germany	Great Britain	Belgium
Muslim Parity Ratio	0.13	0.39	0.74	0.83
Muslim Population (%)	10.83	8.31	8.50	10.17
Major National Origin Groups	Turkey Bosnia- Herzegovina	Turkey Bosnia- Herzegovina	Pakistan Bangladesh	Turkey Morocco

Note: Parity ratios divide the percentage of elected local politicians who are Muslim by the percentage of Muslims in the population. Parity ratios refer to the year 2014 for Austria and Germany. For Great Britain, they cover 2002 through 2013, and for Belgium they include 2006 through 2012. Parity ratios and Muslim population shares are based on approximately 70 municipalities per country. See Appendix A for more information on how these estimates were derived.

If demography is political destiny, parties should take a keen interest in this new electorate. Yet, we observe remarkable variation. Table 1.1 displays Muslim parity ratios across municipalities in Austria, Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium. Parity ratios are measures of representation that divide the share of elected politicians who are Muslim by Muslims' share in the population (i.e., numbers below one indicate underrepresentation, those above one denote overrepresentation). In Austria, parity ratios approach zero. In Belgium, they are close to one. These differences are not driven by the relative size of the Muslim population, which is similar across countries. They are also not the result of varying nationality groups. In Austria, Germany, and Belgium, many Muslim voters have Turkish roots, for instance. In Britain and Belgium, where inclusion rates are high, Muslims have various backgrounds (see Table 1.1). Further, in all four countries Muslim integration has generated fierce controversies, and hostility towards Muslims is widespread.

In addition to differences in the extent of electoral incorporation, parties respond differently to the ideological challenges connected to Muslim inclusion. While some select Muslim candidates who are staunchly secular and egalitarian, others pursue candidates who are decidedly less so. In British cities, for instance, community elders with roots in Pakistan and Bangladesh have for years been winning elections for the major parties on the basis of patriarchal clan and kinship structures. In these contests, men often fill out the electoral registration papers and postal ballots of their wives and adult children, who remain altogether invisible in party politics.¹⁰ Comparable events transpire in the Netherlands. A Kurdish-origin candidate running for the *Islam Democraten* in The Hague explains his party's recruitment strategy: "Once we have the word of the head of the household, the rest of the family also votes

10. Sobolewska et al. (2015).

TABLE 1.2. Muslim Female Representation in Municipalities across Countries

	Austria	Germany	Great Britain	Belgium
Elected Muslims who are Women (%)	46.3	40.6	14.4	36.4
Muslim/non-Muslim Female Representation Ratio	1.37	1.20	0.43	0.94

Note: The Muslim/non-Muslim Female Representation Ratio divides the percentage of Muslim elected politicians who are female by the percentage of non-Muslim elected politicians who are female. See Table 1.1 and Appendix A for more information on how these data were derived.

for us. In our culture we do not go against the will of the *pater familias*.¹¹ The major parties have at times followed a similar playbook.

In Berlin, by contrast, political parties have been faulted for selecting Turkish-origin candidates who are too secular and too progressive to connect with the city's more pious and traditional Turkish-origin electorate.¹² Likewise, when Lale Akgün, born in Istanbul and raised in Germany, served in the Bundestag for the Social Democrats (SPD), she declared on her website that "religion is a private matter" (*Religion ist Privatsache*), even though she was the party's official "Islam representative" (*Islambeauftragte*).¹³ The SPD had adopted this radically secular slogan at the end of the nineteenth century, only to drop it in 1959 in an effort to reach out to churches and religious voters.

These differences in candidate types have implications for parties' gender balance. Controversies surrounding gender equality are central to the "Muslim Question," so we might expect that parties would be careful in balancing Muslim inclusion with gender parity. Yet, Table 1.2 shows that this is not so. It presents the gender balance among Muslim elected candidates and female representation ratios, that is, the percentage of Muslim local politicians who are female divided by the percentage of non-Muslim local politicians who are female, across countries. While parties in some countries appear to seek out female Muslim candidates, others prefer them to be male. Why?

The Argument

This book develops an argument that addresses how parties respond to changing electorates and draws out the implications of these responses for the nature of party politics. First, it explains how and when parties include new groups who are disliked by a set of existing voters and whose values and

11. Zeegers (2014).

12. Karakoyun (2011).

13. Mirbach (2008, 172–73).

preferences conflict with those of others. Second, by underscoring the trade-offs that arise when confronting such a group, I show how parties' short-run inclusion strategies undercut their ideological coherence and electoral performance in the long run.

Much of this book deals with inclusion dilemmas—the notion that efforts to reach out to new voter groups will please some and upset other members of a party's existing coalition. When deciding about the inclusion of ethnic minority groups, parties in today's advanced democracies consider the reactions of ethnocentrists who do not want to be members of multicultural coalitions and of cosmopolitans who do. The Right's core constituency contains ethnocentrists but few cosmopolitans. The Left is comprised of both, but it has become increasingly dependent on the support of cosmopolitans. Though they tend to have high incomes, cosmopolitans' liberal views on gender, sexuality, and diversity have helped bind these voters to social democratic and green parties.¹⁴ Yet, Muslim inclusion presents the Left with an added challenge: On a range of issues, the socially liberal views of cosmopolitans are incompatible with those of Muslims.¹⁵ On top of alienating ethnocentrists, including Muslims can therefore antagonize voters who typically favor inclusiveness.

This book reveals how European parties are resolving these dilemmas. I argue that the incorporation of Muslim candidates into European parties is primarily driven by votes. Only when parties—on the Left and the Right—calculate that the net vote gains from inclusion exceed losses, will they incorporate Muslim candidates and voters. Initially, when the relative size of the minority electorate is small, parties *exclude*. Even if their rhetoric is one of equality and antidiscrimination, parties will only bring in minority candidates when they believe associated vote gains to be positive.

The nomination of minority candidates will increase minority votes but also trigger defections among those who dislike diversity. It is when the former surpass the latter that parties will opt for inclusion. Once net vote gains are no longer negative, but minority votes are not yet critical, parties engage in *symbolic inclusion*: They select a small number of minority candidates that please cosmopolitans who value diversity, but that do not necessarily appeal to a large number of minority voters. Symbolic inclusion signals that the party is mindful—but not too mindful—of the minority electorate and of the need to diversify its ranks. When parties include symbolically, I contend that they not only target minority voters; their intended audience also consists of sections of the majority electorate. Parties intend to signal to cosmopolitans that they

14. On this point, see, e.g., Hellwig (2014), Inglehart (1990) Kitschelt (1994), and Kriesi et al. (2008).

15. See Koopmans (2015) and Chapter 3.

support diversity and nondiscrimination and that they promote minority integration. To do so, they select candidates who adopt values and preferences that are in line with those articulated by core voters and party platforms.

When the minority grows large enough that it outnumbers its detractors and becomes a pivotal electoral player, parties enter the next phase of minority incorporation and pursue *vote-based inclusion*: Parties privilege minority candidates who can attract sizable portions of the minority electorate. Vote-based inclusion is associated with a greater degree of representational parity; the share of minority politicians will be higher when parties include primarily on the basis of minority votes than when they include symbolically. However, when pursuing the Muslim vote, European parties, particularly those on the Left, confront sharp trade-offs: Pivotal Muslim voters, this book demonstrates, live in spatially concentrated urban enclaves, and their views on religion, sexuality, and gender roles are considerably more conservative than are those of Muslims as a whole and especially those of the Center-Left's secular, progressive base. Minority candidates who excel at mobilizing the enclave vote tend to be the most ideologically distant from the Left's cosmopolitan core. On the Right, recruiting traditional Muslim electorates can be compatible with these parties' stances on social conservatism, but it will not sit well with ethnocentrists.

Several predicaments emerge when parties go for vote-based inclusion, and they are most vexing for the Left: First, the types of candidates that maximize minority vote shares and the minority electorates that sustain electoral coalitions do not generally embrace socially liberal values and therefore undermine the Left's ideological coherence. Second, though vote-based inclusion leads to religious parity, it diminishes gender parity. Muslim candidates who can rally the co-ethnic vote are plugged into ethnoreligious networks, connected to religious institutions, and enjoy high social standing within their communities. Such candidates are almost always men. If parties do not compensate for the ensuing decline in female candidates, religious parity will come at the expense of gender parity. Third, seduced by the quick and effective delivery of ethnoreligious bloc votes, the Left misses its opportunity to build cross-ethnic, class-based coalitions and thereby contributes to its own defeat. In vote-rich Muslim enclaves where Muslims are both poor and pious, class cleavages are replaced by ethnic and kinship cleavages; economic concerns are no longer tied to partisan attachments; and left parties ultimately end up losing seats they should have captured: The ethnic vote they have cultivated is not tied to partisan labels.

The crowding-out of class opens up opportunities for the Right. Economically deprived areas that should be out of reach for fiscally conservative center-right parties are in play when minority voters prize personalistic over programmatic politics. But the Right has to tread carefully, for it, too, has a brand

to protect: Core voters who value the Right's traditional emphasis on cultural homogeneity may not feel at home in ethnically diversifying parties. In fact, the more common account is one in which the Right benefits from a diversifying Left; staying true to its ethno-cultural roots, right parties scoop up working-class voters who don't want to form leftist coalitions with minorities.¹⁶ But in races where the Right can only win with minority support it will have to decide whether ethnic homogeneity is worth electoral irrelevance.

Implications

The story I tell in this book produces several implications that cast a new light on research about electoral coalitions and minority representation.

First, my argument challenges coalition accounts that highlight the importance of ideological proximity. Three decades ago, Przeworski and Sprague noted that parties have to dilute their ideological purity when they are forced to expand their electoral coalitions. In their account, the perennial numerical minority status of the manual working-class forces socialist parties to make their platforms more palatable to middle-class voters.¹⁷ Indeed, mainstream parties usually have to balance reaching out to independent voters without disappointing loyal supporters. In most accounts, however, unattached voters are ideological centrists. In trying to appeal to these voters, parties on the Left or the Right will consequently move closer to the middle.¹⁸ The politics of Muslim inclusion, by contrast, causes parties to select candidates with social issue preferences that are considerably more conservative than those of centrist voters and that diverge severely from those of some loyal leftists. This occurs even though European Muslims as a whole prioritize leftist issues such as unemployment and social spending.¹⁹ Yet, the salience of socially conservative positions among those Muslim voters whose spatial concentration and capacity for mobilization turns them into pivotal electoral forces, pushes vote-seeking parties to include candidates and electorates who, especially in case of the Left, are ideologically most distant from one of their core support bases.

Second, by examining how this disjuncture between ideological fit and electoral incentives plays out in local races, the book forces us to rethink accounts that emphasize parties' ability to reshape national cleavages by assembling diverse coalitions. On the national stage, social democratic parties seek

16. See, e.g., Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989).

17. Przeworski and Sprague (1986).

18. See, e.g., Downs (1957) and Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012). Moreover, it is not the case that the electoral entry of religious actors necessarily moves parties away from centrist, secular positions; see Kalyvas (1996).

19. On issue priorities, see, e.g., Brouard and Tiberj (2005), Laurence (2013), Laurence and Vaisse (2006, 204), and Mirbach (2008, 223).

to marry competing interests: They court middle-class cosmopolitans by stressing commitments to social liberalism and universalism while holding on to low-income voters susceptible to ethnocentrist movements by offering redistributive policies.²⁰ Subnationally, however, parties' short-run strategic incentives collide with these goals. Inclusion decisions that are rational for local parties or individual MPs hurt the party collectively by managing to alienate both cosmopolitans *and* ethnocentrists. This development is hastened by political opponents who capitalize on their adversaries' dilemmas. For instance, a number of Conservative candidates were eager to condemn the Labour Party's sanctioning of gender-segregated seating arrangements mentioned earlier: "Labour are completely desperate. They are selling their values in exchange for a few votes," proclaimed a Conservative MP up for reelection. Competing in North West Leicestershire where the Far-Right is strong (UKIP obtained 17 percent of the vote in 2015), another Tory MP remarked, "On the one hand, Labour is preaching about feminism and equality for women, and on the other hand they are happy with a segregated audience. . . . This shows Labour talking out of both sides of its mouth—as usual."²¹

In addition to inflicting such short-run costs, inclusion strategies can also backfire in the long run as parties' incorporation of electorally influential minority voters on the basis of personalistic rather than programmatic ties creates a floating voting bloc that is not loyal to a particular party.

Third, the dynamics I explain are also difficult to square with other prominent accounts of minority electoral inclusion. Studying the incorporation of ethnic minorities in American cities, Shefter notes that the integration of new groups is also "a struggle over precisely who will assume leadership . . . extrusion of ideologically unacceptable contenders for the leadership of previously excluded groups . . . is a characteristic aspect of the process of political incorporation."²² In line with this thinking, in the recent past the national Democratic Party has had little incentive to cater to the interests of African Americans when these have conflicted with the party's pursuit of other voting blocs the party is targeting. But parties might not always have the luxury of selecting candidates and recruiting electorates that are "ideologically acceptable" to existing voters and party elites. This book underscores that the neglect

20. On social democratic strategies and voter responses in the face of multiple cleavages, see, e.g., Beramendi et al. (2015), Cronin et al. (2011), Kitschelt (1994) Kriesi et al. (2008), and Roemer et al. (2007).

21. The first quote is from Julian Smith, Conservative MP of Skipton and Ripon; the second statement was made by Tory MP Andrew Bridgen (Martin and Robinson 2015). See also Chapter 6 on this point. Across Europe, even the Far-Right has capitalized on this tension. Recognizing leftist dilemmas, far-right parties are presenting "themselves as the only true defenders of western identity and western liberties" (Polakow-Suransky 2016).

22. Shefter (1994, 197).

or exclusion of ideologically incompatible minorities typically occurs when minority electorates have few outside options. African Americans, for instance, are captured by the Left; the Right has been less interested in their vote.²³ This capture leaves blacks with relatively little leverage within the Democratic Party. By contrast, I study how parties incorporate minorities when outside options do exist. As the following chapters will make clear, European Muslim voters are not a monolithic voting bloc, and in many contexts, especially sub-nationally, no single party can take their vote for granted. This status allows pivotal group members to influence both election outcomes and parties' ideological profiles. The findings of this book therefore have implications for how the inclusion of noncaptured groups will reshape politics. Such groups include, for instance, Hispanics or Asian Americans in the American two-party system and immigrants more broadly in European multiparty systems.²⁴

Fourth, by examining the causes and consequences of different inclusion types I contribute to research on minority representation. Scholarship on the political representation of ethnic minority groups is still in its early stages, and research "on minority representation in Europe is in its infancy."²⁵ Most work that does exist tends to investigate one country, highlighting, for instance, whether and how features of the local context, such as electoral rules or minority spatial concentration, affect the chances of minorities getting into office.²⁶ I build on this work, but I also make the case that without paying attention to varying inclusion types the emphasis on election outcomes—that is, how many group members hold elected office—can't tell us much about the nature and consequences of minority political incorporation.²⁷

I demonstrate instead that different inclusion types yield different candidate types. The notion that the representation of groups can take various forms has been well articulated by Hannah Pitkin.²⁸ However, much of the empirical

23. Frymer (2010).

24. In the 2000s, less than 50 percent of Hispanics and Asian Americans identified with a party (Hajnal and Lee 2011), though more recently these groups have voted disproportionately for the Democrats. In Europe, immigrants are more likely to vote for left parties (Bird et al. 2011a), but this link is not as tight as it used to be and, moreover, even within the Left, they can generally choose among several electorally viable parties.

25. Bloemraad and Schönwälder (2013, 572).

26. See, e.g., Dancygier (2014), Dancygier et al. (2015), Michon and Vermeulen (2013), Schönwälder (2013), Togeby (2008), and Trounstein and Valdini (2008); for an exception, see Garbaye (2005), Maxwell (2012), and Ruedin (2013), and for a comparative approach, see Bird et al. (2011b). Dancygier et al. (2015) additionally investigate the effects of individual-level candidate characteristics on election outcomes.

27. See also Dunning and Nilekani (2013) on how minority candidates' links to parties explain the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in India. Celis et al. (2008) also argue for a more encompassing approach to women's representation that moves beyond the central assumption that "numbers matter."

28. Pitkin (1967).

research on minority representation fails to connect how party objectives critically shape *who* among the minority electorate gets represented and how this selection affects both the nature of minority inclusion and of party politics. I take Pitkin's insights as a starting point and clarify when minority political representation is likely to occur at all, what forms it is likely to take, and what political consequences it is likely to produce.

Finally, this book questions popular narratives that depict European Muslims as alienated from mainstream political institutions. Unable to bridge the gap between the traditional, conservative norms of their countries of origin with the modern, liberal cultures they experience in the West, European Muslims—the story goes—withdraw from majority society and institutions.²⁹ Not only do Europe's Muslims actively participate in elections, however; this book demonstrates that embeddedness in traditional ethnoreligious communities actually enhances their chances of becoming central players in subnational party politics. Moreover, parties of all stripes operating in different national contexts have recognized the usefulness of these cultural ties and ethnic linkages in the electoral sphere. The evidence I present therefore casts doubt on arguments that stress the importance of national multiculturalism policies in shaping sociopolitical incorporation.³⁰ Hard-nosed electoral calculations drive parties towards inclusion or exclusion and determine the salience of ethnoreligious electoral recruitment, no matter the policy regime (see also Chapter 4 on these points).

Empirical Approach

To explain the causes and consequences of Muslim electoral inclusion in Europe, I adopt a comparative approach. I chose countries based on the potential importance of the Muslim vote, which, in turn, will influence whether parties pursue exclusion, symbolic inclusion, or vote-based inclusion. To do so, I focus on the permissiveness of citizenship regimes and local electoral institutions. To avoid ambiguous cases, I select countries that are either permissive or restrictive on both counts.³¹ I do not aim to disentangle which of these institutions (citizenship or electoral rules) is more influential in determining incorporation outcomes. Rather, I select institutional contexts that I hypothesize should, on average, be associated with distinct inclusion goals.

29. For a discussion and critique of this view, see Gest (2011).

30. This result is consistent with Wright and Bloemraad (2012) who largely find null effects of these regimes on immigrants' sociopolitical integration.

31. Note that France is such an ambiguous case: its citizenship code is relatively liberal, but its local electoral system—e.g., at-large elections, the absence of preference votes, a semiproportional allocation of seats, and the prominence of entrenched "local barons" (Bird 2005)—tends to be difficult to penetrate for minority voters and candidates.

In Austria and Germany, comparatively restrictive citizenship regimes combine with local electoral laws that make it difficult for minorities to capitalize on their concentration or capacity for mobilization. Local elections are held in municipalities at-large according to proportional representation (PR) rules, and the impact of preference votes is rather limited.³² Preference ballots allow voters to support specific candidates within party lists, and minority groups have used them to boost the ranking of favored co-ethnics. Furthermore, non-EU citizens cannot vote or run in local elections. The potential electoral impact of the Muslim vote in Austrian and German municipalities is therefore, on average, small, and hence I predict that exclusion should be common, followed by symbolic inclusion.

In Belgium and Britain the opposite is true: Permissive citizenship legislation coexists alongside local electoral institutions that provide incentives for minority mobilization. In Belgium, elections are also held at-large and feature PR, but here preference votes can substantially improve the election chances of individual candidates. Moreover, noncitizens can vote (but not compete) in local elections. In Britain, local elections take place at the ward level according to plurality rule, providing spatially concentrated groups with electoral leverage. Noncitizen residents from Commonwealth countries are allowed to cast ballots and to stand for office. On average, then, Belgian and British municipalities are more likely to be home to electorally influential Muslim communities, which should generate greater degrees of vote-based inclusion and increased rates of representation as a result.

Though the overall size of the Muslim population is estimated to be similar across countries, its electoral significance (and the associated net vote gains that accrue due to inclusion) are not. This difference in the importance of the Muslim vote generates variation in religious parity and gender parity across countries.³³ Additionally, I show that my argument travels when we hold the national setting constant: It explains variation in inclusion outcomes across parties and municipalities within these countries. To test my claims, I gathered

32. When municipal elections are held according to PR and at-large, a party's seat share in parliament is based on its vote share in the municipality as a whole (e.g., a party that wins 20 percent of the municipal vote obtains approximately 20 percent of the seats). In at-large elections, the municipality is not divided into districts. In district-level plurality elections, by contrast, voting takes place in several districts across the municipality, and candidates with the highest number of votes within a district win seats.

33. Table 1.1 shows that Muslim population percentages are similar in my municipal sample. They are also at similar levels nationally. According to estimates of the Pew Research Center, the percentage of the population that is Muslim (in 2010) is 5.7 in Austria, 6.0 in Belgium, 5.0 percent in Germany, and 4.6 in the UK (see <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/>). According to the UK's 2011 census, 5.2 percent of those who answered the religion item identified as Muslim (in England and Wales). Statistik Austria estimates that 6.8 percent of the Austrian population was Muslim in 2012; see Aslan et al. (2014, 20).

information on the selection and election of Muslim candidates in close to 300 municipalities (approximately 70 per country; see Appendix A for more details). In Belgium and Britain (where I expect more considerable cross-municipality variation in the size of the Muslim electorate compared to Austria and Germany), I collected data on all candidates—winners and losers—which allows me to gain deeper insights into parties' selection strategies. In Belgium, I furthermore coded candidates' list rankings by religion and gender. In all, I coded the backgrounds of well over 80,000 candidates.

To establish group preferences and voting intentions I complement these election materials with several opinion surveys, and to assess parties' relevant ideological positions I developed an original coding scheme to examine how general election manifestos discuss the treatment of immigrants and Muslims.³⁴

Additionally, I rely heavily on local news coverage (both conventional print sources and online sites such as election blogs) that reports on the campaigns of minority candidates and on the actions of elected minority representatives. Wherever possible, I also consult existing case studies about minority inclusion in specific localities, though this literature still remains very small. Together, these sources provide information about candidates' style of mobilization, the electorates they seek to recruit, and their behavior once in office. In some cases, these sources also comment on the assumed motivations that drive party leaders to select particular candidate types. Party gatekeepers typically do not divulge the inner workings of their parties, and it is very difficult to get political elites to talk candidly about their inclusion motives. When researchers try to engage with party elites to open up about these matters, they can usually study only one or two cases in depth, and even then it is unclear whether strategic politicians are sincere when discussing selection aims. Though I draw on such case studies and a plethora of local news reports, I have opted for an alternative research design that allows me to test my propositions across a variety of contexts and, in doing so, to rule out competing explanations having to do with party-, city-, or country-level variables.

Moreover, focusing on subnational elections offers several advantages. First, many of the issues that are relevant to ethnic minority electorates have particular salience at the local level (e.g., accommodating religious or linguistic differences in schools or public services), and understanding differences in local representation is important as a result. Second, inclusion outcomes and their determinants vary considerably across cities within countries. This variation permits me to test my argument while controlling for national-level variables that might also influence inclusion decisions. Third, by examining

34. This project was carried out with Yotam Margalit; see Chapter 4 and Appendix C for details.

subnational elections I reduce the chances that electoral inclusion generates open citizenship regimes or electoral rules. Citizenship reforms are hammered out by national political actors, often following protracted partisan negotiations, whereas the inclusion decisions I examine are taken at the municipal level. When considering which candidates to place on the ballot and whose votes to court, municipal party gatekeepers confront a fixed institutional setting. In the long run, local inclusion dynamics may prompt national politicians to reconsider these laws (though existing research points to alternative explanations)³⁵ but in the short term subnational party leaders and office-seekers must play with the institutional cards they are dealt.

While my empirical strategy varies minority electoral clout, I hold constant the minority group in question, and most of this book addresses the political behaviors and inclusion of European Muslims. Why Muslims? First, even before the onset of the more recent refugee migration, throughout Western Europe Muslims have been the largest and fastest-growing ethnoreligious minority group, and sizable shares of first and later generation immigrants are of Muslim faith. In addition to size, a spate of highly visible events, ranging from terrorist acts to honor killings, has raised public scrutiny and skepticism of this group, and debates about immigrant integration typically revolve around Muslims. Any study that deals with minority integration in Europe must therefore take note of this population.

Second, given that I expect that varying electoral incentives affect different short-term and long-run outcomes across countries, cities, and parties, it is helpful to limit the investigation to a group who shares similar features across these contexts. More pragmatically, since we currently lack systematic cross-national or even cross-city data on ethnic-minority politicians—let alone on candidates who do not end up winning—I concentrate my data collection efforts on one group.

Focusing on a group that shares a common religion and varying national and local contexts, the book does not seek to isolate a “Muslim effect.” It instead investigates how the bundle of attributes that characterize this population—such as their social organization, settlement patterns, and political preferences—shapes their political inclusion. Through clever research designs, others have indeed presented convincing evidence of a “Muslim effect” and have documented that European Muslims do encounter increased discrimination and integration hurdles when compared to non-Muslim migrants with otherwise similar characteristics.³⁶ These findings underscore the importance of studying Europe’s Muslim residents across contexts.

35. See, e.g., Brubaker (1992), Howard (2009), and Janoski (2010).

36. Adida et al. (2015).

At the same time, I do not treat Muslims as one homogenous entity but consider how variation in Muslim preferences across and within electoral districts influences parties' incorporation strategies. Following others, I build on the idea that groups who share a common, politically salient, identity can simultaneously embrace other identities.³⁷ Like any other group, Muslims identify along a number of dimensions, including, for example, their national, regional, or kinship backgrounds. Some of these will matter significantly during elections, an issue that I address explicitly (see Chapter 5). Specifically, the small geographic scale of British electoral wards in conjunction with Muslims' spatial concentration serves to highlight the importance of identity attributes on which Muslims differ, namely tribe and kinship. These attributes are meaningful markers in the sending regions and continue to be salient in social life and electoral politics today.

Yet, a sense of belonging to other groups exists alongside an encompassing Muslim identity. Across Europe, Muslims tend to believe that Muslims in their country "have a very or fairly strong sense of Islamic identity" and, further, that this identity is growing.³⁸ Muslims' attachment to their religious identity often supersedes other attachments. In Britain, for instance, only 6 percent of Muslim respondents surveyed in 2010 stated that they thought of themselves as black or Asian first, while 60 percent prioritized their religion.³⁹ Similarly, among second-generation migrants of Turkish origin across European cities, substantial majorities stated that "Being a Muslim is an important part of myself."⁴⁰ Finally, European Muslims' faith in contexts where majorities have traditionally been Christian, and are increasingly secular, has prompted specific claims related to the accommodation of religious practice in the public sphere.⁴¹ In such a context, Islam—though hardly monolithic—is associated with the articulation of interests and policy concerns in ways that

37. For expositions on how this constructivist insight shapes ethnic politics, see Chandra (2012) and Posner (2005).

38. See Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006, 9). The survey also shows that large shares of Muslims state that they first think of themselves as Muslim rather than as a citizen of their country.

39. Thirty-four percent said they identified equally as Muslim and as black or Asian. These data are based on the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study; see EMBES (2010). Note that in Britain, the "black" label used to be commonly employed to categorize all nonwhites.

40. Concretely, the mean answers to this question (with a range of 1, "totally disagree," to 5, "totally agree") were 4.31 in Amsterdam, 4.28 in Berlin, 4.20 in Brussels, and 4.55 in Stockholm; see Fleischmann and Phalet (2012, 329). Scholars studying a diverse set of European countries have also noted that in later generations, Muslims' religious identity rises while those tied to their ancestors' country of origin tends to recede (cf. Pędziwiatr 2010, 40).

41. On the rising but not uniform accommodation of cultural and religious rights of immigrant-origin populations across Western Europe, see, e.g., Fetzter and Soper (2005), Koopmans et al. (2012), Laurence (2012), and Tatari (2010).

ethnonational identities might not be. In short, European “Muslims share strong religious beliefs, identity and policy concerns that could lead Muslim voters to support Muslim candidates.”⁴²

Additionally, even when religious beliefs or interests do not come into play explicitly, Muslim identity is nevertheless relevant in political affairs. “Muslim identity,” Sinno clarifies,

is hard to escape in the context of today’s politics. . . . Politicians who define themselves as “culturally Muslim” or even as “secular Muslim” find themselves dealing with “Muslim” issues and being considered as “Muslim” by their own political parties when they wish to emphasize their diversity, by minority constituents who feel connected to them or who do not trust them, by jealous rivals wishing to discredit them, by the media when they need “Muslim” voices, and by civil society’s organizations. . . . Even if someone from a Muslim background wishes to do so, it is not easy to escape being a “Muslim” in the West anymore.⁴³

Though this book rests on a similar premise, I also illustrate that the questions that arise with respect to the Muslim presence in Europe are neither particular to Muslims nor to Europe. Rather, the political inclusion of ethnic minorities in other democratic contexts can exhibit similar dynamics and confront parties with analogous trade-offs. The theoretical arguments I develop in Chapter 2 are formulated in a general way and can thus be tested among other groups and countries. Learning about Muslims’ electoral incorporation and its effects on the nature of political competition is therefore meant to also illuminate a more general phenomenon.

Last, when examining the consequences of inclusion, this book studies the nature of electoral campaigns, election outcomes, and the effects of inclusion on another marginalized group, female candidates. But I do not systematically examine policy effects. Rather, my goal is to show how *even without* considering policies that are enacted due to minorities obtaining elected office we observe substantial transformations in the ways in which elections are fought and won as well as in the social bases of party support. As I will suggest in the conclusion, if minority incorporation generates policies that further divide existing coalitions, this realignment will be even more dramatic. Nonetheless, identifying policy effects goes beyond the scope of this book. To credibly trace policy change back to minority representatives one has to be sure that it is indeed the presence of minority politicians—rather than other characteristics of the legislature, electorate, or the district that give rise to minority elected officials—that is doing the work. Research can exploit official regulations or

42. Fisher et al. (2015, 889).

43. Sinno (2009, 2).

natural experiments that lead to minority candidates being elected across legislatures in an as-if-random fashion. These remain rare in the European context, but present an area ripe for future study.⁴⁴

Chapter Outline

The following chapters proceed as follows. Chapter 2 develops the main arguments. I explain when and why parties will pursue exclusion, symbolic inclusion, or vote-based inclusion and discuss how each inclusion type is associated with distinct candidate and mobilization types. I also address how the distribution of minority and majority preferences will influence the kind of candidates and voters that parties will seek to recruit, and I specify how variation in partisanship, electoral geography, mobilizational capacity, and political competition affects the causes and consequences of minority inclusion.

The structure of the empirical chapters is organized around *causes* of inclusion (Chapters 3, 4, and first half of Chapter 5) before turning to the *consequences* of inclusion (second half of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Chapter 3 delineates the preference landscape that parties confront when they contemplate inclusion strategies. In essence, parties face a minority electorate whose preferences and attributes present them with an uneasy ideological fit, but whose votes can swing elections. I argue that disagreements over social values and norms between non-Muslims and Muslims are greatest where parties face the strongest inclusion pressures, namely in vote-rich neighborhoods in urban areas. Additionally, these areas are most likely to raise conflicts over economic resources, thereby intensifying inclusion dilemmas. I first review the processes that have led to this preference distribution, explaining how selection mechanisms of the migration process, available housing stock, and enclave formation have served to replicate in Europe's cities the social networks and norms that structure communal life in the sending towns and villages.

I then turn to survey data to illustrate that both sorting and polarization converge to produce a notable clash in values in these areas. Across Western Europe, sorting processes have caused more socially conservative members of Muslim communities and more socially liberal members of the non-Muslim population to reside in the same urban space. Furthermore, employing individual-level panel-data from Britain, I show that polarization is at work: Over time, non-Muslims espouse increasingly liberal views on gender roles as they become exposed to Muslim populations in their municipality. Though Muslim and non-Muslim preferences are diverse, this chapter draws on several

44. For research that is able to isolate the effects of minority representation on policy by examining variation in the implementation of quotas, see, e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Dunning and Nilekani (2013).

pieces of evidence to demonstrate that it is precisely in locations where parties will want to recruit the Muslim vote that the preference gap is at its peak.

One might presume, then, that the deck is stacked against Muslims' electoral inclusion. Preference divergence and prejudice, along with material conflicts, could come together to thwart incorporation. Chapter 4 investigates whether two countervailing forces—ideological commitments to equal treatment and the potential electoral leverage of the Muslim vote—can nevertheless lead to representational parity. To answer this question, I examine how parties' commitments to equal treatment and nondiscrimination on the one hand and the potential importance of the Muslim vote on the other correlate with inclusion outcomes across countries. Here, I draw on two original sources of data. The first source measures the salience of parties' programmatic pledges on issues related to the immigrant and Muslim presence in Europe, as expressed in manifestos. In the chapter, I focus on positions related to the equal treatment of immigrant-origin, minority populations as well as on parties' stances toward religion and Islam. The second original source consists of my datasets measuring Muslim descriptive representation across cities and parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain.

I show that across these four countries, the Left is indeed much more tightly wedded to principles of equal treatment than is the Right, but proactive rhetoric in this domain does not predict inclusiveness. Though, within countries, center-left parties are always more likely to recruit Muslim candidates than are center-right parties, this is not true across countries; parties only feature significant shares of Muslim candidates when local Muslim electorates can deliver substantial votes. Absent electoral incentives pushing towards inclusion, parity ratios remain well below one, regardless of parties' ideological commitments. In short, electoral incentives trump ideological considerations.

Chapter 4 provides a macroperspective on the causes of inclusion, but readers may be concerned that the selected countries differ in other, unmeasured characteristics that may drive these causes. Chapter 5 therefore drills down to the microlevel and studies candidate selection and election outcomes in English municipalities. It confirms that parties are primarily interested in pursuing votes and think about the ideological repercussion later. In England, ward-level elections allow us to get a sense of how the distribution of Muslim and non-Muslim preferences affects parties' calculations of the anticipated gains and losses that they associate with Muslim inclusion. Studying thousands of ward elections over time, the chapter demonstrates that these calculations significantly influence parties' inclusion decisions. Parties are less likely to put Muslim candidates on the ticket in wards where they anticipate a considerable non-Muslim backlash. However, once the size of the Muslim electorate reaches a critical threshold, inclusion chances rise substantially.

Having demonstrated that inclusion outcomes are consistent with the notion that parties are mainly motivated by a desire to win seats, I next consider the consequences of this approach for the nature of political competition. Because parties have time and again favored the efficient mobilization of ethnoreligious bloc votes over the establishment of cross-ethnic, class-based coalitions, the electoral incorporation of Muslims has transformed party politics in Muslim enclaves, leading to candidate-centered campaigns in which partisan alignments are an afterthought. As a result, election outcomes become much more volatile: Muslim voters in enclaves switch their support on the basis of ethnoreligious kinship, no matter the party label, and the Labour Party eventually ends up losing seats that it would have easily captured had it established class-based linkages with Muslim candidates and voters. Moreover, these aggregate election outcomes are replicated at the individual level: Though class is strongly related to partisan identification among Muslims overall, in urban Muslim enclaves the link between income and partisanship is much weaker.

Chapter 5 thus draws out how parties' vote-based inclusion strategies serve to undermine the class cleavage and, along with it, the electoral performance of the Left. In Chapter 6, I turn to another consequence that emerges when parties' primary concern is to maximize votes: balancing religious parity with gender parity. A salient concern, voiced across the political spectrum, is that multicultural inclusion empowers conservative male community leaders at the expense of women. Chapter 6 inquires whether electoral inclusion can produce similar outcomes. I argue that different inclusion goals should be associated with different outcomes with respect to gender and religious parity. When parties are mainly interested in symbolic inclusion, they will select Muslim candidates who can signal to non-Muslim voters that they are well-integrated and abide by the norms and values of the majority population. The simplest way for parties (and non-Muslim voters) to assess how candidates fare on this score is to look at their gender: Just by virtue of running for office, Muslim women (especially if they do not wear a headscarf) signal that they are not bound by conservative, patriarchal constraints in ways that men—even if they shared the same belief system—cannot. When parties are interested in vote-based inclusion, by contrast, they will prioritize candidates who are enmeshed in religious networks that can dispense sizable vote shares on Election Day. These candidates are predominantly male.

The consequences of these inclusion motives are substantially different gender balances across countries and municipalities. In Austria and Germany, where due to Muslims' reduced electoral strength symbolic inclusion is more common than is vote-based inclusion, parties feature a disproportionate number of Muslim women (relative to non-Muslim women). Furthermore, parties here are more likely to include female Muslim politicians than are their

counterparts in Belgium and Britain where vote-based inclusion is much more widespread. Across countries, gender parity clashes with religious parity.

To investigate these dynamics in a more fine-grained manner, I then explore variation in the representation of women and Muslims across party lists in Belgian municipalities and expose similar trade-offs. When parties seek to mobilize the Muslim vote, they systematically privilege Muslim male candidates, placing them on more attractive list positions than women, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Muslim voters, in turn, award these candidates with the highest number of preference votes. Both party and voter mechanisms therefore lead to a relative overrepresentation of Muslim male politicians, which comes at the expense of the election of female candidates overall. This trade-off between religious parity and gender parity results just as much from top-down decisions to favor men and disadvantage women as it does from bottom-up processes: Because party gatekeepers in charge of devising inclusion strategies are mainly driven by the pursuit of votes, their inclusion motives end up undermining their ideological commitments.

The concluding chapter takes a more speculative stance and considers what conditions make it more or less likely that minority political incorporation has significant impacts on intergroup relations, the identities of parties, and the electoral alignments underpinning party systems. The discussion highlights that parties' recruitment strategies can meaningfully affect majority perceptions of the minority, minority views about the political system, and minority social integration. It also emphasizes that the waning of traditional structures of mobilization—in particular the decline of trade unions—raises the relative attractiveness of minority bloc votes and associated ethnically based campaign styles. Larger, more slow-moving, political and economic forces that shape linkages between the majority electorate and political parties thus also help determine whether and in what ways minorities are brought into the party system. The chapter concludes by positing under what circumstances this incorporation will trigger electoral realignments and, in the process, generate a reordering of European party systems.