CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Making of Anchoring Groups

"CLEAR IT WITH SIDNEY." THE TIME WAS JULY 1944, A WEEK BEFORE THE Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The Sidney was Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and chairman of the Congress of Industrial Organizations' Political Action Committee. The speaker was said to be Franklin Delano Roosevelt, instructing Robert Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a St. Louis pol, to get Hillman's approval before selecting a vice presidential nominee to replace the erratic Henry Wallace. As a Republican catchphrase, the slogan aimed to show FDR in the pocket of sinister elements sympathetic to communism. Exactly what Roosevelt told Hannegan remains frustratingly out of reach; the evidence is stronger that Hillman quashed the nomination of Jimmy Byrnes, a conservative from South Carolina, than that he affirmatively approved Harry Truman.

Whatever the particulars, granting something like a veto over the year's most important political decision to the leader of a small men's clothing union, an immigrant with a thick Eastern European accent, confirmed major shifts in both the Democratic Party and the labor movement. Wallace having become unacceptable to southern conservatives, the party regulars—Hannegan and his pals in other big-city organizations—sought a candidate who would satisfy all factions, including labor. The new reality was clear. As a leftist magazine explained, "there was a deeper reason for the choice of Senator Truman: he was the only candidate on whom both the conservative pro-Roosevelt elements and the most advanced labor groups could agree."[1] For the labor movement, the moment marked a turning

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[1] A. B. Magil, "Why They Chose FDR, Truman," *New Masses*, 1 August 1944, 6.

point: the breakaway CIO had abandoned organized labor's long-standing practice and, through CIO-PAC, embraced party politics to press for broad social legislation that would benefit all workers.

"I know you can't endorse *me*. But . . . I want you to know that I endorse *you*." The date was 22 August 1980. The speaker was Ronald Reagan. The place was the National Affairs Briefing, a gathering of fifteen thousand conservative evangelicals organized by a who's who of the emergent Christian Right and its allies in the conservative movement. And the line was hardly spontaneous: James Robison, a Fort Worth televangelist who entered politics the previous year when his program had been yanked from the local station after he discussed homosexuals recruiting children, had fed it to Reagan in a meeting on the way from the airport.[2]

The National Affairs Briefing represented a major departure for white evangelicals, who had long shied away from direct engagement in party politics and from alliances that crossed sectarian boundaries. The Dallas event heralded the shift. As Robison told the crowd just before Reagan spoke, "I'm sick and tired of hearing about all of the radicals and the perverts and the liberals and the leftists and the Communists coming out of the closet. It's time for God's people to come out of the closet." Six members of Congress, Republicans all, addressed the crowd; New Right political guru, Paul Weyrich, an Eastern Rite Catholic, spoke on emulating liberals' organization; Phyllis Schlafly, also Catholic, denounced the Equal Rights Amendment; Paige Patterson, a driving force behind the conservative takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention, addressed how "The Bible Sets the Agenda"; and a Georgia judge spoke on "Scientific Creationism."[3] The Republican Party, too, had begun to shift. In the 1970s, surveys show, Republicans favored fewer restrictions on abortion than did Democrats.[4] Yet the party had begun to expand its issue agenda, emphasizing social issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and school prayer, and linking them to the embrace of traditional American values.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Each gathering marked a pivotal juncture in alliance—that is, institutionalized accommodation of mutual priorities—between what I term an

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[2]William Martin, *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America*, rev. ed. (New York: Broadway Books, 2005), 216; Allen J. Mayer, "A Tide of Born-Again Politics," *Newsweek*, 15 September 1980, 28.

[3]Howell Raines, "Reagan Backs Evangelicals in Their Political Activities," *New York Times*, 23 August 1980, 8; Box 4, Religious Roundtable file, unprocessed accretion of September 1986, Papers of Paul M. Weyrich, American Heritage Center, Laramie, Wyo.

[4]Greg D. Adams, "Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 730.

"anchoring group" and a major political party. Anchoring groups are organized actors that forego autonomous action to ally with major political parties. Inside parties, anchoring groups exercise broad influence on national politics by virtue of the money, votes, and networks that they offer to the party with which they have allied. Just as other influential actors may keep would-be anchors outside the party, anchoring groups control the entrance into the partisan coalition of new claimants. More than just a logroll, anchoring groups shape parties' long-term trajectories by enacting favored policies and shaping parties' ideological development.

This book offers a new framework for understanding party development from the Civil War to the present day, emphasizing the crucial role of social movements. Repeatedly, movements have redefined the fundamental alignments of political parties and, in turn, the organizable alternatives in national politics. The alliances between labor and the Democrats, and the Christian Right and the Republicans have defined parties' basic priorities, and exerted long-term influence away from the median voter. The two alliances' fates have proceeded in close parallel with each other. Still more important, they diverged sharply from those of major social movements that failed to find and to maintain a stable place inside political parties.

Mass movements and mass parties emerged together at the dawn of modern democracy, as means for ordinary citizens to influence the state. In the United States, these developments define the Jacksonian era; in Europe, they began in the Age of Revolution and quickened through the nineteenth century.[5] Movements and parties share a common history—but they hold very different roles, and operate on different time horizons.

Social movements hold special possibility to disrupt the terms of debate and expand ideological horizons. The movements in this study have all offered public philosophies that reframe basic questions asked since the founding. Each has thrust into party politics conflictual, moralistic traditions of

[5] For macrohistorical context, see Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics," in *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory*, ed. Charles Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 297–317; Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768–2004* (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2004), chap. 2; Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds., *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1–64. In Tilly's definition ("Social Movements and National Politics," 306), "A social movement is a sustained series of interactions between powerholders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for change in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support." This definition offers a more concrete understanding of power than that in his 2004 book.

reform, protest, and dissent.[6] Social movements seek radical change—but they cannot simply institutionalize their visions and call it victory. Instead, the American electoral system agglomerates social cleavages inside parties. Given the realities of the Electoral College and a first-past-the-post voting system, movements that seek durable change in the state and its priorities must confront political parties.

"A political party," wrote E. E. Schattschneider in 1942, "is an organized attempt to get control of the government."[7] This venerable definition zeroes in on the goal of parties, and of parties alone. Because political parties organize social conflict—the sine qua non of a democratic party system[8]—they also structure the possibilities for movements to achieve ongoing influence. Movements for fundamental change in American society seek influence through alliance, by serving as anchoring groups to sympathetic parties, because parties hold the special capacity to control the government and its resources, and to define the organizable alternatives in public life.

Through the votes, and networks that they offer to allied parties, anchoring groups gain influence when they ally with a party—but they also gain the power to mold ideological possibilities in republican government. Just as Felix Frankfurter once said of Franklin Roosevelt, anchoring groups "take the country to school" as they inject ideas into partisan politics.[9] So, too, anchoring groups loom largest in coalition management, allowing into parties' orbit only partners whose visions can be rendered compatible with their own. These patterns link together: social movements inject foundational ideas into the party system, which then defines the democratic questions to which partisans offer differing answers.[10]

Movements join with political parties only on terms acceptable to winning coalitions inside those parties. Political parties want to win election. Otherwise, the politicians and interests that constitute them have no hope of wielding power or setting policy. And pragmatists inside party coalitions know this lesson best of all. Parties accept alliance only with the support of a winning coalition inside the party, including hard-nosed realists as well as ideological sympathizers. If the movement threatens the pragmatists' core interests, whether electoral or pecuniary, then the party seeks other paths

[6]Seymour Martin Lipset, "Third Parties and Social Movements," *Dialogue* 5 (1972): 3–8; cf. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1944), chap. 1; Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1982), chap. 2.

[7]E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Rinehart, 1942), lix.

[8]The canonical statement is V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), chap. 14.

[9]Quoted in Marc Landy and Sidney M. Milkis, *Presidential Greatness* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 158.

[10]See Nancy L. Rosenblum, *On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

to majority. No movements that meet the terms parties set, no alliance. If parties believe that movement radicals imperil their electoral prospects, then movement moderates must jettison their brethren if they want to sustain alliance with a major party. Anchoring groups pay a high price to join together with parties. Yet given the rules of the game, it is a price well worth paying.[11]

In a two-party system, it takes a majority to win election and gain access to the levers of power. Alliance requires parties, including pragmatists as well as strong sympathizers, to believe that they can win an ongoing majority with the movement incorporated. Parties must perceive that movements offer them votes and the resources needed to get votes—time, money, and access to networks—to make alliance a beneficial proposition. When movements knit together effective organizations, often politicizing face-to-face networks and exploiting new technology, then parties will find them attractive partners. When they fall apart, parties will swoop in, and organize their supporters directly.

Parties and movements cannot magically join together. While conditions present the opportunity for elites to forge alliance, the real work falls to brokers, midlevel figures with deep ties spanning party and movement. They build coalitions from neither the top down nor the bottom up, but from the inside out and the outside in, stitching together different blocs of supporters and finding policies and candidates with appeal across them. Brokers lower transaction costs, explaining to parties the deal that makes alliance work for both sides: use of the movement's grassroots networks to offer the party electoral support, in return for the party delivering on the movement's substantive priorities.

Over time, parties have lost their monopoly over political resources. They have relied increasingly on outside partners who provide the money, time, and networks required to win office. Those outside groups, for their part, demand policy payback—what I term "ideological patronage"[12]—in return for their support, pushing parties away from the median voter. Through this dynamic, anchoring groups and their competing ideological agendas lie at the roots of polarized politics.

Two Transformative Alliances

The reciprocal processes by which organized labor came together with the Democratic Party, and the Christian Right joined with the Republican

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[11] Cf. Paul Frymer, *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), discussed in the conclusion.

[12] I have taken the term from Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 57.

Party demonstrate remarkable similarities.[13] Although the cases may seem disparate—a movement of the left centered on the job site and a movement of the right centered in the church—no other social movements have built such broad and deep relationships with political parties over such a long stretch of time. Religion and work, defining sources of meaning in modern life, have animated these alliances. Rather than taking each in isolation and emphasizing its particular telos, systematic comparison emphasizes their similarities as organizers of political conflict.

Both alliances built on connections and alignments adumbrated in prior campaigns. In 1908 and 1916, the American Federation of Labor supported Democratic presidential candidates in exchange for promises to limit labor injunctions. "Fighting Bob" La Follette's third-party insurgency in 1924 brought together many of the key supporters of labor-liberalism in the coming decade: old Progressives from the West and the settlement houses, moderate socialists, and labor unions. So, too, the networks forged among conservative activists in the Goldwater campaign and the Young Americans for Freedom formed the nucleus of the political New Right. Yet these early efforts hardly resembled full-blown party-group alliance.

In 1936 and in 1980, anchoring groups mounted large-scale, nominally independent, efforts to elect realigning presidents. Group leaders vouched for the candidates, as they gave entrée into voting blocs not yet cemented in their partisan loyalties. Labor's Non-Partisan League, spearheaded by John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers, spent millions to reelect Franklin Roosevelt. In 1980, Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority, along with other new groups such as Christian Voice, sought to rouse the "sleeping giant" of American evangelicals against the born-again Jimmy Carter, whom they viewed as a failure in office. However unsophisticated in the mechanics of electioneering they may have been, these efforts set out the leading edges of campaigns to reframe electoral coalitions and Americans' expectations of the state.

Amid convulsive social change, midlevel entrepreneurs from both party and movement took advantage of opportunities around galvanizing events to politicize key actors in civil society and meld internal group and broader partisan cleavages. In 1935, John L. Lewis stomped out of the AF of L convention in Atlantic City after punching the Carpenters' "Big Bill" Hutcheson in the jaw. He formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations to embrace

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[13] I use the term "Christian Right" as opposed to "Religious Right" to note the movement's particular religion. The term "conservative" has different meanings in religious and political contexts, and in upper- and lowercase, while the term "profamily," often used in movement circles, converts a valence issue—the family—into a position issue. "Christian Right," however imperfect, seems the best shorthand to describe a complex and multifaceted set of leaders and mass publics evolving over decades.

positions long anathema to the federation: to "organize the unorganized" in industrial unions, and to fight for social legislation that would benefit all workers, organized or not. In 1979, conservatives began their takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention, the nation's largest Protestant denomination, committing the SBC to a platform of biblical inerrancy—and also, for the first time, to opposing abortion rights and the Equal Rights Amendment.

More than realigning presidents, midlevel brokers such as Hillman and Weyrich, located at key sites of power across the sprawling American state, made alliance. Young movement loyalists and their intellectual allies moved into government, aggressively staffing up the New Deal administrative state, and decades later attempting to channel hiring, regulations, and rulemaking to new ends. The executive branch followed the dictum of New Right operative turned Reagan aide Morton Blackwell, who expressly emulated Franklin Roosevelt: "personnel is policy."[14]

In Congress, partisan brokers reached out to give the movement space to organize, and to demonstrate the rewards for involvement. The key figure in the Second New Deal of 1935 was Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, the loyal Democrat who wrote the law guaranteeing most workers the right to bargain collectively. In the late 1970s and 1980s, a passel of congressional conservatives stopped the Carter administration from revoking tax exemptions for discriminatory schools formed in the wake of school desegregation (so-called seg academies) and banned federal dollars for abortions. Later, they enacted a universal child tax credit, and banned abortions by intact dilation and extraction.

Cementing the partnerships between movements and parties took further, less-dramatic rounds of institution building. Labor and the Christian Right routinized the coming together first effected in moments of ideological tumult. As movements sought to prove themselves as responsible partners even in politically unfriendly times, they discarded troublesome voices—communists in the one instance, millennialists and televangelists in the other—and shifted toward maintaining ongoing influence *inside* political parties.

After disillusion and defeat—the devastating 1942 midterm elections, and the collapse of the Moral Majority amid policy drift in the late Reagan years—savvier leaders, with deep ties in party as well as movement circles formed new groups to lead effective political efforts. Supporters and opponents alike tagged them as vote-getting machines. Even as they espoused fundamental visions of social change, many radical elements ultimately accepted the rationale for working inside a political party. Sidney Hillman

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[14]Quoted in Becky Norton Dunlop, "The Role of the White House Office of Presidential Personnel," in *Steering the Elephant: How Washington Works*, ed. Robert Rector and Michael Sanera (New York: Universe, 1987), 145.

founded CIO-PAC for the 1944 elections. It matured politically—and was joined by Labor's League for Political Education from the AF of L—in 1948, when labor helped mastermind Harry Truman's unlikely victory. Although Pat Robertson failed to win a single state in his 1988 run for the GOP nomination, he brought hundreds of thousands of evangelicals and Pentecostals into electoral politics for the first time. They served as the base for the Christian Coalition, which he formed in 1989 with the young GOP operative Ralph Reed. CIO-PAC and the Christian Coalition established ties with political parties far closer than those of their predecessor organizations.

In return, the anchoring groups have wielded effective vetoes on important appointments—to the vice presidency or the Supreme Court. Especially when anchoring groups have leveraged other bases of support inside party coalitions, they have achieved victories against long odds. Labor has protected the welfare state and pushed toward full employment. The Christian Right has funneled public dollars into faith-based programs, appointing a phalanx of conservative judges, and gaining a public role for faith. Nevertheless, cherished policy hopes—reformed labor law, a ban on abortions—have remained unmet.

Alliance has always had internal opponents, even in friendly parties. Libertarian-minded conservatives, worried about the loyalties of tolerant young people, may abandon the Christian Right on issues around gay rights. Similarly, Democrats for Education Reform now seeks to place teachers' unions and their inflexible ways at the center of education policy debates, asking Democrats about the price of some of their most loyal backers.

Courts critically shaped the process of party-group alliance. For unions, the story happened earlier in their life cycle. The labor injunction and restrictions from the Commerce and Due Process Clauses had long constrained both unions and social-welfare legislation. These hostile realities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries nurtured Gompersian voluntarism, with workers extracting benefits directly from employers. When the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act in 1937, it opened the door for unions to safeguard the interests of all workers, without fear of losing their special privileges. For its part, anger at Supreme Court decisions on abortion and school prayer helped to mobilize the Christian Right into politics. This focus has remained in the decades since, encompassing both legal strategies through conservative legal organizations, as well as political activism around court decisions, the role of judging, and even the rules for judicial selection.

Albeit in different ways, racial politics centrally shaped the trajectories of both these alliances, whose formation bracketed the civil rights years. Southern opposition to labor, predicated on the fear that strong unions threatened Jim Crow, sharply limited the reach of labor-liberalism, and pushed unions inward to defend their prerogatives and seek benefits

through the private welfare state as the conservative coalition in Congress blocked public programs. A generation later, the crumbling of the Solid South and "white backlash" created possibilities for evangelicals regardless of region to ally with the Republican Party. Two critical episodes—the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act over Truman's veto in 1947, with support from southern Democrats as well as Republicans, and the controversy over the IRS's plans to revoke the tax exemptions of racially discriminatory schools in 1978—demonstrate the ways that racial politics impinged on issues of class and religion respectively.

As movements became fully incorporated into partisan politics, they lost the fringes unacceptable to their partisan allies and forswore sweeping notions of a renewed society. Movement moderates—although not, to be sure, moderates in the system as a whole—oversaw multilevel bargains that sprawled across campaigns, appointments, and policies. Anchoring groups have represented, in many instances, the most radical voices included inside the party system. Yet if 1935 and 1979 signaled the rise of ideologues pushing groups into large-scale issues about where society ought to go, then 1948, especially, and 1989 represented victories for accommodation as majorities proved harder to build. Partial victories inside the system prevailed over more sweeping visions of industrial democracy or a Christian America. Despite predictions, in rocky patches, that alliance would soon end in divorce or oblivion, these partnerships continue to shape the Democratic and Republican Parties, and their responses to fundamental questions about the kind of society in which Americans seek to live.

Outline

The coming chapters develop these themes. Part I asks why movements get inside, or remain frozen outside, the party system. Part II then asks why movements stay inside, or are forced outside, the party system. Each part begins with the story of organized labor and the Democrats, moves onto that of the Christian Right and the Republicans, and finally considers "shadow cases" of movements that failed respectively to ally and to consolidate alliance with major parties. The book moves progressively through the process of alliance rather than chronologically through historical time. By moving the narrative forward in alliance time, the sequence highlights how the same mechanisms of party-movement alliance have played out across very different eras.

Chapter 2 lays out a framework to analyze the confrontations of parties and movements. Political parties accept alliance with potential anchoring groups only when winning coalitions inside those parties see the path to ongoing electoral majority with the anchoring group incorporated. They

TABLE 1.1
POTENTIAL ALLIANCES BETWEEN PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS

Movement	Party	Elections	Outcome
Abolitionism	Republicans	1860–96	Incorporated but not consolidated
Populism	Democrats	1892, 1896	Not incorporated
Labor-CIO	Democrats	1936–present	Incorporated and consolidated
Anti–Vietnam War	Democrats	1968, 1972	Not incorporated
Christian Right	Republicans	1980–present	Incorporated and consolidated

see that path, in turn, when the anchoring group does not threaten their core interests, and when it is sufficiently organized so as to offer electoral incentives—votes, money, time, and networks—unavailable to the party if it mobilizes movement supporters directly. When powerful forces inside parties exercise their blocking power to exclude movements, then movements face nearly impossible odds to institutionalize themselves, or to find their ideological visions a place in ongoing political contestation.

The following chapters apply that structure to critical episodes of party development at each major realignment in the American party system. Table 1.1 lists the five potential alliances between movement and party that this book explores, the presidential elections in which movements played a role, and then the ultimate outcome of alliance in the party system.

Part I examines the moments when major social movements mobilized politically quiescent publics and first confronted political parties. Chapter 3 explores the alliance of organized labor and the Democratic Party in the New Deal years. The breakaway Congress of Industrial Organizations reversed the long-standing philosophy of the American Federation of Labor to eschew partisan politics, and simply "reward its friends and punish its enemies." The Wagner Act gave state sanction to labor unions, and required employers to recognize and bargain with representatives of workers' own choosing. Newly emboldened by a sympathetic state, the CIO embraced industrial unionism and the welfare state, and opened its treasury and mobilized its members on behalf of sympathetic candidates, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt's landslide reelection in 1936.

Chapter 4 considers the entrance into Republican Party politics of white evangelicals during the late 1970s. New Right brokers, led by the direct mail wizard Richard Viguerie and the Coors-funded organizer Paul Weyrich, sought out evangelicals as the crucial new component of a lasting

conservative majority, culminating in the founding of Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority in 1979. The New Right demonstrated to evangelicals how electoral politics impinged on their religious practice—and then mobilized them on the basis of perceived threat.

Chapter 5 tackles two great failures, movements that fell apart before their remnants ended up in the Democratic fold: Populism in the 1880s and 1890s, and the antiwar movement of the 1960s. In each instance, at the moment of movements' greatest strength, parties would not accept alliance with actors they deemed injurious to their core interests. By the time the parties began to come around, movement organization had dissipated and any possibilities for a national majority had vanished. The Silverite remnants of the Populist crusade merged into the Democrats in 1896, while the antiwar senator George McGovern won the presidential nomination in 1972 only after the movement had splintered and the public had tired of casualties in Vietnam. With Populism died the most serious challenge to corporate capitalism that United States would ever see. Although its personnel occupied positions at the top of the Democratic Party for decades, the antiwar movement failed to restrain American empire or reorient American democracy toward a more authentic politics.

Part II treats parties and anchoring groups further in their life cycle. Over time, movement energy dissipates into the ongoing back-and-forth of ordinary politics. The extraordinary circumstances that propelled initial victories recede, even as fundamental controversies from formative moments remain touchstones of partisan division. Majorities prove evanescent and other actors inside parties grow wary. Movements focus on the imperatives of organizational maintenance, exercising influence inside parties and protecting their policy victories even when they cannot realize their visions for a transformed society. To that end, they attempt to build with their partisan partners virtuous circles that trade policy and influence in exchange for votes and the resources that deliver them. Alliance works when those circles benefit both partners, and when other influencers inside the party accept their legitimacy. Should they break down, so does alliance.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the long alliance between labor and the Democratic Party in the seven decades since the end of the Second World War. As Chapter 6 explains, organized labor cemented its status in the postwar Democratic order, but only at an enormous price. The CIO and, after 1955, the merged AFL-CIO, buoyed Democratic candidates and pushed them toward liberal priorities. At the peak, unions represented more than a third of American workers. Yet it was not the thirties. Congress passed the strongly antilabor Taft-Hartley Act over Harry Truman's veto. The CIO forced out its left-led unions, home of the most talented organizers, when they would not endorse the staunchly anticommunist Truman. And once

Congress blocked expanded pensions and universal health care, unions negotiated benefits at the bargaining table that foreclosed future possibilities for public provision.

Chapter 7 brings the story to the present. Starting in the late 1960s, labor and the Democrats endured their roughest years, tested by Vietnam and the "New Politics." Since the 1970s, the fragile foundations of the postwar order have eroded. Weak federal labor law and a patchwork welfare state, unresolved issues from the Fair Deal years, have reemerged amid conservative resurgence. The divide between party and movement has healed; labor's structural position continues to worsen. Organized labor seeks the same goals as it has for decades: space to organize, and support from the state for all workers. Labor's influence inside an emasculated Democratic coalition remains robust—for now.

Chapter 8 explores the Christian Right as it has matured. The sharp distinctions between party on the one hand and movement on the other have softened, and group-specific infrastructure has atrophied. A sequence of peak associations—the Moral Majority, ACTV, the Christian Coalition—have flamed out and, with many of the same leaders and direct-mail supporters, re-formed. All the while, Christian conservatives have grown far more influential inside the organizational Republican Party. The GOP, in turn, has increasingly mobilized church-based networks for its candidates directly, without relying on the assistance of group elites. Evangelicals and their allies may eventually serve as a particularly influential party faction rather than as an ongoing anchoring group.

Chapter 9 takes up another case of failed incorporation, albeit from a very different starting point in party politics: after the Civil War and the end of slavery, the abolitionist movement failed to sustain alliance between African Americans and their northern supporters, and a Republican Party dominated by the interests of northern industry. Although perhaps the most consequential alliance in American history, the movement failed to sustain effective infrastructure in the North, nor did it forge effective links between the freedmen and northern supporters of the Union cause. What began as a social movement died in high politics. In Reconstruction and after, alliance frayed as the Republican Party followed the interests of its core industrialist backers, and forsook its founding heritage.

The conclusion, finally, tackles the problem of writing political history in medias res with some speculation on the future. Both the Occupy movement of 2011 and the Tea Party have aimed to remake American politics. Although the framework presented here helps to make sense of their experience, neither one precisely fits the model of a potential anchoring group—and for rather different reasons. Occupy reveled in its rejection of hierarchical organization and lost any infrastructural capacity before it meaningfully confronted the party system. The Tea Party, for its part,

should be understood more as a party faction aiming to take control of a party than as a social movement with independent goals and supporters.

And so history will continue on. Parties will look to outside supporters for various baskets of resources, and welcome or fear new claimants. Citizens seeking to change society will join together in social movements. They will call Americans back to their visions of what its founding demands, and make claims for opinions and on behalf of social groups often heretofore invisible. Yet they will do so inside a framework that imposes harsh limits on party and movement alike. Parties will have to cobble together majorities from diffuse collections of minorities. Movements will have to hold specific influence over supporters in order to induce parties to move far from the median and include them in their fold. Whatever the issues and whomever the players, when major social movements confront parties, the stakes will remain high. As long as political parties determine competing alternative visions in public life, the entrance into party politics of social movements making radical claims will play a critical role in determining the organizable alternatives in American public life.