Introduction

FREEDOM AND SECURITY
IN THE NEW INTERDEPENDENCE

In June 2013, a former intelligence contractor, Edward Snowden, released top-secret documents detailing the global surveillance activities of the US National Security Agency (NSA). Press reports emphasized the Orwellian implications of programs denoted by sinister-sounding acronyms like PRISM and MYSTIC. Many Europeans were outraged by the revelation that the United States had trampled on their freedoms and comprehensively gathered data on their communications. Less frequently noted was the fact that in addition to collecting massive amounts of internet data, the NSA provided help to its European partners, who themselves were busy spying. While Snowden himself, in his testimony to the European Parliament, highlighted the importance of data sharing between US and European intelligence agencies, most commentators focused instead on the easier stories about the United States and Europe’s clash over privacy.

This is just one example of how scholars and policy makers overlook one of the most significant ongoing changes in global politics: the internationalization of domestic security. People think of homeland security, domestic security, counterterrorism, or interior policy as things that happen inside national borders. That is no longer the case. These issues have become far more internationalized, both in scope and intensity, over the last few decades. In turn, debates over civil liberties and privacy are no
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longer confined behind national borders but have been internationalized as well.

States make considerable efforts to guarantee the safety of their citizens from domestic attack, and since the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is painfully clear that global politics have domestic security repercussions. As threats have become transnational, so too have policy responses to them. Interior ministry officials, like their counterparts in foreign affairs and defense ministries, travel the world to coordinate through bilateral exchanges and multilateral summits. Such meetings play an especially prominent role in the transatlantic relationship between the United States and European Union along with its member states. During the George W. Bush administration, Homeland secretary Michael Chertoff spoke directly to the European Parliament in spring 2007, and Obama administration Homeland Secretary Janet Napolitano traveled to Europe almost as frequently as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. These interactions continue and have been regularized. High-level ministerial meetings have been accompanied by a host of ongoing formal and informal agreements and dialogues among civil servants forging links among internal security bureaucrats on both sides of the Atlantic.

Europe and the United States play key roles in this area. They control the world’s largest markets and thus enjoy enormous clout. They also have the most developed state agencies tasked with overseeing information sharing, policing, and counterterrorism. The transatlantic politics of domestic security, then, shape the policies, practices, and lived experience of security forces, firms, and citizens across the globe.

This tacit condominium belies the mythology, which depicts the politics of transatlantic domestic security in antagonistic terms, pitting the United States against Europe in battles over principle and practicality. Reporters and op-ed writers regularly suggest that the United States is “Mars” (to extend Robert Kagan’s rather-loaded analogy), pushing for stronger security measures and more willing to relax executive constraints, while the European Union is “Venus,” obsessed with the rule of law, privacy, and human rights. Under this perspective, the United States has forced (and is forcing) the European Union to adopt much more extensive antiterrorism measures than anyone in Europe wants, eroding homegrown European privacy protections.

This emphasis on US demands and bullying as a driving force blinds observers to the intricate dynamic that has emerged between the transatlantic partners: demands repeatedly rebuffed, cooperation imperiled, and
ad hoc work-around agreements that produce broader institutional changes in both jurisdictions. Behind apparent deadlock lies a burgeoning set of institutional arrangements for the transatlantic exchange of security information, which not only changes the parameters of potential surveillance globally but is also altering fundamental domestic bargains within the two jurisdictions about the proper balance between government control and individual liberty. This is neither stasis nor convergence; instead, it is an emerging space of political opportunity for nonstate and substate actors as well as governmental leaders, rife with ambivalence and contradictions to be harnessed for strategic purposes.

This book addresses these dynamics through a specific application of a broader account that we have previously described as the New Interdependence Approach (NIA). The internationalization of domestic security offers a window into a more general transformation in world politics unleashed by globalization. Our approach emphasizes how globalization is creating new channels for a variety of actors, who are not always conventional diplomats or trade negotiators, to assert themselves. Increasing economic interdependence destabilizes existing national bargains over policies and institutions, catapulting seemingly domestic policy disputes into the international arena. It also generates political channels of cooperation, allowing actors from different jurisdictions to forge alliances with their peers in other countries, often with quite-dramatic consequences for how markets and societies are governed.

Rather than viewing transatlantic disputes over domestic security and privacy as a clash of systems between the United States and Europe, we analyze them as a set of political battles between alliances of those respectively oriented toward security and civil liberties that often span the two. Power rarely resides in brute coercion, but rather in the political opportunities generated by interaction. The book, then, describes the strategies of change—cross-national layering, insulation, and defend and extend—enabled by interdependence, which security agencies, interior ministries, privacy NGOs, bureaucrats, and others exploit in their struggle over freedom and security.

**The Internationalization of Domestic Security: Moving beyond Systems Clash**

As domestic security threats have been internationalized, policy interdependence between Europe and the United States has increased and expanded into global coordination as well as convergence across domestic surveillance.
and policing policies. Such cooperation expands far beyond early minimal efforts at information sharing such as Interpol. Ongoing dialogues at the subministerial level exist side by side with greater ministerial contact. The transatlantic High Level Contact Group on Information Sharing, for example, offers a forum for internal security and civil liberties bureaucrats in the European Union and United States to discuss emerging issues, develop cooperative templates, and build a common agenda. Interior ministers share information on topics such as financial transactions, biometric data, and airline travel. Domestic security officials have been deputized to pursue criminals across borders, and countries have agreed to far-reaching (albeit ungainly) arrangements covering mutual legal assistance. From surveillance to arrest, cross-border collaboration has proliferated.

This transformation, in turn, spurs debates over the increase in interdependence, which often carry an intense normative charge. The internationalization of domestic security provokes bitter arguments between those who demand action to protect populations from transnational threats and those who fear that outsourced police functions threaten individual freedom. Some see the EU-US relationship as involving the effective subordination of the European Union to the US national security state, and so believe that transatlantic interdependence challenges basic civil liberties. From the 1990s on, the European Union developed extensive rules to protect privacy through managing the collection and exchange of personal information. This has led human rights and privacy rights activists to point to the critical problems of accountability and legitimacy that the EU-US homeland security relationship raises. If states delegate internal policing activities to other states, citizens quickly find themselves subject to another government’s authority. This threatens to attenuate local civil liberties such as due process, privacy, and fair trial. Moreover, as many of these cooperative efforts skirt formal international legal institutions and rely on administrative agreements between ministries, they lack even the indirect democratic legitimacy typical of traditional treaty documents. Although some scholars identify this as part of a growing trend across the advanced industrial democracies, many critics blame US hegemony more or less directly. Privacy International, a leading nonprofit organization based in the United Kingdom, identifies EU decisions to weaken protection on airline passenger data as the product of Europe’s “capitulation” to a US security agenda driven by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) frequently describe the United States as intent on trampling civil liberties in pursuit of self-defeating security objectives.
Others view the EU-US relationship in just the opposite terms, arguing that the European Union is holding the United States back from protecting its security. US conservatives and some US liberals maintain that September 11 demonstrated the dangers of a new kind of terrorist attack, and suggest that broad civil liberty concerns are outmoded, if not positively dangerous. They contend that US deference to certain aspects of international law, and the sensibilities of traditional US allies in Europe and elsewhere, hinders the US ability to prosecute the war against terror. Here, policy interdependence is threatening because it requires the United States to rely on the whims of feckless foreign officials to implement policies necessary to the integrity and security of the US homeland. As the United States becomes more open and more dependent on others to achieve domestic interests (e.g., to secure borders or cut off terrorists’ access to the financial system), it is simultaneously exposed to new vulnerabilities.

This has led to a small industry in conservative commentary, depicting European officials as imperiling the safety of US citizens because of their mindless attachment to abstract principles of privacy protection. For instance, Stewart Baker, former assistant secretary for policy at the DHS, writes that the European Union’s response to US security concerns is that it “sure sucks to be you,” claiming that the European Union seeks to “cripple US antiterror intelligence programs,” and adding that the European Union’s “institutionalized hostility to the United States” threatens to get US citizens killed.

These two perspectives on transatlantic domestic security relations draw opposite lessons about the policy problem posed by EU-US interactions. Both see the transatlantic relationship on domestic security issues as resulting from a clash between political systems inspired by antithetical sets of values. Europeans are purportedly motivated by their fundamental faith in law, civil liberties, and peaceful relations as a means of securing long-term stability, whereas Americans are more belligerent and inclined toward muscular responses to evildoers. This understanding of what is at stake is nearly entirely pervasive among commentators. Both journalists and policy analysts emphasize the basic incompatibility of European and US values along with the conflict that this generates. Regardless of whether the winners are warmongering Americans or lily-livered Europeans, the battle is being fought between profoundly different systems, with profoundly different internal norms.

The problem is that neither of these accounts provides a good explanation of the ambivalences at the heart of the EU-US security relationship.
Those who condemn the United States as a hegemonic bully, using its outsized power to force security measures down the throat of the European Union, fail to explain the timing and character of cooperation, which is by no means always correlated with US threats, and the key moments of resistance. Nor do those blaming the intransigence of Europeans have a better grasp of the truth. Europeans sometimes oppose US demands, but often go further than US negotiators either expect or ask. Neither of these accounts explain why the European Union and United States have created a framework for domestic security cooperation over the last several years, nor yet how resistance to this framework has spread across the Atlantic. This framework is neither a capitulation by the European Union to the United States, nor an acknowledgment by the United States of European unwillingness to take security seriously, nor a simple compromise between the two positions. Instead, it is something new: a set of cross-national relationships that differs in important ways from the domestic institutions governing freedom and security on both sides of the Atlantic, but that is increasingly coming to structure both.

A New Way of Understanding Interdependence

One cannot explain these relationships by looking to system clash. Rather, one has to go a level deeper to understand how interdependence is reshaping power relations between actors—interior ministries, civil liberties NGOs, privacy regulators, and others—both in the European Union and United States, and most important, across the two jurisdictions. When we use the term interdependence, we are referring to the growth in exchange of goods, services, and communication across borders. Such interactions create a situation in which the actions and/or policies of actors in one jurisdiction have significant consequences for the actions and/or policies of actors in other jurisdictions. Interdependence sets in motion three powerful dynamics, which transform domestic institutions and in turn global governance.

First, it produces a situation of rule overlap in which the stability and credibility of domestic rules and laws become increasingly uncertain. As firms and citizens engage in market and political activities that span multiple jurisdictions, they face overlapping regulatory claims made by multiple sources of authority (often with incongruous rules covering a specific activity), thereby creating cross-national tensions. Groups that are dissatisfied with their domestic rules now have opportunities to exploit these conflicts in order to destabilize their domestic legal status quo. In the absence of
concerted policy action by policy makers, existing policies may be undermined. This suggests that interdependence substantially affects the bargaining weight of national authorities. Where there is conflict between actions and policies in different jurisdictions, public officials cannot simply assume a reversion point under which the policy will continue to apply if it is not changed. In other words, interdependence destabilizes the status quo so that policy makers find their policies being eroded by cross-national pressures if they do not take specific actions to defend them.

Second, interdependence expands the number and type of actors who engage in global politics. To be clear, we do not claim that the state or chief executive is irrelevant. We argue instead that it no longer enjoys a diplomatic monopoly. Revolutions in communication technology and travel mean that many more actors conduct transborder politics. Bureaucrats, firms, and NGO activists, meeting their peers at conferences (or through videoconferencing) develop policy proposals that resolve the uncertainty raised by rule overlap.

Third, interdependence provides these actors with new platforms for cooperation. As more and more political institutions transcend national borders, political actors use alternative channels to redefine the global rules, not only by lobbying their home state, but also by creating cross-national alliances with other actors in other jurisdictions.

As we discuss at greater length in chapter 1, these dynamics of openness and globalization allow actors to use transnational strategies to undermine or defend domestic institutions. We specifically draw on the historical institutionalist literature within comparative politics and the literature on American political development to understand how different relationships to the transnational context lead actors to adopt strategies of action, such as cross-national layering, insulation, and defend and extend. Cross-national layering involves actors using transnational interactions to generate policy proposals that over time erode domestic rules. They do this by providing an international alternative to domestic policy bargains, which themselves have been unsettled by rule overlap. Insulation, by contrast, occurs when actors deploy domestic institutions to defend against transnational policy proposals, limiting the reach and consequences of these efforts. Finally, defend and extend describes efforts by domestic actors to externalize their domestic policy environment globally through transnational means. More generally, we build our historical institutionalist account up from comparative politics to international relations and then down again, as we show how the international context shapes domestic policies and institutions.
only does the book demonstrate how theories more commonly employed in comparative politics have purchase on international relations; it also shows how comparativists, if they want to understand the consequences of globalization, need to pay serious and sustained attention to international and transnational politics.23

Interdependence empowers actors with opportunities—but it does not empower all actors equally, and some actors may not be empowered at all. As a result, interdependence generates winners and losers with varying consequences for the influence of different actors; ceteris paribus, those with access to transnational channels are likely to do better than before, and those without such access are likely to do worse. More specifically in the context of the transatlantic domestic security relationship, we argue that the dynamic is less a simple story of US hegemony than a matter of interactions within and across the two jurisdictions between an alliance of more security-minded officials and an alliance oriented more toward civil liberties. The political battlefield is shifting as both groups must consider transatlantic as well as domestic institutional strategies. These two groups are engaged in an ongoing struggle over freedom and security made possible by the new politics of interdependence.

**New Interdependence and Transatlantic Domestic Security Relations**

The main reason that we are interested in the internationalization of domestic security is its substantive importance. From the response to the attacks of September 11 to the Snowden affair to cyberattacks surrounding the 2016 US elections, domestic security plays a critical role in how the two largest global powers define the relationship between their citizens and emerging threats such as terrorism, organized crime, cybersecurity, hybrid warfare, and drug or human trafficking.24 It has been neglected by nonspecialist international relations scholars, despite its importance both to policy makers and the present-day conduct of international politics.

The EU-US relationship is perhaps the best-developed example of global interdependence between separate jurisdictions.25 It is also one of the best-studied international regulatory relationships in the world; EU-US interactions are central for core existing theories of international politics.26 It therefore allows us to assess the relative benefits and drawbacks of the NIA and other major theories of international politics. The latter propose to explain this relationship too, without reference to the causal relationships
emphasized by the NIA. In particular, we contrast our argument stressing cross-national alliances and interactions with the standard accounts focusing on clashes between different jurisdictional systems. We thus meet the challenge raised by scholars like Robert Keohane (2017) who pushes historical institutionalists to test their assertions against plausible alternatives.

The book’s methodology rests on detailed analytic narratives, which use process tracing to assay the merits of the competing causal stories through careful examination of the empirical evidence. In particular, we exploit substantial variation in the character of cooperation or conflict across time and specific policy area to scrutinize our claims about actor strategies. Empirically, the book focuses on three interlinked disputes (related to airline passenger data, financial sector information, and commercial data) over security, information, and interdependence between the European Union and United States over the last two decades. Each of the three disputes examined contains useful points of internal variation across time, with periods of deadlock followed by agreements that sometimes produce institutional change and sometimes are undermined. We employ a range of evidence drawing on a large data set of original interviews, primary documents, and secondary literature, compiled over nearly two decades of research. In addition, we exploit a novel contemporaneous source of data—the Wikileaks cables archive—to uncover both the US approach to negotiations and US perceptions of the political positions of European negotiators and politicians. As well as contributing to theoretical debates concerning globalization and interdependence, we make a more straightforward empirical contribution by offering detailed accounts of highly consequential interlinked negotiations. As such, we hope to inform those interested in studying global cooperation on domestic security issues, surveillance, and privacy in the post 9/11 period.

The Implications of the NIA for Global Politics

The NIA shifts the study of global politics away from traditional perspectives that underscore interactions between jurisdictions toward perspectives that emphasize interactions across them. We hope to use it to push scholars from both comparative politics and international relations to reconsider overly simplistic models of the intersection between domestic and international politics that sidestep transnational causal relationships.

Rather than viewing globalization or interdependence as an exogenous shock that is filtered through domestic institutions, we see global politics as
ongoing dynamic processes in which the domestic and international shape each other. As we discuss at greater length in chapter 1, our way of cutting into these complex dynamics and rendering them intelligible is to emphasize the interaction of rule overlap, opportunity structures, and asymmetrical access to these structures. This provides an alternative to the semiubiquitous metaphor of two-level games—a metaphor that has drawn attention away from dynamics between levels that do not flow through the positions adopted by formal negotiators.29 This has led researchers to detach transnational forces from the domestic contestation that they structure, and instead build models that emphasize domestic interest groups or cleavages. Promising early work in the two-level games tradition, which noted the possibility of “reverberations” between different systems, has not generated a self-sustaining research agenda.30 Standard models now focus almost exclusively on national interests and the domestic institutions that aggregate them rather than the ways in which international interactions transform domestic political struggles, and vice versa.

Equally, we look to move away from the standard diplomatic channels of global governance depicted in the two-level game metaphor, in which chief executives negotiate and then ratify agreements through domestic legislatures. Executive-legislative relations continue to matter in a world of globalization, but so too do a host of alternative channels through which actors engage in global politics.31 As we show in chapters 3 and 4, negotiators can build less formal transnational institutions, sidestepping the direct oversight of executive leadership and legislative ratification, which in turn influence domestic institutions.32 At the same time, as we demonstrate in chapter 5, nonstate actors who do not have access to the channels of formal negotiation may employ unconventional tactics to seize the initiative back from more traditional diplomatic actors.

This is not a world in which national executives—responding either to the median voter or interest groups, or some amalgam—build agreements that neatly fall into a policy space determined by the preferences of all the relevant actors. It is instead a world in which negotiators, regulators, firms, and NGOs jostle with each other as they each look in their different ways to protect their interests. National institutions themselves are often up for grabs, and national executives and legislatures have limited capacity to monitor or rein in the behavior of alternative initiatives. Thus, our perspective calls into question the faith placed in principal-agent models of delegation, which emphasize the ability of political principals to monitor and discipline unwanted political entrepreneurship by agents. Instead, it accords with
empirical evidence demonstrating the limits of state control in a world of complex governance arrangements.\textsuperscript{33}

We hope not only to contribute to debates on the interaction between domestic and international politics but also to shift how researchers view institutional change in the international arena. The majority of studies in international relations today focus on discrete institutional outcomes, such as ratification of a treaty, negotiation outcome, domestic legal change, or compliance. Such snapshots are important, and there is much we can learn from examining them. That said, we believe that this work tends to reinforce the perception that such snapshots represent stable equilibrium outcomes. In actuality, institutional stability is at best the provisional outcome of forces that themselves deserve sustained investigation, and at worst an unrealistic analytic convenience.

In contrast, our approach views politics as a process of ongoing contestation, where institutional outcomes are not static but instead platforms for efforts aimed at changing, building on, or undermining them.\textsuperscript{34} Here, we emphasize two claims. First, political losers will seek over time to undermine political outcomes that are uncongenial to their interests, which means that we need to understand the strategies that they employ. Second, and in contrast to many common analyses, institutional change is not a succession of leaps, whether modest or extravagant, from one equilibrium to another. Institutions are not saltations; they are processes over time. An apparent win by one coalition of actors in $t = 1$ may be thwarted by a seemingly innocuous reform in $t = 2$ that then grows to supplant the institutions in $t = 3$.\textsuperscript{35} For sure, at every moment in the sequence there are winners and losers as well as important power asymmetries generated by the process. Winning, however, often involves little more than cementing a temporary advantage that may in turn be undermined unexpectedly in a later round of play. By taking the long view, we eschew scoreboard assessments in which one coalition can be said to have definitively won or lost, and instead look at how apparent outcomes tend to fold back into processes similar to the ones that gave rise to them.

Finally, the book makes an important empirical contribution to research on the internationalization of domestic security and personal freedom.\textsuperscript{36} In particular, we provide the most comprehensive study to date of EU-US interactions over information sharing, surveillance, and privacy. As we emphasize throughout, this narrative reveals that the conflict is not primarily between a United States focused on security and a European Union focused on the rule of law. Rather, there are political factions within each jurisdiction, which
variously privilege security interests or civil liberties, and work together and against each other to alter the rules that govern domestic security. The book, then, reframes the conflicts between the United States and Europe on these issues, and reconsiders how transnational interactions unsettle the balance between civil liberties and surveillance. It furthermore shows how important domestic security, privacy, and information are for the global affairs studied by scholars of international politics.

The Book’s Chapter Plan

Of Privacy and Power is intended for two related but also distinct audiences. On the one hand, it speaks to academics who want to understand how globalization is transforming world politics. These readers should begin with chapter 1, which presents our theoretical approach in detail. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide empirical demonstrations of the mechanisms—cross-national layering, defend and extend, and insulation—developed in the theoretical chapter. On the other hand, the book offers a comprehensive account for policy specialists concerned with transatlantic domestic security and privacy negotiations. Readers more interested in the substantive debate over freedom and security may prefer to skim or skip chapter 1, and start instead with chapter 2, which provides the factual background for the later account. They can then focus their attention on the empirical sections of chapters 3, 4, and 5, which detail, respectively, the negotiations over airline, financial, and commercial data. Some readers may be interested in both, in which case we commend their enthusiasm and promise that at least the book is not too long. In what follows, we offer a quick summary of each individual chapter.

Chapter 1 elaborates the fundamental theoretical argument of the book. Here we present the basic assumptions of the NIA, highlighting how economic interdependence creates conditions of rule overlap and opportunity structures for cross-national cooperation. The second half of the chapter develops a more specific set of claims about the strategies—cross-national layering, insulation, and defend and extend—that actors employ to leverage interdependence for their political ends.

Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive account of the origins and implications of EU and US policy positions as well as the evolution of global cooperation over domestic security. It maps out the diverse actors in each region, identifies their interests and perspectives, and lays out the sources of potential transnational coalitions. In particular, it identifies those groups
at the domestic and international levels most focused on security, civil liberties, or economic concerns. The chapter charts the relative strength and preferences of the different actors within their respective political systems in the status quo ante before September 11, when domestic security issues were largely handled within national borders. It then systematically examines how preferences and institutional strength changed after September 11. In short, the chapter offers the essential background needed to understand the internationalization of domestic security issues, with a particular focus on the transatlantic relationship.

Chapter 3 examines how the alliances of actors fought over the issue of airline passenger data. It shows how a transnational alliance of security-minded officials used transatlantic cooperation to expand their discretion beyond what was possible under their own domestic rules and ultimately changed them. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the US Congress passed a law that required foreign air carriers to transfer data concerning their passengers to the Bureau of Customs or risk significant fines. This transfer of information was in direct conflict with European privacy laws, and put European air carriers in the awkward position of trying to satisfy both US security requirements and EU rules. What followed was a series of contentious and volatile negotiations over how to regulate the sharing of airline passenger data across the Atlantic. Despite court challenges and active lobbying by civil liberties groups, the European Union ratified an agreement that now allows unprecedented amounts of individual data to flow to the United States. Additionally, the European Union reformed its own internal legislation to permit similar data flows internally. These kinds of domestic transformations are not what current theories of comparative and international politics would have predicted. The chapter concludes by identifying the lessons of the airline passenger debate for future transatlantic negotiations.

Chapter 4 offers a more in-depth examination of a particular strategy—cross-national layering—and how it was deployed by the security community to transform the debate over financial transactions data. In 2006, the *New York Times* published an article detailing a secret US Department of the Treasury program in which it obtained personal financial transactions from a banking consortium in Europe to track suspected terrorist activity. Once again, US demands came in conflict with European civil liberties rules. This led to a five-year period of negotiations, which swung from pledges of quick cooperation to complete breakdown to the culmination of a final agreement.
In contrast to the dispute over airline passenger data negotiations, the United States and European Union did not immediately make significant changes to their domestic laws. Instead, they constructed a transatlantic agreement intended to work around domestic opposition. This agreement used the principle of reciprocity to provide security actors in Europe with access to data on financial transactions that they had previously been denied under domestic institutions via an international cooperative arrangement. That arrangement is in turn giving rise to institutional change, and the likely creation of new rules within the European Union that would have been highly unlikely or even impossible without the EU-US interaction. Far from a standard international agreement on a technical issue area, the transatlantic bargain on financial data sharing underscores how global cooperation circumvents and undermines domestic political bargains. The chapter outlines the mechanisms of cross-national layering through which these changes took place.

Chapter 5 examines the urgent political transatlantic controversies over surveillance in the wake of Snowden’s revelations. These have reshaped transatlantic arguments over security and privacy, allowing a coalition of privacy-friendly actors to undermine the Safe Harbor Agreement, which allowed the transatlantic sharing of commercial data, effectively holding e-commerce firms hostage for changes in US (and over the longer term, European) privacy practices. When the Safe Harbor Agreement was initially built in 2000, bureaucratic actors in the European Union and United States sought to use it to defend their respective domestic systems and promote commercial data exchange. After the Snowden revelations, a different set of actors that was motivated by civil liberties sought to undermine the agreement in the European Union so as to insulate their domestic system from transnational pressures. Again, this illustrates how actors seek to protect existing domestic arrangements as they come under pressure from coalitions of actors empowered by interdependence. In contrast to airline passenger data, civil-liberties-oriented actors were able to leverage domestic political arrangements at home so as to win real power abroad.

The book concludes by setting out a broader international agenda for the study of privacy and power. It first considers the policy implications of the findings for those interested in debates surrounding privacy and freedom. The conclusion discusses both the importance of transnational data flows and the blurring between public and private sector surveillance. Second, the chapter reconsiders the role of power in world politics, highlighting the insights of the NIA, demonstrating the fundamental importance
of information in world politics. It ends by emphasizing how transatlantic conflict and cooperation on the intersection between domestic security and civil liberties not only produces important global agreements but also provides actors with crucial institutional resources to transform basic rights and security policies on both sides of the Atlantic.