Introduction

EMBRACING COMPLEXITY

“It can’t go on much longer!”

I meant the Vietnam War. I remember uttering words along these lines in 1966. I was in my last year as an undergraduate at Cornell University. I was not a leader of any antiwar groups; I was a quiet, lonely follower. I was appalled by the fighting in Indochina and remember marching sullenly down the streets of Ithaca on a demonstration or two. I did not think the carnage could last much longer. I was wrong.

In that year, 1966, I was preoccupied with what I would do after graduation. I had no idea that I would become an historian of U.S. foreign relations. I had no notion of how my views would evolve from a focus on the domestic ideological and economic roots of policy to a preoccupation with threat perception. Even less could I have imagined that I would spend so much time wrestling with the possibilities of reconciling “revisionism” and “realism” and analyzing how perceptions of configurations of power abroad affected thinking about the preservation of core values and democratic capitalism at home. And since I would be trained in traditional approaches to diplomacy, I had not a clue about how the explosion of scholarship on culture, memory, and emotion would influence my growing fascination with the complicated interactions between human agents on the one hand and fundamental structures of political economy and international politics on the other hand.

When I finished college, my future was murky. I applied to law schools, graduate schools in history, and one or two programs dealing with international relations. I had choices, but when Ohio State University’s History
Department offered me funding—the chance to experiment with graduate school without going into debt—the issue was resolved.

My intent was to study labor history. As an undergraduate in Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, I fashioned an eclectic program around history and economic development. Although I did not take any courses with Walter LaFeber, the gifted young assistant professor of American diplomatic history who had recently joined the Cornell faculty and who would subsequently have a major impact on my thinking, I did study American labor history with Gerd Korman. I wrote a substantial paper for him on the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on the American labor movement. Working with Korman made me attentive to primary sources, reading carefully, and extrapolating meaningful generalizations from factual detail. He nurtured my interest in graduate study. He told me about a young labor historian who had joined the faculty at Ohio State: David Brody. He predicted, correctly, that Brody would become one of the leaders in the field. When I got to Ohio State, Brody was on leave. He never returned.

I was adrift. I gravitated to courses in U.S. diplomatic history and modern American history. I had little idea of what I would focus on, but my aversion to the Vietnam War clearly animated my interest in studying U.S. foreign relations. I enrolled in courses taught by a young professor, Marvin Zahniser. His expertise was in early American diplomacy, and he had written a book on C. C. Pinckney. He was then exploring the possibility of a big project regarding U.S. diplomatic missions that failed. Soon, he would turn his attention to writing a general history of Franco-American relations. Wearing a white shirt and a tie, often a bow tie, he presented learned but very traditional lectures. I found him distant, meticulous, rather inscrutable. His dispassionate aura perplexed me when my own emotions were pulsating. I had little idea of how he would influence my intellectual journey, but he did. He nurtured my love for research, encouraged me to interrogate my own predilections, and imparted a quest for “objectivity,” however elusive, that would shape so much of my scholarship.

During my first years at Ohio State I also enrolled in courses with John Burnham, Mary Young, and Andreas Dorpalen, an imposing, eminent historian of German history. In Burnham’s course, we read Gar Alperovitz’s recently published Atomic Diplomacy.1 Though Burnham seemed to take no position on the book, his probing queries aroused passionate discussion. The atomic bomb, Alperovitz claimed, was dropped not to defeat the Japanese and save American lives, but to intimidate the Soviets and shape the course of post–World War II diplomacy. The broad implications were clear: the United States was responsible for the origins of the Cold War.

At the same time, in which course I do not recall, I read William A. Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, one of the era's most influential books critiquing the long trajectory of American foreign policy.² Perhaps David Green assigned it in his course. David Green had just come to Ohio State, as the second “diplomatic” historian, to be Zahniser’s colleague, focused on modern U.S. foreign relations. Two young men could hardly have been more dissimilar. Green was a recently minted PhD student from Cornell, where he had studied with Walter LaFeber. Green was passionate, an ardent opponent of the Vietnam war, a fierce critic of U.S. foreign relations, a charismatic lecturer, and an enthusiastic revisionist who reinforced the themes of Williams’s critique of American diplomacy. Not simply the Cold War, but also the wars in Indochina and the virulent anti-Americanism in Latin America were the result of America’s open door imperialism, its lust for markets to solve the problems of overproduction, and its exceptionalist, self-deceiving ideology of innocence.

Green was a doer as well as a talker. He challenged us. One day in his lecture course—I think it was the day after Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination—he boldly asked the students to hand in their draft cards; as I recall, he was going to take them out to the “Oval”—the vortex of Ohio State’s campus—and burn them during one of the ongoing demonstrations. I sat there nervously; no, I was not yet ready to burn my draft card. Yes, I was ready to take over the administration building, which a few of us briefly did around that time. Although I ruminated endlessly about the war and was appalled by the daily body counts, the scenes of guerilla warfare, the use of napalm, the conflagration of villages, and the suffering of ordinary women, children, and soldiers, I was unprepared for Green’s bold assault on my conscience. He paid a heavy price, forced (I think) to resign.

I turned my attention to studying U.S. foreign relations history. I was now wrestling more deeply with the sources of American power and the harm it was inflicting. How could this war in Indochina be explained? How long could it last? Could it happen again?

The answers to my questions were emerging in the ballooning revisionist literature on the history of American foreign policy. Around this time, I read LaFeber’s *New Empire*, a reinterpretation of late-nineteenth-century American expansion.³ I was writing a paper for Zahniser on the mission by Stuart Woodford to Madrid in 1898 to head off the coming of war with Spain. LaFeber’s book seemed powerful and nuanced. He emphasized the domestic roots of policy and stressed the importance of markets abroad for the preservation of

be deceptive. Compilers in the late 1930s and 1940s had not been especially interested in economic and financial questions, and they certainly did not integrate materials from other government agencies into their volumes. Consequently, the amount of material on debts, reparations, and trade was rather meager compared to the voluminous corpus of diplomatic and political correspondence saved lovingly in those rectangular, gray archival boxes that were rolled out to me on one dolly after another for month after month, many of them from Record Group 39, Records of the Bureau of Accounts in the Treasury Department, and from RG 151, Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. As for the records in RG 59 of the Department of State, I remember mastering the key decimal file numbers that, after forty years, I still vividly recall: 851.51, 811.51, 851.00, 851.62, 462.00R296, etc. At the same time I grew increasingly aware that the organization of the FRUS volumes by country, while understandable, could be misleading: you could not study Franco-American relations without also examining U.S.-German relations and U.S.–United Kingdom relations.

I found that isolationism was a myth. The United States was hugely embroiled in European affairs in the 1920s. After all, European diplomacy during that decade was all about these very matters: reparations, war debts, private loans, tariffs, trade, currency stability—and arms limitation and France’s quest for security. The general thrust of my argument became clear: after Versailles, the United States jettisoned collective security and political commitments as a means to nurture European stability. But the quest persisted: the overall goal of U.S. foreign policy toward France and toward Europe was to promote stability along liberal and capitalist lines and to avert radical revolution. U.S. officials—like President Warren G. Harding, Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes—recognized that the restoration of stability in Europe was important to the vitality of the American economy at home, the promotion of exports, the maintenance of full employment, and the health of the farm sector of the American economy, which was floundering from insufficient demand and low prices.

While the broad outlines of my dissertation formed in my head, the organization and presentation of my dissertation were not yet resolved when I decided to turn my attention to a more immediate goal. I realized I needed to publish an article to help position myself to compete in what seemed a terrible job market. I selected a narrow topic: the origins of Republican war debt policy, 1921–1923. This matter had received little attention in the scholarly literature, and the prevailing view was that insistence on war debt repayment

revealed the ignorance and indifference of U.S. officials about the requirements of European stability. I already had uncovered a lot of material demonstrating beyond any doubt that businessmen and financiers as well as experts in the Treasury, Commerce, and State departments recognized clearly that war debts burdened the key debtors—Britain, France, and Italy. War debt repayments complicated the settlement of the reparations controversy, they retarded efforts to restore currency stability, and they constricted the promotion of world trade and American exports. Just as the open door revisionists were arguing, American businessmen and officials in Washington were not stupid. They knew these payments had to be scaled down if they were to stabilize the international economy along liberal and capitalist lines.

But as I labored on this article I expanded my research and examined the proceedings and periodicals of business groups and trade associations that were not quite so dependent on markets abroad. I looked at the legislative debates and analyzed the views of congressmen and senators. I saw countervailing evidence: a lot of Americans were less concerned about markets abroad and more concerned with the level of taxation at home. Relief to European governments meant higher taxes for Americans because revenue to the U.S. treasury would be reduced while the U.S. government still had to pay interest and principal to owners of U.S. war bonds. Consequently, proposals to lower the war debt payments of European governments—while Americans were suffering from the postwar economic slump in 1921 and 1922—sparked xenophobic sentiment, aroused racist predilections and ethnic prejudices, and reinforced the postwar disillusionment. Officials did want to reduce debts and promote U.S. exports, but they also wanted to lower taxes, encourage domestic investment, preserve the sanctity of contracts, and win elections. Priorities clashed; trade-offs were unavoidable. Policymakers had to balance conflicting imperatives.

I presented all of this in my article “The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921–1923: A Case Study in the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation.” (See chapter 1.) I was thrilled when The Journal of American History accepted it for publication. The article underscored the salience of the open door interpretation yet questioned some of its conclusions. In the course of writing it, I began grappling with issues that would confound me for many years. I uncovered considerable evidence affirming the significance of exports to businessmen and officials; yet such concerns did not always translate into coherent policy. Policymakers and business elites did seek to fashion a stable, liberal, and capitalist international order, but other goals were also important: lowering taxes, controlling inflation, and protecting the home market. The foreign policy history of the United States government was more complex than I imagined. Even while the fighting in Indochina escalated and my op-
position to the war there became more passionate, my understanding of the sources of U.S. policy became more uncertain.

Resolving all these issues was less important in the short run than finishing my dissertation. I defended it in the spring of 1972 and landed a job at Vanderbilt University. I was one of five hires that year; Vanderbilt was rapidly changing, starting to highlight scholarly achievement, and scaling up the demands for tenure, a goal that was on my mind from my first day there. And the expectations were pretty clear: no book, no tenure. I decided to send out my dissertation for publication, thinking that my article in the *JAH* and the enthusiastic support of my mentors at Ohio State boded well for my future.

Then came some dramatic disappointments. One of the worst days of my professional career was at the American Historical Association convention, I think in December 1972 (or perhaps 1973). I was strolling through the book exhibits, and suddenly I saw a volume on one of the shelves, *American Business and Foreign Policy, 1921–1933*, by Joan Hoff Wilson. At the time I never had heard of her and knew nothing about the prospective publication of this book. But I opened it up and my heart sank. It was organized precisely as I had organized my dissertation, with chapters on war debts, trade, etc. She examined business opinion almost precisely as I had. I knew this because I sat down on a chair adjoining the book booth and skimmed through page after page after page. Did I have anything new to say that Wilson had not said? With a pronounced tendency toward seeing the darker side of my future, with ingrained thinking that I never really was suited to be a successful academic, with my parents’ reservations pulsating through my mind, I was distraught.

And perhaps for good reason. Not long thereafter, I received a referee report from the University of North Carolina Press. The reader praised my dissertation manuscript, but voiced strong reservations. He said my topical organization obscured the interaction of issues and obfuscated causal analysis. He also encouraged me to write a chapter on Woodrow Wilson to establish a context for studying Republican diplomacy and for analyzing continuities and discontinuities over time.

My dismay was extreme. But the advice was good. It reinforced my view that I had to differentiate my book from Joan Hoff Wilson’s account. I would shift my attention from business attitudes to decision-making in the American government and give more nuanced attention to causal factors and to means and ends. Organizing my evidence chronologically, rather than topically, would help illuminate the policy process because officials grappled every day with the intersection of war debts, reparations, loans, currency stabilization, and foreign policy. For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu
tariffs, and trade. Writing an opening chapter on Woodrow Wilson, moreover, would allow me to highlight continuities in goals (the quest for a stable capitalist international order) and disparities in tactics (the Republicans’ repudiation of collective security and embrace of economic diplomacy). But to do these things, I had to reorganize my entire dissertation and start anew. I would rewrite from page one.

This required yet more research. The Herbert Hoover Presidential Library had now opened and friends were telling me it contained mountains of essential documents. At the same time, new books and articles were illuminating the workings of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the critical role of central bankers, including Benjamin Strong, the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in orchestrating the restoration of currency stability and the gold exchange standard in the mid-1920s. I needed to look at the papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and gain an appreciation of its interactions with the investment banking community of New York, the Treasury Department, and European central bankers. Figuring out how the American government operated in the 1920s, how it interacted with functional elites in the business, banking, and agricultural communities, and how it balanced conflicting imperatives and clashing priorities were now my central tasks.

As I was despairing over my academic future and pondering my capacity to reconceptualize my dissertation manuscript, Ellis Hawley asked me to contribute a chapter on foreign policy to a book he was editing on Herbert Hoover as secretary of commerce. Hawley had come to Ohio State while I was writing my dissertation. Graduate student friends of mine sang his praises and told me I had to audit one of his courses. He had just written a brilliant book on the New Deal and the problem of monopoly. Now, he was turning his attention to Herbert Hoover and the evolution of what he called the associational state. This framework would shape the writing of American domestic history for decades to come. It riveted attention on the formal and informal connections between government and functional elites in the American political economy. Hawley was developing and extrapolating from new interpretations of the Progressive Era that highlighted the importance of experts, the development of professional associations, the quest for efficiency, and the desire to find mechanisms that would mitigate political conflict, thwart radical movements, nurture productivity, and create a consumer paradise. For Hawley, Herbert Hoover was the central figure in the evolution of these developments. But Hawley stayed at Ohio State only briefly. He moved to the University of Iowa,

where he could easily exploit the materials at the Hoover Library and train generations of students, the most important of whom (for my purposes) was Michael Hogan, who became a lifetime friend, intellectual comrade, and occasional probing critic.

I put aside the revision of my dissertation to work on this essay for Hawley’s book. (See chapter 2.) The exercise was critical to my intellectual development. By focusing on Hoover, I saw how domestic developments shaped approaches to foreign policy questions. As secretary of commerce during most of the 1920s, Hoover reorganized that department to position the United States to benefit from and exercise a constructive role in the world political economy. Hoover interjected himself into all matters of foreign relations, and he put his subordinates to work acquiring new data on natural resources and markets around the globe. Like other scholars at the time, including Mike Hogan, Frank Costigliola, Joan Hoff Wilson, Carl Parrini, Robert Van Meter, Emily Rosenberg, and Joseph Brandes, to name just a few, I recognized how carefully Hoover labored to take issues out of politics, gather statistical data, hire experts, and find solutions that would reconcile divergent priorities. He championed innovative thinking about the role of invisible items (for example, overseas loans and tourist expenditures) in redressing trade imbalances and smoothing the functioning of the global political economy. By studying Hoover, one could see why Republican officials relied on private financiers, central bankers, tariff commissioners, and an agent general for reparations to grapple with the explosive financial and commercial questions of the 1920s. Allegedly, these “experts” would take such issues out of politics and resolve them objectively in ways that would palliate the sensibilities of clashing interest groups and competing nation-states. They would thereby help stabilize the international economy along liberal and capitalist lines.

While working on this essay on Hoover, I grappled with his worldview. He epitomized the economic approach to international diplomacy in the 1920s. Arms limitation was integral to this approach—a necessary means to cut government expenditures, balance budgets, stabilize currencies, and encourage


world trade. Hoover thought prosperity would heal the wounds of World War I, reconfigure the aspirations of governments, mitigate class conflict, stifle revolutionary impulses, and nurture individual opportunity. He was interested in world order and focused on fashioning a new era of perpetual prosperity, yet was unwilling to incur strategic obligations abroad. I appreciated the mechanisms and processes that were being designed to settle contentious international financial and economic issues, but did this make American foreign policy realistic in the era following Versailles? Was it sensible to brush aside France’s requests for security guarantees, repudiate collective security, and disdain strategic obligations if Washington officials wanted to fashion a stable, liberal, and capitalist international order? Had Hoover, Hughes, Mellon, and their subordinates found an appropriate balance between domestic priorities and external demands? Were they employing and deploying American power in effective ways to achieve their goals? Few historians had thought so.¹⁰

These questions prompted me to look much more carefully at the political issues I previously had downplayed in my dissertation. (See chapter 3.) For a generation of “realist” scholars writing after World War II, it seemed incontrovertible that, after the Versailles Conference and the domestic fight over the League of Nations, Republican officials had irresponsibly rebuffed France’s demands for security and ignored the responsibilities commensurate with the power that the United States had achieved. These “realist” analysts believed that American aloofness from the political affairs of Europe contributed significantly to the dynamics that led to the Second World War.¹¹ Yet my reading of the evidence suggested that these Republican officials were not quite so naive, ignorant, or irresponsible. They believed that France’s definition of security would alienate the Germans, weaken the fragile Weimar Republic, and make another war inevitable. Republican officials did not want to incur commitments to a vision of security that they thought was inherently incompatible with the requirements of long-term European stability. Nor did they think that American promises could reshape French attitudes about France’s security needs.

In other words, Republican officials, like Hughes and Hoover, possessed a sense of the limits of American power in the emotionally and politically vola-


tile years after Versailles. They wanted to act within the constraints imposed by an American electorate disillusioned by the results of the war and alienated by what Americans regarded as the self-serving actions of Paris, Berlin, and London. Policymakers in Washington wanted to find limited ways to promote European stability and reassure France without assuming responsibilities that exceeded their assessment of American interests. They did this through a variety of instruments that focused on modulating, if not solving, the contentious economic and financial problems afflicting Europe.

I started to think that Republican officials were neither especially isolationist nor singularly expansionist, but pragmatic and opportunistic. Neither the revisionists nor the realists seemed to have accurately synthesized the complexity of U.S. foreign policies in the era of the Republican ascendancy. In fact, my new research suggested that their approach to arms limitation and neutrality constituted a measured way to play a constructive role in European affairs without guaranteeing a status quo that could not last, given the inevitable German desire to be treated more equally and generously. I showed how the Kellogg-Briand Pact—a war-renouncing agreement that generations of historians had mocked as an international kiss—served as a starting point for Republican officials to rethink their neutrality position, should a European power embark on aggressive war. They never carried through on this modest way to meet France’s demands for security. But this seemed like a tempered and reasoned response to conditions that then existed: there was no threat to U.S. security; the French seemed predominant; the demands of Weimar leaders appeared reasonable; the need to nurture gradual change seemed prudent; the assumption that prosperity could slowly change attitudes and bring about more reasonable compromises did not appear unfounded. Of course, all of this turned out to be wrong. But could this have been foreseen in the 1920s and early 1930s?

The broad outlines of my book were now clear to me, but this article had an interesting history. Two or three journals rejected it, not because of its substance, but because of its length. I felt frustrated because I had a sense that the article was a real breakthrough, an ambitious attempt to transcend the binaries about “isolationism” and “open door expansionism” and at the same time interrogate the meaning of “realism” in historical context. A colleague told me about Perspectives in American History, the annual publication of Harvard University’s Charles Warren Center. It published long essays on a variety of topics. I submitted my essay, and it garnered an enthusiastic response from Ernest May, Harvard’s renowned diplomatic historian, who refereed the article. Although Perspectives was not widely read and my article never received a lot of attention, I still consider it one of the most important of my career. And the very fact that it did wind up in a prestigious outlet nurtured a conviction that I often repeat to my graduate students: if you have something good,
you should stick with it and not get dissuaded by a sequence of rejections. Article publication is a crapshoot, but often it takes just one enthusiastic reader to make publication a reality.

After completing this article, I turned my attention for two or three years to fashioning a real book. I remember it as a time of great anxiety, not knowing if I would beat the tenure clock and not certain about the book’s prospective reception. I knew it was not as profound as some of the great new volumes then appearing on European diplomacy by Charles Maier, Stephen Schuker, and Jon Jacobson. Nonetheless, The Elusive Quest: America’s Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933, along with other major volumes on U.S. foreign relations in the 1920s by Michael Hogan, Frank Costiglio-la, and Joan Hoff Wilson, helped reshape our understanding of the interwar years and influenced an evolving neo-revisionist trend in the interpretation of U.S. diplomatic history known as corporatism. U.S. policy toward Europe in the 1920s was not isolationist.

Rejecting the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations did not mean that the United States was abandoning Wilson’s pursuit of a stable liberal and capitalist world order. It did not mean that the United States was eschewing its responsibilities. In fact, officials spent considerable effort seeking to balance interests and commitments, reconciling divergent pressures, and working with businessmen and bankers to design ingenious, apolitical mechanisms to conduct an effective foreign policy.

But the bottom line was that U.S. foreign policy did not create the stable, open door, liberal capitalist world order that supposedly was its goal: it failed; it was an elusive quest. I was still perplexed by the essential question: if U.S. officials regarded an open door international order as vital to the nation’s health and security, why did they not do more to offset the imbalances in the international political economy and thwart the rise of totalitarian aggression? The last chapter of my book demonstrated that Roosevelt, as he assumed the presidency in 1933, cared even less than Hoover about stabilizing Europe. Al-

though Roosevelt eventually would transform American foreign policy, initially he did even less than his Republican predecessors to satisfy France’s demands—even as Adolf Hitler consolidated power in Germany and the world depression persisted.15

In an essay for the volume Economics and World Power edited by Sam Wells and William Becker, I tried again to address these perplexing issues. I dug more deeply into the perceived salience of exports to American economic well-being in the late 1920s and early 1930s. I examined statistical data more closely than ever before to assess the importance of markets abroad to the health of different sectors of the American economy. I could not ignore the conclusion of U.S. Commerce Department officials: “The significant fact is not that our foreign markets are unimportant, but rather that the domestic market predominates.”16 Hoover believed this; so did Roosevelt.

But did not U.S. military leaders realize that looming threats were emerging beyond the oceans? Were they not aware that bolder action was imperative before the international capitalist order collapsed and democratic nations were engulfed by totalitarian aggressors? I examined military records that I had not previously perused, an undertaking that would hugely shape the rest of my academic research. I started to examine threat perception. I found that army and naval officials were not alarmed by developments in the early 1930s. Even after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and subsequent Japanese military action around Shanghai in 1932, the president of the General Board of the Navy insisted that the United States had to “put its own house in order without worrying about other nations.” France and America, concluded U.S. Army intelligence in 1932, represented “the essence of capitalism and have the great common interest of saving this system from anarchy.” But it was not deemed prudent to guarantee French security, lest such guarantees “perpetuate French hegemony over the Continent.” American commitments might embroil the United States without engendering a real change in French policy.17

As I grappled with these interpretive issues concerning the gap between U.S. diplomatic objectives and U.S. commitments, I started thinking about my next book. I knew I wanted to write about the origins of the Cold War. In the late 1970s, détente was collapsing and Soviet-American relations were dramatically deteriorating. Oil prices soared, the American economy staggered, our European allies floundered, and U.S. power seemed to wane. Unrest in the Third World seethed, Islamic radicals seized power in Iran, regional strife engulfed the Horn of Africa, and the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua. As

17. Ibid., 261–64.
American economists and journalists wondered whether capitalism could survive, Soviet leaders seemed intent on exploiting Western weaknesses and gaining influence at American expense.18 A new group of neoconservatives arose. They exaggerated the Kremlin’s strength and talked aloud about fighting and waging nuclear war.19 They also launched a long campaign to emasculate “state” capacity and narrow the government’s role in the domestic political economy.20

In this context, no topic seemed more important than the history of Soviet-American relations. Big new books were appearing reinterpreting the onset of the Cold War and demonstrating American responsibility for it. If the open door interpretation did not serve as a conclusive guide to explaining American foreign relations before World War II, revisionists like Gabriel Kolko and Lloyd Gardner were showing that the Great Depression and World War II had exercised a decisive influence on the perceptions of U.S. officials about the world they needed to remake after Germany and Japan were defeated. Policymakers in Washington had learned that the United States economy could not recover from depression without markets abroad, and they were now determined to fashion a world order along liberal and capitalist lines.21

From these powerful revisionist writings I sensed that the Great Depression and World War II solidified American thinking about America’s role in the world. Policymakers now used the term “national security” to describe what they needed to do to safeguard America’s vital interests. But what did that term mean and how did vital interests become associated with the preservation of markets abroad, if my own research had demonstrated that this had not been the case before the late 1930s? I decided that I could explore these questions by taking advantage of a unique research opportunity: the government had just opened a huge collection of the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the U.S. military leaders who had helped forge the strategy that defeated the Axis powers.22 These documents transcended the wartime experience and shed light on the opening years of the Cold War. I could interrogate how the concept of national security had evolved and probe its

18. “Can Capitalism Survive?,” *Time*, 106 (14 July 1975): 52–63. This was the front page story.
22. Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. National Archives.
fundamental ingredients through the prism of military leaders and defense officials. In this manner, I thought I might make my own unique contribution to illuminating the origins of the Cold War.

The task was daunting. Although I had done a little research in military records of the 1920s and 1930s, I had no clue what awaited me. In those days military history and diplomatic history were distinct fields, and few historians of American foreign relations made extensive use of military records. I went back to the National Archives to talk to the archivists dealing with military documents. They provided me with the indexes to the JCS files. They were intimidating. I decided to start with JCS requirements for overseas bases. The number of boxes must have been in the hundreds. I knew I would never exhaust them, but I learned after a few weeks that JCS papers went through many iterations, sometimes with only the slightest revisions. They would not consume as much time as I had initially feared, but they alerted me to the difficult enterprise I had embarked upon. It would take me years to examine the many topics that I deemed most important, among which were assessments of the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union, threat perception, the role of atomic weapons, and the occupations of Germany and Japan. My research gradually expanded into archival records of the Army and Navy, the office of the secretary of defense, and many officials, including James Forrestal, the first secretary of defense.

I presented my views in “The American Conception of National Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1948.” It was the most important article of my career, and it appeared in the profession’s flagship journal, The American Historical Review. (See chapter 4.) I argued that U.S. defense officials and military leaders conceptualized the basic requirements of postwar security before World War II concluded. They wanted an extensive system of overseas bases, air transit rights, a strategic realm of influence in the Western Hemisphere, and, most of all, a balance of power in Eurasia. More than anything else, defense officials and military leaders had learned that an adversary, or coalition of adversaries, that dominated Europe and Asia could integrate the resources, industrial infrastructure, and skilled labor of those continents into a war machine that could challenge the United States, wage protracted war, and endanger its security.

More boldly, I argued that when the war ended, Soviet actions did not threaten U.S. security requirements; instead, these requirements were endangered by the social turmoil, political chaos, and economic paralysis that engulfed Europe and Asia. Postwar conditions provided opportunities for leftist and communist parties to win elections or seize power and for the Kremlin to spread its influence. At the same time, ferment in the periphery of Southeast

23. CCS 360 (12-9-43), RG 218, USNA.
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa bred revolutionary nationalist movements that challenged democratic allies in Western Europe, further weakened their economic and financial prospects, and opened opportunities for Soviet inroads. Soviet actions did not catalyze the sequence of events that led to the Cold War, and U.S. military leaders and intelligence analysts did not expect the Soviet Union to engage in premeditated military aggression. Their own very expansive definition of security requirements impelled U.S. officials to shore up weaknesses and vulnerabilities; these initiatives, a product of fear and power, aroused suspicions in Moscow. They triggered a sequence of actions and reactions, culminating in a protracted Cold War.

In a related article, I also showed how strategic thinking and military requirements shaped the diplomacy of the early postwar years. Looking closely at American relations with Turkey, I reconfigured understanding of the Truman Doctrine. (See chapter 5.) Soviet actions toward Turkey were not nearly as ominous as Washington portrayed them. U.S. interest in Turkey was sparked by American war planners. As early as 1946, they realized that if a major war with the Soviet Union erupted, British bases in the Cairo-Suez region would be critical to implementing American war plans and striking the Soviet Union. Turkey was essential to slow down any Soviet effort to overrun the entire Middle East. From bases in Turkey, the United States could attack vital oil fields and industrial infrastructure in Romania and Ukraine. U.S. officials wanted to provide military aid to Turkey to insure that Ankara would be amenable to U.S. strategic needs. Fear that Turkey might assume a neutral posture in wartime impelled U.S. officials to incorporate Greece and Turkey into NATO, after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. Military leaders and civilian officials knew these decisions would arouse legitimate security concerns inside the Kremlin. Soviet leaders regarded these actions in their vulnerable southern underbelly as potentially threatening. But fear and power shaped U.S. diplomacy, and security requirements were the animating force.

At the same time, I wrote another article examining the diplomacy of the early Cold War. (See chapter 6.) Looking closely at the Yalta and Potsdam accords, I analyzed how the ambiguities embedded in their provisions engendered bitter recriminations. In his first meeting with V. M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, President Harry S. Truman assailed the Kremlin for its failure to adhere to its Yalta promises. Molotov and Joseph Stalin rebutted these claims, insisting that British and American officials violated their own commitment to allow the Lublin communists to constitute the core of a reconstituted Polish provisional government. Soviet leaders also believed that the Americans were reneging on their Yalta promises regarding the payments of German reparations from the western zones of occupation. Domestic politics and the imperatives of Western European reconstruction drove these decisions in Washington and London as much as, or even more than, portentous
Soviet behavior. Whatever the motivations, Western claims and Western actions did not seem defensive to the men making policy in the Kremlin.

My close scrutiny of strategic planning and diplomatic developments in the years immediately following World War II reinforced the revisionist critique of the Cold War. My AHR article in particular triggered angry reactions and biting critiques from more traditional historians. In a “Forum” in The American Historical Review, John Lewis Gaddis and Bruce Kuniholm ridiculed my interpretation and mocked my efforts. My argument that military planners were pragmatic and not idealistic, Gaddis concluded, was about as innovative as “discovering sex” at the age of 42. More trenchantly, my critics claimed that my focus on defense officials obfuscated who was really making policy—not military planners—and elided the difficult budgetary battles in Washington that precluded any significant increase in defense expenditures in the early postwar years despite the preferences of Pentagon officials. Basically, my critics said that I was guilty of “archivitis—the tendency of historians to become so immersed in particular archives that they lose sight of the larger context into which all archival revelations must eventually be set.”24 In their view, the larger context and explanatory factors for why the wartime alliance disintegrated and the Cold War arose were Stalin’s barbarity and Soviet aggression.

I reacted sharply to these criticisms, but they exerted a tremendous impact on my subsequent research.25 I realized that to make my analysis about the origins of the Cold War more persuasive, I had to show that military planners alone did not possess these ideas about national security; I had to rebut claims that U.S. actions were primarily defensive, and I had to demonstrate that the absence of a major buildup in defense expenditures did not mean that policymakers were indifferent to U.S. strategic imperatives. I also had to explain why American officials subsequently pivoted quickly to seek a preponderance of U.S. military power. Most importantly, I had to think more carefully about whether U.S. policies were as provocative and countereffective as I had claimed in my AHR article, or whether they were justified by Stalin’s personality and Soviet aggressiveness, as my critics insisted.

Rather than succumb to archivitis, I opened myself to its possibilities. I spent four or five years doing additional research in the records of the Department of State and in scores of manuscript collections at the Truman Library and elsewhere. As I reexamined the dynamics of U.S. decision-making, my analysis started to disappoint my friends on the left. Initially, they had welcomed my thesis because my evidence from new sources vividly

25. For my reply, see ibid., 391–400.
demonstrated the expansionist conception of security and powerfully explained how fears about postwar ferment and anxieties about vacuums of power led to provocative U.S. actions. In other words, revisionists liked the way I outlined a classic “security dilemma”—a concept I embraced from the literature on international relations—emanating from an expansive definition of national security. In their view, and in my view, some of the new documents opening up in Soviet archives in the late 1980s and early 1990s actually reinforced the basic contours of this argument.

But revisionist scholars were disappointed that they did not see a greater emphasis on the economic and ideological wellsprings of U.S. policy. They were even more disappointed when I concluded my book with a rather balanced assessment of U.S. policies. In *A Preponderance of Power* I argued that, in view of uncertainties about Soviet intentions and the explosive conditions that existed after fifteen years of depression, war, and genocide, U.S. actions were partly wise, partly foolish, and mostly prudent. Revisionists welcomed the stress on foolishness when I highlighted the exaggerated fears of Soviet inroads into the Third World and when I portrayed how U.S. officials conflated fears about the appeal of Marxism-Leninism with the behavior and actions of Soviet officials. But revisionists resented my empathetic portrayal of the agonizing decisions U.S. officials faced and the wisdom and prudence they often displayed when confronted with a tyrannical regime led by a brutal dictator whose intentions were ultimately unknowable. William Walker, Bruce Cumings, Michael Hogan, and Michael Hunt rightly noted that I did not claim that a quest for export markets, or worries about another depression, or concerns with the world capitalist system, or ideological hubris shaped U.S. policies. To them, my focus on fear and power as central motivating factors sounded more like a return to realism than an endorsement of revisionism.


Their criticisms stung. Many of them emanated from friends with whom I had shared ideas for decades. Bill Walker had sat in the same classroom at Ohio State decades before when David Green had asked us for our draft cards. I did not think they were right when they claimed that I had jettisoned Williams’s open door interpretation and embraced John Gaddis’s postrevisionism.29 I knew that I had followed the evidence as best I could, and I recognized that I did not fit easily into any of the prevailing categories. As I reassessed where I positioned myself in the interpretive wars about the origins of the Cold War, I realized that, unknowingly, I was marrying revisionism and realism. As I rethought and reread parts of Preponderance of Power, I saw that the most important passages were those where I claimed that democratic capitalism at home was endangered by ominous trends in the configuration of power abroad. U.S. officials were not primarily seeking to promote democracy or penetrate foreign markets. They were driven by their “ideological conviction that their own political economy of freedom would be jeopardized if a totalitarian foe became too powerful,” or if the world divided into autarchic units. In 1940–41, Roosevelt warned that events abroad would lead to regimentation at home. Truman’s advisers felt similarly in 1946–48. They realized that socioeconomic ferment and political turmoil in Europe could lead to geopolitical reconfigurations with dire implications for a free political economy at home. President Truman stated it succinctly: Such developments “would require us to become a garrison state, and impose upon ourselves a system of centralized regimentation unlike anything we have ever known.”30

By the time I grasped the full implications of my own interpretive argument about the meaning of national security as a driving force behind U.S. foreign policy, the Cold War was over. It had ended, suddenly, and pundits, academics, and scholars heralded “the end of history,” the termination of ideological conflict, and the dawn of a permanent, new era of liberal peace based on free markets, democratic governance, and human rights.31 U.S. officials rejoiced over the dramatic turn in world events: “We know what works,” exclaimed President George H. W. Bush. “Freedom works. . . . We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on earth: through free markets, free elections, and the exercise of free will—unhampered by the state.”32

I believed that such triumphalist interpretations dramatically misread the end of the Cold War, obfuscated its details, and misconstrued the lessons that could be extrapolated. As I increasingly collaborated with Odd Arne Westad, my friend and co-editor of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, and as I talked with Chen Jian, my colleague at the University of Virginia, I became convinced that the Cold War was a struggle about alternative ways of life—alternative ways of organizing modern political economies. For the first part of the twentieth century, democratic capitalism had faltered—beleaguered by imperial struggles, colonial conquests, two world wars, a great depression, genocide, and forced migrations. Disillusioned peoples around the globe looked for new models: communism, fascism, and Nazism. After World War II, faced with the challenge of communism, democratic statesmen revived faith in their system, not by discarding the “state,” but by refashioning state capacity to serve the needs of their people. This was what the New Deal was all about, and Roosevelt grasped its global implications as he carved out his vision for the postwar world. He was not alone. Democratic statesmen in postwar Europe and Asia reengineered state capacity to serve the needs of their people: with different permutations in different countries, the state promised full employment, provided medical care, ameliorated housing conditions, assisted the aged, made education accessible to the young, and supported research and innovation. Free markets required state capacity. “The state,” I wrote, “complemented markets, structured markets, liberated markets, and helped allay the hardship caused by markets.” (See chapter 7.) The West won the Cold War precisely because statesmen realized that national security meant proving the superiority of a way of life; that was done not so much by diplomacy or strategy, but by making democratic capitalism and social democracy serve the needs of their people.

My own thinking about the Cold War clashed with popular discourse in the 1990s. In the neoliberal decade that followed the toppling of the Berlin Wall, Republican and Democratic officials in the United States circumscribed and eroded state capacity as they labored to shape popular memory and sustain America’s hegemonic position in the international arena. Without dangerous enemies abroad, they feared an isolationist backlash. The safety, security, and prosperity of Americans, they endlessly proclaimed, was the result of America’s calculated effort to use its military power to nurture a democratic peace. In the mid-1990s, President Bill Clinton embraced the “Regional Defense Strategy,” initially designed by Dick Cheney’s Pentagon in 1992, and went even further to champion a military posture of “full spectrum superiority.” Although Clinton thought force should be used prudently and sparingly,
he, like Bush, believed that dangers, if not yet apparent, nonetheless lurked over the horizon. (See chapter 8.)

While a sense of triumphalism pulsed through the country, I was convinced that the Cold War endgame had less to do with the defense buildup and moral clarity of Ronald Reagan than with the thinking, initiatives, and improvisation of Mikhail Gorbachev. But whoever was more responsible for the sudden and dramatic end of the Cold War, the role of individual agency could not be ignored. Baffled by developments I never had imagined would occur—the peaceful end of the Cold War—I decided to reexamine its trajectory. Why had it started? Why had it lasted so long? And why had it ended? Much of my intellectual energy had been spent thinking and writing about structures, interests, and processes; now, I was enticed to think more systematically about human agency and contingency. The outpouring of new documents from former communist countries allowed scholars to assess more carefully the perceptions and misperceptions of officials in different capitals.

I thought I could write an overall history of the Cold War by focusing on critical moments in time when key policymakers, like Eisenhower and Malenkov, Kennedy and Khrushchev, and Carter and Brezhnev glimpsed the possibility of change, but could not quite seize the opportunity to end the cycle of distrust and strife. Why had they failed, and why had Reagan, Gorbachev, and Bush succeeded? How important were structures? How important was strategy? How important were human agents? In short, having spent almost a decade wondering how American policy shaped or failed to shape the post–World War I era, and after pondering for more than a dozen years why the Cold War occurred, I now turned my attention to understanding why it persisted, how it evolved, and why its winners prevailed.

As often happens over the course of an academic career, I was then sidetracked by administrative duties. I put aside this project for four years (1997–2001) while I served as dean of the College and Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Virginia. This experience was revelatory. I learned how hard it was for administrators to set priorities. I saw how difficult it was to manage time and make bureaucracies function smoothly. I witnessed organizational rivalries and participated in nasty budget fights. I entered into personal battles in which emotion and passion often dwarfed reason and calculation. I grappled with unaccustomed responsibilities: do you evacuate buildings when there are bomb threats, even when you know the threats are not likely to be credible? In short, I learned a lot about policymaking. I thought my background as a policy historian would enhance my administrative skills; at the end of four years

I concluded that my administrative experience would make me a better policy historian. I learned empathy.

I ended my job as dean in the summer of 2001 and went to Washington as a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center to resume work on my new Cold War book. The events of September 11, 2001, altered my direction. When I went to Oxford as Harmsworth Professor the following year, I was engulfed by the emotions and passions aroused by President George W. Bush’s declaration of a global war on terrorism. Daily, I was asked to explain or justify American policy. I sometimes felt as if I were the State Department’s personal emissary to Oxford. Perplexing and provocative was the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy Statement of 2002. Its ideological hubris, emphasis on military preeminence, and justification of preemptive or preventative action incensed most friends and colleagues at Oxford. Rather than give my Harmsworth lecture on my new thinking about structure, turning points, and human agency in the Cold War, I decided to put the Bush administration’s reactions to 9/11 in historical perspective.

Most observers judged the new national security strategy to be provocative and revolutionary. I did not see such a radical transformation. To me, the focus on unilateralism, ideological fervor, military superiority, and open door trade harked back to familiar tropes in American history. Even the emphasis on anticipatory action was not as novel as most commentators thought. I had learned that in the making of national security policy, fear, power, interests, and ideals always interacted in complicated and unpredictable ways, but the overriding goal of safeguarding democratic capitalism remained constant. During times of great peril, U.S. officials mobilized and employed America’s extraordinary power. To catalyze support, they dwelled on the nobility of America’s ideals and downplayed interests. Fear and power, often thought of as being antithetical, were an explosive brew, capable of producing great good and great harm. What resulted often depended on the quality of the process and the quality of the judgment. Outcomes were contingent; human agents were critical. (See chapter 9.) The tendency of academic scholars (like myself)—historians and international relations specialists alike—to downplay the role of leaders was problematic.


Cold War. The animating questions were: why did the Cold War last as long as it did, and why did it end when it did? My research demonstrated that external structures—the configuration of power in the international arena and the dynamics of the world political economy—repeatedly generated turning points when the Cold War might have been modulated or reconfigured, as it eventually was in the late 1980s. But policymakers made choices, and those choices often were driven by perceptions of threat and opportunity. The perceptions themselves, however, were shaped by emotions, beliefs, values, and memory. The ballooning literatures on cognition, perception, beliefs, and emotions helped me think anew about causation in national security decision-making, as did the theoretical work on constructivism. But, for me, most important was the evidence itself and the thoughts, comments, and writings of friends like Frank Costigliola (who was then doing pioneering research on the role of emotions in the making of U.S. foreign policy) and those of Bob Jervis and Richard Immerman (who had long been analyzing the psychology of decision-making).38

If outcomes were contingent, could any lessons be drawn? Since the late 1970s I had been interested in using my historical investigations to extrapolate lessons.39 Ernest May and Richard Neustadt were pioneers in showing how policymakers always drew upon their own version of the lessons of the past to deal with prevailing challenges. May and Neustadt demonstrated how the extrapolations often were ill-advised, simplistic, and oblivious to historical context.40 Historians, I believed, had a key role to play both in showing how extrapolations were made and how they should have been made. If memory—personal memory and collective memory—shaped policy, historians had an obligation to clarify the past and inform “memory” based on their research.

In the aftermath of the war in Iraq (2003) and the global war on terror—when threats from nonstate actors abounded and the hopes of the Arab Spring faded, when the U.S. military buildup peaked and American dreams of a democratic peace vanished, when congressional constraints and partisan battles deadlocked budgetmaking, and when voices proclaimed that diminishing resources might expose new vulnerabilities—the Aspen Strategy Group asked


39. See, for example, Melvyn P. Leffler, “From the Truman to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 7 (Fall 1983): 245–67.

me to give a talk about the implications of budgetary austerity for the making of national security policy. Going against the grain, I argued that generous defense spending often tempted too much intervention and nurtured a sense of overweening power. The worst errors of the era following World War II—the march to the Yalu during the Korean War, the imbroglio in Indochina during the 1960s, the travail in Iraq after the attacks on 9/11—did not arise from a shortage of resources. In contrast, austerity often catalyzed imaginative thinking and systematic planning. Invited to present the essence of this talk to a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, I emphasized that policymakers and commentators should avoid drawing simplistic conclusions between the levels of defense spending and the efficacy of national security policy. In closing, I suggested that the key to American security was making democratic capitalism work at home. (See chapter 10.)

What I had learned was that national security itself was an amorphous notion shaped by external realities, domestic circumstances, and personal perceptions. It meant different things to different people at different times. It was a dynamic concept, always changing, always contentious. Since the early 1990s I had been writing essays on the utility of the concept of “national security” as a guide to explaining American foreign relations. Citing the works of scholars writing about international relations, I noted that national security involved the delineation of external threats to core values—to the “American way of life,” to democratic capitalism. Properly understood, “national security” was a capacious concept. My own thinking about it grew more refined over the decades as I read the many new books on “grand strategy” and as I pondered the implications of the new literatures on religion, human rights, development, race, and emotions. These writings helped to illuminate the many meanings of “core values.”

I grafted the new onto the old. My early embrace of open door revisionism and my ongoing conversations with friends like David Painter, Marty Sherwin, and Bob McMahon still shaped my conviction that one had to wrestle with the ideological and domestic economic roots of American foreign policy. But my quest to understand why strategic commitments were rejected after one world war, but embraced after another, made me forever cognizant about the degrees of importance assigned to foreign policy goals. Foreign policy became national security policy when officials believed (for whatever reasons) that developments abroad might endanger the preservation of core values at home—meaning private property, free enterprise, personal freedom, open markets, and the rule of law as well as the safety of American lives, national

sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Although the term “national security” was rarely used before World War II, it nevertheless had considerable explanatory power for the entire trajectory of U.S. history. (See chapter 11.)

In my evolving thinking, revisionism and realism were not alternative interpretive frames, but complementary. Structures—whether they be interest groups at home, the nature of the world political economy, or the distribution of power abroad—framed perceptions of threat or opportunity based on the memories, experiences, beliefs, values, and emotional predilections of individual officials, ethnic groups, racial minorities, and classes. In this respect, the new theoretical literature on “constructivism” helped me to understand how changing cultural norms and sensibilities shaped personal, group, and collective understandings of the core values that they wanted to preserve at home.42 Most policymakers wrestled incessantly with conflicting pressures, clashing impulses, and competing priorities. They reacted to and tried to mold the views of key constituencies as they debated the meaning of events abroad for the preservation of their own most precious values at home.

My study of American foreign policy over the decades had gravitated toward an analysis of the meaning of national security. This was not intentional. It resulted from my long struggle to wrestle with evidence, often conflicting evidence, that led me to try to synthesize the three levels of analysis that scholars of international relations often talk about: the individual, the domestic/state, and the international.43 By using the concept of national security, I was able to analyze the motives shaping U.S. policymakers, examine their perception of threat and opportunity, assess their willingness to incur commitments and responsibilities abroad, study their readiness to employ military power, and gain an appreciation of how they saw the links between external configurations of power and the preservation of democratic capitalism at home. As I embraced complexity, studied the evolving literature on grand strategy, and grappled with contingency, my empathy for the policymakers grew.

This attitude was reinforced after I joined the Miller Center at the University of Virginia in 2005. This nonpartisan institute focused on the study of the presidency and encouraged multi-disciplinary collaboration. I had the good fortune to work with Jeff Legro, a political scientist and scholar of international relations. Together, we orchestrated two conferences that focused on


strategic thinking and contemporary policymaking. We brought together former officials, leading scholars, and public intellectuals with strikingly divergent ideological predilections. Their discussions and papers, along with my ongoing interviews of former officials in the George W. Bush administration, further highlighted my appreciation of the complexity of national security decision-making. Talking to former officials about the global war on terror and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq illuminated just how hard it is to design goals, set priorities, estimate threats, reconcile values and interests, link means and ends, mobilize public opinion, and calculate outcomes.

Interviews nurtured my empathy for the agonizing decisions policymakers make, but they also reinforced my conviction that there is no substitute for the written record. Seeking to spin history as they see it, and relying on friendly journalists to assist them, officials with predilections for specific policy options seek to shape our collective memory. The only check on their efforts is access to official documents. Yet growing secrecy, poor recordkeeping, and proliferating e-mail correspondence make preservation of the historical record more difficult than ever before. Hence we scholars have a vital role to play: demanding declassification, recording history as objectively as possible, informing public discourse, and creating a credible understanding of the past that future officials can reference when they face the challenges ahead. As we do so, we must challenge ourselves as well: using theoretical approaches in neighboring fields to interrogate our own assumptions; wrestling honestly with evidence that challenges our own ideological predilections; and staying focused on explaining causation.

I hope my writings on national security and foreign policy infuse empathy and complexity, yet hold officials accountable for the decisions they make and suggest lessons that can be extrapolated. When fear, power, and hubris can lead officials astray with portentous consequences, prudence and balance remain the defining qualities of good statesmanship. Ideological zealotry, inchoate fears, global economic competition, and overweening power may tempt officials to do too much, yet they must not be indifferent to real threats and do too little. Nor can they ignore the domestic sources of national security, the ones that made “victory” possible in the long Cold War. If national security is about preserving the core values of democratic capitalism at home, as it is,


45. Some of my thoughts on these matters can be found in my presidential address to the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. See Melvyn P. Leffler, “New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations,” Diplomatic History, 19 (Spring 1995): 173–96.
officials must recognize that full employment, income fairness, educational opportunity, health insurance, and security in old age are the prerequisites for a satisfied citizenry. Credibility of the system at home over the long run is as important as the credibility of commitments abroad.

Fifty years have passed since I walked those Ithaca streets wondering how long the tragic conflict in Indochina could persist. Nowadays, protracted wars have become a way of life. I somehow feel less angry, less passionate, and perhaps wiser and a lot sadder. Wiser because I do think I understand the confluence of factors—personal, domestic, and international—that lead to such wars; sadder because I also think I understand the human dimension—the fear and hubris, the zealotry and idealism, the greed and power, the ambition and sense of responsibility—that makes it so difficult for policymakers to mitigate conflict and ameliorate the human condition.

But sadness is not despair. Personally, my life as an historian has been challenging and fulfilling. My goals—seeking truth, questing for objectivity—always engender condescending smiles from my colleagues and friends who know so well how elusive such goals are and who think that after a lifetime of effort I should know better. But these values, however self-deceiving, have brought rich rewards as I have tried to understand the past and gained an appreciation of the complexity of human affairs and international relations. They still shape what I try to do; they inspire me to tackle what I continue to believe are the fundamental questions of international relations and political economy: making war and peace, assuming commitments and deploying force, shaping the role of government in relation to the market, and protecting human dignity.