INTRODUCTION

Borders matter. Borders regulate the flow of people, the movement of commodities and capital, and the exchange of ideas. Borders separate citizens from aliens, the familiar from the foreign, and those belonging from those unwanted. And perhaps no border in recent history is more iconic in its power of partition than the line bisecting the United States and Mexico. In the century and a half since it was mapped onto desert and water, the US-Mexico border has become a powerful visual representation of the strikingly unequal relationship between the two nations it anchors. The border has estranged families from their kin, dividing the communities that straddle its boundary; it has claimed the lives of thousands who sought to cross its arid waste without legal consent. The border has served as a lightning rod for US nativists in moments of national anxiety, and its razor wire security fences grimly allude to enduring hierarchies of race and class. As one writer unforgettably observed a generation ago, the US-Mexico border is an “open wound” where “the Third World grates against the first and bleeds.”

Yet the work that borders do is not only cultural, material, and political—it is also intellectual. The thin line winding through the deserts of Alta and Baja California, and along the Rio Grande/Bravo, also demarcates to many scholars where “American” history ends and “Latin American” history begins. In the same pernicious manner that the geopolitical border divides human beings, that intellectual border has segregated a common past. It has split historians of North America into two camps, each with different theoretical traditions and vocabulary, rarely engaging with the other. This intellectual border blinds scholars on either side into thinking that aside from the manifestations of inequality that bind the two nations together—immigration, imperial interventions, free trade agreements, and television assembly plants—the national historical trajectories of the United States and Mexico are fundamentally distinct. Excepting the “borderlands” historiographical tradition—and even that school has largely confined its conclusions to the immediate US and Mexican border states—scholars continue to frame the two nations within a neat disciplinary dichotomy. Such divisions reassure us that those hoping to understand phenomena as diverse as state building, popular social movements, economic transformations, and policy making in either nation would benefit little by transcending the intellectual border’s well-policed perimeter.
H. L. Mitchell would surely have disagreed. In summer 1939, he left the United States to seek inspiration and guidance in La Laguna, a vast cotton district spanning the northern Mexican states of Coahuila and Durango. Mitchell was hardly a stranger to the white fiber that stretched across La Laguna’s horizon, or its discontents; he headed the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union (STFU), a multiracial organization of cotton tenants and sharecroppers founded in Arkansas in 1934 that counted tens of thousands of members throughout that decade. He journeyed to Mexico that summer to witness a political experiment he had long been following. Three years earlier, La Laguna gained international renown when a strike by landless cotton laborers brought populist president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) to the region in hopes of brokering a compromise. Invoking the legacy of the agrarian revolution of 1910–17, Cárdenas shocked the nation and world by expropriating hundreds of thousands of Mexico’s most productive, irrigated acres, and then deeding them to tillers of the soil. Wide-eyed STFU organizers north of the border could hardly contain their excitement. One described La Laguna as “one of the most thrilling spots in the world to anyone who wants to see a new world built on release from slavery.” Mitchell, on touring the region in 1939, eagerly agreed. Lagunera cotton pickers were once “exploited and without hope as were Arkansas sharecroppers,” but now stood ready to reap the fruits of their labor. The sojourn pushed Mitchell to wonder whether his union too “should consider a legislative program of expropriating our absentee landlords.”

If Mitchell rejected the belief that national borders mark the bounds of political possibility, so too did Ramón Fernández y Fernández. An agricultural economist whose political education coincided with the violent drama of the Mexican Revolution, Fernández devoted his professional career to the pursuit of agrarian social justice. As secretary of the Liga de Agrónomos Socialistas (League of Socialist Agronomists) and statistician for the influential agrarian census of 1930, Fernández stood at the vanguard of Mexico’s land reform campaign of that decade. Yet his marriage of social science and revolutionary politics also led him to the US countryside. Long enchanted with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and its assault on rural poverty in the United States, in 1942 Fernández volunteered to participate in a yearlong “in-service training program” with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). Of that department’s many divisions, he decided his time would be best spent working with the Farm Security Administration (FSA), arguably the New Deal’s most socially reformist agency, which particularly targeted the stark inequalities of the southern Cotton Belt. That year and the next, Fernández followed his FSA hosts around the region, studying agricultural cooperatives in Georgia and Mississippi before settling down in eastern Arkansas for an intensive study of what his US hosts deemed “credit problems more nearly related to those in his own country.” Fernández re-
turned to Mexico seduced by the FSA’s “revolutionary faith,” his “natural impulse ... to push a campaign to have our own Farm Security.”

What persuaded Fernández and Mitchell to think outside the national containers that became so naturalized and pervasive during the twentieth century? As this book demonstrates, they lived in an era of dramatic social and political convergence between the two nations, where dialogue and exchange regarding rural matters was frequent and lively. In the generation between the Great Depression and the advent of the Cold War, government and civil society in the United States and Mexico waged unprecedented campaigns to remake their countrysides in the name of agrarian justice and agricultural productivity. The following chapters reveal the rarely acknowledged entanglement of those campaigns. The book reconsiders several key historical moments—the Mexican Revolution and its crescendo under Cárdenas, the New Deal’s contradictory agrarian program, and campaigns to promote scientific agriculture in the so-called Third World—and unshackles them from the separate national frameworks to which they are frequently bound. In doing so, I hope to reveal that the rural histories of the United States and Mexico share far more than is often imagined.

_Agrarian Crossings_ advances two primary arguments, both of which take aim at artificial but widely accepted geographic dichotomies mapped onto the US-Mexico border. I will elucidate each separately in this introduction. First, I argue that the disciplinary distinction between “American” and “Latin American” history has obscured the confluence and interaction between US and Mexican state-led rural reform along with its attendant social upheaval during the radical 1930s. In 1933 in the United States and 1934 in Mexico, two state governors known for their political experimentation—Roosevelt and Cárdenas—rode a current of rural and industrial unrest into the presidency. Each promised to shatter the political stasis and economic stagnation that had mired the 1920s, pledging voters in the countryside a “New Deal” and “Six-Year Plan” to right rural wrongs. Though each began that campaign tentatively, by 1935 both diagnosed agrarian inequality as a vital problem, and poured astounding resources and political capital into its resolution.

In the years that followed, agents of the state fanned out across each nation’s landscape, seeking to transform farming, rural culture, and country people’s relationship with the land. They engineered projects to resettle vast multitudes in order to improve agricultural efficiency and defuse political dissent; they constructed massive dams to harness waterpower to an ambitious program of economic development. They planned model rural communities, serviced by new federal programs in credit, technical assistance, and education. They attempted to conserve endangered forests, water, and topsoil. And perhaps most important, they sought to reverse deep-seated patterns of uneven land tenure by subdividing latifundia—large estates, from
the Latin latus plus fundus—and deeding small plots to the landless and dispossessed. On this last point Cárdenas was ever more aggressive, pioneering the most successful land reform program ever undertaken in the Western Hemisphere, encompassing nearly fifty million acres. The New Deal’s effort to remake land tenure was comparatively timid, cautious, and largely symbolic, but it nevertheless marked a watershed in US history; it was the first time since Reconstruction’s hollow promise of “forty acres and a mule” that the federal government seriously considered land redistribution. And in each nation, the frenzy of reform and pervasive rhetoric of change could hardly be contained by the walls of government, encouraging and emboldening civil society to demand ever-greater promises from their leadership.

Yet the US and Mexican agrarian campaigns of the “long” 1930s, stretching from roughly 1933 to 1943, not only ran parallel; they frequently intersected. Indeed, this book is not a comparative history but rather a history of comparisons, a study of interactions and exchanges. As politicians, bureaucrats, agronomists, economists, tenant farmer unions, and peasant leagues waged a multifaceted war on their varying diagnoses of rural injustice, they looked across the border to learn from their counterparts’ successes and failures. New Deal policy makers seeking to dismantle the long reign of plantation agriculture within their borders drafted programs inspired by Mexico’s revolutionary land reform. Nearly every key leader of the USDA, perhaps the most aggressively reformist bureau in 1930s’ Washington, DC, visited Mexico during the Roosevelt years, captivated by its agrarian ferment. The highest rungs of Mexico’s political leadership, including Cárdenas himself, traveled to tour the works of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), hoping to replicate its formula of hydraulic agrarian transformation. And countless activists not on the federal payroll, such as H. L. Mitchell, likewise looked across the border for insight and encouragement. None of these pilgrims glibly equated the New Deal and Cardenismo, nor should we as students of history; most recognized that the latter was far more radical and revolutionary than the former. It was precisely because of this ideological imbalance that the majority of the decade’s intellectual traffic flowed from south to north.

Mexico was not the only nation from which the New Deal borrowed. The Roosevelt administration’s reform agenda was forged in the global crucible of the Great Depression, where common hardships invited common solutions. As important recent scholarship has revealed, key legislation in nearly every field of New Deal intervention both resembled and reflected examples from across the globe. The Civilian Conservation Corps surprisingly paralleled Nazi Germany’s voluntary labor service, though New Dealers were wary to eschew its militarism; the Public Works Administration’s housing program openly imitated similar efforts in Great Britain. The National Recovery Administration’s famed “blue eagle” logo, as one contemporary critic
argued, “was plainly an American adaptation of [Benito Mussolini’s] Italian corporate state in its mechanics.” But among this global bricolage of influence, Mexico stood out. As one of the few non-Western, nonindustrialized nations to impart its footprint on US policy, it deserves special attention.9

Curiously too, not every region of the United States shared equally in the agrarian dialogue with Mexico. As Mitchell and Fernández’s pilgrimages suggest, it was the US southern Cotton Belt that produced the most emissaries and greatest interest in Mexico’s rural transformation. Indeed, at its heart this book is a work of southern history, although it seeks to emancipate that region from the straitjacket of national history by charting the US South’s rarely acknowledged relationship with its own southern neighbor.10

To many readers, this may be surprising, as the plantation South is rarely included in what many scholars term the US-Mexico “borderlands,” a geographic container that traditionally encompasses northern Mexico and the southwestern United States.11 Likewise, few historians have imagined the early twentieth-century US South as globally connected in any sense, swallowing whole contemporary characterizations of the region’s “miasmatic jungles” and “cesspool[s] of Baptists” as entirely distinct from the United States and the world beyond.12 Recent studies, though, are forcing a revision of such assumptions.13 After all, on the eve of the Great Depression, the southern Cotton Belt looked far more like Mexico, Cuba, or Brazil than it did Massachusetts or Iowa. If compared to its northern US neighbors, the South’s one-party politics, racial hierarchy, plantation agriculture, concentrated land tenure, and pervasive rural poverty may have seemed an aberration. Yet should the South have looked south, such characteristics would hardly appear exceptional at all.

Therefore, is it perhaps appropriate to consider the US South as the northernmost reach of the Latin American and Caribbean world? Scholars of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries would hardly object, as studies of slavery, emancipation, and the black diaspora have long connected the plantation colony of the South with those of Cuba, Brazil, Haiti, and Mexico.14 But after the demise of Reconstruction in the late nineteenth century, those transregional perspectives disappear almost entirely from scholarship, and their absence suggests that the South withdrew from these earlier networks.15 This book challenges such an assumption, revealing that even in the wake of slavery, it was the persistence of the plantation and its social organization that linked Louisiana and Mississippi to Mexico and beyond. If US northeastern social reformers in the first third of the twentieth century adopted Western European experiments with welfare capitalism, social security, and urban planning—as Daniel Rodgers’s *Atlantic Crossings* demonstrated—the lessons of Berlin and London meant little to agrarian reformers concerned with the plantation society of the US South.16 Instead,
their gaze turned toward the Caribbean basin, where they exchanged ideas with a diverse group of Latin American actors that approached rural inequality in dramatically different ways.

Yet the border between the United States and Mexico not only separates “American” from “Latin American” history. It also marks where Global North meets Global South, or as was once popular, where the First World meets the Third World. This book’s second major argument concerns that planetary dichotomy, and how it has warped scholarly understandings of a vast campaign that would remake countless human societies during the twentieth century: development. “Development” is a word heavy with historical baggage, not unlike “civilization” in the nineteenth century. To its millions of faithful, it encapsulated a belief that human societies evolve similarly and can be charted linearly, and that assistance from “developed” societies to “developing” ones can speed the latter’s progress. Given its complete absence from global discourse at the dawn of the twentieth century and ubiquity sixty years later, one may well wonder: From where did this crusade arise?

In the prevailing scholarly account—whose faults we will consider shortly—development was a child of the 1940s. It grew up with the slow sunset of European colonialism and the geopolitical polarization of the escalating Cold War. It came of age when intellectuals and policy makers in the United States grew increasingly anxious that the Soviet Union held a distinct advantage in its appeal to the hundreds of millions of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans then emerging from colonial or neocolonial subjugation. To forestall the global advance of Communism, US strategists presented development aid as their alternative to the nascent Third World, suggesting that technical expertise from First World societies might produce economic growth far more rapidly than any five-year plan drafted in Moscow. In this telling, President Harry Truman’s 1949 “Point Four” speech announced the arrival of the development era, while social scientist Walt Rostow’s 1960 formulation of modernization theory in *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* marked its zenith.17

Of the Cold War era’s myriad development projects, none has been more widely celebrated or fiercely critiqued than the concerted effort to teach US scientific agriculture to Latin American, Asian, and African farmers in pursuit of boosting global food production. None, too, was more transformative of land and life. Concerned that material want might provide fertile ground for Communist insurgency, US policy makers and their partners in philanthropy hoped to meet a geopolitical need—containing Soviet expansion—under humanitarian cover: they would feed a hungry world. Armed with recent advances in plant breeding, pest control, and synthetic fertility, US agronomists and engineers approached the global countryside
with a swaggering confidence. At the campaign’s climax in 1968, US policy
maker William Gaud conferred on it an enduring name; in contrast to the
Soviets’ “violent Red Revolution,” theirs was a “green revolution” that lifted
all boats, a war on hunger beyond the narrow politics of left and right.
Whether Gaud’s optimism was warranted has been hotly debated, though
the persistence, if not exacerbation, of hunger into the twenty-first century
has unquestionably dulled the luster of the green revolution. What is cer-
tain is that the campaign forever remade the human and ecological fabric
of our planet. Its expansion of grain production enabled the meteoric rise
of world population, unimaginable just decades earlier. Its uprooting of
millions of “inefficient” peasant cultivators played a pivotal role in the rapid
urbanization of our planet, made strikingly clear in 2008 when city dwellers
outnumbered rural people for the first time in human history. Indeed, fu-
ture scholars may well look back at these twin transformations as the twen-
tieth century’s most important legacy, outweighing wars both hot and cold.18

Mexico has long played a leading role in the history of the green revolu-
tion, and has been ubiquitously designated as the “birthplace” of that global
campaign. It was there in 1943 that the Rockefeller Foundation, a US phil-
anthropic powerhouse, undertook an initially modest program of agricul-
tural technical assistance, in partnership with the Mexican agriculture secre-
tariat and headquartered not far outside Mexico City. On fields expropriated
in the agrarian revolution, Rockefeller scientists and their Mexican collabo-
rators sought to increase the yields of the nation’s staple food crops, pri-
marily corn and beans. Over several years, they experimented with seed col-
lection, plant breeding, disease control, and the application of fertilizers
and pesticides. Declaring a revolution in productivity by the early 1950s, the
foundation sought to make its Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) a blue-
print for replication elsewhere. In 1950, it expanded to Colombia; by 1957,
the foundation was operating in India, and then in the Philippines by 1962.
Looking back at this path of global proliferation, scholars have long studied
the MAP, seeking seeds of what would later bear fruit elsewhere in Latin
America but particularly in Asia and Africa. Unsurprisingly, many have
found in Mexico a microcosm of the mature green revolution: a campaign
driven by Cold War geopolitics, obsessively focused on hunger, dismissive
of indigenous knowledge, and neglectful of the poorest farmers. In this tell-
ing, Mexico’s green revolution was evocative of the stark divide between the
First World and Third World—an idealistic but dangerously shortsighted
Cold War development scheme hatched by the former for application in
the latter.19

This book presents a fundamentally different understanding of the green
revolution’s origins and motivation. When in 1943 the Rockefeller Founda-
tion intervened in Mexico’s countryside, its officers drew on a deep well of
prior experience in rural development within the United States. Rockefeller
philanthropy could trace its birth to the first years of the twentieth century, when the oil tycoon John D. Rockefeller and his reform-minded son diagnosed the poverty and “backwardness” of the US South as a national disgrace. Their first undertaking, the ambiguously named General Education Board (GEB), established in 1903, devoted itself explicitly to regional shortcomings. Between 1906 and 1914, the board waged a sweeping effort to transform the practice of southern agriculture, believing that the adoption of scientific cultivation techniques might unravel the bonds of debt and dependence that submerged so many millions of black and white farmers in marginal poverty. The board’s leadership targeted two crops, cotton and corn, and sought to dramatically raise their yields, confident that a revolution in productivity would grant common farmers a higher standard of living as well as greater independence from merchants and other creditors.

The Rockefellers’ southern crusade was a contradictory campaign, divided as to the root cause of inequality, and one that could claim little enduring success. But it was precisely this model that inspired foundation planners to attempt its replication in Mexico, as that nation’s problems were “similar to that which confronted the South following the war between the states,” in the words of one Rockefeller administrator in 1941. Such comparisons provided the framework and structure of the MAP, and were hardly a secret to its participants. Even the Mexican agriculture minister partnering with the foundation was well aware of the philanthropies’ prior efforts to “improve the conditions of life of the rural population of the Southern States of the American Union.”

Why, then, have the regional US roots of the green revolution been so long neglected? Just as was true for studies of 1930s’ agrarian reform, the history of agricultural transformation in Mexico has been skewed by artificial geographic dichotomies and the conventional wisdom that the green revolution was a phenomenon of the Third World, not the First World. Yet when we acknowledge that the US South served as the domestic laboratory for Mexico’s green revolution, the entire “development” project suddenly appears in a new light. It no longer seems to be the natural product of post-1945 geopolitics, but is born instead of far earlier efforts to address the enduring existence of an impoverished agrarian periphery within the core of the industrial United States. Such a prehistory reveals the similarities rather than the differences apparent in the rural transformations of the First World and Third World. And it deeply problematizes any characterization of development as a neat project of “Americanization”—for what good can such a concept serve if it does not recognize the profound importance of regional distinctions within that patchwork nation?

This book therefore probes the rarely acknowledged link between two geographic containers, the US South and Global South, that newly fashionable term that recently replaced the Cold War relic of “Third World.” In many
ways, this is hardly a novel pursuit. As early as 1953, historian C. Vann Woodward argued that with its troubled past of poverty, military defeat, and underdevelopment, the US South was not exceptional, as many northerners viewed it, but rather representative of the normative global human experience. Yet despite Woodward’s observation, few US historians have begun to explore these linkages in a global context. Southern history, which shares equally with points south as with points north, too often remains submerged within a national narrative. In Mexico, the stark borders separating it today from its northern neighbor, both physical and imagined, have also precluded an open conversation about historic commonalities and shared lives.

The following chapters explore the entangled history of agrarian politics and agricultural development in Mexico and the United States in rough chronological order. The first chapter sets the stage for the dialogues and exchanges of the 1930s and 1940s with a comparative analysis of social, political, and economic change in the US southern and Mexican countryside between the 1870s and 1920s. Where prior scholars have largely seen difference—if they have looked at all—I argue that the two shared strikingly similar historical trajectories. During the late nineteenth century, each region was violently thrust into the web of global commerce as railroads, investment capital, bankers, and merchants came to reorder the business of agriculture. While large-scale landholding was hardly unknown on either side of the border, in those decades export-oriented plantations and haciendas further tightened their grasps on the rural landscape. Paying the price were formerly independent smallholders, who were unwillingly pulled into the plantation complex as wage laborers, tenants, and sharecroppers. Simmering resentment among those dispossessed would boil over in two dramatic agrarian revolts: the Mexican Revolution and US Populist movement. Each insurgency challenged the rural status quo, but in each case the most radical visionaries were vanquished politically or militarily. Yet in defeat, the rebels forced their rivals to grudgingly adopt their demands for social and economic justice—demands that would later animate future generations, most notably during the Depression era.

The second and third chapters are complementary, with each detailing how during the “long” 1930s, US as well as Mexican rural reformers inside and outside government revived earlier campaigns to address inequality in the countryside. In doing so, they frequently looked to each other for inspiration, support, and importable strategies. The second chapter considers the south–north intellectual exchange of that decade. It demonstrates how a host of US liberal reformers within what I call the “agrarian” New Deal—those concerned with poverty, inequality, and environmental decline—eagerly observed Mexican political experimentation and sought to incorporate its
insights in their own policy making. It traces the pilgrimages undertaken by a diverse group of agrarian critics, from the chief of the USDA to socialist organizers well outside the New Deal, and how their travels to Mexico forced a rethinking of US political possibilities. In each of these exchanges, it was either US southerners or those interested in the South who paid closest attention to Mexico. The third chapter, meanwhile, reverses the intellectual flow to examine how New Deal politics shaped the agrarian program spearheaded by Cárdenas and opened possibilities for its success. On the one hand, it explores how Mexican bureaucrats drew on the rural rehabilitation projects of the Roosevelt administration. On the other, it shows that New Deal sympathies among US diplomats stationed in Mexico facilitated Cárdenas’s expropriation of millions of acres of US-owned land — land that the embassy was formally tasked to protect. Had Cardenismo not coincided with the agrarian New Deal, it would likely have had a far different outcome.

Chapters 4 and 5 turn away from US and Mexican state policy, and toward the rural development campaign that ultimately became known as the green revolution. The fourth chapter begins by considering the Rockefeller philanthropies’ first exercise in agricultural extension and education, waged between 1906 and 1914 in the US Cotton Belt. As a blueprint for future undertakings, it was decidedly ambiguous in its vision for a renewed countryside. Yet during the turbulent decade of the 1930s, US southern veterans of the first Rockefeller campaign revived its unfulfilled promises as a potential solution for Mexico’s agricultural dilemmas during the Cárdenas years. The heart of the chapter, therefore, analyzes the transregional comparisons that inspired the Rockefeller Foundation to embark on its influential MAP in 1943. Chapter 5 then narrates the pivotal first decade of that program. Surprisingly, the early years of the Rockefeller experiment in Mexico diverged sharply from the developmental model of the mature 1960s’ green revolution. Instead of focusing obsessively on hunger, it emphasized living standards and economic mobility; instead of partnering with wealthy, commercial landlords and neglecting the rural majority, the MAP of the 1940s explicitly sought to reach smallholders who had recently received land in the Cárdenas era redistribution campaigns. The chapter demonstrates that it was precisely the lessons and memories of the US South that motivated such sympathies for the rural poor. But by the early 1950s, as growing conservatism in Mexico and the escalating Cold War narrowed the spectrum of political possibility, Rockefeller planners disavowed the regionally informed experimentation of earlier years, to the great detriment of millions of farmers worldwide.

Chapter 6 explores the last great exchange of the US-Mexican agrarian dialogue: the Mexican government’s enthusiastic embrace of the TVA’s hydraulic development program after World War II. More than any other New
Deal agency, it was the TVA’s monumental effort to harness waterpower for social and environmental transformation that most deeply impacted the Mexican countryside. When in 1947 Miguel Alemán made the first Mexican presidential tour of the United States since the revolution’s outbreak in 1910, northern Alabama and eastern Tennessee were foremost on his trip agenda. His pilgrimage would engender extensive discussion among Mexican policy makers about the similarities between the southern US and their own tropical south, coming to a climax in the several river valley commissions that Alemán established in 1947 to replicate the TVA’s ambiguous success in coastal southern Mexico. Yet because of its late incidence, long after the political passions of the 1930s had cooled, this last agrarian exchange would be a far more conservative affair that tended to exacerbate rural inequality rather than erase it.

By the 1950s, the agrarian crossings of the previous generation were rapidly coming to an end. In both the United States and Mexico, an increasingly restrictive political atmosphere ensured that elites were able to subdue once-vigorous debates about rural inequality and the human impact of agricultural change. Questions of productivity and efficiency, rather than landlessness and poverty, were the watchwords of the decades that followed. The book’s epilogue addresses the shared rural transformations of the twentieth century’s latter half. Where country people had once contested their marginalization through political mobilization and alliances with state reformers, in the Cold War era they more often abandoned their small plots, seeking elusive possibilities in urban slums or as wageworkers in the agribusiness sector. As they left their farms, the plantation complex they had long struggled against achieved its nearly total hegemony, but with pesticides and machines replacing sharecroppers and campesinos. In unexpected ways, the US and Mexican countryside during the Cold War saw new convergences.

When H. L. Mitchell of the STFU returned to his union’s Memphis headquarters in 1939, after several weeks in La Laguna’s cotton belt, he was firmly convinced that poor US and Mexican farmers sought exactly the same thing: “to see the land and all its resources owned by the people who earn their living by the sweat of their brow.” Indeed, the visit reaffirmed for him that “we are all members of the same human family no matter what color we are or what language we speak.” Few historians today would disagree with such a hopeful conclusion. Yet when we segregate the past into nationally bounded containers, we risk perpetuating such distinctions. I hope that the following pages suggest an alternate path.